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A MEMOIR
LORD STANMORE



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
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SIDNEY HERBERT

LORD HERBERT OF LEA

VOL. II



Emery Walker Photo

Sidney Herbert
from the Statue by J. H. Foley, R.A.
at the War Office in Pall Mall

SIDNEY HERBERT
LORD HERBERT OF LEA
A MEMOIR

BY
LORD STANMORE



WITH PORTRAITS AND ILLUSTRATIONS

A sweeter and a lovelier Gentleman,
Trained in the prodigality of Nature,
The spacious world cannot again afford
Richard III., Act I., Scene 2.

VOL. II

LONDON
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.

1906

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SIDNEY HERBERT

LORD HERBERT OF LEA

CHAPTER I

THE DAWN OF PEACE

1855-56

THE fall of Sebastopol, on September 8th, 1855, renewed, and justly so, the hopes of those who longed for peace; for of the two reasons¹ which had led the Emperor Louis Napoleon not to give effect to his own inclination to make peace in the spring, one had ceased to exist, and the other he now felt himself strong enough to disregard.

Nor was Lord Palmerston any longer so anxious as he had been for the prosecution of the war. He was too clear-sighted not to perceive both the reluctance of the French Emperor to continue it, and the danger of carrying it on with the half-hearted assistance of an unwilling ally. He was therefore ready to make peace, provided his following in the country would allow him so to do.

On his return to England, Mr. Herbert wrote to Mr. Gladstone, on September 27th, that:

“Great events have happened since we met, and a great deed has been done. All, I think, tends to

¹ The indisposition of the French Army to make peace before Sebastopol was taken, and the indisposition of the English Government to make peace at all. See Vol. I., p. 423.

peace, though you will not agree with me there, but if it should so end, the taking of Sebastopol will give us for many years great security in India, where the prestige of force goes for so much, and where the Orientals watched this struggle as one for Asiatic supremacy between Russia and ourselves. The Russians made a fine defence, and the whole campaign reflects immense credit on the Army actually engaged, but shows far less formidable resources on the part of Russia than I had supposed them to possess. The truth is they have neither the money nor the population to maintain or justify their peace establishment, and they cannot extend or reproduce it in war without internal ruin. The Government now have but one course, namely, to follow up their success by repeated blows if they can. The mortification of defeat the Russians have encountered, and the greater their material loss the sooner will they recover the anger incidental to it, and treat for peace. You know I am not of your opinion on that head. I think the man who gets the worst of it is the one soonest tired of fighting. Last summer, the English public thought success was coming, and were unready to make peace. The Russians have no prospect of bettering themselves: on the contrary, a mere blockade on our part must reduce them to terms. With the inaction of the winter, therefore, all parties ought to cool, and there seems to me a better chance of peace than we have yet had. I fear the obstinacy of Lord Stratford has seriously imperilled Kars, and as the future must depend a good deal on the Turks themselves, however much we may help them, a mishap in that quarter will be very serious. If we should lose them their fortress, (and it will be our fault, as the French Emperor threw every obstacle in the way of Omar Pasha's going to Asia Minor in his desire to concentrate on Sebastopol, where the Turks were, and could be, of no use,) the least we can do will be to convert the Turkish Loan into a gift.

"I trust the Army will lynch *The Times* correspondent when they read his letter of yesterday. I think it the most scandalous performance I ever read. While he admits that he cannot get satisfactory evidence of any details he brings the most serious and disgraceful accusations against officers and men who under circumstances of desperate danger were risking

and laying down their lives. The *Daily News* letter is written in a juster and fairer spirit. If they were to hang Mr. Russell (alas! there are no Pictons in our Army) I believe the public here would be very well pleased, provided *The Times* found another man who could amuse them as well. There is no talk of a dissolution that I hear, which surprises me, for Palmerston is not apt to underrate his popularity, which is undoubtedly great, and the Government generally are not in love with the existing Parliament. We have had the Ellesmeres here. You are very much in their black books for your last speech."

Mr. Gladstone replied :

"HAWARDEN, October 1st, 1855.

"I am glad you have got back, and hope that your journey has fully answered its purpose.

"I am not sure that I can gather with precision from your letter what is your view of the future. You say 'the Government now have but one course, namely, to follow up their success by repeated blows if they can.' But also 'with the inaction of the winter all parties ought to cool, and there seems to me a better chance of peace than we have yet had.' I need not tell you which of these passages is most in my sense.

"In the spring we said, 'You have gained the objects for which you went to war; the difference between what you ask and what they give is admitted to be trumpery; so make peace.' But they replied, 'We are in a great military operation; the fall of Sebastopol is the object of the war; when that is gained, then talk about peace if you like.' Now Sebastopol has fallen; but *The Times* says no one must talk of peace, but this is the great step towards it, and the rest must be made in due order and *in pari materiâ*. This makes me sick. We all believe we shall have to answer at the bar of God for our share in this war as much as for any act of our private lives, and I am not able to answer for it on the principles on which it appears to be carried on. I still believe that the question of a war is a question of right and wrong, just or unjust; that a great part of strength consists in justice, and that without justice strength is a curse. Now, in my speeches

I may have mixed up all kinds of follies with these principles, and so far as I have done this I am greatly to blame; but it seems to me that my censurers in the public Press and in Parliament do not admit the principles themselves, but support the war by reasoning of much the same kind as was held conclusive twenty years ago in favour of duelling.

"I am, however, very glad to find you sanguine in your hopes of peace. I am not quite up to your mark, but yet I have hopes too, relying mainly, I am sorry to say, on France and not on England for their basis. But I confess myself to be wholly in the dark: I have no idea what it is that Ministers propose to themselves; to judge them upon the surface, one would say it was to go on fighting as long as it is popular and then to stop; but this it would be doing them injustice to believe.

"The *Times* letter is no doubt an affair of no small moment. There can, I should think, be but one opinion as to the gross misconduct of writing and publishing such an account of the English operations at such a time and with no authority: except in Printing House Square, where the gravity of the business is well seen and where it will be worked accordingly. Apart, however, from the criminality of *The Times*, the matter is serious. First, it is a disgrace in the eyes of Europe to have such a thing published; secondly, is it true? for if so, this also is serious; lastly, it read to me as if a good deal of it came rather too directly from the lips of officers themselves.

"I do not whisper even to myself the word dissolution. It would be a public evil, but a ministerial triumph—heavily bought in the end, but, at the moment, light enough. Can it be the inert peace majority in the Cabinet who prevent it? or is it prudence in Lord Lansdowne, the only one of the war section whom I take to be much burdened with it?

"We have seen Admiral Remington's death in the papers with much concern. The little I knew of him helps me to believe and understand all you say.

"I *hope* we are here until January. I am much occupied in some studies upon Horace, which I have long had at heart, and which may during this period of insulation perhaps make some progress.

"From various quarters I hear of pacific tendencies in the Derby party. I know nothing of Graham; but I am about to fire my speeches at him—of which I send you two copies by this post. Last week I had an excellent account of Lord Aberdeen. We occupied September most agreeably in touring among the Welsh mountains and bathing at the foot of Penmaenmaur. Argyll writes to me that Newcastle exposed himself very much on the great day. Do you go to Ireland and when? On that must, I suppose, depend our hope of seeing you and Mrs. Herbert."

To Mr. Gladstone's criticism as to the apparent contradictions in his letter, Sidney Herbert thus replied :

"WILTON, *October 7th*, 1855.

"Here is my meaning as expressed in the two passages quoted in your letter, and which are, I think, reconcilable. People make peace either because they think it right or because they think it prudent, or because they cannot help it. After a defeat, if they think the disaster recoverable, they think it neither right nor prudent, and if they make peace at all it is because they think the disaster is not recoverable, and they will only make their position worse by going on. The Russians have now had all the mortification of defeat. The feeling while fresh of course indisposes to peace. But the more in number are their disasters the less will be the prospect of recovering them. A certain amount of time still remains available for operations in the field—some is gone since I wrote. This should be made vigorous use of, and the worse the material position of the Russians when the campaign closes the more the chance of peace after the winter shall have given time for reflection.

"The public is very noisy, the Press still more so, and all I have seen or heard during the last fortnight makes me less hopeful. But still I hear that among thinking men there is an increasing leaning to peace, and I am glad to hear of people 'croaking' as to the prospects of peace—*i.e.* fearing that it won't be, or, in other words, hoping that it may be—who were a few months ago as sanguine that the war would continue. Wood comes here on Wednesday, and Granville

next day. I hope to pick up something from them, but Palmerston is master of his Cabinet now.

"I saw Cook in London. He is coming out with the aid of all his old *Chronicle* staff with a *Saturday Review*, a review without news, but with reviews of all the stirring subjects. He purposes to begin on the first Saturday in November. He is to write for peace, but not from the Vienna Conference basis, which he thinks used up and blown upon. I take it his intention is rather to conceal his hand and get a hearing before he comes out with his peace view. He has asked me to contribute either something on the war, or the army, or English diplomacy, or German opinions of English motives and objects, on which subjects I had some talk with him. He is very eager to get you to contribute an article on the finance of the war, something which, without entering into the question of peace or war, shall put before the public the cost and the burden in a manner which will force the question on their own minds without any suggestion directly made to them by the writer.

"I think his tactics are good. Every one who meddled with the question last year is considered out of court and will not be listened to, and he, Cook, must first gain his audience's ear and establish his character for blood-thirstiness up to the latest moment.

"I am furious with *The Times* and their correspondent's tone about the Army. I believe that on the 8th a large combined movement was happily executed. Six attacks were made (the Russians say seven), of which one was the real and main attack, the others not feints, but diversions. The one attack was successful. All the diversions failed in themselves, but succeeded as contributing to the one success. We had one, and the French four of these so-called failures. They don't foul their own nest or cry stinking fish through all Europe, but a penny-a-liner, sitting in his house, describes what he did not see, and what he says he cannot vouch for as true, and brands as cowards men who maintained themselves hopelessly for an hour and a half inside the enemy's position. But I must end."

About the middle of October Mr. Herbert went as

usual to Ireland, for the purpose of fishing, a sport in which he delighted, and to visit his Irish property. On his way he stayed a few days at Hawarden, whence he wrote to his wife that the family had been amusing themselves by acting a play, which—

“went off very well, and made us laugh very much, Susie Clinton, who is here with the new duenna, being Cinderella, and the Glynne and Phillimore children doing the rest. It was a misfortune that the slipper which did *fit* Cinderella would have held both feet of her two sisters, who, however, with great gravity declared it too small, and last of all appeared Mrs. Gladstone herself as the Prince, in a costume half bloomer, and a great sword in her hand, at which appearance I, forgetful of all decencies, went into an outrageous fit of laughter.

“Gladstone seems to me to be under an illusion as to the state of public feeling. I reproached him with *The Daily Telegraph*, but he had been likewise a victim, the paper having turned short round on finding its sale affected by its peace doctrines.”

Almost the first intelligence received by Mr. Herbert on reaching Ireland was that of the death of Sir William Molesworth, who on Lord John Russell's resignation had succeeded him at the Colonial Office. It called from him the following comment:

“ So poor Molesworth is dead. I am sorry for him, though, in spite of his amiable qualities (for he was kind-hearted and good-tempered), he created no attachment; just as, though a clever and well-informed man, one was not influenced by his opinion. . . . ”

A vacancy was thus created in the Cabinet, and it was very generally anticipated that Lord Palmerston would endeavour to effect a reconciliation with the moderate peace party. Mr. Herbert himself thought otherwise,

" I am in despair," he wrote,¹ "at the illness of the Bishop of London. God knows whom Palmerston will appoint. You seem to think he will offer it to *me*, as the enclosed will show. But, seriously, Pam is just as likely to offer the Bishoprick to me as the Colonies. I could not accept without loss of character. He could not offer without endangering the popularity of his Government, which rests on its supposed war-at-all-price leanings."

Nevertheless, a fortnight later, the offer, which he had supposed impossible, was actually made, as told in the following letter to Lord Aberdeen.

"WILTON HOUSE, SALISBURY, *November 13th, 1855.*

"You will have seen in the papers last week a paragraph stating that I, among others, had refused the Colonial Office upon grounds connected with the war. The statement had no truth in it except as a prophecy, for on Sunday last I got a note from Palmerston asking me to Broadlands on Monday, as he wished to have ten minutes' conversation with me. As I foresaw the subject and the result, I did not fancy spending an evening alone with Palmerston and Lady Palmerston after a refusal, and as a post might be of value to him I went over by train on Sunday afternoon, spent two hours there, and returned.

"When we met, I gave him the last reason for coming a day earlier than he asked me, wishing thereby to give him an indication of my indisposition to accept, and put him on his guard against making statements and disclosures, which, unless they succeeded in their object, he might wish to keep for himself.

"He was not by any means disposed to be retentive. He began by saying that so far as the manner of carrying on the war we should not disagree; at least he judged by the line I had taken when in the Cabinet, and paid me compliments as to the measures taken at my suggestion for the efficiency of the Army. I answered that so long as we were of necessity at war he could not make war too vigorously to please me, and if I were disposed to find fault, it was not the

¹ To Mrs. Herbert, from Mount Merrion, October 28th, 1855.

vigour, but the plan of campaign since the capture of Sebastopol, which I should be disposed to object to: but for that I knew the Government was not answerable. He said they had greatly suffered from the incapacity of the generals, and assented to some observations I made on the attack on Kinburn. He then went to peace, and talked, as I thought, very wildly, and as if he had never given his mind to the consideration of what would constitute a just, and therefore good, peace for England. He seemed to have no thought except for what you could ask and how much you could get. He talked as though there was but one rule,—namely, that whatever is worst for Russia is best for England. He said Austria had proposed and pressed upon them ‘neutralisation.’ This we discussed at some length. The insecurity of a country with a seaboard and no fleet [*was suggested by me*], to which he answered that the *mare clausum* secured the seaboard. But in case of war might not the Dardanelles be forced, or the Turks connive at a passage? or, lastly, if the Turks were at war, the whole Russian seaboard would be at the mercy of their fleet. He said Turkey making war on Russia was so unlikely as not to be worth considering, and said generally that if the terms were bad for Russia she had brought it on herself. I asked about the Crimea, and he talked about giving it to the Turks; and then went on to conquer Georgia and make it an independent kingdom.

“We had some argument, which I need not repeat, about the Turco-Crimean plan. He talked about the plan for the next campaign of having two *corps d’armée*, one under Sir Colin Campbell and one under Eyre, the whole under Codrington, and operating in Georgia. He said the French were very cordial, far more warlike than they were; though the French never felt towards the war as we do here. I spoke of the danger of the war changing its character altogether, and gradually assuming a propagandist character, which, I added, will never suit France. He said the war would not take that character, but if it did, the French would like a war in which the map was to be altered far better than one whose results were so indirect as that in which we are now engaged. I told him that his Government was very strong at this

moment; that this strength was derived from the belief that he, Palmerston, was for a war to the knife; that his popularity depended on that opinion; that insensibly it must bias his judgment, and he would be carried on step by step beyond what was required by, and contrary, therefore, to, the interests and honour of this country; that his taking me into the Government would either create suspicion as to the sincerity of his warlike professions, which he would probably meet by still stronger declarations, or destroy my character by assuming that, though I had professed opinions in favour of peace, I had swallowed those opinions, and joined a War Government for the sake of office; and I added that I had myself reasoned in the same way on the subject of Lord Stanley's offer. It appeared to me by his tone in answering that he agreed to all this.

"I told him that, so far as my own course was concerned, I had made up my mind as to the line I should take. That I thought the limitation proposal of April last a bad one, and that we had an escape in the Russians rejecting it. That the feeling of the country had been that terms were immaterial while we left unfinished a great military enterprise like the siege of Sebastopol, that failure then would have had a very disastrous effect in Asia, and that the prestige of success was necessary for our Indian Empire, and that I did not deny that there was soundness in this view; but that, granting that, we had no business to go to Vienna at all, and that our rupture of the Conferences for fear we should get peace on our own terms was a breach of faith. That that opportunity for peace was gone—that it was impossible to say when another would recur, (he said that Russia had made no sign). That, till it did recur, we had nothing left but to fight on as vigorously as we can. That I should support him in so doing. That when the opportunity does recur, he has advantages over any one else for making peace, as his views are unsuspected, and a peace would be taken from him which would be scouted if offered by any one else. That I would support his peace with all the means I possess, provided he made it, and would not look too closely at his terms; but if the opportunity were lost through his proposing terms which

in my opinion rendered peace impossible, my support would be at an end. He said that was quite fair. I spoke to him then about the tone of his own speeches as being offensive to Russia, and contrasted the conduct and language of the French, and said that whenever peace came the French would reap the benefit of it, and that already the Russians marked the distinction, and say that the French make war like gentlemen, and we like fish-wives, and they look on France as their friend among the allies. He defended himself on this score, and said he had never said things 'like Johnny.'

"This, of course, is a mere outline, as our conversation lasted an hour and a quarter. We parted very good friends.

"Charles Wood, who is here, says that his language about the Crimea, Georgia, etc., etc., means nothing; that he has no defined ideas on the subject, and that he never holds such language to the Cabinet; that it is mere talk and bluster, such as he constantly uses, but never acts upon. To some extent this is true, for Palmerston has a good deal of Irish braggadocio about him. His colleagues evidently want to strengthen themselves against him, but he must win—for, if in a majority in the Cabinet, they could not carry on the Government for peace, he resigning and opposing it."

Lord Aberdeen, in a long reply, gave his approval to the course Mr. Herbert proposed to adopt as being perfectly just and fair in principle. In the course of the comments which followed upon the possible contingencies of the future he expressed the opinion that—

"should our Press prove triumphant, and Russia, according to their own phrase, be 'finally crushed,' I think it would be the greatest possible misfortune for Europe; for I believe that England and France, closely united, would then commit more injustice in one year than might be expected from Russia in twenty,"—a remark perhaps worthy of record.

MR. HERBERT TO MR. GLADSTONE.

"WILTON, *November 16th*, 1855.

"MY DEAR GLADSTONE,

"I wrote to Lord Aberdeen a detailed though very hurried report of my conversation with Palmerston, when he offered and I refused the vacant Colonies. As you will probably see it I do not re-write it, but only give you my general impressions. I have often been struck by Palmerston's clumsiness in managing discussions of this kind, and certainly his talk on this occasion was not of a nature to attract a man holding opinions which I had publicly expressed. He left on my mind the impression that he had never devoted any serious thought to the question, 'What kind of peace is it the interest of England to get or to give?' He seems to have laid down no principles on the subject, but merely thinks the more you can get the better. The more you ask the more you are likely to get, and whatever is worst for Russia must be best for England. He said Austria is very friendly—she proposes and prefers neutralisation. He talked in a loose sort of way, as if throwing out ideas as they came, of giving the Crimea to Turkey and making Georgia independent. I told him I thought the latter an English and not an European object, and, therefore, not so likely to be done, as being less desirable, and that his Crimean proposal was against the interest of any nation concerned, including Turkey. His colleagues say he has held no such language to them. I had the opportunity of telling him some truths as to his own language and speeches, and tried to put them so as to impress him with the ultimate danger to his own power of any extreme courses.

"He said Russia had made no proposals to negotiate, nor conveyed any through any third party. I laid down my own course for the future as to support, specifying the bounds beyond which it cannot go—which he declared to be perfectly fair. I have very little hope of him, but I am confident that if we intend to influence public opinion in favour of peace we must place ourselves in a better position than that which we occupied at the end of the Session, when

we put ourselves nearly out of court. All this, however, must be talked over, and is too delicate for paper.

"The colleagues who want help against the chief are at their wits' end for a new man."

MR. GLADSTONE TO MR. HERBERT.

"HAWARDEN, *November 20th*, 1855.

"I am afraid the Cabinet will be the worse for not having you; but I hope you will not be the worse for having declined to join it. I conclude, from your proceeding to London, that you went so far as to *entertain* the proposition; if you had accepted, I should have had much comfort in reflecting that it implied a better hope of peace than I fear is now before us.

"For your interesting letter confirms my worst apprehensions as to Palmerston and the Government. It matters little that in the counting of votes the men of peace outnumber the men of war, (and they have received, too, an accession in the person of Labouchere). Mere willingness, or even a vague desire to have peace, will not extricate this country from its position. It must be sought with ardour; or (unless help come from France, which is a separate and our best hope) it will not come. It does not tumble into people's mouths; and the path towards it is beset with obstacles, which require a serious will and purpose to surmount them. In this state of things Palmerston, who represents for this subject (and this for the Government is the only subject) the whole motive power of the Government, has no clear sense of what duty or policy require of him, and cannot tell what are in his mind the objects of the war.

"To the carrying on a war without defined objects, or to the supporting of a man willing to carry on a war without defined objects, I have the greatest repugnance.

"From the will and intention of the Cabinet as a whole I look for nothing good; and every day confirms me in the fear I have had from its first formation as to the moral and practical preponderance of the elements most favourable to war. From the Emperor

of the French I still hope something. The commercial and financial state of France and her prospects for the future, and the connection between these subjects and his own position, must have weight with him; and I shall spend the time until the meeting of Parliament in hoping that he may drag Palmerston and Clarendon into peace, notwithstanding 'public opinion.'

"I see it stated in *The Press*, which is now admirably written, in its articles on the war, that the Emperor *has* moved in this direction—I also see with pleasure the mere rumour that Drouyn is to come back. Either or both of these may indicate something good.

"For *us*, there may be a sharp time coming. We cannot well remain much longer between wind and water. The first thing to be hoped is, that we shall follow our consciences and keep right; the second that we shall all in keeping right also keep together; and if there be a third, no doubt it is that we may have the comfort of being intelligible, and visibly and immediately useful.

"There is a most able and interesting paper in *The Saturday Review*, No. 2, on our diplomacy. Many things in it would lead me to think it yours; but what it says of the nation having been right and the Government wrong shows that, if it be yours, you wrote in an abstract character and with reference to the public. This article has also, consciously I suppose, the strangest possible vein of latent sarcasm when it sets up the doctrine that England is not responsible as a whole to Europe, but has a dualistic existence, and may speak, when it pleases, through Ahrimanes or Oromasdes without breach of faith or liability to reproach.

"Were I a Russian diplomatist I should say, Give me, ye gods, such a security as that one arm, and I will throw aside all vulgar resources of trick and falsehood as comparatively worthless.

"There is a clearness, point, and precision in the analysis of the Vienna proceedings which this article contains (though it leaves more to be said) which makes me wish I had it by heart.

"I have begged Lord Aberdeen to let you know *directly* on what day he will be here, as I thought it

possible there might not otherwise be sufficient notice.

"I have a letter from Graham; very gloomy, very short. I do not quite like the handwriting—it gives me the idea of his not being strong.

"So Russia has made no proposals. Alas for her if she had—as P.'s conversation too clearly shows."

MR. HERBERT TO MR. GLADSTONE.

"MY DEAR GLADSTONE,

"Here are two or three hurried lines on the same number of subjects.

"You guessed right as to the authorship of the article in *The Saturday Review*, though I may say parenthetically that I maintain the anonymity to every one else. It was partly adapted to the tone and tactics of the paper. It would be difficult, however, in a letter to define where the abstract view commences or ends. As you know, I was not satisfied as to our move in the summer, nor did I agree with you as to the policy of fighting for a gone chance when our identification with it would, I thought, destroy our authority hereafter for the practical struggle."

MR. GLADSTONE TO MR. HERBERT.

"HAWARDEN, *November 27th*, 1855.

"When we meet I shall be glad to know from you precisely what is the point either we, or I, went in the summer, and short of which you think we ought to have stopped; I mean as to the general question, not as to the Turkish loan, with respect to which I remember what you said. Then it may be worth considering, at which you glanced in your last letter, whether anything can be done to rectify misapprehension, if it exists. There is no doubt that we are confounded a great deal too much with a party, whose position—whether it be worse or better being quite another question—is wholly distinct from ours."

MR. GLADSTONE TO MR. HERBERT.

"HAWARDEN, *November 30th*, 1855.

"The peace article in *The Times* rejoiced my heart; all the more from the abuse of me, because this

pleasant sauce to a dish, which it was evidently thought might be unpalatable, helped to show design and inspiration from Downing Street.

"But how is it possible to make neutralisation tolerably fair to Russia? If it is as unfair as on the face of the thing it would seem, I shall accept the peace with a bad opinion of her sincerity and with fears for the future. But we, or at least I, am the very last person who if it becomes a reality ought to pick holes in it by references either backwards or forwards.

"Your letter adds greatly to my pleasure. A word on *The Saturday Review*. It seems to be written with great ability; but is it in the nature of things feasible that a weekly collection of rather long leading articles and short literary papers should be made to live?

"I daresay you did not write the article on me; but whoever did, he has done me a service. There is great truth and force in the critical part of his remarks. The worst of it is with *me*, that similar errors might recur; for like absorption in the work of a department might again (not I hope as to a war, but as to other great questions) disable me from giving them due—*i.e.* calm and disengaged consideration.

"I put my question as to *The Saturday Review* with some fear lest the weight of it, commercially speaking, should rest on you. You have, I know, laboured, and I fear bled, in the past, and this, which hardly any other man would have done, without ever making use of it to advance in the slightest degree your own personal interests and position. I trust there may be limits to your self-sacrifice in this respect."

Before the end of the year it had become tolerably clear both that Russia desired peace, and that, for his own reasons, it was equally desired by Louis Napoleon. Lord Palmerston would have wished to continue the war, at all events until such time as some striking and decisive military success had been obtained by the Allies which might efface the memory of their winter sufferings, and of the repulse sustained in their last attack on Sebastopol, a repulse all the

more galling because the French forces had succeeded in accomplishing that part of the assault which they had undertaken. Probably a large majority of the English nation shared the wishes of the Prime Minister, but it was not the view of the more sober-minded and thoughtful portion of the public, and it need hardly be said that it was not the view of Sidney Herbert, or of the friends with whom he acted.

"We are all alike, I suppose, on tenterhooks," wrote Mr. Gladstone on January 7th, "about peace and war. I had thought Russia was about to accept neutralisation with an intention to break it. It now looks as if she were about to pursue a more honourable course. I am bound to say I know of no state of things which would induce me, were I Russia, to agree to it, except that, I fear, impossible one, of hermetically sealing the Bosphorus for time of war as well as peace. I see nothing else which would not leave it my duty to say to the Allies: 'You have a right to take my territory if you can, or at any rate I might acquiesce in it; but you have no right to require me to hold territory and to forego the means and the right to defend it.'

"Look at the other alternative. Ought we not to expect that if L. N. continues the war out of deference to us, he must save himself by changing its character; and we *en revanche* must acquiesce in that change? I fear that the present position, unless it turn to peace, will become worse than any we have yet had. Hard terms are one thing, terms involving that deepest of all disgraces, the forfeiture of duty to the territory you hold, are quite another. Neutralisation, I think, as compared with Limitation, is far more dishonouring! far more dangerous if observed; just as effectually liable to complete evasion."

Mr. Herbert's views had been very fully expressed a little earlier in the following letter to Lord Malmesbury:

"WILTON, December 8th, 1855.

"MY DEAR FITZ,

"A thousand thanks for your letter. I have no doubt you are right as to the facts of the case of

the French line-of-battle ships passing the Castles; indeed, you are sure to be so, having been cognisant of them, which I was not. I alluded to it only as, if true (which you show it is not), being one of the many evidences of the disposition of France to make political capital in the East by establishing French influence, and possibly acquiring rights if not territory. What with the campaigns of Napoleon in Egypt, the capitulations of Francis I., and even old St. Louis and Tunis, the French have a traditional field for ambition in the East. But they have not the same *interests* in the East that Russia has, and we have, therefore, far less to apprehend in that quarter from her than from Russia.

“Every country situated as Russia is will encroach on its neighbours *if not prevented*. Her relations with Circassia, Georgia, Persia, are the same as ours with Rangoon, Scinde, the Sikhs, and Oude. The stronger and more civilised necessarily absorb the weaker and more barbarous, but Russia, as compared with us, has this to her advantage, that one of those provinces, though barbarous and Asiatic in religion and habits, is partly European in geography, and we in Europe will not allow the process of absorption to go on. The public here are right in thinking of Russian aggression, but wrong in attributing it to a wonderful foresight, skill, and design. The Russians are just as great fools as other people, but they encroach as we encroach in India, Africa, and everywhere—because we can't help it. We, however, have an interest in preventing her, and by a combination of circumstances we have the power. We have rightly and justly availed ourselves of it, and we may flatter ourselves that we have, for a generation at least, put a check upon it; more than that we can't say.

“Now, as you say, we must not form our opinion from an incorrect view of facts. So I must correct one opinion of yours—namely, that I hold that a Russian is better for us than a French alliance, and that it arises from my having a natural bias in favour of Russia. Now, I have no bias in favour of Russia, but on the contrary, arising from the natural bias of my mind, am in favour of a liberal policy. I don't mean I am in favour of intervention to set up Brummagem constitutions, such as Palmerston and Lord John

Russell talk about, but are too wise to act upon; but I mean that the Russian system and politics are the opposite of ours, and do by their intervention arrest the progress of good government in Europe. Russia is not in these days a possible ally for us, in the sense in which you use the word when talking of a French alliance.

"I, from my Russian connection, have heard and known more of their interior and exterior policy than the generality of people here. I recollect your grandfather's letters well, and I believe the Duke and Aberdeen were right in 1827-8 (I am not sure of the date), when they would have resisted the march on Adrianople, but Palmerston and the Whigs, who were then full of Phil-Hellenism, and were intriguing with the Princess Lieven to turn the Duke out, succeeded in preventing any move in that direction; Palmerston, I think, called it Austro-Turco barbarism.

"Had I held their views I could not have been a member of Lord Aberdeen's Government, nor advocated in the Cabinet the cementing in every way the French alliance and striking the blow at Russia. I felt that it must come sooner or later, and that no such opportunity would probably ever again recur.

"France is the obvious ally of England for many reasons. I do not know that I can select a better one from among them than that she is the only country who, if on bad terms, can injure us. There is no other nation we need fear. But there are other and less selfish reasons, which I need not enumerate to you.

"My only fear is lest the too long continuance of a state of things bringing us into daily communication and requiring necessarily great forbearance and much give-and-take, should end in jealousy or coolness. I think it of paramount importance to England, with a view to the future, to end the war before any one of the Allies is tired of it, and before France begins to ask whether she is making sacrifices of her own honour at our instance. I want to secure all that we have got and all we have gained, and to lose none of the ulterior advantages if possible.

"Now, with this full explanation, I do not think there is much difference between us. I feel some

remorse at the length of the letter, but console myself by reflecting that you brought it on your own head."

On December 19th Sir Charles Wood inquired of Mr. Herbert whether he thought there was "any chance of Russia's agreeing to Austria's terms? They are substantially *hers*, for any alterations we have suggested do not alter them materially, and in some cases relax rather than tighten the strings. One can hardly suppose that Austria can have taken this step without some notion of what Russia would do, and yet I can hardly bring myself to think that Russia will accept the terms." Mr. Herbert replied:

"WILTON, *December 24th*, 1855.

"It is impossible to give a guess what Russia will do. Austria has a great interest in our extracting high terms from Russia, though her weakness and exposure prevent her aiding us to obtain them, and if you recollect, her proposals at Vienna in May last were more severe than those we had originally offered, and increased in point of severity the original French terms from which they were taken. The fact is, though the Austrians have considerable political sympathy with Russia, all her material interests are different, and there lies underneath, the hatred which jealousy, propinquity, and fear all create. I do not, therefore, think the Austrian terms are Russian terms, or that Austria has ascertained before forwarding them that Russia would accept them.

"It seems to me that the neutralisation of the Black Sea is a worse thing for Russia to swallow than the cession of part of Bessarabia. It is better to cede a portion of territory than to tie yourself up not to defend the remainder. I do not see how any reciprocity can be established, or at least any real equality. Russia can have no fleet in the Black Sea—no more shall any other Power—but every maritime Power may and will have fleets within a few hours' sail of it, except Russia. The French have Toulon; we have Malta; the Turks, the Bosphorus. The Russians have nothing in the Mediterranean. There may be

sixty sail of the line ready at any moment to come in. In peace, of course, there could be no question of their entering, but it is for war and not for peace that we are making conditions. How are the other maritime Powers to be prevented from going in if at war with Russia or in connivance with Turkey? There is no precedent in the law of nations or their practice. How would it be easy to restrain, say, France, for example, if at war with Russia, from yielding to the temptation the undefended coasts of Russia would offer? The penalty might be war with us, but I doubt very much whether we should go to war with France in defence of the Treaty, which would virtually be in defence of Russia.

"You are quite right to ask anything if you mean to concede something, which in all negotiations, if honestly conducted, both parties should be ready to do. But, unfortunately, the previous publication of the terms constitutes them an ultimatum, and unless our French ally helps us out of the difficulty by some middle term, I do not see much chance of a solution."

In writing to Mr. Gladstone, he said :

"January 9th, 1856.

"MY DEAR GLADSTONE,

"In *re* peace.

"I do not understand the machinery by which the neutralisation is to be made effective in war as well as peace. I suppose there must be a solemn European compact and guarantee by which the Black Sea must be removed from the map. Unless this can be done effectually it will be no settlement at all—because the want of security to Russia will force her to evade the Treaty, and the evasion will either be repressed or it will not. If it be, there will be another war; if it be not, there will have been no settlement as the result of the present war. All therefore depends upon the degree of security which we can give to Russia for the maintenance of our proposed arrangement. If this can be done and she accepts it, I shall be content. I am anxious therefore to know how they propose to effect it before I give any opinion upon it. The Austrians must have had some definite ideas as to the mode of carrying their project into execution when they made the proposal.

"The French, judging by *The Morning Post*, are threatening Prussia if she don't take part. I am not sorry that they hold this language, for it ought to open people's eyes to the prospect for the future and the danger of a rupture with France.

"Malmesbury has been here. He talks of hot attack about Kars, and moving for Lord Stratford's correspondence with Williams and Clarendon's with everybody concerned. He thinks peace impossible—under-rates our military campaign, and thinks we have not done enough to force Russia to concede the original objects for which we went to war. I think his view is a merely partisan one. He seems to entertain a sincere antipathy to Lord Stratford, with whom he quarrelled when at the Foreign Office."

MR. GLADSTONE TO MR. HERBERT.

"HAWARDEN, *January 11th*, 1856.

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"With respect to neutralisation, my fear is that there is no machinery at all for giving to the coasts of Russia that security during war which seems necessary to compensate for a compulsory defencelessness. I fear the determination here, on the part of those who really determine, is to look resolutely at one-half the case, and refuse as resolutely to look at the other at all. That is, to urge that the aggressive projects of Russia will be crippled by the want of a fleet, and to decline to entertain at all the question of her defensive rights. If this is done, Russia will either refuse, and then my hope is in L. N. alone, or she will accept with the firm intention to break the engagement on the first opportunity.

"The last accounts are more favourable, it seems, and let us hope in God there will be peace. But if there is not, my view of duty I feel will turn very much upon the question whether the break is upon a matter only of *more or less*, or whether it is upon some demand of ours essentially untenable as striking at the permanent security of Russia. To make war for *such* an aim as that is a horrible and hopeless affair, and I should lean to going any length compatible with prudence and honour in opposing it. But if it be only a matter of *amount* of concession, and does not vitally

touch character or safety, a different order of considerations comes into play.

"As far as I see from your letter, we are entirely of one mind. I also quite agree in your view of the anti-Prussian bluster. *The Post*, by-the-bye, appears to have become the best paper for news.

"So you take Stanley to Manchester. Disraeli, I see, has been the sandwich between you and us.

"Malmesbury has told me that prestige was everything, and that he could not help wishing for a little more war to set ours right. He seemed to me no witch.

"One other word about neutralisation. It is hardly possible to give enough without giving too much. If you *could* hermetically close the Bosphorus for war as well as peace, Europe would be finding for Russia an immunity from attack (not even except Turkey's) upon that part of her coasts. I am always driven back upon the opinion that though all proposals may be bad, the Russian one was for us all the least bad."

Lord Aberdeen, though not less anxious for peace, equally with his friends doubted the wisdom of the terms imposed on Russia with regard to her naval force in the Black Sea. He predicted that she would take the first opportunity of disregarding the obligations of the Treaty, and that we should be obliged to acquiesce in her doing so—a prediction verified when, fourteen years later, Russia, at the instigation of Prince Bismarck, coolly announced her intention of no longer observing the limitations imposed by the Treaty of Peace.

LORD ABERDEEN TO MR. HERBERT.

"ARGYLL HOUSE, *January 21st*, 1856.

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"I am going to Windsor to-morrow, and am to remain there until Friday. This will prevent me from seeing you at the time you propose; but I shall be delighted to do so whenever you please after my return, as I very much desire to have some conversation with you on the present prospects of peace.

"No doubt a great step has been made, but it is very uncertain if any sincere desire to arrive at peace exists here. It is difficult to imagine that any such condition as that contained in the fifth Austrian proposition could ever have been made with the hope of its being accepted. I suppose no negotiation ever commenced under such auspices before; for, strictly speaking, it would authorise us to make any demands whatever, and, of course, it would equally entitle Russia to reject any we make.

"The plan of neutralisation is simply absurd. It has nothing to recommend it but the name. It sounds well, but is really impracticable. People forget that the Bosphorus is as much a part of the Black Sea as Sebastopol itself. If the Turkish fleet is to be stationed there, and liable to be indefinitely increased, bad as they are, they must be masters of the sea. I presume, however, that it is not intended to interfere with Russia at Nicolaieff, or in the rivers. She may therefore build as much as she pleases, but cannot venture into the sea. Can such a state of things last long? No doubt if we could really shut up the Bosphorus, and render the Black Sea as inaccessible as the North American lakes, Turkey and Russia might come to an agreement respecting the force to be maintained in it by each. Russia and Persia might do this in the Caspian. But when the Black Sea is open to the navies of all the world, and would only be closed by a treaty not worth more than the parchment upon which it is written, nothing can be more irrational than to talk of an exclusively commercial sea.

"The cession of territory in Bessarabia is humiliating to Russia, without adding materially to the security of Turkey. The freedom of the Danube may be quite as well established by other means.

"The state of the Christian population in Turkey opens a chapter of endless difficulty. No treaty will ever secure real privileges to the Christians, and at the same time preserve the independence of Turkish despotism.

"Although these terms of peace are clumsy and impracticable, I do not think it would be wise to object to them on these grounds, and still less in consequence of their being unnecessarily humiliating

to Russia. But there is one solid ground of objection arising out of the insecurity of any peace founded upon such terms. The terms will be evaded, or the peace will not last. You may call it honourable—glorious if you please—but it will not be secure.”

MR. HERBERT TO MR. GLADSTONE.

“*January 21st, 1856.*”

“MY DEAR GLADSTONE,

“I have been turning over neutralisation in every possible aspect, and I do not see how a secure peace is to be made on such a basis.

“My expectation was that Russia would argue: ‘This arrangement will be good for peace, but not for war. No one will have a fleet in the Black Sea, and if we have it not there we can only have it at Cronstadt. But you, France and England, have stations in the Mediterranean, and Turkey in the Bosphorus—you three Powers may always have three fleets within a day’s sail of the Black Sea—we shall therefore always be at the mercy of your good faith.’

“But she has yielded—*i.e.* Esterhazy has satisfied Nesselrode that the neutralisation can be guaranteed in such a manner as virtually to convert the Black Sea into land, that in war as in peace, without reference to the circumstances of the war, the other maritime Powers, as well as Russia, are to be precluded from entering the Black Sea with armed ships.

“Then we give over Turkey and Persia to Russia. Merchant ships can carry her munitions and her troops. No defence will be required for them, because every Power will have been precluded by treaty from attacking them.

“Neutralisation, if effective, binds us to defend Russia in the Black Sea from all comers, and ties us up not to attack her even if at war with her. We have forced Russia to submission now by operations in the Black Sea. In any future quarrel this means will be lost to us. If I am right, we should do much better without any treaty save a general one of amity and goodwill.

“How does this strike you? I would give anything to get the old Vienna terms instead.

“P.S.—I met a Minister of State after I saw you.

My fears were founded on a misapprehension. The neutralisation only applies to peace, and to Turkey and Russia only. In war all is at an end.

"I have just time to scrawl this."

MR. GLADSTONE TO MR. HERBERT.

"4, CARLTON HOUSE TERRACE,

"January 26th, 1856.

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"I, too, have seen a great man, a Minister of State, and he does not agree with your great man at all. I put to him the question—if America quarrels with Russia and wants to get at her through the Bosphorus, will you be bound to keep her out? The answer was, 'I suppose we should.'

"But I do not think the case comes or can come right, whichever's great man is correct. It is only removing one horn of the dilemma to be impaled upon the other. If Russia is to be liable at any moment to be assailed and have her coasts ravaged by any Power who may declare war against her, and can force or wheedle Turkey, then she has what may be called a natural right to prepare the means of self-defence when she sees such a danger coming, and it will require no great wit by means of this right to devise means for evading the treaty without giving an available case for forcible repression.

"My great man, I must say, was very reasonable, and admitted the objections, not seeming to agree with the world in attaching so much value to neutralisation.

"In consequence of what you said to me yesterday morning, I at first taxed my memory, and then sent to Hayward for the note, for I was not without the fear that I had committed the *bêtise* of the tailors of Tooley Street, with the additional aggravation that I am one instead of three. The opinions I expressed were that we were in danger of having to continue the war for neutralisation; that it was not worth it; that England would take any reasonable peace that France approved, and that L. N. would be perfectly safe in acting on this principle. All this, I think, was rational, and the substance of it I might have said in Parliament or upon any fair public occasion; but I think I was wrong, because impertinent, in adding that the Emperor

of the French ought to know this, which Hayward would have been justified in interpreting as a message, which, however, he did not, as he assures me. So his discretion has saved me.

"I mean to write to Newcastle, but need not name you, which, indeed, I did not understand you to authorise.

"The French, I imagine, are slippery about Bomarsund, for it seems they agreed to make it a *sine qua non*, but did not tell Russia anything about it. The point is not yet settled."

MR. HERBERT TO MR. GLADSTONE.

"January 28th.

"MY DEAR GLADSTONE,

"I begin to think that our great men have never come to a clear understanding among themselves as to what they mean by neutralisation. If so, what chance is there of six separate, divergent, disputatious nations hitting on a common meaning? However, we shall soon have some indication of what is really meant. I suppose the bench below us will be very inquisitive and suspicious, and Mr. Otway will represent the honour of the nation.

"If Layard wrote the article in *The Quarterly* (which, however, I have not read) there will be trouble about Kars, and there ought to be, for it was a disgraceful neglect. The fact is, Palmerston has a great turn for a warlike policy, but no genius whatever for war.

"I see *The Times* is beginning to attack the French ministers, which the French nation will, of course, resent. That the French press should attack the English for its war-at-all-price tone I am not surprised at."

When at length negotiations for peace were opened at Paris it was felt that a pacific result was certain, but they were long protracted, and pending their course another matter occupied the first place in Mr. Herbert's thoughts and occupied much of his time.

Before the fall of Lord Aberdeen's Government it had been determined to send a Commission to the

Crimea to inquire into the alleged defects in the Quartermaster-General's Department and the Commissariat of the Army. This decision was given effect to in the very first days of Lord Palmerston's Government, and while the Peelite Ministers were still members of it. Two very able men, Sir John McNeill and Colonel Tulloch, were despatched to the Crimea to conduct this inquiry, and in due time they reported the result of their investigations.

Their Report absolved the military authorities on the spot from responsibility for the want of a road between Balaclava and the camp. "The demand for the services of the troops in the trenches and for other military duties was such," they said, "that they could not be spared" for road-making.

To this want of a road the failure of supplies to reach the camp was admittedly in a great measure due, but in the opinion of the Commissioners it was also partly attributable to short-comings on the part of the Commissary-General, Mr. Filder. Certain "animadversions" were also passed upon the administrative qualities shown by four officers, especially Major-General Sir Richard Airey, the Quartermaster-General.

General Airey naturally and rightly asked that the accuracy of the statements and insinuations of the Commissioners should be inquired into, and in this request he was joined by the other officers who had been the subject of the Commissioners' strictures.

Such an inquiry it was justly determined by the Government to grant, nor do I think the equity of such a step was questioned by Sidney Herbert. But he was extremely anxious that the proposed investigation should not appear to imply any reflection on Sir J. MacNeill and Colonel Tulloch. He objected to what he called a Commission on a Commission.

Instead of an investigation into the accuracy of the Commissioners' Report, Mr. Herbert wished to substitute a Court of Inquiry into the conduct of the officers named by them, and he engaged actively in correspondence to effect this end.

On February 21st he wrote to Sir C. Wood, pointing out that the proposed inquiry was—

“a military judicial proceeding, and it ought, if you hope to satisfy the public, to be invested with all its distinctive forms and characteristics.

“The Cintra Inquiry was conducted by what in the King's warrant was called a Board, but it was called by every one else (the Duke of W. among others) a ‘Court of Inquiry.’ The word would sound more judicial and more military too. You want to impress the public with the conviction that you are not going to shield officers who may be delinquents because, when ignorant of the delinquency, you bestowed honours and rewards upon them. You want to impress the accused officers with the conviction that you are not going to sacrifice them to clamour if the charges against them are unfounded.

“You cannot for these purposes make the investigation too judicial or too solemn.”

A few days later Sidney Herbert addressed Lord Palmerston himself:

TO LORD PALMERSTON.

“1, GRAFTON STREET,

“February 25th, 1856.

“MY DEAR LORD PALMERSTON,

“I have had so much connection with the administration of the Army that you will not think it impertinent in me to make one or two observations on the proposed Court of Inquiry before whom Sir Richard Airey and other officers are to be brought. I understand the position of the case to be this. Sir John McNeill and Colonel Tulloch have, in accordance with their instructions, taken evidence, and reported on certain facts, have investigated causes and, as far as possible, suggested remedies. They were not

instructed to examine or ascertain what had been the conduct of this or that officer, and with the exception of a single sentence they impute blame to no man, but the evidence which they recite implies blame, and leads to inferences which the public have been at no trouble to escape from, and accusations which the Commissioners properly abstained from making are freely made by the public against officers in high employment. The Report of the Commissioners is a document of too much importance, from its own character as well as the character of the Commissioners themselves, to be put in the waste-paper basket. The inferences to which it leads are too obvious to be passed over, the Report would necessarily become the basis of further proceedings. A Court of Inquiry is to be summoned before whom these officers are to appear. This Court is, I apprehend, in the nature of a grand jury whose business it is to decide whether there is a case for trial by court-martial or not, and if not to give an opinion on the conduct of the accused officers, which may have been unexceptionable or which may have been blamable through incapacity, though not of a nature to be made the subject of charges before a court-martial.

"Now, whether for acquittal or condemnation, the Court must be so composed and the proceedings so conducted as to inspire confidence in the public both as regards its competency and its impartiality. A court of general officers is a tribunal to which in a case like this, where the authorities at the Horse Guards and the War Department are in a certain sense parties, a good deal of public suspicion will necessarily attach. The best check upon it is publicity. I do not know whether the Court which sat after the convention of Cintra was open or not. Lord Castle-reagh wished it to be open; if he was overruled it must have been on the ground that the case turned upon the nature of the future operations to be affected in the campaign and the means at our disposal for their execution, which of course it was important to keep secret. No such reasons apply in this case. Without publicity all the proceedings will be suspected. The fear is that the trial of the officers whose conduct is impugned will degenerate into a trial of the Commissioners whose conduct no one impugns.

"One of these is a civilian; the other an officer better known for civil than for military service. That there will be in the minds of the court of general officers a prejudice against them is scarcely to be doubted. Even if it does not exist it will be believed to exist, and it is the more important to constitute the Court not only in the fairest way but in the way which shall the most convince the public of its fairness.

"For this purpose it must not be composed of men too much wedded to past systems, nor of men directly or indirectly under the influence of the Horse Guards, or at any rate there must be a due admixture of men who are independent of them. Lastly, they must be men still in the vigour of their intellect. Lord Seaton is, I believe, a wonderful man of his age, but still he is above 80. Looking at the opinions expressed on this subject but a few days ago in the debate on Baron Penefather, is it wise to place Lord Seaton on the Board? Again, ought there not to be some officer representing the Ordnance Corps? and some officer who has had practical knowledge of the peculiar difficulties which our Army had to encounter in the late campaign? Sir Howard Douglas and Sir de Lacy Evans appear to me to fulfil these conditions. Sir Howard has in an independent spirit objected to the policy of the invasion of the Crimea. So far he has expressed opinions not in accordance with those of the Horse Guards or of the Government, and has shown an independence of judgment which would inspire confidence in his impartiality, while the accused officers would derive benefit from his appreciation of the difficulties which he thought to be so great as to render the expedition inadvisable. Sir de Lacy Evans was present in the Crimea long enough to know what were the difficulties to which an army was about to be exposed, but not there during the period when the errors are supposed to have been committed by which the sufferings of the Army are said to have been aggravated.

"A verdict of acquittal, if they obtain one, is everything to these officers, if the Court be well constituted—but it will be of no value to them whatever if the Court that gives it does not carry with it the confidence of the public.

"I have come to the conclusion that for this purpose, after well considering the balance of inconvenience both ways, an open Court is necessary. And that in naming the Court no man of extreme age should sit upon it, and that two men so prominent as Sir Howard Douglas and General Evans cannot be excluded without leading to so much suspicion as to the ground of their exclusion that the verdict of the Court will carry no weight with it. If this be the result, the position of the accused officers will be no better than it is now, and that of the Government will be worse."

This letter was supplemented by another on the 28th :

"I trouble you again," he wrote, "on the subject of the Court of Inquiry.

"The danger was that it should be, or if it is not, that it should look like, a Commission to try the Commissioners instead of a Court to try the officers. Sir J. Pakington adopts this view, and makes it a ground of accusation in his motion. At this moment, unfortunately, out comes the Warrant, the wording of which is a complete confirmation of Sir J. Pakington's accusation.

"It is called in the heading a 'Board' 'to inquire into the statements contained in the report of Sir J. McNeill and Colonel Tulloch, and the evidence on which that report is founded.' This appears to me to admit the whole of Pakington's case.

"There is no mention of the officers whose conduct is to be investigated, nor any reference to further measures if their conduct should deserve punishment ; while the two Crimean Commissioners are mentioned—the nature of their report is inaccurately described—and the inaccurate description is so coupled with the recital of their instructions as to imply an accusation against them.

"It will require a very strong statement in Parliament, if not a new Warrant, to get over the impression made by this document as it stands."

Mr. Gladstone concurred with Sir James Graham

in adopting Mr. Herbert's views. Nevertheless, it may be questioned, notwithstanding this weight of agreement, whether they were right in desiring to see Sir Howard Douglas and Sir de Lacy Evans members of the Board. The former was nearly as old as Lord Seaton; the latter could not be regarded as an impartial judge. His personal animosity towards some of the officers concerned was well known, and on some of the points in dispute he had already expressed his opinion in the House of Commons. In protesting against secrecy, and demanding a public and open inquiry, they were, however, clearly right, and the course ultimately chosen by the Government was probably determined by the firm stand thus taken. The decision of the Board was in every case favourable to the officers assailed, and it is impossible, I think, now coolly to read over the evidence given without arriving at the conclusion that, with possibly some exception in the case of Mr. Filder, the decision was well justified by it. This was the last of the Enquiries, and they may be said to have resulted in this, that the short-comings of the hospital service were almost wholly due to local want of energy and sense, and that the short-comings of the transport and commissariat were due partly to hesitation on the part of the Home Government in supplying forage, and partly to want of energy on the part of Mr. Filder. Another generation recognised that the most violently attacked of all the officers assailed, Sir Richard Airey, had fully deserved the entire confidence and support which he had received from Lord Raglan, and had been largely instrumental in preventing the trials of that memorable winter from being converted into disasters. He was raised to the peerage with general approval in 1877.

Sidney Herbert's attention was, however, at this

time drawn away from public affairs by more engrossing cares. His whole time was now absorbed in attendance on his mother, whose increasing illness excited just alarm. From the beginning of February, 1856, it was clear that her end was approaching, and on March 27th she died.

Catherine Woronzow, Countess of Pembroke and Montgomery, was no ordinary woman. To the possession of the more feminine attributes of wit, humour, and practical good sense, she added a man's breadth of view and strength of will. But the masculine vigour of her mind did not in the least impair her exquisite tenderness of heart, or diminish the wealth of her affection and unselfishness. She was idolised, and justly idolised, by all her children, who found in her not only the most loving of mothers, but the most shrewd and practical of advisers. And this adoration was as fully bestowed by her sons-in-law, step-daughter, and daughter-in-law as by her own children.

Though born a Russian, and a resident in St. Petersburg in her earlier years, she had lived so long in England—having accompanied her father to this country some years before her marriage—as to have become virtually an Englishwoman. But she never forgot her Russian origin, and the last years of her life were saddened by the war which had broken out between the country of her birth and that of her adoption. Before her death, however, she had the satisfaction of knowing that the restoration of peace between them, though not proclaimed, had as a fact been accomplished.

Sidney Herbert, who had been devoted to her during her life and unremitting in his attention to her during her long illness, sent to her brother, Prince

Woronzow, the following pathetic account of her illness and death :

" 49, BELGRAVE STREET,
" *March 28th, 1856.*

" MY DEAR MINGA,

" You will have known before this by the telegraphic despatch that God has taken to His blessed rest my dear mother ; but it was impossible in such a despatch to express all the consolation, all the gratitude we feel to God for her happy and painless death. For many days past she had been slowly sinking, though her natural strength of constitution often rallied to a degree which at the beginning of her illness deceived us with hopes of her recovery. During all the autumn and winter there had been a marked change in her health. She came to us at Wilton the day before Christmas Day with a constant and harassing cough. Though she got rid of it before she left Wilton at the end of January, yet she left the house but a few times while she was with us, and then only to church or to drive out with my wife; who watched her like a daughter, and was rewarded with a mother's love. She complained of shortness of breath in walking about, and she frequently spoke of herself as failing. The day she went away, as she was leaning on me, she stopped in the cloister and looked round, saying, ' Ah ! I never shall see this dear old place again ! ' A week after she was in London the difficulty of breathing much augmented, but she still dined every day with us all downstairs. But from that time the symptoms of her malady were rapidly aggravated, and the physicians found the heart so weak as to be scarcely able to perform its functions, and she suffered very much from that distress, which is worse to bear than pain, arising from great difficulty of breathing and the frequent recurrence of faintness. Blisters on the heart and side, for which she was always asking, gave her great relief, though the formation of water could not be arrested by them. All this time she showed the most accurate knowledge of her own state, and put questions to the doctors with a coolness which showed that it was neither possible nor necessary to conceal her danger from her. She had so long contemplated death, and was so

fully prepared to meet it, so strengthened by that peace and comfort which God grants to prayers like hers, that death had lost all its terrors for her. Even this highest result of all earthly excellence to her humble mind was for a moment the source of misgiving. She said to me that she had always put her whole faith and trust in God—that ‘Darden’ had taught her that from a child—but that she had so loved Him that she doubted whether she had feared Him as she ought. ‘My heart has been so full of love that there has been no room for fear. Even now, at this awful moment, I cannot feel fear. Is not this wrong?’ After this Charles Harris and the Bishop of Salisbury at different times both prayed and conversed with her, and this one doubt seems to have left her. Indeed, hers was that ‘perfect love which casteth out fear.’

“For a time she seemed much better. The symptoms of her disease abated: her breathing became more free, the pulse stronger, and during the whole time of her illness she never had a headache, which, suffering as she had done from them formerly, she said she counted among her daily blessings. But even when her malady caused, as at first, so much suffering, she was not only patient and collected, but she gave the most minute directions as to everything which she wished done after her death with a calmness as though she were going on an ordinary journey, and between each access of suffering she was as cheerful as when in health. I cannot in writing convey the playfulness of manner as well as the tenderness with which she treated us all. Latterly, all the distressing symptoms disappeared. As the water subsided to the feet, her breathing and the action of the heart seemed to be restored. She said she was perfectly happy. She constantly thanked those around her in the most touching way for their little services to her, and spoke of the happiness of being nursed by all her children. Only one face was wanting in that room to complete the happiness with which she left the world. She had your picture (the one painted at Berlin) brought into her room and placed opposite her bed. She gazed on it with the greatest affection, and once or twice, when lying back in bed, she clasped her hands, suddenly crying, ‘Oh! my Minga, my Minga!’

"Three days ago it became evident that her strength was failing so fast that her end must be near. Almost daily she asked the question, 'Will it be to-day?' From the first she had insisted on the doctors telling her the whole truth. When told it might last some time, she said, 'One can never be so prepared but that a few days may make one more ready; but it is bad news for me too, for I had hoped I should not suffer long.' And, thank God! though her life was protracted, she did not suffer more, for she said to the last she had no pain.

"She took leave of her grandchildren the day before her death—one of those partings was affecting beyond any. Little Fanny Vesey was lying ill in the room below, unable to move. Of all her grandchildren, she was the one whom she loved with the most passionate fondness. She had never seen her grandmother since her illness, and she begged to be carried up to see her. She was carried up and laid, while my mother was sleeping, on a couch by the bedside. When she awoke, in the darkened room, she did not see her till the candle was turned upon the child's face, who lay, pale as marble, with her large eyes full of tears gazing on my dear mother's face. But the moment she saw her, her countenance lit up with an expression of the most intense love and delight, and she lay looking at her and calling her by the most endearing names till they lifted little Fan's face up to her to kiss, and she was carried out again. The same day she told me she wished to be laid next to my father under the church at Wilton. By this time she had great difficulty in speaking clearly, though her mind remained present, and she listened with the greatest comfort to the prayers offered up at her bedside. She rallied a little towards evening, and had much sleep at night, but through the day her breathing, though undisturbed, became slower and slower, and at last, at a quarter before five, she expired, without a struggle or a sigh, so peacefully that we, standing and kneeling round her bed, were unable to tell the moment when her spirit passed away. Never was there a more peaceful and blessed end to a pure and holy life.

"My poor sisters are terribly broken by this great sorrow. They were indefatigable around her, and

their constant and watchful care gave her inexpressible happiness. But we none of us yet know the void which her loss creates. But we have the best of all consolations in the thought of the blessed life to which she is now called.

"Dear Minga, our hearts all turn to you, and we pray God to strengthen and comfort you in the loss of your dear sister. Give our love to Lise and Simon. Clanwilliam is also writing to you. God bless you.

"Your affectionate nephew,
"SIDNEY HERBERT."

In a letter to Mr. Gladstone, written a few days later, the restoration of peace and Lady Pembroke's funeral are closely joined.

"The guns last night brought sad memories to us. I trust the nation may show wisdom and moderation. . . . We had a day of tempest and rain yesterday, but a vast number of people reverently followed my mother's coffin to the grave. There was much feeling shown."

The Treaty of Paris was a disappointment to those who wished the war to be prolonged until Russia had been not only defeated, but humiliated and crushed, and objects attained which had not been contemplated when the war began. Those who so wished were perhaps at the time the majority in the country, for they comprehended all those who ignorantly and lightly adopt a popular cry appealing to the vanity and self-sufficiency of the nation. But the number of those who saw the advantages of peace was large enough to sustain the Government which had made the Treaty.

When, on May 8th, an Address of Congratulation to the Queen was moved in the House of Commons, Sidney Herbert warmly defended the peace, the terms of which he considered "fully commensurate with the success of our arms," though he avowed his distrust of the scheme of "neutralisation," and

pointed out with prophetic accuracy the futility of the Porte's concessions to its Christian subjects. He eulogised Lord Raglan, clearly explained and defended the attitude of Austria, and, above all, praised the conduct of the negotiations by Lord Clarendon, of whom he said:

"What was lost in the conduct of the military campaign has been more than regained by the skill of Lord Clarendon in the negotiations at Paris. I sat with Lord Clarendon in the Cabinet of Lord Aberdeen. I have seen how he bore a weight of responsibility which few men could have sustained. I have witnessed the vigilance, the untiring patience, and the skill with which he at one and the same time managed a variety of important transactions. . . . The skill and ability displayed by Lord Clarendon have enabled us to secure terms which without the advantage of his services we could not have hoped to obtain. The despatches written by Lord Clarendon upon military subjects, which have been much criticised, merely transmitted the opinions and decisions of others. The despatches by him upon the terms of peace are his own."

This speech elicited warm thanks from Lord Clarendon, who a few days later wrote that he was—

"much pleased at the manner in which the Treaty has been received, considering the war spirit and the party spirit and all the different spirits that I thought would be at work to tear it to pieces; but I believe that people were beginning to count the cost of the war, and after they had read, marked, and inwardly digested the conditions, they doubted whether another campaign would have given them better guarantees for the future.

"Nothing, however, has gratified me more than your most friendly and generous speech, which I value so much because I know you are incapable of saying anything you don't think. I wanted to tell you all I felt about it, but you had left London on the day when I sent over to ask if you were at home.

"Yours gratefully,
"CLARENDON."

CHAPTER II

AFTER THE WAR

1856-57

DURING the time Mr. Herbert was absent from the House of Commons an unpleasant quarrel with the United States had arisen, which at one time threatened to assume a serious character.

After the passing of the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1854, and during Mr. Herbert's short tenure of the Colonial Office, instructions were given to the British authorities in North America to open a depot at Halifax for those inclined to take service under its provisions; but the establishment of any agency for enlistment beyond the limits of the British provinces was neither directed nor desired.

In their anxiety to secure recruits, however, the Governor of Nova Scotia, Sir Gaspard le Marchant, and Mr. Crampton, the English Minister at Washington, unquestionably infringed the municipal law of the United States. This was pointed out to the British Cabinet, and a request made by the Government of the United States for the recall of Mr. Crampton. This request being refused and Mr. Crampton's conduct upheld, the Government of the United States took the matter into its own hands and dismissed him from Washington. If, in accordance with the practice usual in such cases, the United States Minister in London had been also recalled by his own Govern-

ment, or had his passports been sent him by that of Great Britain in consequence of the dismissal of the British Envoy, a state of relations would have ensued in which the danger of war, resulting from various questions then pending between the United States and Great Britain, would have been very greatly increased.

The efforts of all friends of peace were therefore directed to the retention in England of Mr. Dallas, the United States Minister. In this they fortunately succeeded. Sidney Herbert, in common with his Peelite friends, thought the action of the English officials in America unwarrantable, and that the Government had acted injudiciously in giving them support. But they had no desire to dwell severely on an error which was at all events a generous one, and as such easily pardoned. Their attention was exclusively given to the maintenance of the friendly relations existing between the United States and the mother country. How seriously the question was regarded by them may be judged from the following pages :

MR. HERBERT TO SIR JAMES GRAHAM.

"WILTON, *May 16th*, 1856.

"MY DEAR GRAHAM,

"I have read carefully through the American recruiting Papers. It is clear that there has been great carelessness and confusion on one side and unfriendliness on the other. Crampton seems to have been constantly professing and believing that he was not infringing the U.S. municipal law, and scarcely moving a step without doing it.

"On the other hand, the American remonstrance seems to have been an after-thought; but whether the motives were good or bad, there is no doubt they have a case.

"In war you must run risks, and clearly our Foreign Enlistment Bill, though a necessary and good measure, was full of risk.

"I look upon Baillie's motion to be the natural following up of the original opposition to the Bill. They said the measure would embroil us with foreign countries, and they wish now to vindicate their former opposition by fixing upon our measure the evil results which they had prophesied.

"It appears to me impossible to abet such a proceeding. To an Opposition the course is open, and they have a right to thrust at a weak place in the armour of the Government."

Sir James Graham replied that he too had the enjoyment during the holidays of reading the Blue Book on recruiting in the United States, and that the conclusion at which he reluctantly arrived was unfavourable to the British authorities concerned.

In the course of this letter (the body of which will be found in Mr. Parker's forthcoming Life of Sir James Graham) Sir James said :

"I was very reluctant to consent to the enlistment of foreign troops. It was a mistake into which we were hurried by the urgent necessities of the moment ; but the enlistment in America was the most unwise portion of the error ; and much of what has happened ought to have been foreseen. These foreign troops which we have enlisted are now an incumbrance ; they have not done one stroke of work, except at Malta, where the British garrison has been almost compelled to fire on them ; and although we cannot condemn acts for which we are in part responsible, yet in defending them I am resolved not to be hustled into complicity with this American quarrel, of which we stand entirely clear ; the answer to your dispatch to Sir Gaspard Le Marchant not having arrived when we quitted office.

He added : "My desire is not to overthrow Palmerston, but to keep him in the right course, and to prevent his dangerous tendencies. But if he be determined to swagger and to attempt a course of bullying with the United States, I am not disposed to take a hand in this fatal game. I am rather prepared to resist him in that case to the utmost ; and, in my opinion,

his early overthrow would be a much less evil than the imminent danger of an American war. I wish you would come up to London for a day, that we might have a meeting at Lord Aberdeen's, when we could talk these matters over with great advantage."

Mr. Herbert did not altogether relish the condemnation of a measure largely his own work, and replied from Devizes, May 22nd :

"I agree with you that we are worsted in the argument with the U.S. Government, and that the apology was not a full one. The manner in which the U.S. Government press the case is unfriendly and unhandsome, but they have right on their side, and we must end by knocking under.

"I do not agree that the Foreign Enlistment measure was a bad one. The peace came so soon that the forces raised under it have done no work, but that applies equally to our British augmentations, to our gunboats, floating batteries, etc., yet their existence contributed to the pacification."

The state of his health precluded Mr. Herbert from taking part in the discussions which ensued. He was imperatively ordered to Carlsbad, and left England early in June, but not before he had on the 4th of that month delivered a remarkable speech on Military Education, which will be more fully noticed in a subsequent chapter where that subject is dealt with. During his stay at Carlsbad he received reports from Mr. Gladstone of the steps taken by his friends to ensure the maintenance of peace.

MR. GLADSTONE TO MR. HERBERT.

"June 7th, 1856.

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"Yesterday Palmerston's answer was taken to be a retraction of the one given on Thursday ; but between anticipation and rumour all the men seem to look upon Crampton as dismissed. *The Times*

writes to-day, if possible, more shamefully than ever; and men who have not read the Papers hold the same high language. Still, they are gradually filtering through people's minds, and to-day *The Herald*, without any change towards the Americans, holds that our Government are in the wrong.

"We met yesterday morning at Lord Aberdeen's. Newcastle did not come. Lord Aberdeen's first suggestion was, 'If Crampton is gone, try to prevent Dallas going.' But the question has become infinitely complicated by the state of things in Central America, where we now depend on the discretion of naval captains on both sides to decide whether there shall be bloodshed, and after bloodshed in this state of feeling it may be hard indeed to avert war. We determined that I should tell Heathcote, for him to communicate [to Lord Derby] that we thought: (1) That there should be no motion unless with the assurance of very extensive support. (2) Peace should be the great and permanent end of it, but the proceedings of Government, as per Blue Book, cannot be justified. (3) Any motion should be made by an independent member of high standing (such as F. Baring), and if one in opposition, then it would be well to get, if possible, a man not in opposition, (such as, *e.g.*, Lord H. Vane), to second.

"From what Heathcote says, Lord Derby is sensible of the great gravity of the question, but by no means keen to take it up in a party sense.

"We do not know when the debate will come. Your letter¹ will, of course, be a prominent subject. I imagine the two points to put are: (1) That it is written subject to Newcastle's public pledge; (2) that it contemplates no system of British agency within the U.S.

"I write late and in haste."

MR. GLADSTONE TO MR. HERBERT.

"HOUSE OF COMMONS, *June 16th*, 1856.

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"Since I wrote to you the American question has passed through one or two phases. The U.S.

¹ To Sir Gaspard Le Marchant.

Government made a most adroit move in entrusting to Dallas power to settle the Central American questions at the moment when they dismissed Crampton, but a maladroit one in their attempt to draw a broad distinction between Crampton's responsibility and that of the British Government at home; because the Blue Book shows beyond all doubt that Crampton and Matthew's highest acts, though at variance, perhaps, with official instructions, indeed, I think clearly so, yet were completely covered by subsequent approvals and by the clause as to recruiting which Clarendon has advanced in the correspondence. It is hard to say what will be the effect of the new indistinctness thus introduced into the case.

"Last week we had made up our minds at Lord Aberdeen's that Dallas should be retained, but that this of itself would not set the case right, and we suggested to Baillie, on his application and request, the words as expressive of our views, which he adopted bodily of his own accord or on the advice of others. These were printed on Friday night. To-day P. has announced, in answer to Lord J. R., that the Queen has not been advised to remove Dallas—that pacific instructions have been given to the captains of ships—and that our great strength enables us to practise moderation. Disraeli said in reply, but with evident timidity, that he hoped that the House of Commons would not consent to make Crampton and the Consuls the scapegoats in this case. We are puzzled at the moment to see what this will work out into; on the whole it looks most like blowing over; but I am inclined to doubt how far the distinction between Crampton and the Government can be taken, or rather, to think it cannot, and to regard the proceeding of the U.S. Government as a very dirty one, while one must be thankful that affairs have taken a turn in favour of peace."

MR. HERBERT TO MR. GLADSTONE.

"CARLSBAD, *June 20th*, 1856.

"MY DEAR GLADSTONE,

"Your letter of the 16th was very welcome, for it holds out better prospects for the future. I shall look with great anxiety to the debate on Baillie's

motion, which looks as if it might be carried. Certainly, as you say, the investing Dallas with large powers of settlement on the Central American question was a good stroke of the U.S. Government, and I do not think their attempting to draw the distinction between Crampton and his Government was maladroit, though it might be illogical, for it helped to compass the object—namely, to deprive as far as possible the act of expulsion of its character of an insult to England. They will have succeeded in the object of getting credit with the Yankee democracy for insulting England, and yet escape the consequences by softening the blow as much as possible to England. They have right on their side, though they have used their right unhandsomely and for a dirty purpose.

“But the position of our Government is a very bad one. If Clarendon’s despatches were sincere and he believes his own arguments as to Crampton’s innocence, Dallas ought to go. If Crampton be innocent, we are grossly insulted, and Palmerston, the fire-eater, is compelled to pocket the affront. I am very glad they do not send Dallas away, because it is clear to me that Clarendon’s statements are untenable, and ourselves thoroughly in the wrong; but then we ought to have withdrawn Crampton, and not let him be turned out. In point of fact, we have never apologised. To say to a man who complains that you have trod on his toe, ‘I beg a thousand pardons; it was entirely an accident, *and I never did it*,’ is not only no apology, but an aggravation to the proprietor of the injured corn. We shall look small to foreign nations in this transaction. It is the natural fruit of Palmerston’s bullying tone and indifference to what claims or positions he maintains, provided only he maintains them. If there were a decent Opposition, one capable of taking the Government, the proper course would be a change. No Government should take a reversal of a peace and war policy from the House of Commons. To fight such a question to the last moment and then give in is most discreditable to the Government, and, what is worse, to the nation whom the Government represents.

“I see *The Daily News* (which represents Panmure, I am told) is very angry with me and my military education plans. I augur ill from this, and fear that

if he does anything in my sense he will cripple and spoil it, or at least spit in the soup to make it his own. I have several letters from men who take an interest in these matters, approving. I hope Panmure will manage his reductions carefully. At the end of the great war, under the pressure of old Hume and Co., it was most extravagantly done. Discharging men before their service is out entitles them to pensions, and we paid men *6d.* a day for life to save paying them *1s.* a day for four or five years.

"By stopping recruiting and *granting* discharges to those wishing to leave you may reduce all that is necessary, and next year the period of the first ten years' service men under the Act of 1847 will have expired.

"Woronzow, whom I saw at Dresden, says that the French are very popular in Russia; we very much the reverse, and he thinks it will take years to efface the feeling against us. He attributes it to the Baltic campaign, and the attacks on undefended places and destruction of private property. Remember me to Graham. I hope he is better; he looked very ill when I left."

MR. GLADSTONE TO MR. HERBERT.

"LONDON, *July 12th*, 1856.

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"I ought long ago to have acknowledged your welcome letter of June 20th, in which you summed up with so much acuteness and justice the bearings of the American case as to recruiting.

"When you left us we were all uneasy at your going off, with reference to the American debate then in view. But we afterwards found from the hopelessly impracticable condition of affairs that you were fortunate in being absent with a just cause. We had a most embarrassing business to manage; but we stuck together, which seems to be more than any three of Derby's men now do. The British case turned out in debate quite as bad as we thought it. One man defended and lauded the conduct of the Government: it was J. G. Phillimore! *Exceptio probat regulam*. But Palmerston, having consulted Hayter's infallible watch, was in the greatest force and good humour, and his

speech was a brilliant Parliamentary success. He not only made the House of Commons drunk, but made them drunk on ginger beer. I had a conversation with him the next night at the Palace and found him overflowing.

"I had myself a good deal of difficulty about the vote: but I felt this vanished entirely, when it appeared how entirely Moore¹ was without the support of even a shadow of a party. I had previously, however, made up my mind to speak and act in full concert with Graham."

Sidney Herbert benefited considerably by his stay at Carlsbad, and much enjoyed the opportunity afforded him of prolonged intercourse with his uncle Prince Woronzow, whom he now saw for the last time. On his return to England he was greeted by the following letter from Sir James Graham:

SIR JAMES GRAHAM TO MR. HERBERT.

"NETHERBY, *August 10th*, 1856.

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"I see by the newspapers that you have returned to England, and restored, as I hope, to health by your visit to the waters. You lost nothing by being absent at the close of the session: I never remember a more barren and more annoying sitting. No two people can agree about anything, except in the firm determination to follow their own wayward fancies, without the least regard to consequences; and the result is, that an incompetent administration is all-powerful, and rules triumphant amidst the ruins of party. I fear that the peace of Europe is hollow; and that our relations with Russia are by no means re-established on a firm or friendly footing. Turkey in the East, and Spain in the West, may wrap us in a flame at any moment; and when the bellows is in the hands of Palmerston, I know not where the extinguisher is to be found—unless, indeed, our faithful ally at Paris be disposed, as I believe he is, to cold water us considerably.

"Have you read Guizot's articles on Peel in the

¹ Who had moved a vote of censure.

last three numbers of the *Revue des Deux Mondes*? They are admirable, and do Peel more ample justice than anything which has yet appeared, either under his own hand or from that of a friendly biographer.

"Did you see your uncle Woronzow at Carlsbad? I hope that peace, which will have comforted him, has also revived him. He is no bad judge of the dark future. The relative positions of Russia and Turkey in the East cannot be durable. The trial of statesmanship will be to find a solution for the difficulties in that quarter without a renewal of the war. Affairs, when left alone, often settle themselves; but this is a lesson which the experience of half a century does not teach all aged ministers.

"My principal object in writing to you is to plead guilty to an impertinence. My second son and his first cousin made an excursion last month into the south of Ireland. They are children of the rod and delight in fishing. In your absence, I took the liberty of asking permission for them from your agent in Dublin to fish in your Atlantic River. This permission he gave in the most obliging manner, and they passed three or four days on the banks of your stream. They *saw* salmon innumerable; but they were not successful in killing one, though your water-bailiffs were most attentive and gave every possible assistance. My son begs me to thank you, which I do very cordially, both on his behalf and on my own. Pray remember me kindly to Mrs. Herbert, and believe me always, yours sincerely."

MR. HERBERT TO SIR JAMES GRAHAM.

"WILTON, *August 14th*, 1856.

"MY DEAR GRAHAM,

"I should have been very much vexed if your son or any one of your kith and kin had passed my Irish river and not taken whatever sport or pleasure the said river could give him. I am only sorry he was not more successful. All the Irish rivers have failed this year, not from want of fish, but from want of disposition to rise on the part of the fish themselves. I start to-morrow for Newport, where I intend to spend a few days, hoping for better luck than my predecessors.

"I saw Woronzow at Dresden on my way to and at Frankfort, and again on my way from Carlsbad. He is well in health, though feeble. He greatly laments the anti-English feeling which exists in Russia, and which is exclusively anti-English, for our allies have contrived to stand better, partly from the notorious fact of the greater inclination in France for peace, partly from the virulence of our Press and the language of our public men, and lastly from the feelings created in the population on the sea-board by the operations of the Baltic fleet.

"It will take a generation to efface the impression among the peasants and middle classes.

"I hear from a guest at Brocket¹ that Louis Napoleon refuses to back our remonstrances with Russia about the Isle of Serpents, Kars fortifications, etc., and that matters are advancing to a state of things in which it will be England and Austria *v.* France and Russia. I believe this to be an exaggeration, for the interests of France are too strongly engaged in the English alliance, and there is too much popular and political antipathy between Austria and England to allow of any very close alliance or intimacy. It is curious, however, to find Palmerston leaning upon Austria. Anyway, Palmerston will find himself both out-weighted and outwitted, too, by the French, but I am very much afraid that we shall suffer in influence and character, however popular our Blue Books may look, and however loud the cheers of the House of Commons.

"The Government in a mere party sense is very strong, although Palmerston's happy-go-lucky style of conducting it shakes the confidence of the melancholy minority composed of thinking men. There is a certain dash and charlatanism about him which takes with the public, and they excuse and even are amused by and admire in him what they would call any other Minister to a severe reckoning for.

"We have the prospect of an abundant harvest here, with no more complaint on the part of the farmers than serves to relieve them of too heavy a sum of obligation to Providence.

"I am the better, I think, for Carlsbad, though the journey home nearly laid me up."

¹ Lord Palmerston's residence.

On his return from Carlsbad Mr. Herbert went at once to Ireland as usual for a month's fishing—his favourite relaxation. While there he wrote to Mrs. Herbert that :

"August 9th, 1856.

"The postboy from Hollymount having a bad foot—his horse had trod on it—I took him alongside of me to drive, and was repaid by much information. He told me Sir Roger Palmer was just expected down the first time for many years. His son just come from the *Creemaa* where he was in the *cavalry*—sure the likes of him wouldn't go afoot—his sister Miss Palmer went with him to the wars, and was riding, he hears the other day, on the Curragh with her two medals and one star upon her. 'Where did she get them?' says I. 'Sure the Queen gave them to her.' 'But what for?' says I. 'Well, just for her speerit and valour in the field.' This is a curious historical fact rivalling Iona."

"NEWPORT, August 20th.

"The furniture of the O'Donnel Arms is not elegant. In my bedroom there is not one pane in the window which is not either mended with paper and putty, or else has a thing like the bottom of a bottle in the middle, and as the weight-string of the sash is broken, it is kept open by the insertion of a boot-jack. Indeed, boot-jacks seem to be provided with this view, as I see another bedroom window kept open in the same way."¹

And he tells Mr. Gladstone (September 14th) that he has been to Curraghmore, which he finds—

"... a noble place—magnificent woods of immense extent on fine hills rising upwards into grouse mountains, and fringing a rocky stream at the bottom, with great stretches of pasture on the hill sides covered with deer and cattle.

[¹ I find this note written outside this letter by Lady Herbert :

"S. sold this fishery because he could not stand the distress of the people round, and, unless he had given up every other duty, nothing effectual could be done for their relief."

“Everything bears evidence of the genius of the woman who reigns over it, and has tamed and improved the Centaur who possesses it.”

The conclusion of peace had increased that divergence of opinion which already existed among the principal members of the Peelite party. So long as the war lasted, their common repugnance to it bound them comparatively closely together. When that strong external bond of union was removed, the tendency to fall apart became more and more evident. The profound distrust of Lord Palmerston's foreign policy entertained by Lord Aberdeen, Mr. Gladstone, and Sir James Graham was not to be allayed. But that distrust, though felt, was not felt so keenly by Mr. Herbert or Mr. Cardwell, who were disposed to condone much which they admitted to be objectionable, for the sake of reunion with the Liberal party, and in order to regain the power of acting in unison with the old friends and former colleagues of whom the Cabinet was chiefly composed. They were therefore not indisposed to accept Lord Palmerston as the inevitable head of what was virtually little more than a reconstruction of Lord Aberdeen's Government under another chief. Lord Aberdeen and Sir James Graham agreed with them in desiring the reunion of the Liberal party, but being unable to overcome their well-founded objection to Lord Palmerston's policy and personal character, they looked rather to Lord John Russell as its leader. Mr. Gladstone went further, and not only shared their objections to Lord Palmerston, but had no wish for any close union with the Liberal party, and indeed denied that there could be any *reunion* with a party which he vehemently declared he never had joined at all, nor would join. His inclinations were strongly in favour of a nearer approach

to the Conservatives and to Lord Derby, and though admitting that the moment for such a junction had not yet arrived, he looked hopefully to time and the chapter of accidents as the means of one day naturally effecting it.

Mr. Herbert's views on the political questions which attracted attention during the last few months of 1856 will be most completely and most clearly shown by a selection from his correspondence during that period. The first of these letters is one in answer to an intimation from Mr. Gladstone that he was the author of an article in *The Quarterly Review* on "The Declining Efficiency of Parliament." This article, which is not reprinted in the collected volume of Mr. Gladstone's contributions to that periodical, was powerfully written, and at the time attracted considerable notice. After dealing with other reasons in some measure accounting for what appeared to him the diminished efficiency and waning authority of the House of Commons, the writer proceeded to assign the conduct and methods of the Prime Minister, Lord Palmerston, as the main cause of what he called "the demoralisation of Parliament."

MR. S. HERBERT TO MR. GLADSTONE.

"WILTON, *October 22nd*, 1856.

"MY DEAR GLADSTONE,

"I had not read the article when I got your letter, but I did so last night, and think it very good. There is but one point which you omit, or do not dwell upon, which is the effect produced not only on the Government, but on the supporters of the Government, by the absence of an Opposition prepared for office. It is not worth while to rally round and defend a Government whose existence is not threatened—and, there being no fear of letting in the enemy, each man can afford to kick and cuff or desert

the Government on his own account and then talk to his constituency of his independence.

"There is an occasional tone in the article which I attribute to the Editor, or to your necessity of making your article look *Quarterly*-like."

A more unrestrained criticism on Mr. Gladstone's article is contained in a letter to Lord Granville, to whom, on October 29th, Sidney Herbert wrote :

"Apropos of Pam, read an article in *The Quarterly Review* on the declining efficiency of Parliament. It is an able paper—very severe on Palmerston, and giving a good account of the dislocation of parties and its effects. I think one could answer a good deal of it—*i.e.* it overlooked the fact that the destruction of the simple old party organisation, though immensely inconvenient to Members of Parliament, is by no means an unmixed evil as regards the country."

MR. GLADSTONE TO MR. HERBERT.

"LIVERPOOL, *October 24th*, 1856.

"I am glad you are not displeased with the article ; Graham's judgment too was favourable. Lord Aberdeen had not yet seen it. Pray remember my secret.

"You are quite right in supposing that I endeavoured to write up to the character of a '*Quarterly Reviewer*' when I could do so with propriety. The local praise of Pakington in New Zealand, and a commendation of Henley, (by the way, they are at daggers drawn) are both, I think, justified, but, of course, they were things that it was not *necessary* to say. The editor told me he had struck out some epithets laudatory of relief measures ; but I do not know that he has put in anything abusive, so that for what there may be of that kind I am probably responsible.

"The truth is, I am a good deal pressed in mind by two considerations, the first that my own presence in Parliament is more than worthless under the present circumstances, for I think any good done upon a particular question is more than counterbalanced by

the evil of helping so materially to prolong a bad state of things in Parliament. The second is that I have very strong feelings against Lord Palmerston as Prime Minister. His inefficiency at the Home Office was an evil, but it averted greater evils. His inefficiency now at home and his meddlesomeness abroad are each of them very great evils, and threaten not to avert but to bring about greater ones. I have not the least doubt that the substitution of Derby would be the substitution of a better man; I am not sure that it would be the substitution of a better Government, but a Government under him would be kept in order by the Liberal Party, which is at present disqualified for good. The Liberal Party should never occupy the Treasury Benches excepting under a powerful Government like that of Lord Grey, or, at any rate, a tolerably active one like that of Lord Melbourne. At present the *sheep* are set to play the part of watchdog, and the watchdog is busy with his sop.

"You are quite right about the effect on the supporters of the Government; there is also *much* to be said on the state of the so-called Conservative Party, but I did not think it was for me to say. *The Morning Post* had rather a curious leader *yesterday*."

MR. HERBERT TO MR. GLADSTONE.

"WILTON, *October 26th*, 1856.

"MY DEAR GLADSTONE,

"Your secret shall remain inviolate. After having assented to so much of your article the reaction comes, not as to the causes, but as to the extent and intensity of the evil. We who are members of Parliament and have to work the machinery are very much disturbed at finding our routine interfered with, and are troubled at the necessity of devising new ways for ourselves; but it does not follow that the country suffers. In some respects they have gained considerably; the old party organisation maintained by a blind adherence on the part of followers to an unquestioned superiority on the part of the leader could not, in the nature of things, last. The diffusion of political information and intelligence, together with the removal of the old subjects of party contest, make it impossible. The

break-up must have come sooner or later. Peel only hastened or precipitated it. We must recollect that the great party fights up to 1841, however exciting and easy from the perfection of the discipline they may have been to members of Parliament, were far from wholesome for the country, which was divided into hostile factions, one half of the population fiercely embittered against the other. All the social relations of life, even trade, suffered when grocers were employed, not for the goodness of their cabbages, but for the goodness of their votes.

"I do not think it is possible, even if it were desirable, to restore the old state of things. The change has come upon us, and we must work out a solution of the difficulty by adapting ourselves to the new conditions of political life, which refuse to adapt themselves to us. If you ask me how, I can give you no answer, but no more can you, as to the means of re-establishing the *status quo*. You look forward to no nearer approach to it than the existence of two parties, each offering to do the same thing, but one claiming to do it better than the other."

MR. HERBERT TO MR. GLADSTONE.

"WILTON, *November 10th*, 1856.

"Palmerston seems to have flourished much at Manchester, and the papers are in a chorus of delight at a man making three commonplace speeches in one day. I confess to being surprised also at any man being able to make three speeches with scarcely an idea in one of them.

"There seems to be a restless and uncomfortable feeling brewing everywhere. The Queen had Persigny to Windsor the other day without Lord Clarendon, as Albert thought he could better smooth some difficulties without the Foreign Minister being present. I have no right to know this, but I believe it. It argues a sore and irritated feeling between the two Governments. There is a curious statement in *The Globe* or *Times*, I forget which, that Sardinia is to be excluded by our desire from the proposed Paris Congress because she is against the line taken by Austria and England.

"Bitter cold weather here."

MR. GLADSTONE TO MR. HERBERT.

"HAWARDEN, *November 14th*, 1856.

"With your argument against *The Quarterly Review* I only go up to a certain point. I do not believe that the settlement of the great questions is the main cause of the disorganisation and partial abeyance of party; the main cause, I believe, has been in personal considerations, acts, and feelings, which first led the Protectionists to throw off Peel, and then Peel to throw off the Protectionists not only *quoad* Protection, but *quoad* everything, because he took it into his head that Protection *was* everything—*i.e.* that there would be a struggle to restore it when the Protectionists came in, which would absorb all other questions. However, tongue is better than pen to work through a discussion of this kind, which, though interesting and somewhat historical, is apt to become long, and at the present moment I am particularly busy (literally) with the politics of Troy.

"But Foreign Affairs are so strange, gloomy, and mysterious that not even Troy can keep them out. I think Palmerston's denunciation of the secondary states at Manchester is one of those shabby apologies for himself which no one but a man with a reputation for courage could venture upon. But that is of less importance than the Eastern question. I hope the case for the Government is something quite different from, and very far beyond, that which *The Times* has made, or *The Morning Post*. It must be a very good one indeed to justify their having played such tricks with the French alliance, and kept the Austrians for another winter in the principalities.

"Louis Napoleon is weak at this moment, or I imagine he would have been more difficult to deal with. I interpret his words to Kisseleff, however, as a most distinct declaration that he does *not* mean to quarrel with Russia, and has no fault to find with her.

"I think that, at best, Lord P.'s premiership will cost the country a few millions a year. To such fine words we cannot be treated without good large establishments. But if in addition to that we are to see every alliance spoiled and every nation offended

one after another, and ourselves only isolated and hated, the day must be close at hand when the first duty will be to put an end, or contribute towards putting an end, to so great and unmitigated an evil.

"The remedy for the French difficulty in Prince Albert's intervention is anything but pleasing."

The features in the foreign relations of the country which appeared to Mr. Gladstone to be strange, gloomy, and mysterious, were (1) the prospect of a fresh quarrel with Russia as to the interpretation of those Articles of the Treaty of Paris which related to the boundaries between the Russian and Turkish Empires; (2) a demonstration against the misgovernment prevailing in the kingdom of Naples, which, begun blusteringly, had ended tamely; (3) a war with Persia, commenced without any communication to Parliament and carried on from India and with Indian troops.

MR. HERBERT TO MR. GLADSTONE.

"WILTON, *November 18th*, 1856.

Foreign affairs certainly look ill. But they will, I expect, be much mended before Parliament meets so far as regards France and Russia. It is difficult to know the facts, but so far as I can gather the question of the Isle of Serpents is one which we should have been wise to have gracefully yielded rather than show up the difference with France, and by so doing we might more effectually have closed the Bolgrad difficulty which I imagine to be important. The real merit of the Treaty of Paris was its satisfactory settlement of the navigation of the Danube and of the Turkish frontier, and this compensated for the mere reproduction of the condemned limitation in the Black Sea under the new name of neutralisation. Any material departure, especially one involving the loss of a main security for the position conquered on the Danube, is therefore a grave affair, and I have no doubt that Walewski, and some of his colleagues who are about as honest as himself, have been com-

bining with Russia for objects of their own and were ready to sacrifice the Danube or anything else.

"I have little doubt, however, that our views, right or wrong, have been urged in the manner most offensive to the French Government, for I assume that the tone of *The Times* has been borrowed from Downing Street.

"Palmerston is in the meantime more popular and stronger than ever. He will be rebuked for his Neapolitan policy and well backed up in his Russian policy, and he will consider and adopt the net result as a triumph.

"There does not appear to be the slightest chance of any one turning him out. To make Palmerston useful or even harmless his Ministry should have been leavened and not opposed.

"I was staying at Heytesbury last week. Lord Bath had been going about saying that the Government were sure to be turned out, as the Foreign Ministers were all going to move against Palmerston. If they do, they will set him up to all time. Even Lord Heytesbury, who is no admirer of his, answered that if anything could make him support Palmerston that would, for he should resent any such interference, as would the whole country. The mere suspicion of such complicity served him on the Greek question."

SIR JAMES GRAHAM TO MR. HERBERT.

"NETHERBY, *November 16th*, 1856.

"I thank you sincerely for the kindness of your inquiries respecting my wife. She has been dangerously ill, but all cause for immediate alarm is at an end. I wish that I could add I consider her safe and recovered. However, I must hope the best, and be thankful for the mercy already vouchsafed.

"This Neapolitan affair appears to me to be the height of absurdity. Nobody knows better than Lord Heytesbury the fatal and cruel consequences of British interference in the cause of Italian independence and of Sicilian freedom. ¹

"We may have patched up for a moment our differ-

¹ The omitted portion of this letter will be found in Mr. Parker's Life of Sir James Graham.

ences with France, and Napoleon, in this crisis of his financial difficulties, cannot afford an open rupture with us; but the warmth of the friendship has evaporated, and the new love is proclaimed, while cold excuses only are offered to the discarded old love; and still the question remains, 'Shall the Conferences at Paris be re-opened?' On this will depend the triumph or defeat of England, the enmity or transient goodwill of France. I never confided in the French Alliance or valued it as a permanent security for peace. The Duke of Wellington was right, 'Concert with France, if you please, but no love: *point d'amour*.' I wish this precept had been observed at Windsor."

MR. GLADSTONE TO MR. HERBERT.

"HAWARDEN, *November 20th*, 1856.

"I feel with you that we are really in the dark as to the facts of the Eastern question. My principal misgiving arises from the extraordinary manner in which the case has been stated by journals, which I suppose really derive their information from Lord P. and from the Foreign Office. Why does *The Times* bluster with unparalleled insolence and vulgarity, but carefully eschew telling us the facts? Why are we left in the dark on a question as plain as whether Chester or Hawarden is the larger place?

"Again I want to know, would Bolgrad Tabab give Russia an access to the Danube? And has she not one already by the Pruth, or why not by that, if by the other?

"You would do me a charity if you have any light on these matters that you could shed upon me.

"With regard to *leavening*, was not that what we tried, with the worst possible result? Was it not quite clear that the first time he and the leaven disagreed about a question of which he had the popular side (he was perfectly sure to have or take the popular side of all questions) the leaven would go to the wall? After all, it is not strange if Lord P. is still the man of July, 1850, the date of the Greek debate. I admit that if you answer any of my questions, it will not be human but heroic virtue."

MR. HERBERT TO MR. GLADSTONE.

"WILTON, *November 24th*, 1856.

"I was called up to town on Saturday to attend a funeral service, held in the Greek Chapel, for Prince Woronzow. We had heard of his death, which took place on Tuesday last at Odessa, by telegraph. We are still receiving letters from his wife and family, describing the happiness of their life, his enjoyment of his rides, his delight at the growth of the improvements he had commenced, and the warm and heartfelt affection and respect shown to him. So it must have been at the last very sudden, though his age and broken health made his life precarious. So ends another noble and well-spent life. It was said of him that through the whole of South Russia you could talk to no man half an hour without hearing his name, and never without a blessing.

"I can't tell you much about Bolgrad; I gather from Wood that Brunow himself had proposed the more Northern Bolgrad at the Conference, and that the importance attached to it rests on the access to vessels of larger draught than the upper part of the Pruth, where the new frontier is drawn, affords.

"They expect that the whole question will be settled before Parliament meets and Naples forgotten."

SIR JAMES GRAHAM TO MR. HERBERT.

"NETHERBY, *January 29th*, 1857.

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"I hope to meet you on Tuesday. If Persia has succumbed, I agree with you in opinion that an attack, however well founded, which proceeds on the ground that the means used were unjustifiable will be of little avail. You probably are right that Palmerston is still in the ascendant, and that he will not quail before a multitude of divided opponents, more especially if his secret friends outnumber his covert enemies. I have little doubt that John Russell will play him a slippery trick if he have the opportunity, and I regard him as

a more formidable adversary than Derby and D'Israeli. 'The Jew and the Jockey' are still in bad odour, and when it comes to the point, this nation will not be governed by them. Gladstone's strong ground will be finance and expenditure, and however much Palmerston may dislike this financial policy, it is more likely to win public favour and to stand the test of a general election than any other great question now open. If Persia be *not* settled, it presents a breach most inviting for an assault, but the luck of the Government is such that I conclude they have effected a settlement on their own terms. Sir J. McNeill's comments on Panmure's treatment of his own Commission are stinging and quite just. I should imagine that the relations between the Horse Guards and the War Department are not altogether amicable, and Panmure's influence is not of a soothing character. It would require much dulcet modulation to harmonise these jarring elements."

MR. HERBERT TO SIR JAMES GRAHAM.

"WILTON HOUSE, SALISBURY,

"December 14th, 1856.

"MY DEAR GRAHAM,

"I ought to have written before this to thank you for your kind and feeling letter. Poor Woronzow was not ill more than three days, and up to the commencement of his illness had been daily riding on horseback and greatly enjoying the sight of the growth of his creations at Odessa. He had been much touched at the respect and affection shown by the population on his arrival. He was one of the foremost of the public men in Europe—a good soldier, a skilful administrator, and a model of integrity and virtue in a corrupt Court and a corrupt country. I preserve a very happy recollection of a week spent with him this summer.

"I hoped by my delay to be able to send you some account of the state of our Russian and French difficulties. I have had Granville here, but I did not get much from him. He thinks the Russians have more case for the Southern Bolgrad than is generally supposed, but I do not think that his account gives them much *locus standi*.

"It appears that from an excess of caution, or of suspiciousness, which is a very different thing, the Conference would not so much as look at a Russian map, but trusted solely to a French map, on which there was marked but one, and that the Northern Bolgrad. The first line proposed went to the north even of that, but on the representation that Bolgrad is the *Chef lieu du département*, and therefore on that ground important to Russia, the line was drawn south of it, but equally to the north of the lake, which has a deep-water communication with the Danube. Of the two Bolgrads, however, now shown to exist, the southernmost, half-way down the lake, turns out to be the one which is the *Chef lieu*.

"Now, the concession as to the drawing of the line south of Bolgrad was undoubtedly made for the purpose of leaving to Russia the provincial capital; but it was given as clearly in the belief that the Bolgrad was to the north of the lake, and that the concession did not invalidate the principle on which the new frontier was drawn, which was the exclusion of the Russians from any port having access to the Danube. For this reason they were driven up the Pruth till the shallow water was reached on which no armed boat could float.

"The sudden yielding of a renewed Conference after a refusal conveyed so acrimoniously, and maintained so pertinaciously as to have seriously alienated the French Government and people, is a confession of wrong in the first instance, or of weakness now, which must injure us seriously in the eyes of Europe. But it is the old game of brag which Palmerston has always delighted to play till the last moment, then shamelessly abandon."

Under the influence of the Emperor of the French a compromise on this question was arranged in which all the parties interested were content to acquiesce.

In the early part of December it seemed probable that Mr. Gladstone would come to the conclusion that the time had arrived for closer co-operation with the Conservative party; in which case the divergence already existing between himself and the other Peelite

leaders would have been widened by his open junction with Lord Derby. With great difficulty, and contrary to his own opinion, Mr. Gladstone was then dissuaded from returning an affirmative answer to a proposal made to him that he should meet Lord Derby, with a view to concerted action against the Government—a meeting which at that time could have had but one result. The decision was a momentous one—far more so than was at the time apparent—and one which, not improbably, some of those who were most instrumental in securing its adoption would have regretted had they known its far-reaching consequences. The following letters will show how very narrowly a contrary decision was escaped. What most inclined Mr. Gladstone to hesitate was the fact that he had received no direct invitation from Lord Derby. The day after he had sent his letter courteously declining the proposed meeting he received that direct personal invitation from Lord Derby which, had it arrived but one day earlier, would almost certainly have been accepted.

MR. GLADSTONE TO MR. HERBERT.

“HAWARDEN, *December 15th*, 1856.

“MY DEAR HERBERT,

“I have just sent to Sir James Graham, who will forward them from Netherby to you to-morrow, copies of two letters of my own: one to a correspondent (who, not being a politician, remains nameless)¹ on the subject of a message, as I construed it, that he sent me from Lord Derby, expressing a wish to communicate with me on public affairs; the other to Lord Aberdeeen, in answer to one in which he had written to me on the subject of this correspondence.

“I had in the meantime come to the conclusion in my own mind that perhaps I should have done better

¹ Mr. Elwin, editor of *The Quarterly Review*.

to write at once on my own responsibility, for the delay incident to exchanging letters with Aberdeenshire, and indeed exchanging them twice, tends rather to give the formality to this communication (if it takes place), which it is, above all things, desirable that it should not possess. I also felt that, after the awkward and roundabout proceedings of last session through Heathcote, it would be hardly possible for me to decline the proposal.

"Should Lord Derby desire to meet me, I think our conversation must be confined to public questions and the position of the Government, and must not enter upon any question of political approximation as a thing to be arranged in private. Upon that footing I shall be glad to meet him; for I think that a conversation conducted in honourable confidence and the freedom it inspires, will enable me, and possibly you, to form some better opinion at least than I can now form how far he and his party offer the smallest hope of efficient aid in controlling the Government. The difficulties of our position are extreme, and its continuance is anything but favourable either to the public interests or to our own characters; even J. Wortley's acceptance of office¹ is another warning; while feeling all this I do not see the way of escape, but I own I look with earnest desire to any improvement in the means of making the Government do right and preventing them from doing wrong, quite irrespective of any improvement or change in our own condition.

"You will, of course, hear when I have more to say. With kindest messages."

SIR JAMES GRAHAM TO MR. HERBERT.

"NETHERBY, *December 16th*, 1856.

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"By the desire of Gladstone I forward to you the two enclosures which came to me from him this morning. I have not been taken entirely by surprise. My recent correspondence with Gladstone had led me to the conclusion that some such measure was impending; and though I have only discussed it as a

¹ He had become Solicitor-General.

speculative case, I have given no encouragement. On the contrary, I have said that I could have no hand in it; and that I am not prepared to cross the House and to join the band which surrounds D'Israeli. I have told Gladstone that in my opinion two things for his own honour are indispensably necessary: first, that he should be a *Leader*, and not a *Follower*, under any new arrangement; and secondly, that the transaction should be in the face of day and in the presence of the public, on some broad, intelligible public ground, which shall involve national interests and raise a new landmark of separation between statesmen. In the main I agree with Gladstone in his opinions, but I am more patient and less discontented with the impotent lassitude of neutrality. We shall see what comes of this; but I do not augur favourably. Have the goodness to return the enclosures to Gladstone as soon as you have read them.

"I am obliged by your accurate and most intelligible account of the present state of the question pending between Russia and the allies. One striking fact is prominent—England resisted the re-opening of the Paris Congress, and she has yielded under strong compulsion. This is the triumph of France and Russia united; it is the debasement of Austria and England in their new confederacy. This Persian war also, declared at Calcutta, is a most awkward circumstance at this juncture, and the tone recently adopted by the Foreign Office towards Brazil has been such as to call down the thunder even of *The Times*. Everything appears to me to be out of joint, and I am gloomy and morose in the extreme, but never cease to be most sincerely yours."

MR. HERBERT TO MR. GLADSTONE.

"WILTON, *December 19th.*

"MY DEAR GLADSTONE,

"I return your letters which Graham forwarded to me. Your answer is quite safe and guarded, but though the step binds you to nothing, it will tend to what I think you wish—viz. political approximation to Lord Derby. I cannot say that I wish to see it; for though you might infuse fresh vigour and responsibility into a party which is much in want of both

(if there is such, or ever again will be such, a thing as *a party*, which I am inclined to doubt), yet you will always be in a false position with them. Your opinions really are essentially progressive, and when all measures—I mean the measures of any Government—must be liberal and progressive, the country will prefer the men whose antecedents and mottoes are liberal, while the Conservatives will always prefer a leader whose prejudices are with themselves. However, *che sarà sarà*. We reckon on you for the 17th."

MR. GLADSTONE TO MR. HERBERT.

"HAWARDEN, *December 23rd*, 1856.

"Our visit will supply, I hope, such a clear and free opportunity of talking politics that I need hardly trouble you with a word now. I am sensible too that a man ought never to have less credit for self-knowledge than when he thinks he knows his mind. Not at all attempting to escape from the mesh of this proposition, I think you see farther for me than I do for myself. I am undeniably conscious of the greatest objection to Lord P. as minister; were it in my power to sign the warrant for turning him out, I would do it with the ink that is now in my pen. I do sincerely believe him to be a most demoralising and a most destructive minister for the country; and as unfortunately he is the minister, and gives the ministry its tone as well as its popularity, this becomes equivalent to objecting to men to whom in themselves I do not object. But beyond this, and as respects myself, I do not see one inch. The inch you speak of represents half my mind, but there is another half: I feel the full force of all you say, and could add much of my own in the same sense. As I have admitted, a man cannot tell his own intentions; but he can try, and depend upon it I shall not fail for want of trying.

"I have heard nothing on the subject of my last. It makes me think my informant may have been deceived; nor am I eager that it should prove otherwise. Despairing of the Liberal party's disposition to do the good that is essential so long as they have Lord P. at

their head, I am naturally anxious to see whether the others are disposed to it; but this I am going to try through *The Quarterly*, and by that channel advice will come to them without any factitious element, whether of attraction or repulsion, that might attend my authorship if known. Please to keep this quite close as before."

MR. HERBERT TO MR. GLADSTONE.

"WILTON, *January 4th*, 1857.

"MY DEAR GLADSTONE,

"I ought to have written to you to close with your offer of the 16th, on which day we hope to see you. We look forward to your visit with great delight. The Bishop of Salisbury promises to spend Sunday here in order to talk with you and preach to us.

"I postpone politics, but I must say I look on Palmerston as a fixture, if only by the process of exhaustion. He is the only public man in England who has a name. Many criticise, many disapprove, but all, more or less, like him and look on him as the only man. He has on his side that which is the strongest element in the mental organisation of all human society, namely, the public's national prejudices. Some one said, 'Give me the national songs, and I will rule the nation'; and Canning said, 'Don't talk to me of the "sense of the nation"; give me the *nonsense*, and I will beat it hollow.'

"To return confidence for confidence. If you take in *The Saturday Review*, read in the number of Saturday, December 27th, an article headed 'Our Foreign Policy,' and in to-day's 'Sailing before the Wind.' There will be one next week on the American question, which, however, I know less of than the old Vienna case. I have promised one, if not two, more. I have little hope in the opposite side of the House. They require regeneration, if not absolute creation. It will be a task of years, which in the meanwhile will have disposed of our poor Pam., in the way, not of all ministers, but of all flesh.

"Yours affectionately."

MR. HERBERT TO SIR JAMES GRAHAM.

"WILTON HOUSE, SALISBURY,
"January 27th, 1857.

"MY DEAR GRAHAM,

"I hear to-day from London, at second-hand from Vernon-Smith, that the Government have received a telegram from Stratford to the effect that the Persian Government have conceded all our demands, whatever they may be.

"I do not share your expectation of a change in the Government, or in any important portion of it during this Session. You, I gather, expect it from Lord John Russell: Gladstone from the opposition side of the House. I am satisfied that this latter expectation has no foundation to rest on. Palmerston's popularity is very great with the country gentlemen. His old Protectionist leanings, his unconcealed aversion to Gladstone's financial policy, his objection to Parliamentary Reform, in any shape or degree, and his noisy foreign policy, which they understand the use of on a hustings as well as he, combined with the distrust they feel to their own leader, all incline them to support him. Many who sit opposite to him would like to sit behind him, and no doubt would do so, were it not that the old machinery of party is stronger than its spirit, and the club in London and the attorneys in the country prevent them. Nor do I see how Lord John is to do it. Why is an unpopular man out of office to oust the most popular man in England who is in office, and who will use his nine points of the law with a hearty determination to keep every one of them?

"With the exception of China all the foreign questions are closed. Parliament does not enter into the main questions of *how* they have been closed. I have no doubt, from all I hear, that the Government of Louis Napoleon has been unnecessarily irritated, and that L. N. himself complains loudly both of Clarendon and Cowley. Disraeli, I hear, half persuaded him that the Government would be displaced soon after the meeting of Parliament. I don't believe it will, but his willingness to accept the prophecy is an indication of his leanings. Nevertheless, these are not matters

capable of Parliamentary proof, though sensible men are getting uneasy at the world-wide unpopularity which we are achieving.

"I am very glad you inspired some caution into Gladstone's sanguine and impatient mind. I have little inclination to the party, if party it can be called, towards whom his sympathies are tending.

"He is gone to Oxford to look up his supporters there. Lord Aberdeen very kindly came down here for a night, which I suppose was the foundation on which *The Herald* built up its new coalition. The only thing which I wished were true was your imputed visit. We go to town on Monday next.

"I hear that Panmure has got into an odd difficulty on the subject of officers' instruction, on which you may recollect that I made a statement last year in the House of Commons. He has drawn up a plan, or rather has had one drawn up by Colonel Lefroy, and the Duke of Cambridge has produced another, which he purposes to work himself. I have seen both, and have no hesitation in saying that the Duke of Cambridge's is far the best, but the two are, of course, at issue as to the merits of their respective bantlings, and the Duke, I am told, proposes that I should arbitrate between the two!

"As Lewis has referred to a compromise, the question how the Government is to pay the Government servants, I should not be surprised if in some shape the Duke's proposal is adopted by Panmure. But the question as to the authority of the Secretary of State is one which he must necessarily settle for himself, and I have no doubt that he finds it far from easy with Windsor Castle watching his every move."

MR. GLADSTONE TO MR. HERBERT.

"OXFORD, *January 28th*, 1857.

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"On Monday I sent my letter to Lord D[erby] after it had gone to Lord A[berdeen], and on Tuesday morning I received a very unexceptionable letter from the former, wishing to see me in London on Sunday or Monday. The epistles crossed on the road. Of course I must adhere to my letter. At the same time

the conclusion expressed in it is *not mine*, but is accepted from others, you among them. I admit the inconveniences of meeting, but I should have been disposed to face them had I acted alone.

"My visit to Wilton, besides all its pleasure, was I think really of use in enabling us to compare notes as to the state of our minds respectively ; and I estimate our several views as follows :

"I think we have very nearly the same opinions as to the morality and as to the public utility of Lord Palmerston's system of managing public affairs. I honestly think you would feel even a stronger repugnance against stooping to it than I should. It seems to me that we are further agreed in the opinion that this system ought to be put an end to ; though we may not estimate alike the chances of such an issue, which I think less violently improbable than it seems to you. Then I think we go another step, and a great one onwards, in company. We feel ourselves to be without any party connection, and to be under the clear and simple obligation to do what we can to point out the right line of public policy, let those pursue it who will. From this results the further duty of supporting (be it officially, be it independently, is another, and may be a difficult, question) those by whom it shall be pursued ; if any such party there shall be, with respect to which neither of us, perhaps, are sanguine.

"This, I have concluded, is our common stock of propositions concerning public duty applicable to the present state of affairs. To this stock I add some others, on which perhaps there are shades of difference between us. I seem to feel more keenly than you do that in our present position we are, or that beyond doubt I am, a public nuisance. I am more hopeful than you about seeing some nearer approximation than we now have to the old system of Government. I am more willing than you to see Derby and his people zealously embrace the right course ; but this, I hope, is more a difference in speculation than anything else, because as I have no disposition whatever (I hope) to prevent the Liberal party from so acting if they are disposed, so I am certain that Derby would have your fair and even full, though reluctant support, if they will not do right, and he will."

But though a formal severance had been for the moment avoided, it was the impression, not only of Mr. Herbert, but of almost all Mr. Gladstone's friends, that it was only postponed, and that the time was rapidly approaching at which Mr. Gladstone would, if not *rejoin* the Conservative party (which he maintained he had never abandoned), at all events renew that close and intimate connection with it which since 1846 had been suspended.

In February the interview with Lord Derby, from which Mr. Gladstone had two months earlier allowed himself to be dissuaded, actually took place. It was followed by others, which were kept carefully secret, to the great dissatisfaction of Lord Aberdeen, who maintained that if the contemplated junction was to be creditable to both parties, it must take place in the light of day and as the result of open agreement on questions before Parliament. But in truth these conferences never assumed the same serious character which they would have worn had they been entered into before the commencement of the Session. What had then been possible was no longer so.

Meanwhile, subjects of difference multiplied, and on March 6th Sidney Herbert wrote that the "few gentlemen referred to—*i.e.* the Peelites—had, on almost every question lately submitted to Parliament, voted in different lobbies." And the tone of his warning to Mr. Gladstone not to press unduly his schemes of retrenchment, while it shows no abatement of personal friendship, clearly implies an absence of concert in political action.

"WILTON, *March 8th*, 1857.

"I stay for the grand jury to-morrow, for my affairs want looking after here, and I shall not be at the debate to-morrow. I do not know what you decided

about your retrenchment motion, but if you bring it on, I hope you will be guarded and moderate in the extent to which you propose any reduction. I suspect your views are extreme, and we have seen in the case of Cobden and the financial reform apostles, how little very extreme views can catch. They are looked on as unpractical, and pooh-poohed. There is also a great alarm as to the extent you are ready to go. There is very little really to be reduced from the military estimates, and the sanitary state of our barracks requires a large, though I trust not a lasting, expenditure.

"You must also make allowance for the prevailing passions and prejudices of the public. You can never lead men by reason alone. Not one in man a hundred ever exercises his reason, but all act on other motives, and you must establish a bond of sympathy by sharing their feelings before you can induce the multitude to follow you. What a sermon!—but it is Sunday."

Nevertheless old friendship and old habits kept up the practice of common consultation among all the members of the Peelite party, though such consultation frequently failed to result in combined action.

They still sat together in the House of Commons, and a certain likeness of thought still led them more frequently than not to act together. They were again thoroughly united in their disapproval of the proceedings of Sir J. Bowring in China. That functionary as Governor of Hong Kong had called on the Admiral Commanding on the Station to undertake hostilities against the Chinese authorities on account of their refusal to recognise as of British nationality a Chinese lorcha carrying a licence from the East of Hong Kong. The forts in the neighbourhood of Canton had consequently been taken, the city itself shelled, and its suburbs burnt. When Mr. Cobden moved a resolution condemnatory of the policy of the Government, it was supported in speeches of great brilliancy by

Mr. Gladstone, Sir James Graham, and Mr. Herbert. The last showed by the confession of half a dozen official authorities that the *Arrow* was not a British vessel, or one belonging to a British owner, and that the registration under which it was sought to give it that character was altogether *ultra vires* and illegal. He further pointed out the grave impolicy of a step which would have given to it and similar vessels the character of a British ship in all parts of the world, and drew an amusing picture of a crowd of yellow-faced, pig's-eyed, and pig-tailed Chinese sailors who had got into a scrape in some Mediterranean port, marching up to the British Consul and demanding redress from that astonished functionary with shouts of *Cives Romani Sumus*.

Passing from the trivial details of the particular case and from strictures on the conduct and motives of Sir John Bowring, he took a higher line, and accepting, for the sake of argument, the contention of the Government with regard to them, he denounced the punishment inflicted as out of all proportion to the offence committed. Reprisals, the seizure of a greater or smaller number of junks, would have amply sufficed to satisfy our honour; nor did the capture by the Chinese police of the *soi-disant* British but really Chinese schooner in any way call for or justify the bombardment of a great and populous commercial city. He sternly reprobated the language he had heard in debate, and which was prevalent out of doors, which implied that Chinese only deserved bad treatment and merited every injury inflicted upon them. "Were the Chinese people to be judged by the purlieus of Canton? Were the British people fairly represented by the rabble of Shoreditch and Wapping?" And in the name of humanity and justice he called

on the House to censure the outrage on both, which had received the approval of the Government.

Lord John Russell spoke and voted for the resolution, which, on March 4th, was carried by a majority of sixteen.

Parliament was immediately dissolved.

The appeal to the country thus made by Lord Palmerston was eminently successful. The already small number of Peelites was reduced to insignificance. Of those who had voted against the Government, Mr. Cobden himself, Mr. Bright, Mr. Cardwell, and Mr. Roundell Palmer lost their seats. Lord John Russell narrowly escaped the same fate. Of the lesser members of the so-called party, Lord Alfred Hervey, Dr. Phillimore, Mr. G. Vernon, and others were defeated, and the one pledge given by the majority of the new Parliament was that of unhesitating trust and confidence in Lord Palmerston.

On the whole, and looking back after an interval of nearly fifty years, I am inclined to believe that the instinct which led the country to rally to Lord Palmerston's support was right, and that the course taken in opposing measures which had become inevitable was wrong. Abstractly the arguments used in condemnation of the policy of Sir John Bowring were perfectly sound, but perhaps hardly sufficient allowance was made for the effect which would have been produced on the relations between English and Chinese by acquiescence in the pretensions of the Chinese authorities with regard to the lorcha *Arrow*.

CHAPTER III

THE EXTINCTION OF PEELISM

1857-58

THE Dissolution of 1857 may be said to have terminated the existence of the Peelites as a party, whilst it accentuated the differences existing between the individuals who had composed it and were still popularly known by that name.

Sir James Graham and Mr. Herbert differed altogether from Mr. Gladstone as to that party in the new Parliament to which support should be given. Lord Aberdeen, as usual, acted the part of a mediator, and their common regard and respect for him enabled him to prevent, or, as he himself thought, only to postpone, a separation, which to all appeared inevitable.

Nearly a year before the Dissolution, Mr. Gladstone had shown that he was not disinclined to support a Government led by Lord Derby. Writing to Mr. Herbert on April 22nd, 1856, on the subject of hiring and letting houses, he adds :

"It is odd to pass from house agency in this sense to *house agency* in a very different one, but after leaving Lord Aberdeen's on Saturday I was sorry to find I had just missed Northcote, who had two things fresh to tell me, both of which were satisfactory.

"The first was that Jolliffe had been working in various places to prevent trouble to persons of our political complexion, and with some success, but he had not yet been able to prevail with Lord Bath, and

much regretted it. I believe Jolliffe to be a very honourable man (as I am told he is also an admirable whip), and with this belief I replied this was kind and handsome, perhaps premature.

"The other point was that Derby had asked Northcote something of this sort: 'What if the Government is thrown out without their co-operation in the act, but under circumstances such that they could not disapprove. Is it a possible case that, without being prepared to take office, they might notwithstanding look with a friendly eye on my attempting to form a Government, and be disposed to give such support as we gave Peel in 1835?' I said I thought it was quite possible that this *might* be the best solution. In truth I was relieved and glad to find Derby spontaneously starting it. Had we mentioned it he would probably have considered it a trap. It is the same thing which formed the substance of my letter to him, and I think of yours in some degree, in February, 1855. I think Graham received this with some satisfaction."

At a later period, as related in the preceding chapter, he had felt strongly inclined to comply with an invitation to meet Lord Derby with a view to consider the possibility of co-operation with him. It was only with extreme difficulty, and as he himself declared, contrary to his own opinion, that he was persuaded in December, 1855, to refrain from a step which, if then taken, would have almost certainly led to his open and active co-operation with the Conservative party.

The meetings, which at a subsequent period did take place, between Lord Derby and Mr. Gladstone, though not resulting in agreement, did not diminish the probability of their closer union.

When the Dissolution became imminent, overtures were made to Mr. Herbert and Mr. Gladstone from the Conservative wire pullers, suggesting that if the Peelites were prepared to exercise a benevolent

neutrality in their favour rather than in a Liberal direction, their seats would not be contested by Conservatives. Sidney Herbert replied thus to Lord Malmesbury, through whom the offer had been made :

"BELGRAVE SQUARE,
" *March 6th*, 1857.

"MY DEAR MALMESBURY,

"I write, as I promised, before I leave town, in answer to the questions which you put to me to-day, and my answer must be the same as that which I gave in conversation with you. I can, however, speak for no one but myself. There is no such thing as a Peelite party, and I have studiously avoided doing anything which could tend to keep together as a body the few gentlemen who had followed Sir Robert Peel and supported Lord Aberdeen's Government. They are much divided, and on almost every question lately submitted to the House of Commons they have voted in different lobbies. When, therefore, any case arises in which the intentions or opinions of an individual member may appear to be of importance, they had best be ascertained by a direct reference to himself. In truth the number is not so large as to make the task difficult.

"So far as I am concerned, I have been already in communication with some of my friends and constituents, and I have assured them that, having entered into no combination for party purposes, but having voted upon any question submitted to the House of Commons on its merits alone, without reference to its origin or its effects on mere party politics, I should hold myself free to continue the same course, and would give no party pledges whatever, either for or against any Government, either present or future.

"Having made this declaration, you will acknowledge that I could not in honour enter into any arrangement with any party as regards election matters."

This is not the answer which would have been (and probably was) returned by Mr. Gladstone to a similar appeal. He disapproved of the coldness of tone in Mr. Herbert's letter, and said so plainly.

"I have heard," he wrote,¹ "with the utmost concern of your contest in Wiltshire. I frankly own it appears to me that you turned what is called the cold shoulder upon Malmesbury and Co., and that it would have been well to use some words and make some allowance for the actual co-operation which has taken place during the present session. The absence, however, of such words and such allowances does not justify the measure that has been adopted. This is strongly felt by Jolliffe, Walpole, H. Lennox, and I believe generally; but when they go about expressing their feelings and trying to do good in the matter, they are met by rumours of conversations in which you are supposed, I am sure falsely, to have said that you would support Palmerston after the Dissolution, and that (this last upon the credit, I am told, of Ernest Bruce) you would never upon any consideration sit in the same Cabinet with Lord Derby."

The Conservative party in Wiltshire, irritated by the coldness of his reply to Lord Malmesbury, put forth all its strength to oppose Sidney Herbert's return for South Wilts. He had much to contend against. As he himself wrote, a day or two after going down to Wilton to commence his canvass,² "I find every one here warmly with Pam. They know nothing of the Budget, nor of Bowring's contradictory letters, nor of any part of the case. But they read the leading articles of *The Times*. It is mortifying to see a sensible nation so Press led."

A few days later he wrote to Sir James Graham :

"WILTON HOUSE, SALISBURY,
"March 15th, 1857.

"MY DEAR GRAHAM,

"I enclose a copy of my address, which you will see I have a little altered and added to since you saw it in MS.

¹ March 11th.

² Wilton, March 8th.

"I went into the market at Warminster yesterday and was well received, and since the publication of my address stand much better. The suspicion of coalition did great harm. But the general opinion, I might almost say the universal opinion, is in favour of Palmerston at any price. Measures or no measures, principle or no principles, he is the man. The debate on the Chinese question has percolated very little, though had there been time, and had it not assumed the aspect of a party question, I cannot doubt that public opinion would have been strong on our side.

"There was one expression in your letter to your agent at Carlisle which appears to me of very doubtful policy: 'They must choose between Mr. Fergusson and me.' Now, why are they to make any such choice? You need not coalesce, but surely you need not court opposition from a large, probably the largest, section of the Liberal party there.

"Palmerston is an exceptional Prime Minister. We never shall again see an old-fashioned ultra-Tory leading the Liberal party, and this exceptional state of things cannot last very long, looking at the age of the man and the ordinary temper of the men on whose support he must ultimately rely. It seems to me that under these circumstances you do wrong to divide the Liberal party, perhaps permanently, for a very ephemeral cause.

"Gladstone's position is becoming every day more difficult, and in my opinion the result more certain. I take it he is in frequent communication with Lord Derby, and I do not see how he can ever effect a reconciliation with the Liberal party, or break through the meshes in which I fear he has involved himself with his friends opposite. You cannot confer with men on political matters and remain uncompromised by acts of so confidential a nature.

"It grieves me very much, but I foresee political separation, and a great career marred by the false steps into which his impatience and his predilections have hurried him.

"I have so much to do here that I do not contemplate returning to town, unless for a night. I shall be very anxious to hear what are your prospects. I

was pleased at our success on the last night I was in the House, when an act of justice to an ill-used man¹ was extorted from the Government.

“Believe me, yours faithfully,

“SIDNEY HERBERT.”

But though the contest was an uphill one, it was well fought by Herbert, and ended in his return by a majority of 247.

His own views as to his position are clearly stated in a letter to his wife, written during the progress of the county election :

“WILTON, *March 18th*, 1857.

“I have, ever since I joined Lord Aberdeen’s Government, considered myself a member of the Liberal party, and certainly have never had the least intention of leaving it, so your answers were quite right. I wrote strongly in that sense, and as to the necessity of healing the breach in the Liberal party, to Graham. I took the opportunity of writing to-day to Strelecki on emigration topics to put in some general views as to politics, which are pretty safe to be circulated by him. I wrote also to Gladstone, stating my own course, and expressing my fear that he was so committed as to be now bound in honour elsewhere. I fear he is *a lost man*, but he has no judgment, and does not seem to understand the purport or value of his own acts. The meeting at Westbury had excellent effects. They had been well plied with handbills from the other side, all about Odessa, and Roman Catholic chapels, and God knows what, and though the audience seemed hostile at first, and the questioning and interruptions were loudly cheered, after a time they were silenced and my speech cheered and approved, and at the end, when I had done, some one called out for three cheers for Thynne, for which not a voice was raised ; then three cheers for Herbert shook the room.”

¹ Colonel Tulloch.

To Mr. Gladstone he wrote on the same day :

" March 18th.

"MY DEAR GLADSTONE,

"I have been so much engaged here that I have scarcely time to write a line, and in contested elections nothing is so fatal as over-security and consequent neglect. I have no fear whatever for the result, and every day is strengthening me. It is clear now that the Dissolution will effect great good. It will have taught the Government a lesson, and it will simplify parties. The accession of Moderate Liberals will, I think, be considerable, and will keep the Government in order. I am weary of the evils which the existence of a third party (which you called a public nuisance) created, and shall take my place where my opinions and predilections alike keep me—namely, on the Liberal side of the House. There will be a great deal very painful to me, for I fear we shall be divided, and that you have cast in your lot with Lord Derby. I say this because I hear of further meetings, letters, and conversations, and no one can be on these terms in politics and not be bound by the consequences.

"The state of opinion here is curious : the Palmerston fever is still very rife, though a little cooling. The anti-China feeling is only a lesser part of the former.

"There is an entire apathy about and indifference to measures. The Tories are the keenest for Palmerston, as being the greatest buffer against change. The Liberal party look upon him as the greatest buffer against Lord Derby, and in a general state of aversions he has the suffrages of both."

MR. GLADSTONE TO MR. HERBERT.

"11, CARLTON HOUSE TERRACE,

" March 22nd, 1857.

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"I am going into Flintshire very early to-morrow morning, and must not longer postpone answering your letter. I did not reply to it when it arrived, because it touches principally upon subjects

with respect to which I feel that my mind has been wrought into a state of sensitiveness which is excessive and morbid.

"For the last eleven years, with the exception of only two among them, the pains of political strife have not for us found their usual and proper compensation in the genial and extended sympathies of a great body of comrades, while suspicion, mistrust, and criticism have flanked us on both sides and in unusual measure. Our one comfort has been a concurrence of opinion, which has been upon the whole remarkably close, and which has been cemented by the closer bonds of feeling and of friendship. The loss of this one comfort I have no strength to face. Contrary to your supposition, I have nothing with which to replace it; but the attachments, which began with political infancy and which have lived through so many storms and so many subtler vicissitudes, cannot be replaced. You will never be able to get away from me as long as I can cling to you, and if at length, urged by your conscience and deliberate judgment, you effect the operation, the result will not be to throw me into the staff of Lord Derby; I shall seek my duty, as well as consult my inclination, first by absconding from what may be termed general politics, and secondly by appearing, whenever I must appear, only in the ranks.

"I can neither give even the most qualified adhesion to the ministry of Lord Palmerston, nor follow the Liberal party in the abandonment of those very principles and pledges which were my original and principal bonds of union with it. On the other hand, I never have had any hope of Conservative reconstruction except (and that both slender and remote) such as presupposed the co-operation—I am now speaking for the House of Commons only—of yourself and Graham in particular. By adopting Reform as a watchword of present political action he has undoubtedly inserted a certain amount of gap between himself and me, which may come to be practically material or may not. If you make a gap upon this opportunity, I believe it will be a novelty in political history; it will be the first case upon record of separation between two men, all whose views upon every public question, political, administrative, or

financial, are, I believe, in as exact accordance as, under the laws of the human mind, is possible. But if, as I have said, by the act of others, not my own, I find myself isolated, I shall still retain my conviction that no reconstruction of a Conservative party ought to be attempted, unless under circumstances which will enable it usefully to serve and in case of need creditably and firmly to govern the country. Never having felt certain that such a reconstruction could be effected even by our united force, I shall be certain enough under any circumstances such as I can foresee, that it cannot be effected by any such small fraction of it as I should carry. The severance among us, therefore, if it come, will not enable, but still more disable, one at least of us, from contributing towards the cure of the present unhealthy and injurious state of things.

"Having referred to what I regret in Sir James Graham's operations at Carlisle, I must not fail to mention the far exceeding pleasure they have given me. In a period both of gross delusion and of gigantic imposture they have been the most gallant, outspoken, energetic, and apparently successful protest against both that eye could see or heart desire; they enthrone honesty and courage—the two great English virtues which England seems now almost everywhere to be trampling under foot.

"I do not know to what you refer when you say you 'hear of further meetings, letters, and conversations' between Lord Derby and me. Meeting there has been none for several weeks, nor, I believe, since the last you heard of. The whole letters are at your service; the last was dated March 7th, and enclosed one from me to Cobden. I believe they would add nothing to your knowledge or I should send them to you at once. Lastly, as to conversations, the one which went the farthest was the first, which I recounted as faithfully as I could to you on the same day and on the next, taking particular care to name all in it that was wrong or that appeared to look forward.

"I rejoice sincerely to hear that you are secure in the vexatious contest to which you have been subjected. Your account of the Palmerston fever is, I think, alike succinct and true; it is abating, however, unless among the gentry. I do not clearly gather

from your letter whether you mean to keep or change your 'seat,' *i.e.* bench.

"Before concluding let me add what I have forgotten to say above, that my relations to Lord Derby rest, as I consider, on the memorandum to which you were a party.

"I like your address very much."

At the close of the elections, Mr. Gladstone addressed a long letter to Lord Aberdeen, pointing out how much more his views on public questions resembled those of Lord Derby than those of Lord Palmerston, and while intimating his indisposition actively to support the former, expressed his absolute inability to give the smallest assistance to the latter. If Graham and Herbert persisted in sitting on the Ministerial side of the House, a split between him and them must follow. Lord Aberdeen replied that the Peelites had already virtually merged themselves in the Liberal party. It was true, he said, that on the formation of Lord Derby's Government in 1852, no important difference, except on the question of Protection, existed between it and Sir Robert Peel's friends, but the separation was widened by the conduct of the Government during the elections, and confirmed by its action in the new Parliament. After the overthrow of Lord Derby by the joint action of the Peelites and the Liberal party, and the formation of a Government which recognised Parliamentary Reform as one of its fundamental measures, the whole relation of parties was changed and an amalgamation of Peel's friends and the Liberal party took place. "This is so true that, although frequently tormented by the personal waywardness of Lord John, the amalgamation was complete so long as the Government lasted." On its fall, Lord Aberdeen and the Duke of Newcastle were extruded, but the Government

remained composed of the same individuals. Mr. Gladstone had left it with Graham and Herbert on a ground entirely unconnected with "Peelism," and on which any other three members of the Cabinet might equally have resigned. They were not thereby thrown any nearer to Lord Derby or his party, or necessarily relieved from the duty of supporting the Liberal policy to which they had recently adhered. They had, since their retirement, remained on the Liberal side of the House, and did not declare any general hostility to the Government. Now, had anything since happened essentially to alter this position? Lord Aberdeen thought not, and that, until it was so altered, Gladstone's place was "by the side of Graham and Herbert, both from political affinity and private friendship."

But Mr. Gladstone was hard to persuade, and almost passionately denied that any amalgamation with the Liberal party had taken place. If it had, he protested that he had been deceiving both himself and his constituents, and the deception had reached its climax in his selection as a candidate for the University of Oxford under a totally contrary supposition. At Mr. Gladstone's request, Lord Aberdeen sent the correspondence to Mr. Herbert, who returned it with the following letter:

MR. HERBERT TO LORD ABERDEEN.

"WILTON, *April 12th*, 1857.

"MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

"Many thanks for your letter and its enclosures. Nothing can be clearer or truer than your two answers to Gladstone's letters. But some things occur to me upon them as well as upon Gladstone's letters, which I may as well say in the order to which they occur to me, as I am not sure that the time is not drawing

near, which all of us have foreseen, when our positions with regard to one another will become more difficult than that with regard to existing parties in the House of Commons: for the results of the General Election have unfortunately made the latter simple enough.

"I entirely agree with you that the fusion of the Peelites with the Liberal party took place in 1852, when your Government was formed, though it virtually took place earlier, when all gave a common opposition to Disraeli's Budget. I don't see that my position or Gladstone's in this respect materially differs from Graham's and Cardwell's. It is true that our opposition dated from a later period than theirs, as did also Lord Palmerston's, who acted with us. And we all ended alike—*i.e.* we all disapproved of his measures, opposed them and turned out the Government, which surely constitutes opposition. I saw my way to the formation of the Government which succeeded, thought it a public advantage to be attained, and acted throughout with my eyes open to the consequences.

"I don't believe that one man in a hundred would now recollect that any difference in our course existed during any period of Lord Derby's Government.

"Your Government formed, the fusion was completed, and though we afterwards differed from and left another Government formed from the same side of the House, it was a Government far less liberal than yours, and our secession from it, in my view, could not affect our relations with the Liberal party, and we continued to sit on the Liberal side of the House, which to the Parliament and to the country is more significant of one's own view of one's party position and intentions, than any profession of faith, oral or written.

"Since then we have been thrown into opposition to Lord Palmerston's Government because we held to principles more liberal than those to which his party, rather than secede from the only man on this side who could hold the Government, were inclined, and encouraged by the apathy of the country to place in temporary abeyance.

"We were independent Liberals, rather more liberal than the Government, but less so than the men with whom 'geographically' we were sitting.

"Our maintenance of these principles entirely failed:

firstly, because we had lost our power and influence through two errors, as I think, which we had committed, (a) when we left the Government for reasons good at any other time but wrong then; and (b) when we appeared to be weary of the war before its objects were attained. The public has set down all our conduct since as the spite of men who had seen a policy successfully carried out in their teeth. I won't now go back upon the objections I felt at the time to the course taken. We tried to pull up a high-spirited horse suddenly in the middle of his stride, and he took the bit in his teeth and went all the faster.

"But another cause of our failure was the temporary adoption of our financial principles, obviously for party purposes, by the Opposition. The Opposition as a body (and its leader in the Commons) had been hearty advocates of the war. Their constituents the same, not because they hate Russia, but because it was war. No Tory party can ever be, unless under pressure, the advocates of real retrenchment. The hollowness of the proposed support given by the Opposition to these principles reacted on our character, and we were confounded with those who would use Liberal professions to turn out the Government, but no further, and the general election has done what is thought justice upon us. Besides which the country now cares very little about retrenchment, whatever it may do next year when the immediate prospect of new taxes may make it sing to a very different tune.

"This is a point—namely, the feeling out of doors—of which we have never made sufficient account. If there is an apathetic House of Commons, we may be sure there is an apathetic people behind. The result is that what the world called Peelites are extinct. I maintain that they were extinct in 1852, and that accidental circumstances brought us, or a few of us, together again latterly. I have always, so far as I could, discouraged the appearance or affectation of party, and Gladstone felt we were a 'public nuisance.'

"We have now at any rate been spared the pain of suicide, for we exist no longer; and I confess I do not regret the fact, though I lament the men who might have been most useful to the public, and I hope will be again.

"Now comes the question, what are we three, Graham, Gladstone, and myself, to do?"

"We are agreed on the subject of foreign policy. On the subject of retrenchment there would probably be a considerable difference in degree, nor, now that we are embarked in a difficult Chinese war of which the country has just recorded its approval, does any very large retrenchment seem possible.

"On retrenchment, then, we should stand probably :

" 1. Gladstone.

" 2. Graham.

" 3. S. Herbert.

"On the subject of Parliamentary Reform, which seems to me the only domestic subject in which the country takes any interest, we should stand :

" 1. Graham.

" 2. Herbert.

" 3. Gladstone.

"The Budget is over, and can no more be re-opened with any hope of a hearing than the Chinese question. The estimates have to be voted, and will be voted with little change, probably, beyond what the Government may themselves have again introduced. Reform will be the question of the Session. Lord John Russell in a congratulatory note written to me the other day adds : 'They say Palmerston has a Reform Bill ; we shall see.' Lord John, in default of the Government, promises to bring in a Bill of his own ; and even Sir Fitzroy Kelly undertakes to do the same thing in default of the Government and Lord John.

"I do not believe that a large measure is necessary or wished for by anything like a majority of the community. The prevalent feeling seems to me to be that it must come sooner or later, and that it is better to compromise the matter and anticipate later a greater demand by early but moderate legislation.

"Palmerston hates Reform as he hates the Devil. He only dislikes peace because it must lead to it. But the country has returned a Parliament to support Palmerston and Reform, and the two must be brought into harmony, or the former will go to the wall. Palmerston has the sense to know it, and colleagues who are, I suspect, determined to drag or drive him

in that direction. Mr. Vernon Smith's speech at Northampton is a strong indication.

"Locke King will reproduce his motion immediately. When it is brought forward, the Government must declare their course, not only on the Bill, but on the whole subject.

"Now, I have no great faith in Lord John Russell as a reformer. His ambition and hopes will induce him probably to go much further than is either necessary or wise, or even politic for his own objects. The country cannot again be made drunk with Reform as it was in 1832, and even the men who are the organs of extreme opinions on this subject would prefer protesting against a moderate measure to passing a large one. When, therefore, Lord John outbids Palmerston, I doubt whether his higher bid will not repel more people than it will attract. I, therefore, shall not be sorry to see the Government take up the question, and I look upon it as safer in their hands than either those of Lord John, who would go too far, or Lord Derby, who could produce nothing which would satisfy the Liberal party, whose property the question is.

"Here, I fear, I differ both with Graham, who wants more, and with Gladstone, who wants less, or rather wants nothing.

"Graham, I think, looks to Reform as the weapon with which to destroy a Government which, for other reasons, he disapproves of. I rather look on Reform as a subject for the sake of which the Government should be kept in, always assuming that they make up their minds to deal with it, which I expect they will. If they do not, *alors comme alors*.

"These are really the only practically important questions before the House. Education no Government can grapple with. Law reform all Governments will deal with alike.

"Upon foreign policy and finance, for the present, Palmerston is unassailable. We have carried those questions to an appeal, and he has got the verdict. I think this is partly our own fault, for our attacks were of a force beyond what the case seemed to a previously uninstructed public to justify. In a year's time, possibly, the case will be understood, but our bolt will have been spent.

"Now, if my speculations are right, and they may

be so, and if my estimate of the leanings of my two friends are accurate, then Graham wishes to turn out Palmerston to bring in Lord John; Gladstone wishes to turn him out to bring in Lord Derby; and I wish to keep him in.

"Now, these are great differences, and necessarily imply separate action for the present, though I cordially trust we shall ultimately find ourselves acting together again. But even in our present separate action, if separate it must be, for all of us it seems to me that quiescence is the right course; but if we sit in our old places will quiescence be possible for any, or at any rate for all of us? The speech of each will be taken to express the intention or the opinion of the whole three; or each must make a protest for himself. Either result would be mischievous. The first would place two of us in a false position, as appearing to coincide with opinions from which we differ. The second would give the appearance even if it did not create a formal permanent separation between us. Last session I was obliged to speak on Locke King's motion because I was sitting next to Graham, and differed with him. Had we not sat together it would have been unnecessary. Next month will it be wise for all three of us to sit together, and each answer the other on the general subject when the same motion comes on again?

"It is quite clear that we stand, since the General Election, in an altered relation to the Government—all opposition is based on a presumed support out of doors. The appeal to the country has been made. We have been beaten, and we cannot appeal *from* the people. The reappearance of the Peel party, seated together in the same place, will indicate an intention of beginning again where we left off, and it will indicate our belief in the continued existence of a Peel party, which I think it is important in every practicable way to contradict. Consulting together as independent members of Parliament, sitting on the same side of the House, and being private friends is quite another thing; but anything having the appearance of hoisting a banner is surely most objectionable: it would deprive our advice of all weight, and ourselves of much influence, and would only seem to rally men round the Government against ourselves."

"I think Palmerston's popularity a bubble, which, if only let alone, will, like all bubbles, amplify till it bursts. Our activity has certainly helped him wonderfully on one or two occasions, besides which, as I have before said, the verdict of the country imposes quiescence on us, so far as opposition on past matters is concerned. I have written with an entire absence of reserve the painful conclusions at which I have arrived. Gladstone's position is far more difficult than mine, especially if he thinks that no fusion has ever taken place between him and the Liberal party, and still more if, as he says, his constituency share his opinion. I am more and more perplexed at it, and torn opposite ways, by one's sensitiveness as to what his honour may require, and by one's anxiety to retain his great powers and high character for that Moderate Liberal party which I think must govern this country, to say nothing of that co-operation with one's self which his noble qualities have made it a privilege to enjoy; but I trust that you and he will have worked out some possible course."

MR. HERBERT TO MR. GLADSTONE.

"WILTON, *April 13th*, 1857.

"MY DEAR GLADSTONE,

"Lord Aberdeen has sent me copies of his recent correspondence with you, and I have written him a terribly long letter in returning them. I should have written to you before, but elections have occupied each of us, and I have had a narrow escape of a rheumatic fever since.

"I am very much disappointed at your result in Flintshire,¹ but it was a moment when everything was against you, and therefore against Glynne, and I do not suppose that the result is a fair indication of what would happen in a General Election in ordinary times. Here, I was, *at the end* of the contest, struck

¹ Mr. Gladstone had taken an active part in supporting the candidature of his brother-in-law Sir Stephen Glynne in the Conservative interest for Flintshire. To use the words of the Duke of Argyll, he had "been making a speech in every town, every village, every cottage, everywhere where he had room to stand! And at Liverpool it was an avowed canvass for Derby on his part."

by the fact that *furor* for Palmerston lasted far longer in Conservative than in Liberal households. The regular old-fashioned country gentlemen who are not Londoners enough to have come within the vortex of the Carlton are Palmerstonian *pur et simple*, as the only man who can make peace and ward off democracy. With the Liberals Palmerston is fast becoming secondary to some undefined but not immediate measure of Reform. Indeed, there is a wholesome fear of extreme measures; even those who advocate them hope to be beaten.

"As for ourselves—*i.e.* Graham, yourself, and me—we are *rari nantes*, and we are not only broken up as a party (though I maintain we were not one), but the country intends us to be so broken up, and would, I think, resent any attempt at resuscitation. The fear of the cliques and sections is universal, and they bear more than their due in the way of reputation for mischief intended or done. I gather from your Flintshire speeches that you do not consider the result of the elections as a final verdict on past questions, though being engaged in an election, by the way, you, of course, were still pleading the cause.

"However, I have written at such length to Lord Aberdeen that I cannot by this post do the same to you. The whole question of our future is very difficult and perplexing, though, within a certain distance, I can see my course ahead clearly enough. I am more puzzled about yours since I read your second letter to Lord Aberdeen, and your difficulties are immediate and not prospective. I am certain, however, that for the public good we ought not to reappear as a triumvirate on our old bench, nor for our own sakes either, for with this Reform question ahead we should differ, but the difference would be far more *éclatant* if we were acting as a party together up to the moment of differing.

"These are terrible questions to discuss between men who have sat together so many years, but the discussion seems inevitable.

"Do you know anything about Wortley, how he is, or to what extent recovering, or likely to recover? What I fear is, he is another of our old friends gone. Altogether the prospect is most depressing. I try to console myself with the idea that I shall occupy

myself out of the House with commissions, and leave Parliamentary discussions and tactics to those who have better heart for them. Whatever happens, the warmth of friendship will, I know, remain among us all undiminished.

"Remember me and Liz to your wife, and believe me, ever affectionately yours."

MR. HERBERT TO SIR JAMES GRAHAM.

"WILTON HOUSE, SALISBURY,

"*April 14th*, 1857.

"MY DEAR GRAHAM,

"I received on Saturday a letter from Lord Aberdeen, enclosing a correspondence with Gladstone on the subject of his future course and the position to be taken up on the opening of the new Parliament. Gladstone's second letter is the key to much that has lately happened. He says that if we were fused with the Liberal party on the formation of Lord Aberdeen's Government, then he has unwittingly deceived the whole world and his own constituency, who have elected him in the belief that no such fusion has ever taken place.

"To me, the simple fact that we have remained sitting on the Liberal side of the House seems conclusive, and made the awkwardness of Gladstone's communications with Lord Derby, for had we not been sitting on the Liberal side there would have been neither embarrassment nor objection arising from such communications.

"But this view of his own position makes his course the more difficult. The General Election has altered the aspect of public questions. It has shelved China and the Budget, as the House of Lords shelves a lawsuit. Reform has risen into the first place, or, at any rate, a front place. I doubt whether you and I are agreed in degree on the subject, though we are so as to the principle. You have had your hand in such matters in times more troublous, and your nerves are used to what rather shakes mine. The difference, however, may be, and I trust is, less than I think; but of this I am certain, that the more we agree the more shall we disagree with Gladstone, and I do not like the idea of recommencing the session in our old places

with an affectation of 'Peelism' as a party badge, when a few weeks must show how great the difference is between us. I trust we two will be able on this Reform question to act together, tho' I shall be content to halt when you are still anxious to go on; but I do not see how Gladstone is to act with us at all. It is very perplexing and very painful.

"I have assumed throughout, and perhaps with little or insufficient evidence, that Gladstone is prepared to resist Reform, or, at any rate, not prepared to further it. Do you know anything of his intentions?

"I hope Lady Graham is better, and that you are relieved from the anxiety you were suffering under a few weeks back, at any rate for a time. The weather is very trying to all who are ill or delicate."

SIR JAMES GRAHAM TO MR. HERBERT.

"GROSVENOR PLACE,

"April 15th, 1857.

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"I have not seen Gladstone since his return to London, but I have seen the correspondence between Lord Aberdeen and him, to which your letter relates. Lord Aberdeen's letters appeared to me excellent, and I subscribe to every word of them. Whatever may be Gladstone's ultimate decision, which must be guided by events and measures hitherto unknown, I should be sorry for his own sake to see him cross the House at the meeting of Parliament.¹

"But it is vain to speculate on possibilities which the lapse of a short time will convert into certainties, and then, and not until then, the moment for decisive action will arrive. In the meanwhile, it would appear to me natural and decorous that those who have been united by every bond of private friendship and of a common sense of public duty should continue to sit and to act together until some serious difference of opinion shall arise. It may not occur, and then the pain of separation will be averted. If it does occur, let the ground be broad and intelligible, and let the dissolution of the union be in the face of day and in the presence of the public. The political connection will then be severed;

¹ The remainder of this letter will be found in Mr. Parker's *Life of Sir James Graham*.

but the debt due to private friendship will have been satisfied, for we shall have maintained the union to the last moment consistent with the higher claims which love of country and public duty may impose."

MR. GLADSTONE TO MR. HERBERT.

"II, CARLTON HOUSE TERRACE,
"April 17th, 1857.

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"It was only to-day that I found Lord Aberdeen, and saw your letter to him. Practically the point at issue is, I imagine, nothing but this—where we are to sit in the new Parliament. I agree with you to the full in thinking that Peelism should be held extinct, and that we ought not to form a clique or party; but I do not agree, so far as I can see my way, in thinking that the legitimate way to effect these ends is to divorce ourselves locally from one another: the fundamental objection to that, I think, is, that it would be the understood and regular sign of a final and formal separation, that it ought to follow, not precede, such a separation, and that such a separation, to be justified in the face of the public, must be sustained by reasons, which reasons must show not only the objections to our holding the place we have, but the propriety of our sitting down in the places we go to. I grant that to put forward the appearance of identity at this moment, after what the elections have done, would be a deception; but it seems to me that it would also be a deception were we to cease to occupy the same bench—the bench which is, of all places, in the House of Commons the most nearly one of pure neutrality for ex-Ministers—for though it is on the ministerial side of the House, it is traditionally the place of men who, having been in office, may be either practically connected with, or wholly dissociated from, the existing Government.

"Agreeing in your premises, and dissenting from your conclusion, I am bound to answer the question, in what way I should myself give effect to the principle I have admitted, that we ought no longer to appear as a clique or section. I know of but one

way, nor do I pretend that it is entirely satisfactory—it is the way of silence and of absence. As far as I can forecast the coming session, it is not unlikely to allow us both these privileges in a high degree.

“We have agreed together, and have differed from the Government, on finance, expenditure, and foreign policy; but I do not see any likelihood of our doing good, certainly none of my own doing good, by raising the fight at the present junction. Pen in hand, I think the acquiescence of the country in the handling of the Persian affair, in a constitutional sense, an infamy; but I know of no advantage to arise from starting the subject afresh, though, if it were taken up with power from any quarter independent of us, it might be a duty to follow; this, however, is little likely.

“It appears to me that in your letter, wearied out (and no wonder) with the prolonged and increasing pain of our political suspense, just as a man roasted at a slow fire would, if he could, make it a quick one, you have cut the knot by treating as actual and mature, differences between Graham, yourself, and me, on public questions, which are only remote and possible. You may think me too backward about Parliamentary Reform, as on my side I doubt whether you have taken an accurate measure of the forces arrayed in its favour, as compared with the chances of its miscarriage; but this difference may never become practical in the slightest degree, and different shading of sympathy and antipathy, not admitted as paramount in action, whether they be as to questions or to persons, do not appear to me to justify the final act of severance among old political associates, not to say personal friends. In a word, it appears to me that, were the views you incline to adopted, the issue might probably be that instead of one false position, which in the last Parliament we have shared together, we should have three false positions, each of us one, in the new House.

“At the same time, whatever happens, I shall be little, I hope, in any one’s way; since, for myself, I can see no choice except between mischief and inaction.

“But once more I say, do not let us separate corporally, which ought to be the final act of an ascertained, practical, and incurable difference—when it is still perfectly possible that upon emergencies as

they arise, by which, and not by theories, we must in the last resort be governed, we may find ourselves compelled to act together.

"I may be biassed in my judgment by disinclination to a process intensely painful, but I have not knowingly submitted to any such influence. I have striven to estimate calmly the bearings of duty in a difficult case, and I have distinctly included in my estimate the effect of the elections, which may in given contingencies materially modify my course with reference to the existing Government.

"We have still time before us. I am delighted to hear you have recovered."

Finding the course which he would himself have preferred thus strongly deprecated, not only by Lord Aberdeen, but by Sir James Graham and Mr. Gladstone also, Mr. Herbert ceased to press its adoption, and at the meeting of the new Parliament the three friends resumed their former seats next to each other below the gangway.

The ascendancy of Lord Palmerston was so complete as to render the earlier part of the Session dull and uneventful. Mr. Gladstone consequently found no difficulty in carrying out his announced intention of habitual non-attendance. Mr. Herbert also was to a great extent drawn away from his Parliamentary duties by the business of the Sanitary Commission, of which he had undertaken the direction. But he was always in his place when questions affecting the Army were under discussion.

The Crimean War had taught many lessons—among them the necessity for the training and handling of larger bodies of men than it had hitherto been usual to bring together in England in time of peace.

With this view a considerable vote was proposed for the permanent Camp at Aldershot, and Sidney

Herbert gave the full weight of his support to the Government proposal. On June 5th he said :

“The first encampment established in this country, within the recollection of the present generation, was that which existed at Chobham. Public opinion had not previously been directed to the deficiencies of our Army, and our troops were afforded very few opportunities of acting together in large masses. When I, as Secretary at War, proposed that there should be a military encampment, the doctrine which I advocated of the expediency of having the various regiments of the Army brought together in divisions and brigades was very much questioned, upon the ground of the expense which the carrying of that doctrine into practical operation would entail upon the country. Economy was at that time the order of the day, and efficiency was but little regarded in comparison. During the war a different state of things prevailed, but we may now perceive again a tendency to revert to economy. I must confess I am myself a great advocate for economy in matters such as that under our notice; but I feel bound to consider how far we should be consulting that opinion by lopping off a sum of £50,000 from this vote, and spoiling the whole of our plan. It is proposed on the part of the Government to construct permanent barracks at Aldershot, but not to do away with the system of having masses of troops encamped there during the summer months. It was, however, I maintain, necessary to purchase the ground at Aldershot. The extent to which the land is enclosed in England accounts for the circumstance that it is not easy to find an open space which is well supplied with water, and which in other respects is not open to objection. I believe the erection of permanent barracks at Aldershot to be a necessary step, and for this reason, that there is not at present in England a sufficient amount of barrack accommodation for our troops. When the Committee examines into the detail of that accommodation, they will, I think, be surprised at the sanitary considerations which it will present to their view. Those who enter our Army are picked men, in the prime of life, their period of service varying 20 to 30 years of age; they are examined by a medical man, and must, before their

admission into the service, be reported free from malformation and all tendency to disease. How comes it so to pass, then, that among that class of men the mortality is greater than among those of the same age in civil life? There must be some reason to account for the circumstance; a good one, in my opinion, is that they are generally badly housed. Well, the Government propose to construct permanent barracks at Aldershot, by which that objection will, to some extent, be met.

"I must say that I hope greater care will in future be taken to instruct our soldiers in those minor points of military education in which they are so extremely deficient. Not one among them, unless he happens to have learned the trade of a glazier, or to have come from the bogs of Ireland or the Highlands of Scotland, where men must, more or less, shift for themselves, knows how to put a pane of glass into a window, or to accomplish any of those small contrivances in the way of cooking and hutting which are of so much use to an army in the field. For these reasons I should be glad to see more of the work at Aldershot done by the troops themselves. You cannot, it is true, create an efficient commissariat in time of peace. I do not believe that it can be done until the second or third year of war. No man in his senses would dream in the present state of England, of marching a troop of soldiers from one quarter of the country to another with a commissariat in its rear, going into every farm-yard and purchasing its contents, when they might get the necessary provisions by contract with half the trouble and at half the price."

The great Sepoy mutiny broke out in May, and by the middle of July all domestic matters were overshadowed by the rapidly darkening news received from India. In these events, Sidney Herbert took his full share of interest, but few references appear to them in his correspondence. One letter of his, however, written at this period, deserves preservation as an admirable example of the courteous exposure of an impracticable scheme.

Among the innumerable suggestions to which the

excitement of the time gave birth was one for the formation of a regiment, or regiments, of *gentlemen* to serve in India. Mr. Herbert was asked to give his support to this movement, and thus replied:

"WILTON, *September 25th*, 1857.

"DEAR MR. RAIKES CURRIE,

"Nothing would be easier than to organise a rendezvous where all the young men of the 'Jack Steele'¹ type might enlist, so as to form a battalion or battalions together, if that be their object. This would secure to them that which they naturally enough desire—namely, the fellowship and company of men of their own habits, class, and education. If that is what they want, and all that they want, so far as the feasibility of recruiting them is concerned, a few pounds would open a house where they should enroll themselves, and a few more would advertise and publish its whereabouts. But then come two other questions. Is this all that they want; and, if it be so, are they likely to make good soldiers?

"Now, it is not clear that this is all they want. I observe in their letters to *The Times* such conditions as, 'Provided I am secured as good a position as that to which I am accustomed,' 'Provided I am not thereby placed in a lower scale than that in which I have hitherto moved,' and so on, from which I gather that either they don't intend to be privates, or, if privates, that they are to be paid (for pay marks rank and social position in this country) as officers. Now, for the State to pay a man more for doing that which another man will not only do, but do better, for less, would be absurd. Even without higher pay these battalions would be to the line what the Bengal Army was to the Madras, a caste soldiery: fine gentlemen who would hold themselves superior to, and keep aloof from, their comrades in less favoured regiments. Again, are they to elect their own officers, or take them from the line (there are none on the half-pay list below field officer's rank, fit or willing to serve). If they elect from among themselves, will they never repent their choice? Will they obey as *blindly* (for

¹ The signature of letters to *The Times* on the subject.

that is how a soldier must obey) a man who has no superiority to themselves, except his temporary rank? In despotic (which are always military) countries, the strong military feeling induces military obedience as a matter of course, nor does the military system offer much contrast to the civil. But here, where our freedom has created a strong feeling of independence and self-assertion from authority, military obedience would be impossible, were it not that the soldier comes from the class that is accustomed to respect and obey the class from which the officer comes. The peasant touches his hat to the lord, the squire, the banker, the rich tradesman, and the yeoman; he sees the farmer ride alongside while he walks at the plough, and he says 'Sir' to him. I doubt the military obedience of the volunteer private to the volunteer officer. Again, would the former cheerfully perform all the duties of a soldier, which are those of a day-labourer, a cook, a scullion, a scavenger, and a servant? If they would not they would be worse than useless, for they would set an example fatal to those who would.

"On the other hand, would they obey the regular Queen's officer with his peremptory word of command, or would they not damn the insolent aristocrat, unless the latter diplomatised and wheedled them, which, for example, would be equally mischievous?

"I fear a caste army. I have done something to reduce the privileges of the officers of the Guards; but here we should be creating a body of Guards, whose privates are to have exclusive privileges as well as the officers. But are they likely to serve zealously? I rather doubt the permanence of enthusiasm. These fellows if placed in a row opposite a sepoy battery to-morrow morning would charge and take it; but will their enthusiasm—I don't mean of one or two, but of the mass—last through two or three months' drill here, and a long sea-voyage to India, and still longer marches backward and forward under weights to which they are unaccustomed, without the commonest comforts to which they are accustomed, and under a burning sun and drenching rains, undergoing labour which previous habit only makes tolerable—viz. labour with pickaxe and spade?

"Many of our recruits from the peasant class, nay,

the majority of them, you will say, are entering from a feeling of enthusiasm. That is true, and they do not, as a body, either repent or repine afterwards. But then they leave a hard life of physical labour in exchange for another, which gives them besides better food, better clothing, and generally a better income than they had before (for a man could not lodge, feed, and clothe himself as a soldier for less than 13 or 14 shillings a week), and he gains in social position. Whereas Jack Steele goes *downwards* instead of *upwards* in all these particulars, but yet is always to be satisfied that he has made a very wise choice.

"I enclose three letters cut out of *The Daily News* of yesterday, in two of which Jack Steele, who has been told to enlist, instead of offering to do so, puts clearly enough the loss of caste and position and prospects which he would incur; and another shows that he will only be a private on condition that he is made an officer. Now we have plenty of officers, and can only admit more by keeping others out.

"I do not say that if we had a war of invasion you should not adopt plans of this description, for then the want would be to arm all male adults; but for a distant war of a very trying character real soldiers are best, and happily we are getting plenty of them, more than 1,000 a week. We have an army of professional privates, the best in the world, with officers against whom it can only be said that some of them are not professional enough; but that is an evil which will soon be remedied, and I doubt the policy of organising battalions of unprofessional privates. The feeling that dictates the proposal is a very fine and creditable one, but on the balance of advantage and disadvantage I think the latter predominates.

"Pardon this long letter, but I thought it due to you to give you, however hastily and imperfectly, the reasons and doubts which prevent my acceding to your proposal."

The greater part of Sidney Herbert's time during 1857 and 1858 was, however, devoted to the Commission on the Sanitary State of the Army, which forms the subject of another chapter in this book.

The autumn of 1857 was saddened by the death of Lady Graham, and the dangerous illness of Lord Aberdeen.

MR. HERBERT TO MR. GLADSTONE.

"I was grieved indeed to hear of the sad misfortune at Hawarden Church.¹ Will you give the enclosed to Mrs. Gladstone, that I may have a few stones in the new building?"

"There is great gloom here. The panic in monetary affairs has been greater to-day than ever. I have reason to think the Government will do now what they did in 1847, and suspend the operation of the Bank Charter Act to the same extent. If so, the question will arise whether Parliament must not be called together.

"Palmerston's speech at the Mansion House has been a good deal criticised, and justly, for the tone of his allusion to supposed threats of foreign Powers, which threats have had no existence whatever, (for the Governments and their organs in the Press have been studiously civil, though the public opinion of the nations themselves has been often hostile to us). But his reference to Canning was creditable, and will turn out to be right, I think, into the bargain, for he seems to have done well on the whole, and it is not in parts that any person's conduct in such emergencies can be judged."

The already overwhelming popularity of Lord Palmerston was, in the first instance, only increased by the Indian Mutiny. He was regarded, and perhaps regarded himself, as the one man necessary and able to meet the emergency. The strains of adulation were as loud and the expressions of confidence as strong on the part of the Conservative Opposition as on that of the Liberal supporters of the Government. But at the height of his power it began to wane. It was thought that the Revolt was looked on by

¹ It had been burned by an incendiary.

him with optimistic levity, and that his measures for its repression were lacking in expedition and energy. In the early days of 1858 a severe shock was given to his popularity by his injudicious admission of the Marquess of Clanricarde (a man universally and justly disesteemed) to the Cabinet. Of this appointment Sidney Herbert wrote :

"I hear that Granville was the only colleague consulted on the introduction of Clanricarde into the Cabinet, and that he, strange to say, approved of the step. As Leader of the House of Lords, no doubt, he was well pleased to stop the mouth of an angered and pertinacious opponent, but his usual tact must have failed him if he did not foresee the results on public opinion on the strength or weakness of the Government.

"It is said that Lord Lansdowne wrote to Palmerston to ask him if he was out of his mind on the occasion. Lord Landsdowne, who is here, is evidently much alarmed at the prospect of the India Bill and its Imperial Government. He said very little, but by showing a gesture he implied a very modified satisfaction.

"I suspect Granville does not approve ; but Palmerston has not in his Cabinet a man who can hold his own."

"SIR JAMES GRAHAM TO MR. HERBERT.

"NETHERBY, *January 21st*, 1858.

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"I am sincerely obliged by your kind inquiries. I am getting better, but the process is slow, and there is a sinking of energy and of heart from which I never shall recover.

"The prospect of public affairs must have been alluring, which would have made my return to the discharge of public duties a public service. As matters stand, I regard it with aversion. I dread the Indian Bill of the Government. I am not prepared to hand over to Vernon Smith the fate of that tottering empire ; and I am still less prepared to hand over the fortunes of England to 'the Jockey and the Jew.' In these

circumstances I would gladly stay away, for I foresee a fierce struggle of parties, in which I take no interest, when the greatest and most difficult question of modern times demands solution, and when a mistake with respect to the future Government of India may be attended with fatal consequences.

"I have had some correspondence with Lord J. Russell on the subject, but he, I am afraid, is hampered by communications which have passed between him and the ministers respecting the outline of the Government measure.

"I have studiously kept myself free to judge the measure by its merits, when it is produced, and I have avoided P.C., which in Cannon Row¹ means 'Previous communications.' When we meet I will tell you all that has passed. I have kept Lord Aberdeen constantly informed; and he, I hope and believe, approves what I have said and done.

"I have not heard from Gladstone since the end of the short Session. My unwillingness to go into the lobby, under the guidance of Dizzy, opposite to the Government, is rather increased by the untoward accident which led Gladstone astray on that occasion, when his speech was right, and his vote was wrong; but the present state of parties is a serious aggravation of the national dangers. There must be some limit to the necessity of upholding Pam. at all hazards. If his colleagues do not check him, the nation will be undone, unless the Commons have the courage to interpose. The old Whigs are subservient, and lick the hand which feeds them. They call Palmerston their 'Swiss' Commander; but the troops are no less mercenary than their chief.

"The kindness of your wife's message delights me. My heart is not yet insensible to the charm of the affection of a good and beautiful woman."

The decay of Lord Palmerston's authority was not yet apparent when Parliament met in 1858, and in the absence of all opposition and consequent abeyance of party contests, it appeared probable that the attention of the House of Commons would be mainly

¹ Where the office of the Board of Control was situated.

occupied by legislation on the subject dealt with in the above letter—the future Administration of India.

But no progress was made in that direction by Lord Palmerston, for immediately after the introduction of the Bill to transfer authority from the East India Company to the Crown, his Government was, on February 19th, suddenly and unexpectedly displaced from office. Three days before, a cynical flatterer had told Lord Palmerston that like the hero of a Roman triumph he ought to have at his side some one to remind him that he was mortal.

Deep and even dangerous irritation had been excited in France by the discovery, after the daring attempt of Orsini to assassinate the Emperor Louis Napoleon, that England was not only the home and refuge of conspirators, but the workshop of their weapons, and the asylum whence assassins went forth on their mission of murder. It was thought desirable to do something to allay this irritation, and the law, as it existed, rendering it very difficult to convict or punish crimes committed by a resident in England in a foreign country, a Bill was brought in by the Government to amend the law with regard to such offences. Its provisions were not in themselves unreasonable, but a strong distaste was felt throughout the country to a measure supposed to be dictated by France. It was popularly held to be a weak yielding to the threats contained in an address to the Emperor from the colonels of many regiments, which had been published, without comment, in the pages of the official journal, *The Moniteur*, and backed by an insolent and unanswered despatch from the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. Even the first reading of the Bill was opposed, and that by Lord John Russell. On this occasion, Mr.

Herbert assumed a calm and neutral attitude. He counselled extreme caution and deliberation, and urged, in opposition to Lord John Russell, that the Bill should be read a first time. Great circumspection, he said, was at all times necessary, but especially when the Government had abandoned its own duty, and the House of Commons was virtually asked to answer the despatch of a foreign Government. He pointed out the extraordinary change of feeling which had arisen as to the Emperor of the French. He had been the subject of great adulation—adulation in which the speaker had never joined—and had never been more popular in this country than when the attempt to murder him was made. That attempt was as much deplored in England as in France. What in the last few days had caused so entire a change of feeling? This sudden change was due to three causes: the official publication of the Colonels' addresses, the irritation felt at the suggestion of foreign interference, and the unanswered despatch. For the first, Louis Napoleon had apologised, for the second he was not responsible, and the third needed more light. In the hope of obtaining such light justifying the silence of the Government, he was content to vote for the first reading. But his support thus given to the Government was largely qualified by a strong denunciation of the Palmerstonian policy of meddling and interfering in the domestic affairs of proud and independent nations. This he believed to be the true and chief cause of the ill-will with which England was regarded on the Continent. It was said—not in reprobation, but as a matter of praise—that England was feared and hated on account of this meddling. It was called a distinguished policy, a spirited policy. That was not the light in which he himself regarded it.

Writing to Mr. Gladstone on the following day, Mr. Herbert said :

“I thought Lord John very wrong in the course he took, which was unexpected by me. I had, therefore, to make the case of Cardwell and myself. The House received it very favourably, and the issue was, I think, a sound one. Palmerston was very feeble and disheartened. Sir George Grey spoke very well. Roebuck, the night before, excellent in his way, and more Roebuck than Roebuck. Monday is the second reading. I have not a guess what your feeling may be on it. Mine is that we should not refuse to do right—if it be right—on the ground that we are asked to do it by a foreign country ; but we must be sure that it *is* right, safe, and effectual. I think we ought not to proceed in our present ignorance of the law as it is and as it may be.”

In the interval which elapsed between the first and second reading of the Bill, however, he became convinced that the action, or rather the inaction, of the Government could not be defended, and was prepared to agree with Mr. Gladstone, who wrote that—

“on the Conspiracy Bill, Palmerston’s speech was even worse than usual; Grey seems to have tried all that could be said for the measure. Having now read what its advocates had to say, I am decidedly and strongly against it. I feel with you the difficulty of refusing to do right because it is demanded by some one who has no title to make the demand; but that despatch of Walewski is intolerable, and no Minister would have left it unanswered except the one who betrayed the Belgian Press—I mean abandoned its liberties in 1855 at the Conferences of Paris. I must say I do not see the case against the law upon its merits, nor do I see how that case can arise until it has been tried and has failed. It was imprudent in Lord John to divide, but I must have voted with him.”

Once more the friends found themselves united in

opposition to the Government, and their votes, along with those of Lord John Russell and some of his friends, defeated, on its second reading, the "Conspiracy to Commit Murder" Bill. Lord Palmerston at once resigned, and Lord Derby succeeded him. Lord Derby went immediately to Lord Aberdeen, and requested him to use his influence with Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Herbert to induce them to join his Cabinet; but this Lord Aberdeen was not prepared to do. The Duke of Argyll meanwhile endeavoured to mitigate Sidney Herbert's objections to Lord Palmerston, and I quote his letter for the sake of the answer it elicited.

THE DUKE OF ARGYLL TO MR. HERBERT.

"March 8th, 1858.

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"As our conversation was cut short, and I do not meet you often, I am going to overflow in ink.

"I was a little surprised by the severity of your Pamphobiacal symptoms: an affection under which I knew Gladstone to have been long suffering, though it certainly has not reached in him that latter stage—*lock-jaw*.

"But joking apart, there are one or two things I wish to say on the view you expressed to me—of Pam.

"In respect to his faults, that view is one, I think, of very great exaggeration; and, in other respects, I am satisfied that it is essentially unjust.

"None of us ought to forget his conduct at the close of Aberdeen's Government. I thought it then, and think it now, highly honourable to him. I believe you thought so too; and I can't forget that in the consultation to which I was a party, your impressions as to the propriety of our serving under him were very different from those of Gladstone and Graham. I agreed with you, so did Aberdeen, and he persuaded the junction which then took place. I have no knowledge of the secret history of the subsequent

separation. I thought, and I still think, it was not justified by the circumstances, and I am persuaded that with Graham and Gladstone it was in great measure determined by that invincible personal distrust which made them so long refuse to join. I did not share in that feeling, and I was determined not to follow their lead under its influence.

"I now come to subsequent events. I put aside the Yankee affair, because it was not one of policy at all. We should have fallen into it equally if all of you had remained. There was nothing in it of Palmerstonianism. It was local mismanagement, and we acted rightly in dealing with the difficulty when it had arisen.

"Since then, in making the peace with Russia, in the negotiations for the fulfilment of its terms, and in other matters of Foreign Policy, Pam.'s conduct has not been open to the charges you made against it. He may have been right or wrong in his estimate of the importance of particular points—*e.g.* Bolgrad, the union or separation of the Principalities, etc. On these questions opinions may well differ, but I can witness that Pam. has acted with firmness and courage *towards the strong*—even towards the French Government, on whose alliance he sets great store.

"In this last affair we made a mistake in tactics, I admit. I doubt whether our course was not the best, after all, in other senses; but in this, Pam. has not been actuated by any disposition to truckle to the strong. He values more than Gladstone does the French alliance and the present French Government. But I am bound to say in justice to him, that, so far from truckling to them, he has shown during the last two years a readiness to oppose and confront them that has surprised me, and arose only from an honest adherence to his own opinions on European policy.

"I hear he is now attacked for not having assaulted Naples on the 'Engineer' question. We were withheld from doing so, solely out of respect to the principles of public law. If Pam. had acted solely from the motives you attribute to him, he could have had no better opportunity.

"Both the possible leaders of the Liberal party *have great faults*; I see no justice in running down either of them. Of the two, Pam. is far more amenable

to the opinion of his colleagues. I have seen both in Council, and I affirm this without a doubt of its truth.

"In other respects, in knowledge of home affairs, and in some valuable instincts, Lord John is the superior man, no doubt. But I protest against the exaggeration with which you seem disposed to look at P.'s faults. None of them are any just impediments in the way of acting with him. He is perfectly fair to his colleagues, and fairly represents his Cabinet."

MR. HERBERT TO THE DUKE OF ARGYLL.

"WILTON HOUSE, SALISBURY,

"March 13th, 1858.

"MY DEAR ARGYLL,

"I ought to have answered your letter before, but I thought it necessitated a detailed answer, which would take time; after all, however, it would lead to discussions very lengthy in themselves, and not likely to be very profitable in the way of conversion to either of us. I quite admit all you say of Palmerston's conduct and Lord Aberdeen, and I am as ignorant as you are of the secret history of our secession—if that is the word for it—from Palmerston's Government. I supported the Government through the war, and upon more points than one did not let my opinion stand in my way in so doing. I think now, as I thought then, that more might have been done with our Army, and more might have been got by treaty; but I know how much you were hampered by our allies. Since then we have had differences to which I have given out-spoken utterance, and some which I have kept to myself. I confess that I disapproved of the withdrawal of our Minister from Naples, and the subsequent attempt to negotiate through a Consul when the principles of public law were violated by the King of Naples. Malmesbury, I see, has been unwise enough to run on in the old grooves, which is excusable in a minister who began in it, but inexcusable in one who had *tabula rasa*.

"These things, however, are all now matters of history. What I wish is that disagreements should

cease. I look forward to a gloomy future. I had rather make no contrasts between the faults of possible Prime Ministers. There is too much material of the kind to make it either difficult or pleasant.

"In the meanwhile the present people seemed inclined to try and outbid the Liberal party—a course which will be justly fatal to themselves, but, what is more important, will be very fatal to the country too: whatever they propose, our friends must cap. If Derby goes for universal suffrage, Palmerston or Johnny will produce the women and children.

"It will require cautious steering on the part of those who prefer the interests of the country to the interests of party, to prevent mischief being done between them all. I look upon you as one able and willing to take an important part in so regulating matters, and I, though wearied and disquieted with politics and politicians, would contribute what I could towards this desirable, but I fear unattainable, object."

The remainder of the Session seemed likely to be fairly calm, but the publication of a despatch from Lord Ellenborough, the new Minister for India, conveying a strong censure on the measures adopted by the Governor-General, Lord Canning, to secure the pacification of Oude, evoked a violent storm. Sidney Herbert wrote thus to Mr. Gladstone:

"May 10th, 1858.

"You have been terribly wanted these ten days in Council. Here is the existing state of things:

"Cardwell moved a Resolution, reserving all opinion on Canning's Proclamation, but expressing our regret that, when in the midst of difficulties, a despatch should be published which must weaken his authority and tend to protract the armed resistance of the insurgents.

"There may be strong party reasons against this move, but, as Lord Aberdeen says, if Parliament is Parliament, they cannot allow so flagrant a proceeding to pass uncensured. The fear is the despatch will arrive in India in time to ensure the failure of Canning's policy, or, indeed, anybody's policy, for it is a justification of the Oude insurgents, and an

invitation to them to fight on for the good cause. Melville says that Canning's Proclamation will have pacified Oude before the despatch reaches. That shows greater confidence in the Proclamation than I have, but he is a better and, indeed, the best of all judges. The motion is for Thursday. I hope you will be up to-morrow. Graham went to Wimbledon yesterday afternoon, still undecided, but Lord Aberdeen says he is confident he will support Cardwell."

Lord Ellenborough gave way before the popular expression of disapproval, and resigned. This was considered by such of Lord Canning's friends as were not swayed by party considerations to be a sufficient vindication of his action, but plausible reasons were not wanting to justify those who wished to overthrow the Government in still pressing for a vote of censure. In the end, Mr. Cardwell's motion was withdrawn, but how difficult Mr. Herbert found a decision on the point to be is shown in the following letter to Mr. Gladstone:

"May 17th, 1858.

"I can assure you I did not want your note to remind me of the terms of your letter to Lord Derby, nor can events well occur more important there to our Empire, or on which one way or another men's conscientious convictions can be stronger. As a mere party move, the continuance of the motion had my continued opposition; as an assertion of right against wrong, being once put, it must have my determined support. Lord Ellenborough's resignation was an implied revocation of this policy. But the Government have now accepted it fully, and I think we are bound to publish in India our reprobation of it. If it leads, as it honestly should, to the return of Oude to the King, it is the first step in a downward policy, made in defiance of all consideration for the happiness of the people. If it does not, it is the hypocritical penitence of a thief who still retains his plunder. If Canning's Proclamation be right, and I think that looking to the future government of Oude and not

to the military question alone, it probably is so, then Ellenborough's despatch is a serious, but not irremediable, blunder; but if Canning is wrong, then the success of any policy in the face of that inflammatory despatch is impossible. One must put parties at home and Canning abroad out of sight. It is a great national danger, produced by the insane vanity of one man, and we must do what we can to mitigate the evil. This, I fear, for I am told so, is not your view. Let it not be more than a difference on a political question. My friendship and affection for you, believe me, can stand rougher shocks than this."

But that such rougher shocks were impending, and that the two friends were likely to be henceforth politically alienated, if not actively hostile, was painfully foreboded by Sidney Herbert. He wrote to Mrs. Herbert a few days later (May 31st) that he had "seen Lord Aberdeen and read Gladstone's correspondence on the late offer [of a seat in Lord Derby's Cabinet], which he declined, rather, I think, against Lord Aberdeen's and Graham's advice, who seem to have thought that—as he must do it ultimately—he would be happier if he did it at once." But though Mr. Gladstone was not unwilling to work with Lord Derby, he was less disposed to co-operate with Mr. Disraeli, and stuck to his refusal.

In the discussion of the Resolutions as to the future government of India, proposed by Lord Derby's Government, Sidney Herbert took great interest and an active part, and on June 14th he spoke at some length on the question of the composition and attributes of the Secretary of State's Council. Lord Palmerston had proposed that the members of this Council should be nominated by the Crown for a fixed period; Lord John Russell that they should be nominated for life; Lord Stanley and the Government, that they should be partly nominated and partly

elected. The scheme of appointment during good behaviour—*i.e.* practically for life—was that which Herbert himself preferred, and he pointed out that without such a guarantee the Council could have no real independence or moral weight.

The autumn was for the most part devoted by Mr. Herbert to visits of inspection to nearly every military barrack in England and to drafting schemes for their improvement. In the midst of this useful work Mr. Herbert was visited with a great and sudden sorrow—the death of his eldest and favourite sister, Countess Clanwilliam.

MR. HERBERT TO SIR JAMES GRAHAM.

“WILTON HOUSE, SALISBURY,

“October 8th, 1858.

“MY DEAR GRAHAM,

“I thank you most truly for your kind and feeling letter. This sudden loss has been a terrible shock to us all. Of all my sisters she was the one whom, by common consent and without jealousy, each of us loved the best. She had been apparently, and, for her, unusually well before the short illness which carried her away at the little wretched roadside inn where she died. I had been struck by, and remarked upon, the strong sense of enjoyment that her letters breathed during her Highland tour. The peace with China, too, had relieved her of an immense anxiety which had gnawed at her heart this last year, though she had given her two boys bravely and cheerfully to their duty. Hers was a noble character, and its truth and affection were marked, even to strangers, in her face.

“But I cannot speak of our sorrow in the presence of Clanwilliam. I know no one whose whole existence was so much *within* his home as was his. His interests, occupations, were all centred there, and his desolate life, now to begin, is fearful to think of. Hitherto, the battle with his grief has necessarily something of excitement in it which helps to support; but he has worse to come. God only can give him

strength, and to Him he looks. I could not wish him otherwise than he is—in any respect. The affection of all his family and the sympathy of his friends is very soothing to him. He has asked me to delay this letter that he may add a note from himself. I had projected an excursion northwards to see Lord Aberdeen when our calamity overtook us. I fear from your account that he will not be long among us. You say nothing of yourself. I wish you had adhered to your plan of going to Vichy. I have great faith in suitable waters. I got great good from mine, though it may not last long.”

No fresh offer of office was made to Mr. Gladstone, but his assistance was requested by Lord Derby to settle on the spot certain questions which had arisen as to the administration of the Ionian Islands. He accepted the task, and left England as Lord High Commissioner Extraordinary early in November. Beyond a hint given that Sir E. Bulwer Lytton's deafness made him desirous to retire from the Colonial Office, nothing was said with regard to any closer approximation to the Government, but it was tacitly understood that on Mr. Gladstone's return from Corfu he would be asked to take Sir E. B. Lytton's place. Had matters remained as they were when Mr. Gladstone started on his mission, I believe this proposal would have been not only made, but accepted. But before Mr. Gladstone was again in England, the influence of great and unlooked-for events had swept him away in a totally different political direction from that towards which he had for some time past seemed to incline.

CHAPTER IV

THE SANITARY COMMISSION

1856-59

THE Crimean War not only made manifest many shortcomings in the organisation and management of military hospitals, but also incidentally disclosed the fact that the whole structure of the Medical Department of the Army was unsound and in need of radical reform. It was generally felt that no adequate attention had been given to the soldier's comfort when in barracks, and that while but little had been done to cure him when sick, nothing had been done to keep him in health when well. A change in this respect was demanded with great unanimity by the Press and the Public, and the War Office authorities were constrained to take steps in that direction, though hampered by the reluctance of the Treasury to provide funds for expenditure of this character, and by the apathetic inattention born of an irrational apprehension that the soldier would be spoiled by any amelioration of the hardships of his life.

Towards the close of 1856, Sidney Herbert was requested by Lord Panmure, then Secretary of State for War, to preside over a Commission of Inquiry into the Sanitary State of the Army. To this invitation he replied as follows:

"WILTON, *November 22nd*, 1856.

"MY DEAR PANMURE,

"My faith in Commissions is rather shaken. We have all of us seen elaborate reports shelved, together with the subjects to which they refer. A Commission may draw out the truth, and, by the authority of its recommendations, strengthen the hands of the executive for action. But a Commission may also get rid of the necessity for immediate action, and hang up the subject till public feeling or expectation has died away.

"I confess that I think that the proper Head of a Commission to investigate matters of administration under a department is the Head of the department, for the authority which his responsibility gives him enables him to sway his Commission and secure his Report: then a few hours' labour converts the Report into a Warrant, and the thing is done. But I know you have an answer to this, and I admit its weight.

"Supposing, then, that my past experience fits me, in your absence, for the task you propose to me to undertake, that a Commission is necessary, and that its labours are likely to produce good fruit, I hold, that so far as my time or exertions can be made profitable to the public service, I am bound to give them.

"I am not, however, without doubt as to the advisability of a Commission, and should have preferred the exercise, either comprehensively or step by step, of the authority of the executive in the direction of reform. I cannot conceal from myself that there is a strong professional feeling in the Army Medical Department which is averse to all change. The knowledge of detail and the authority over its members possessed by its heads may greatly influence the evidence at our disposal. If the result of the Commission should be to produce a mass of cumulative assertion from a number of witnesses meeting allegations as to practice by the production of unobserved regulations, and allegations as to the regulations by statement of practice of an opposite character, all tending to establish that our present system is perfect, we shall have done much harm.

"On the other hand, supposing we get from our

witnesses a fair and unreserved expression of the truth, we must not have a Commission so composed as to endanger the chance of a fair and unreserved statement of the evils which may exist and the necessary remedies. Again, the composition of the Commission must be such that not only the Report shall be truthful and fair, but that the public shall have confidence that it is so. Lastly, the instructions should be such that there shall be no part of our rules and regulations and system in any branch of the Army which bears on the sanitary condition of our troops which shall not be open to the investigation of the Commission, by which I mean that not only the hospital practice after disease, but the prevention of disease, and the powers of the medical authorities for that purpose, shall be considered; ration, clothing, camping, and the modes of supply and its quality, etc., etc.

“The finance; the relative authority of departments within hospitals; the organisation and authority of the Medical Department; the education, promotion, and position of medical officers; the facilities for acquiring and dispensing knowledge; the advantages, if any, offered as to the treatment, and science in civil hospitals, which are not available in Army hospitals, etc., etc.; the statistics of disease, their accuracy, completeness, and the purposes to which they are and may be applied,—all these things ought to be within the scope of the inquiry.

Before I accept, therefore, the office of Chairman of such a Commission, and with it the responsibility of its failure or success, I must ask you to tell me who you propose to name as the other members of the Commission, and what will be the instructions under which they will act—*i.e.* what will be the scope of the inquiry, and what its restrictions or limitations. Upon these two points, as it appears to me, rest the policy or impolicy of having a Commission at all, and you will understand therefore why I ask for information on them before I give an answer to your proposal as regards myself.

“It will perhaps save time, and relieve you from some responsibility also, if I at once give a sketch of what appears to me desirable in the composition of the Commission. I should like to see two military

officers possessing a practical knowledge of the subject, one of whom should represent the scientific branch of the Army. I find from General Storks and Colonel Lefroy, whom I consulted as to the possibility of the inquiry being successful, that you contemplate their serving on the Commission. You could not have made a better selection. There should, I think, be two Army doctors, one representing the Medical Department, and one the active part of the profession; two civil doctors to give us the means of comparison with civil practice; some one to represent the sanitary as contradistinguished from the purely medical element, who, I hope, would be Dr. Sutherland, who now combines Army and campaign experience to his previous general knowledge; and, lastly, a good examining lawyer. The Commission would then, with myself, consist of nine members, of whom five would be official. There are several reasons which incline me to think that Sir James Clark should be one of the civil medical men.

"But the most important selection would be that of the two Army doctors. You will, I suppose, name Smith,¹ and it is most important that the other should be a man well known and respected by the junior part of the profession. Very early in the war, I heard from various sources that Alexander was the ablest and most effective man with our Army. That opinion has been fully confirmed since. I know of no other person who could be of half the use to the Commission. He has the interests of the profession thoroughly at heart, and the Army has justly great confidence in him. I hear that he is in Canada, but he could, I hope, be spared from a healthy station for such a service as this, which is important far beyond the duties of any local appointment. Nor would his nomination entail any delay, as the Commission could not go into much business for some time to come. I frankly say that I look on Alexander's nomination as indispensable to the success of the Commission.

"I assume throughout that the object of the inquiry is not to rip up questions regarding the past conduct or fitness of persons, but to examine into the system, and lay the foundation for its utmost future improve-

¹ Then Director-General.

ment, with a view to render impossible, so far as human means can, the recurrence of the sufferings and the evils we have undergone.

"Pardon this long letter. The matter is very important, and the subject, if undertaken, will require great labour, more, I confess, than I am inclined to give, unless I have a good prospect of a successful result.

"Pray believe me,
"Yours faithfully,
"SIDNEY HERBERT."

Mr. Herbert was assured that his wishes, both as regards the persons to be employed and the instructions to be given, should be complied with; but many weeks elapsed without any further step being taken towards the issue of the Commission, and on February 12th Mr. Herbert again addressed Lord Panmure, reminding him that—

"the Medical Commission will be a very long affair, and if not begun without loss of time, it will be impossible to conclude it in time for you to have the report for next recess.

"I trust you have sent for Alexander. If you have not, pray do so without loss of time. You know he is the man on whom I rely. He did right well in the Crimea, and he sees with his own eyes, is unprejudiced, and is not deterred from saying what he thinks ought to be done by the fear of disagreeing with others. That is the reason for making his presence on the Commission the condition of my acting upon it.

"A well-constituted Commission with their heart in the work may do much good, and may enable you to overcome evils which, without their assistance, it would be difficult to grapple with.

"Will you let me know whether you have sent for Alexander, or whether you can do so by the first available post?"

Miss Nightingale strongly dissuaded Mr. Herbert from accepting the Chairmanship of this Commission

without a pledge that its recommendations should be acted on.

"All that Lord Panmure has hitherto done," she wrote, "(and it is just six months since I came home), has been to gain time, and this Commission, I hold it, granting it only as he does *now*, is also merely to gain time.

"He has broken his most solemn promise to Dr. Sutherland, to me, and to the Crimea Commission. And three months from this day I publish my experience of the Crimea campaign, and my suggestions for improvement, unless there has been a fair and tangible pledge by that time for reform."

A few days later Miss Nightingale's dissatisfaction with the War Office was raised to vehement indignation by its approval of the Report of the Board which had sat at Chelsea to investigate the charges against certain officers on whom reflections had been cast, or rather suggested, in the Report of Sir J. MacNeill and Colonel Tulloch, to which reference has already been made (Vol. II. pp. 28-33).

I agree with Mr. Kinglake in thinking the findings of the Chelsea Board to have been sound and equitable. I believe that such would be the impression made on any one now, coolly studying the question after a long lapse of years. But at the time they were not so regarded, and Miss Nightingale, with her usual impetuosity of language, pronounced the Report of the Board to be "a deliberate insult" to the Crimean Commissioners, whose conclusions it in some degree questioned. She at once renounced all active participation in the work of the proposed Sanitary Commission, and strongly urged Sidney Herbert to do the same.

More prudent counsels, however, prevailed. Mr. Herbert, though much influenced by Miss Nightingale, was not prepared to follow her lead in this matter.

He saw that whatever vexations and disappointments he might have to encounter, the Commission would effect good, even if not in such full measure as he could desire, and that, if he threw it up, things would probably be left as they were, without improvement. His doing so would, therefore, unjustifiably throw away an opportunity not to be neglected. Skilfully handled, much might be done—and, in fact, was done—by the Commission. Miss Nightingale, surprised to find that others were in favour of proceeding, ultimately accorded a more or less reluctant acquiescence, and though she declined to take an official part herself in the inquiry, she remained throughout its continuance in constant intercourse with Mr. Herbert, whose conclusions were greatly influenced by her experience, and generally sound, if somewhat harsh, judgment.

Months more, however, were wasted in official procrastination, and it was not till May 5th, 1857, that the Commission was actually issued.

During this interval of time Mr. Herbert and Miss Nightingale were busily employed in endeavours to persuade or coerce the Secretary of State into granting to the Commission real powers of inquiry into abuses, and liberty to recommend real reforms; while the War Office was as busily engaged in efforts to narrow the scope of the investigation, and so limit the powers of the Commission as to make it difficult for them to go beyond the recommendation of measures of the most "harmless" character.

When the Commission at length met, the time and thoughts of Sidney Herbert were for the next year and a half almost exclusively devoted to its work, and that of the four sub-commissions which sprang out of it, and of each of which he was the head.

It would be impossible, in the space at my command, to convey an adequate idea of the amount of labour involved in the task thus undertaken. The field of inquiry was of vast extent, and the patient diligence with which Mr. Herbert made himself master of enormous masses of minute details can only be truly appreciated by those who have had an opportunity of examining the piles of papers and mountains of statistics which were collected, perused, annotated, and digested by him during the preparation of the report, the draft of which proceeded entirely from his own hand.

But Mr. Herbert was not satisfied with returns, however accurate and voluminous, or *vivâ-voce* evidence, however carefully tested. He personally visited, during the course of 1858, nearly every barrack and every military hospital in Great Britain and Ireland, and not a few in France and other Continental States. That from this apparently overwhelming accumulation of facts he and his colleagues were able to deduce clear and startling conclusions is no mean evidence of their sagacity and skill. They had to deal with problems of a most complex nature, and to grapple with difficulties which often threatened to baffle solution. Nor were the difficulties inherent in the questions themselves the only stumbling blocks in their way. The Commission had also to encounter obstacles at every step, due to official languor and indifference, professional prejudice, antiquated conservatism, departmental jealousies, and personal interests.

How wide its field of labour, and how vigorously work was done when once commenced, may be judged from the account of its first fortnight's proceedings contained in the following letter to Sir John MacNeill:

"49, BELGRAVE SQUARE,

"May 18th, 1857.

"DEAR SIR JOHN,

"I take advantage of your promise to listen, consider, and advise, to give you a report of the progress our Army Medical Commission has made, and to ask for your opinion on some points.

"At our first meeting I proposed to the Commission to take our subjects in a certain order, beginning :

"(1) By the introduction of the medical officer into the service, the qualifications required of him and their sufficiency, the means of enlarging and increasing his knowledge afterwards, especially as regards military hygiene.

"(2) The second head would be the organisation of General Hospitals, the distribution of duties within them, the mode and character of supply, the co-operation of the different branches of the service, the forms and financial checks. The same as regards Regimental Hospitals.

"(3) The sanitary division of the subject will comprise : Barracks, Hospitals, Clothing, Rations, '*et quibusdam aliis.*'

"(4) We reserve the pay, rank, and promotion of the Medical Department till after the duties to be performed, as well as the nature of the preparation for them, has been decided : (1stly) Because without so laying the ground for an increase of pay, and a general bettering of their position, we shall not get it from the Treasury ; (2ndly) Because we should not get the required concessions as to duties and system from the Army Medical Department if we gave the plans first.

"(5) Lastly would come the constitution of the Army Medical Department at Whitehall, with its powers and authority.

"The Commission agreed to this course, though there was a proposal to put No. 4 in place of No. 1 ; but it was overruled.

"We have had four meetings, and have examined Dr. Andrew Smith, Sir John Liddell, Sir Benjamin Brodie, Mr. Paget (Chairman of the E. J. Co.), Mr. Ferguson, Dr. Parkes, Dr. Meyer (Purveyor at Chatham), Mr. Hill (Governor of the London Hospital),

and on Wednesday we shall examine Mr. Robertson (late Purveyor at Scutari) and Dr. Steele (Superintendent of St. Thomas's).

"This has carried us through the first head, and a good way through into the second.

"These are the conclusions which, I *think*, the Commission are prepared to advocate:

"(1) That some medical diploma, as well as the surgical one, shall be required of the candidate, the majority of cases in military hospitals being medical even in war.

"(2) That no course in military hygiene (which is now allowed to be taken as a substitute for some other course, which is probably far more useful as well as much more effectually taught) should be required; but that we should seek for a good knowledge of civil medicine and surgery, and, if possible, test likewise the general education of the candidate (this is strongly pressed by Brodie, with reasons which appear sound).

"(3) That there should be an independent Board of Examiners unconnected with the Army Department, as already done in the case of the East India Co., and that, if the arrangement can be effected, the same Board should examine for the Army, the Navy, and the East India Co.

"(4) That the specialities of the military profession, which, by the way, are mostly sanitary, shall be taught in a course to be given in the new General Hospital at Netley, where the passed candidate shall be kept for six months on a modified scale of pay and allowances, with quarters. (At Chatham only the three seniors receive anything.) Three permanent professors, one of whom will be the Curator of the Museum (now at Fort Pitt), will give clinical pathological instruction.

"(5) That there should be a second examination before promotion to a surgeoncy.

"(6) That prizes be given, not for essays where the thoughts may all be pilfered from books, but for "cases" described with their treatment and the conclusions derived from them.

"(7) That private practice should be encouraged, and leave of absence granted for hospital study.

"This disposes of No. 1, though we have strong opinions given us that without better pay and the

prospect of rising by merit, so far as selection in the place of seniority can ensure it, we shall not attract our fair share of the cleverest and most ambitious students.

"We have got likewise an unanimous condemnation against the imposition of any but medical duties on the medical officers, and we have established, I think, by comparison between Army and other hospitals, that our routine is unnecessarily complicated and efficiency sacrificed to it; that the system of requisitions ought to be, and can be, greatly curtailed; and that all that is indispensable to the treatment of every case in a hospital, as regards furniture, diet, or medicine, should be done, not by requisition, but under a general warrant as a matter of course, or by diet-roll, requisition being necessary only for a very reduced list of extras, which, of course, can be reduced in proportion as the ordinary ration is enlarged. Indeed, the diet-roll might take the place of requisition altogether with a liberal table of extras.

"But the question of the supply of the ration is very difficult. Here in England the Purveyor is a Commissariat officer. Mr. Pratt, at Chatham, not only supplies the hospital where he resides, but every hospital in the south-east of England, even crossing the Thames to Ipswich, Colchester, etc., and going south to Dover and Canterbury.

"Abroad in peace, and, I believe, in war, the hospitals are rationed by the Commissariat; the purveyors only supply medical comforts. Clearly in war the Regimental Hospitals in the field must be rationed by the Commissariat, and if the General Hospitals be likewise in the field—and no campaign can last a month without them—I do not see how the two hospitals can be victualled upon different systems, nor, indeed, how any one except the Commissary can victual them at all. We must not be misled by the peculiarities of the last war—peculiarities which may never occur again—when the van of our operations and our hospitals were not even in the same country, nor even in the same continent with the war and the Army conducting it.

"It seems to me that, however far removed inland be the invading army, even when the van and the large general hospitals with it are on the sea coast

of the same country, though miles away from the actual operations, yet the whole country will be, as far as the sources of supply are concerned, under the immediate pressure of the perquisitions of the Commissary-General; and the Purveyor must take from his hand or starve.

"This is the Indian system. Indeed, with them it is carried further, for everything which is required in a hospital is supplied by the Commissariat. We shall, I hope, be agreed that the Purveyor shall not be dependent on the barrack department for furniture, beds, light, fuel, etc., etc., but that each hospital shall have its own stores. And we had evidence to this effect to-day from Mr. Pratt which will, I think, if supported, establish this.

"But I am fairly puzzled by this ration question. It is fair to say that in the Peninsular War the General Hospitals were rationed by the Purveyor, and the Regimental by the Commissary, none but Regimental Hospitals, probably, moving on with the Army, which at the time I speak of was an advancing Army.

"Could you, some time before we close, come to town and give evidence? We are at work on facts, so far as they can be got, and very rare they seem to be. Nor is it much good asking for opinions from men whose bias leads them to think their own existing system necessarily the best. But by the time we have examined as to facts through all our five heads, and before we attempt to decide upon our recommendations, it would be of great service if you would give us the advantage of your observation and experience, and the weight of your authority likewise, in favour of the changes which we discussed when you were in town the other day. It would, I feel certain, settle many doubtful questions, and assist us in arriving at the conclusion on which the reformation of the Army Medical Department and the sanitary regulations of the Army must depend.

"If you can do this, will you tell me at what date it would be most convenient for you to come up to town?

"I think another fortnight will get us through the hospitals and the sanitary head. The ration will be the most difficult question there, for it touches other departments, and raises delicate questions. As

regards other sanitary arrangements, there is much to create; but at any rate nothing to destroy or modify, for there are now no arrangements at all. Do you think, then, that after Whitsuntide you could come up? And would you prefer coming soon after, or at a later date?

“Pray believe me,
 “Yours sincerely,
 “SIDNEY HERBERT.”

Six months had elapsed between Mr. Herbert's acceptance of its Chairmanship and the actual appointment of the Commission. By dint of sheer hard work on his part, the Report of the principal Commission was prepared in half that time, and on August 7th, 1857, he was able to write to Lord Panmure that—

“the Commission on the Sanitary State of the Army has now closed its labours, and in a few days the Report will be reprinted with the alterations made in it during discussion, and some changes in the order of subjects, which I have authority to make.”

The investigations of the Commission revealed the appalling fact that the rate of mortality in the Army *at home* in time of peace was more than double that of the civilian population. The case will be best stated in the words of the Report itself:

“The soldier's is a picked life. He is recruited generally at 19 years of age. He is drawn from two classes—the agricultural labourer and the working class in towns. All men offering to enlist who bear signs of physical weakness, or of tendency to disease, are rejected, and even after acceptance can be discharged, on the representation of the regimental surgeon, at any period within three years from their admission; and all these rejected lives are thrown back on the civil population.

“On the other hand, the apparent health of the Army is maintained by the continued influx of fresh lives in the place of those who are weeded out by the process of invaliding, by which means a large number

of men whose physical powers are exhausted are thrown back on the civil population, while their removal lowers the rates of mortality of the Army, though their deaths are owing to the military service which first undermined their health.

"It is obvious, therefore, that the rates of mortality, taken alone, represent a part only of the loss annually caused in the ranks of the Army by disease."

Nevertheless, the Commissioners were able to show, by the inexorable statistics furnished by the Registrar-General, that while the rate of mortality in the civil population of England, taking town and country together, amounted to 9·2 per thousand, and in the country alone to only 7·7 per thousand, that of the Army at home was 17·5 per thousand, and in the foot-guards reached the fearful figure of 20·4 per thousand.

The rates of mortality per 1,000 men of the Army at home, and of the English civil male population at corresponding ages, as stated by the Registrar-General, were even more startling:

Ages 20 to 25—	Civilians	...	...	...	...	8·4
	Soldiers	...	...	...	...	17·0
Ages 25 to 30—	Civilians	...	...	...	...	9·2
	Soldiers	...	...	...	...	18·3

But the terrible nature of the facts disclosed is perhaps even more forcibly brought home to the mind by the comparison of the civil and military mortality in certain London parishes:

	Civilians		Military
St. Pancras	... 2·2	2nd Life-Guards, Regent's Park	10·4
Kensington	... 3·3	Rl. Horse-Gds., Knightsbridge	17·5
East London and		2nd Batt. Coldstreams	} Tower 10
Whitechapel	... 5·4	2nd Batt. Fusiliers	

The Report goes on to say that—

"the occupation which comes nearest to the Army as regards its rate of mortality is that of clerks. The close application to business, the sedentary attitude,

the want of exercise and of fresh air, render their employment one of the most unhealthy of all extensive occupations.

"It seems almost incredible that it should be necessary to have recourse to the most unhealthy occupations in order to institute any comparison in which the rates of mortality shall approximate to those prevailing among Your Majesty's troops, for at present the Army stands almost at the head of unhealthy occupations in the United Kingdom."

The Commissioners proceeded to investigate the causes of this abnormal mortality.

"That in war men should die from exposure, from fatigue, from insufficient supplies is intelligible, or that the occupation of a town of 30,000 inhabitants by an army of 30,000 men, without any sanitary precaution, suddenly doubling the population to the area, and thereby halving the proportion of every accommodation, of supplies, water, drainage, sewerage, etc., etc., should engender disease, is readily understood; but the problem submitted to us is to find the causes of a mortality more than double that of civil life among 60,000 men, scattered in numbers seldom exceeding a thousand in one place, among a population of 28,000,000, in time of profound peace, in a country which is not only the healthiest, but which possesses the greatest facility of communication, and the greatest abundance of supply in Europe.

"The causes assigned to us for these high rates of mortality are :

"1. Night duty.

"2. Want of exercise and suitable employment.

"3. Intemperate and debauched habits among the soldiers.

"4. Crowding and insufficient ventilation, and nuisances arising from latrines and defective sewerage in barracks."

While not denying that the three first causes might have some effect, the Commissioners assigned reasons for believing that their influence was comparatively inconsiderable. The Police had severer

and more constant night duty than the troops, but their rate of mortality was comparatively low. Want of exercise and employment had a greater influence, but they doubted whether much of the mortality could be attributed to drunkenness and debauchery, pointing out that it was due not to diseases of the nerves or digestive organs, but to pulmonary affections.

"If therefore," they went on to say, "it can be shown that the soldier in barracks breathes a vitiated and polluted atmosphere, it follows that of the four predisposing causes above enumerated, the last is the one to which the excessive liability of the soldier to this class of disease [pulmonary] may be chiefly attributed."

In writing to Lord Panmure on the subject of this Report, Mr. Herbert made the following suggestions :

"The true way to carry the recommendations into effect will, it seems to me, be the appointment of sub-commissions or committees to settle the details on each head ; but there should be one executive Commission, with powers not only to examine and report on each hospital and barrack, but to execute minor works within a certain specified limit. Otherwise, while reports are being considered time will have slipped away, and you will lose the prestige which attaches to rapid action on a subject likely to arrest a good deal of general attention. I will gladly help you in any way I can, either by serving on these sub-commissions, or by drawing up, or helping to draw up, regulations, or both.

"There will, I think, be four Sub-Commissions required : (1) To ventilate, drain, and re-arrange the hospitals and barrack buildings. (2) To draw up the scheme of a statistical branch in the Army Medical Department, and to decide on the forms to be used, and the results to be published. (3) To revise the hospital regulations, and so much of the Queen's Regulations as touch on sanitary subjects, and draw up a warrant for the promotion of medical officers (I have made a sketch of one), and to lay down a scheme for the details and business of the Director-General's

office. (4) To draw up the plan for the medical school to be established in our chief military general hospital.

"You will, I think, find it advantageous to make as much use as possible of the members of the original Commission in working out these details. They are fresh from the subject, and have it at their fingers' ends, and the relief to your office at a moment of pressure will be great if you can have everything presented to you in a working form, with the aid of Dr. Andrew Smith for some portions, Tulloch for statistics, and Crooms, if he is well enough, for warrants and regulations. They could put it all into a shape that would only require your judgment and decision upon it.

"I will gladly help you in any way I can, and will, if you wish it, serve on any of the Committees or Sub-Commissions I have mentioned.

"I will, as we agreed the other day, move at the end of the Session for a copy of the Report, and any orders founded upon it; and if Sir John Ramsden will then put in a dummy, you can later send in the Report with evidence and appendix and all your orders and regulations founded upon it, which will satisfy the public and give the prestige which promptitude always carries with it.

"Let me have a line to say whether you agree. I send you a copy instead of the original of this letter, in consideration of the time to be saved to the reader of good handwriting."

On the 14th of the same month Mr. Herbert had an interview with Lord Panmure, at which an agreement was arrived at as to the appointment of the sub-commissioners to carry out the works recommended in the Report, and as to the powers they were to possess. Mr. Herbert, however, thought it expedient, *ad majorem cautelam*, to address the following letter to Lord Palmerston:

"BELGRAVE SQUARE, October 6th, 1857.

"Panmure has promised me to send for your approval instructions which I have drawn up and given him for some sub-committees to carry into effect, or

rather to supply him with the means of carrying into effect, the measures which the Commission on the Sanitary State of the Army have decided on recommending for adoption. I believe you are cognisant of their general character, and also of the magnitude of the evil which we have to cope with. There must be something radically wrong when soldiers at home, picked lives, at the healthiest and strongest period of life, offer an amount of mortality exceeding that of the most notoriously unhealthy trades and double that of ordinary civil life. If you add to this the number of men invalided and who die out of the Army, though killed by it, and who instead of counting as soldiers in the comparison with civil life actually go to swell the mortality of the latter, the excess becomes positively frightful.

"We have done our best to account for this and to advise remedies. With an Army raised by volunteering the country cannot afford to let men die in this way, even were there no other motive for doing our utmost to secure health and life to them. I cannot undertake to say that we have fathomed the depth of the evil, that we know all its causes, or have suggested all the remedies, but we know some causes and have urged some remedies, and I am very anxious to commence their trial without loss of time. The War Office is overdone with work at this moment, and that is the reason why I have offered to relieve it of these details, and to put the whole plan into such a shape that the Secretary of State shall be able, with such alterations as he may think right, to set it in motion at once without trouble and without delay. The barrack inspection ought to begin immediately. The days are shortening, and the weather in which immediate alteration can be effected is passing away. I have proposed that for small alterations to secure ventilation, light, etc., the Commissions should be authorised to spend a small sum at once on the spot on their own authority, reporting all large works to be done to the War Office for consideration. I wish I could get more than £100 per barrack for this purpose.

"My object in writing is to beg you to give first turn to this matter among the many coming daily before you, so as to give us time to begin our work

and finish some of it before Parliament meets. I know the interest you feel in the subject, and am confident that you will pardon my troubling you with this letter urging immediate action and asking your assistance and co-operation."

Nor was this precaution needless, for, subsequently, Lord Panmure revoked the consent he had given to the formation of the third of these proposed Sub-Commissions, on the ground that it involved too large a delegation of the powers of the War Office with respect to pay and promotion in the medical branch of the Army. Mr. Herbert, who, so long as it was effected, was quite indifferent whether the work he wished to see done was done by the War Office itself or by the Commission, returned to the charge in the following letter :

"49, BELGRAVE SQUARE, *Nov.* 11, 1857.

"MY DEAR PANMURE,

"All our Sub-Commissions or Committees are at work, and with more or less advanced progress. One only you did not appoint, on the ground that the constitution of the medical department and the warrant for promotion ought not to be delegated out of the War Office. But by this arrangement the hospital and medical regulations (to which that objection does *not* apply) remain untouched, and Alexander and Crooms, both of whom could do us good service, are not utilised as they should be.

"I have therefore recast the instructions for them, excluding all reference to the Army Medical Department and to the promotion Warrant, and those I will ultimately give you my ideas upon in confidence.

"Alexander is hard at work for me on the hospital regulations, and if you will send us the enclosed authority we will prepare a revised code. You will, of course, adopt it or not as you think best, but this I am certain of, that it is very much required, and that if it is not done by us it will not be done at all. No one in the office has time to give to it, nor enough familiarity with the subject.

"We are doing well with barracks, and I will report progress to you on that head in a few days. Nothing can be more obliging or anxious to help than the authorities."

The third Sub-Commission thus insisted on was then, though with evident reluctance on the part of the War Office, allowed to sit.

In the spring of 1858 Lord Palmerston's Government was overthrown, and in that of Lord Derby, which succeeded it, General Jonathan Peel replaced Lord Panmure at the War Office. The change was one welcome to Mr. Herbert. Lord Panmure was, in his way, a military reformer, but his views were mainly limited to the substitution of civil for military control. He himself shared the antiquated prejudices, and the instinctive dislike to improvement, which Sidney Herbert had set himself to combat. General Peel was far more in sympathy with Sidney Herbert's aims, but was hardly gifted with sufficient originality heartily to appreciate them. Nor had he sufficient decision and strength of will to overcome the *vis inertiae* of the office over which he presided, or to brush aside the host of petty obstacles urged against every measure of reform.

To General Peel, on his entering office, Sidney Herbert addressed the following letter, containing a short account of what had been done by the Commission and Sub-Commissions up to that time:

"MY DEAR PEEL,

"I promised to send you a report of the progress made in the various Sub-Commissions and Committees appointed by Lord Panmure to aid in carrying into effect the recommendations of the Royal Commission. You are in possession of the instructions given to the four Sub-Commissions or Committees appointed by him—namely, the Sub-Commission to

inspect and report on Barracks and Hospitals, the Committee to revise the Medical Hospital Regulations, the Statistical Committee, the Committee to draw up a Scheme for the proposed Army Medical School. The Quartermaster-General, Sir R. Airey, was on the Committee on Regulations, and Captain Galton, R.E., who was lately employed to report on the sewerage of London, was the engineer officer named on the Sub-Commission on Barracks and Hospitals. The progress made by the several committees is as follows: The scheme for the medical school is drawn up and finished, all but a few details of minor importance, which one more meeting will complete. It will, I hope, be in the hands of the Secretary of State by Easter. The statistical forms have been considered, and some changes are being effected, but they may be ready about the same time. The Regulations Committee have made considerable progress. All regulations on instructions referring to medical officers, and which are now scattered through the Queen's Regulations or the War Office Regulations, have been collected together, so that the medical officer can at once find what concerns his own Department. But besides the introduction of new matter pointing to prevention rather than to cure, the revision and codification of the Hospital Instructions, and the definition and distribution of the duties of the officers of the various departments, on whom devolve not only the treatment of the sick, but the supply of food, medicine, medical comforts, and furniture of the hospitals, as well as the repair of the buildings themselves, constitute a work of much difficulty and require great care and attention. We will make every endeavour to complete them in the next three weeks, but I am far from positive that it can be done. The Barrack and Hospital Sub-Commission have inspected all the London barracks and hospitals—the Tower Barracks and hospital; the Wellington Barracks and three hospitals; the Portman Square Barracks; the St. George's Barracks, Trafalgar Square; the Magazine Barrack, Hyde Park; the Knightsbridge Barracks and hospital; the Kensington old Cavalry Barrack; the Kensington old Infantry Barrack; the Kensington new Cavalry Barrack; the Kensington new Infantry Barrack; the St. John's Wood Barrack; and the Albany Street Barrack,

Regent's Park. They have inspected the barracks at Portsmouth, on the Gosport side, ten in number, besides the hospital and new barrack building at Gosport; also the barrack at Winchester; the barracks for artillery, cavalry, and infantry at Aldershot. They are preparing a Report on the London barracks, but they wish to await the results of experiments now being tried, or about to be tried, in ventilation before they send in their report; and as these results must affect the recommendations which it will be their duty to make with reference to almost all other barracks, they think it right thoroughly to satisfy themselves by practical experiment before they venture to make recommendations which may entail some expense on the country. They will afterwards be able to report very rapidly upon the other barracks which they have inspected, as well as on those which it will be their duty subsequently to visit.

"There are some other matters which Lord Panmure referred either to the Barrack and Hospital Commission or to myself individually, which I may as well here mention.

"The Sub-Commission on Barracks and Hospitals was desired to inspect Netley and to report what alterations, if any, are advisable in the plans, and what course we should recommend to be adopted with regard to it. This report will be ready in a few days. I also undertook, at the request of Lord Panmure, to put together the materials for a draft Warrant to regulate the admission to the service, the rank, and relative rank of medical officers, their promotion, full pay, half-pay, and retirement. This includes a new scale of pay, half-pay retirement, less in amount than that proposed in 1856 or 1857 by the Director-General, and which was proposed to but refused by the Treasury; but it appeared to me to be a liberal and sufficient provision. I have accompanied it by a draft letter to the Treasury, explaining and justifying the changes embodied in the Warrant, and the increased rates of pay; this I will send in a few days."

On May 10th, in the House of Commons, Mr. Herbert vigorously defended the Government from the charge of having "fooled away" money on the improvement

of barracks and hospitals, showing conclusively how great an economy was in fact involved in maintaining the soldier in health and comfort. Two days later, Lord Ebrington, prompted by Mr. Herbert and Miss Nightingale, moved Resolutions in the House of Commons to the effect that the long-continued excessive mortality of the British Army had been mainly caused by the bad sanitary condition of their barracks, the increase and improvement of which were imperatively called for, not less by good policy and true economy than by justice and humanity.

Lord Ebrington's Resolutions were accepted by the Government, and although General Peel's speech on the occasion showed more good will than accurate knowledge, a great step had no doubt been gained in thus pledging the House of Commons to the principle of the reforms advocated by the Commission. But Mr. Herbert was well aware that there was still much more to be done before they could be regarded as safely established.

Not content with the acquiescence of Parliament, his efforts were unremitting to excite the interest of the country generally in the reforms he advocated. Besides inspiring, and often writing, articles in the newspapers, he contributed an article to *The Westminster Review* for January, 1859, which, contrary to the custom of that periodical, appeared signed with his initials.

A considerable part of this paper was devoted to a controversy which no longer possesses any interest, and in which he combated the views of a scientist, who had endeavoured to prove that overcrowding in barrack rooms was not one of the causes of the high death-rate in the Army, and indeed had little, if any, influence on health. Another portion of it dealt with

the recommendations of the Royal Commission, and the work already accomplished, which have been described in an earlier part of this chapter. But that part of the article which set forth the objects yet unaccomplished merits somewhat closer notice.

After welcoming the new Warrant with respect to the reorganisation of the Army Medical Department as a great improvement on a system scathingly described as combining "all the evils of seniority without its certainty, and all the evils of selection without its stimulus," he thankfully acknowledges the improvements in progress in barrack accommodation and expresses belief that the pledges given by the Government during the debate on Lord Ebrington's Resolutions were being faithfully redeemed. But he calls attention to the fact, that nothing had yet been done to reform the organisation of military hospitals, and points out the extraordinary combination of entirely independent authorities by which they were governed.

"In fact there is no governing power at all, nor are the subordinate departments so placed relatively to one another that they can supply the deficiency. All are equal—all can obstruct; none need assist—because none feel that they need obey. The medical officer can ask the purveyor for something which he considers necessary for his patients, and the purveyor may procure it, or he may exercise his discretion and refuse it. The building may require repair, and the barrack master exercises his discretion whether or not he shall apply to the engineer to effect it, who exercises his discretion whether he shall or shall not comply. Each covers his own responsibility by asking. . . . And yet the War Office attempts, whether at home or abroad, to regulate and govern hospitals organised by such a machinery as this. These jarring elements are to be reconciled and the machine made to work by

a Secretary of State, through the medium of the post. There is but one condition on which he can succeed. If he be infallible, omniscient, and omnipresent, the plan is a good one; if he be not, it is absurd."

He then sketches the organisation by which he proposes to replace the existing system, or no system, of hospital government, and proceeds to that which of all reforms he was most anxious to introduce, and the necessity for which, even at this day, is far too little realised—the recognition of the fact that the main duty of the Army Medical Department is not the cure of disease, but the prevention of its causes. To carry out this reform he urges that there should be a Sanitary Adviser attached to every Army Corps, that such an officer should also be attached to the Army Medical Council, and that the medical men entering the Army in future should be educated in the principles of sanitary science. But on these topics it will be well to let him speak in his own words.

"The General Hospital is the one in which the greatest pains should be bestowed, because it is there that the existing system is the most defective. You cannot do without them in war, and you cannot have them effective in war unless you give them a good organisation, simple and suited to the rough exigencies of war, and in which those who are to conduct them have been thoroughly practised during peace.

"But as these military General Hospitals have to be extemporised in war, as their habitat is often shifting, as they must frequently be established in buildings never intended for the purpose, and in localities requiring minute inspection and much sanitary precaution before they can be adapted to hospital purposes with any security to the sick, it will be necessary to provide the governor, who is to be responsible for the safety and efficiency of the whole, with the best possible advice on points on which obviously he cannot himself be a competent judge. This is the reason why a sanitary adviser should be attached to

him as to the Quartermaster-General of an Army. The duty of an Army surgeon is curative, but it is not so much so as it is preventive. Health is the first condition of success to an Army, for health means numbers. Precaution alone can arrest the constant thinning of the ranks by disease. Remedy, however effectual, comes too late. For the mere purpose of the campaign, putting aside humanity and duty to the soldier, the success or failure of the remedy is not very material. Indeed, death affects an army less than disease. For death only diminishes numbers, whereas disease not only diminishes numbers, but detracts from the efficiency of the remainder who are still unaffected by it. The hospital intercepts rations, transports, guards, surgeons, money, all of which are wanted to maintain, in efficiency, the Army at the front.

"Sanitary science is looked upon as mere humbug by the mass of mankind. It is not till we have been decimated by cholera that we can be persuaded to cleanse our dwellings, to remove our cesspools, and attend to our sewers. Neither is the civil surgeon as much in advance of the lay civilian on these matters as his education and knowledge should make him. The generality of civil physicians and surgeons live not by prevention but by cure, and what men live by they most esteem. They neither live by prevention, nor practise it, nor do they teach it. Our Army surgeons have acquired the groundwork of their medical knowledge in civil schools, but the speciality of sanitary science they have never been taught. . . . The combatant military officer, again, like the lay civilian, is seldom practically convinced of the necessity of measures of prevention, and is conscious that he is too ignorant to know whether the advice offered him is sound; and if convinced of the necessity, perhaps doubts, and often justly doubts, whether his adviser knows much more about the matter than himself.

"When the medical officer goes to the General-in-command, who, under a tropical sun, up a river surrounded with swamps, is feeding his troops on salt pork, and tells him that unless he gives them fresh meat and vegetables, they will be down with scurvy and fever, he does no more than his duty, and what is imperative that he should do. But if he is

met by the man in authority with the rejoinder, 'Sir, when your advice is wanted it will be asked for,' he probably vows never again to expose himself to such a rebuke. Six weeks afterwards he is called upon to cure disease which is not curable at all, or not curable in time, though care and precaution a few weeks earlier might have obviated much of it.

"Such things ought to be impossible, and the Commissioners urge that so far as regulations can effect it they *shall* be made impossible.

"At present a military disaster is like a railway accident, no one is ever to blame; but when once the man whose business it is to advise is made to record his advice, and the man who is to act to record his reasons, we shall know, as the Turkish Pasha said, 'whose beard to pull.'

"There would be a direct economy in establishing in the office of the Director-General a Sanitary Branch, with a competent officer at its head, specially devoted to the overlooking and directing all sanitary measures. We have thrown away not hundreds of thousands, but millions, in the course of the last ten years, from our blind and reckless neglect of the simplest laws in this respect. A man who has seen the modern hospitals at Paris, such as Lariboisière and Vincennes, would have been struck by the wonderful simplicity of the plans, and by the light, the airiness, the cheerfulness of the wards; and that in a climate far more severe than ours. But we had no sanitary department in the office of the Director-General to look into these things, and no one whose business it was to study the construction of buildings for the use of the sick, nor the conditions necessary to a healthy site. Hence, when an immense sum was voted to create a General Hospital, with all England to choose from, our selection fell on three acres of clay standing over ten miles of mud bank, with a soft damp climate, in a district to which there is no record of any man having been sent for his health by any physician that ever lived; and this is to be a place of recovery for our soldiers returning from abroad, the majority of whom come from tropical climates, and whose constitutions, according to the highest living authority, Dr. Martin,

require a high, dry, bracing climate! A plan was adopted, magnificent in scale, far more extensive than is likely to be required, and far more costly than was necessary, and which, with reduction, was admirably adapted for a barrack, though quite unsuitable to a hospital. Not but that Netley is a step in advance. To get a good barrack instead of a hospital is an advantage which the sick soldier is not everywhere provided with. In the majority of our stations, the best hospitals are those which were built, not for hospitals, but for barracks. Where a hospital was designed as such, the constructor seems to have raked his ingenuity to devise as many crooked corners, blank walls, dark and unventilated spaces as possible, as though light and air, instead of being the two first requisites of a hospital, were dangers to be carefully guarded against. At Woolwich, not in the benighted days of the Georges, nor even of King William, but in the reign of Queen Victoria, in this very decade, during the Russian War, a ward was added to the General Hospital, which we venture to say is the largest room with the smallest window-space which can be found in all England built to be inhabited by human beings.

“At Dumdum, within a drive from Calcutta, upwards of 300 women and children perished from disease in 15 months out of a mean strength of about 1,000, from sheer overcrowding in unventilated rooms. It seems as though we wanted to rescue the memory of Shah Soujah and the Black Hole from infamy by showing how, by our ignorance or neglect, or both, we can emulate his world-known crime. For it is ignorance and it is neglect, and it is horrible to find that so little is the responsibility of the authorities felt in this respect, that the Government is actually praised for its energy, because one of the officers as soon as the details of the tragedy were known (that is, when the victims had been dying for weeks), drove over in a buggy and made a report. As if a report would resuscitate the dead, or save the living! How came the details not to be known? And who was the military, and who the medical, officer who ordered, or who allowed the crowding which destroyed these poor creatures?

“These things would not be possible if the Army

medical officers were made to understand that their first great duty is prevention.

"There must be, in the office of the Director-General, a Department with a recognised competent head, to overlook, to advise, and, above all, to be responsible for the advice given on these subjects. At present the Director-General has no responsible adviser. Medical officers who happen to be near at hand are seized upon and constituted advisers, *pro hac vice*, not because they are competent, but because they are near at hand. Chance makes them advisers, and chance is to blame, not they, if the advice they give turns out to be bad. If they are right, they get no credit for it, and it is but fair that if they are wrong, they should escape blame. This was the composition of the office under the late Director-General, and it is so still. The work is multifarious, and in extent and variety far beyond the powers of any one man. There is a vast routine business to transact with the 700 or 800 medical officers, over whom he is the sole professional authority. He must have that undefinable tact in governing men which induces them to follow willingly and acquiesce in his decisions even when against them. He must be gifted with discernment to judge of merit and capability, not only for the purpose of awarding promotion with justice, but of allotting to each the task for which his attainments especially fit him. He is ultimately responsible for the health of an army of 150,000 or 180,000 men scattered over the world in every latitude and in every climate. He has to deal with sanitary questions on the largest scale, and in the greatest possible variety. He has to deal with medical questions, with surgical questions, and with statistical questions. He must be able to interpret rapidly the dry array of figures before him, and argue from them to sound conclusions; to trace the evils detected to their true causes, and to apply the proper remedies.

"It is an impossible task. A simple recurrence to the old form of an ordinary board will not meet the difficulty. A board consisting of members having equal powers, voting on each measure as it arises, is a form of government almost incompatible with a decided and energetic administration. It divides the power without strengthening it. It either produces

continual difference and continual bickering; or it results in a series of compromises in which every convenience except the public convenience is consulted.

"Where administration alone is the object, where rapid but not hasty decision, energetic but well-considered action are required, the responsibility and the decision must be vested in one man, but the mind of that man must be strengthened by friction with the minds of men whose special acquaintance with each of the classes of subjects on which he has to decide, make them competent to inform him. They should be responsible for the advice they give; but he, and he alone, should be responsible to the Government and to the public for the decision taken.

"A Director-General, solely responsible, but assisted by three councillors, one medical, one sanitary, and one statistical, through whom all business would pass which might appertain to the speciality of each before it came up to him for decision, all important measures being reserved for discussion by all, but for the ultimate decision of one, appear to us to constitute a machinery the most likely to perform the duties which have hitherto proved too much, either for an unaided autocrat or an irresponsible board.

"But one thing is wanting, and on that the Report of the Commission was silent. They propose to educate the medical officer to give advice, but they do not propose to educate the combatant officer to receive it and appreciate it. True, they fix upon him the responsibility of rejecting it by compelling him to affix his reasons for the rejection. If the advice shall prove bad, well and good, the reasons will be given and the course will be justified; and if the advice be good, and it be rejected, the blame will ultimately fall on the right shoulders; but the mischief done in the interim may be incalculable. Authority may visit the error on the head of the officer, but it cannot compensate for the disaster. Means must therefore be taken to inform the combatant officers on these subjects, that they may be protected from their own errors, and, what is more important, that those under their command may be protected from them. Our Army is, perhaps, at present, the least professional of all our professions. The education for

the Army, and the examination previous to admission, has been as yet but very superficially military.

"Our belief is that unless the military authorities give to our officers the means and encourage them to acquire this knowledge and secure its acquisition by them through the means of examination, much of the advantage of the measures recommended by the Commissioners, and now, we hope, about to be adopted, will be neutralised or lost."

The last paragraph of this paper may well be quoted *in extenso* :

"But there are other and higher motives for immediate and energetic action. Every month that is allowed to pass while nothing is done brings into the Service fresh batches of young men to whom are entrusted duties for which they have received no previous instruction. They are sent out to be taught in their turn by disaster what they have learned from no teacher at home. Their experience will again be acquired at the expense of the soldier, whose life and health are in their hands. If there be war, fresh sufferings and fresh disasters will again lower our reputation as a military nation, and, *pro tanto*, deprive us of the security which rests on military reputation. Every day's delay, therefore, is a loss. While these plans, matured by practised and experienced hands, are being handed from branch to branch in the cumbrous consolidation of the War Office, not only are the evils complained of unarrested, but the seeds are being sown for their long continuance. Delay, then, is not only a loss but a sin, and one which we trust that the country will not long allow our rulers to commit. Its officers and its men are of the finest material which the world can show; they have undergone much unnecessary suffering, and been exposed to much unnecessary difficulty, but they have endured those sufferings and overcome those difficulties with a patience and a courage which have never failed. It remains for us to give them the organisation and the skill, which shall utilise those great qualities to the utmost, and constitute our Army a machine perfect for its purpose."

Forty-six years have passed since these paragraphs

were written. Can it be said that they have no application even at the present day ?

The whole article from which these quotations have been made is very remarkable as the production of one who had been, and was again to be, a responsible Minister of the Crown. Of the sincerity and earnestness of the writer there could be no doubt, and it might well be supposed that when again in power, all that he had so powerfully advocated would be speedily accomplished. The sequel will show how far this was from being the case, notwithstanding Mr. Herbert's persistent efforts.

A better idea of the many lets and hindrances which Mr. Herbert encountered in the prosecution of his work will be conveyed by telling the story of two or three in some detail, than by the simple enumeration of a larger number.

In July, 1858, Mr. Herbert, in a letter to General Peel, had expressed his anxiety that the different parts of the scheme which was proposed for the reorganisation of the Army Medical Service "should all be considered in relation to one another, and not, by being criticised and altered piecemeal, be made utterly incongruous and unworkable as a whole," and that "if there were points which seemed obscure or regulations which appeared questionable or the object of which was not evident on the face of them," he hoped "before any change in them is decided on, the subject-matter of such change would be referred back to the Commissioners for consideration." "The subject," he added, "is so important that no one, I am sure, will grudge the trouble. The same applies to all the Reports which I have enumerated as forming part of the whole scheme, and to the Medical School."

But this suggestion was by no means in harmony

with the ways of the War Office, which at once set itself vigorously to work to discover or create obstacles to the realisation of the proposals made, and subjected them to narrow and pedantic criticism in detail, without any reference to the general scheme.

One of the chief recommendations of the Royal Commission had been the establishment of a Medical Council, of which the Director-General was to be the head, but which should be able to afford him expert advice on statistical, sanitary, and other questions not purely medical in the technical sense of that word. The draft Warrant forming this Council, and the Instructions for it, were written by Sidney Herbert himself, after much conference with Sir John MacNeill and Miss Nightingale.

These Instructions clearly defined the position and duties of the Director-General and of each member of the Council. But they were by no means palatable to the existing heads of the Military Medical Staff or the permanent officials of the War Office. As Miss Nightingale wrote, with her usual incisiveness, (January 4th, 1859):

“As there are striking and original views of English history now to be found only in the Prayer Book, in Burke’s Peerage, and Mrs. S . . . , so there are striking and original ways of doing business, now only to be found in the War Office. To strike a blow at these ways of doing business in one direction was quite as much the object of your instructions to the Medical Council as to organise the Medical Director-General’s Office. . . . That the War Office does not like the instructions I can well believe. They are in opposition to all its ways. . . . Without your instructions to the council there had better be no council, and without the quinquennial appointments there can be no independence. . . . If Hawes likes to call it a Board, that does not signify. But without the instructions the department would have no strength,

nor the Director-General any aid in specialities. Rather than Hawes' plan, let Alexander go on as he is—Don't you think so?"

Another recommendation as little relished at the War Office was that which dealt with the subject of medical education of Army surgeons, and the suggested establishment of a Medical School. These proposals were the work of another of the four Sub-Commissions; but it was suggested by General Peel that they should still remain under 'consideration, and any active steps with regard to the matter be for the present postponed. Had the head of the Commission been a man of less determination, or held a personal position of less weight than Sidney Herbert, the recommendations of the sub-committee would probably have been verbally approved and practically set aside, as is too often the case. But Sidney Herbert was not easily overborne. He at once wrote to General Peel:

"49, BELGRAVE SQUARE,
"November 26th, 1858.

"MY DEAR PEEL,

"I have been thinking over the subject of the Medical School, and I am the more anxious on the subject since a short conversation I had with Lord Hardinge yesterday.

"It never will do to hang it up. We used to send out no assistant surgeons who had not passed through the existing school at Chatham (for it is a school, though a very defective one, inasmuch as it merely teaches what the examination at the Medical Board, if it be good for anything, proves that they know already—namely, medicine and surgery as taught in the civil schools—and does not teach what is still more important, and what the civil schools do not and cannot teach—namely, military hygiene).

"Still, looking at the possible insufficiency of the examination in the Army Medical Department, it has the advantage of securing that the young medical officer is a civil general practitioner.

"But we are now sending the young men out direct from the examination without passing through Chatham. What was thought necessary in peace is being dispensed with in war.

"Unless we can get these young men back, and make them pass through the reformed Army Medical School, we shall have grafted on the Army medical service a stock of untutored and uninformed ignorance which will lower its efficiency and its character for years.

"I know that the pressure is great, and that on emergencies you must put up with shifts; but be prepared to substitute a good system for the existing bad one immediately.

"There are great facilities at Chatham. You have there soldiers in all states, recruits, made soldiers, and invalids from abroad, and especially from the tropical climates—*i.e.* both chronic and acute cases together. We never shall have both either at Aldershot or Netley, and it is most important to ascertain before you finally locate your school at either, which is the class of cases most important to the teacher, and which can be most easily dispensed with, if both cannot be had.

"There is a theatre at Chatham and a museum, and lodgings can be procured either at Stroud or Rochester. A corrugated iron hut with glass in the roof can easily and at small cost be run up for pathological demonstrations.

"If you will authorise Alexander to meet Sutherland and myself and Sir James Clark, I am sure we should all prove willing to undertake and devise a temporary arrangement by which the school should be *at once* put, though on a limited, still on a useful footing.

"It will not do to send out batch after batch of young men, who have never had the slightest instruction in the most important part of their duty—namely, the sanitary—especially when we are sending them to India.

"We could also relieve the Army Medical Department of a function for which they are not properly competent, and which consumes time which is invaluable for other purposes during the present pressure, or indeed at any time. This ought, under existing circumstances, to be done at once. If, owing

to the exigencies of the service, the examination is the only test, it ought to be made as efficient and as trustworthy as possible. I hope, therefore, you will immediately send the Medical School Plan to the Treasury, with my draft letter explaining its object. Now is the time to strike while the iron is hot. The public are looking with anxiety to these measures. They do not like the expenditure of half a million a year in recruiting to fill vacancies which ought not to exist.

"Pray, therefore, knowing how slow these communications between Departments are, lose no time in sending this, and everything else you can, on to the Treasury.

"The Regulations, I should think, do not require their sanction, as they carry no increase of expense; but the Medical School and the Council are urgent, and cannot be adopted without them."

This seems to have satisfied the War Office that Mr. Herbert was inexorable, and that "something must be done;" but to combine the appearance of doing something with a practical assurance of further delay, the War Office, through the medium of the Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir B. Hawes, next proposed that a fresh Commission, including among its members Dr. Acland of Oxford, and some London physician of celebrity, should be appointed to consider and report on the recommendations of the Sanitary Commission and of the Sub-Commission in this connection. To this proposal Sidney Herbert was as little minded to agree as to the former one.

MR. HERBERT TO GENERAL PEEL.

"PLYMOUTH, *December 1st*, 1858.

"MY DEAR PEEL,

"You cannot, I think, expect me to agree to Sir B. Hawes's proposal. He clearly has never given his attention to the subject of Army medical education, for he is too acute a man to write such questions as those in his memorandum, if he had ever done so.

"He assumes that the mode of introduction into the Army Medical Department is now perfect, instead of being condemned by the first physicians and surgeons in London.

"He proposes to reopen all the questions decided by the Royal Commission, though the Report has been affirmed, and commissions appointed to put its recommendations into practical shape.

"As to calling in Dr. Acland and a first-rate London physician to decide on these questions, we should have to begin by instructing them as to the nature of the duties which ought to be performed by military surgeons, and then to ask their opinion on a plan which has already received the sanction of the late and present Directors-General, Sir J. Clark, Sir R. D. Martin, and Dr. Sutherland, and on which we consulted Sir D. Bredin, Mr. Parker, and the examiners for the East India Company.

"It is impossible to have a higher or more disinterested authority than that which we already possess. The memo. proposes, in fact, that the Royal Commission shall go for nothing, and that the evidence of the first medical men in London shall be set aside.

"You have before you the results of the labours of the men whose names I have mentioned, and you can seldom get results backed by such high authority. You are Secretary of State, and it is *you* who must judge whether you will adopt them or not.

"I have in conjunction with my medical colleagues bestowed much labour and time upon them. I will be no party to throwing them over. All I can say is this: that I never would have had anything to do with the new warrant increasing pay and promotion unless the medical officers were to be made competent to discharge increased and higher duties. Without this the warrant is an unnecessary extravagance.

"I am satisfied of the urgency of the various proposals made. They may require some modification as to expense. I care little about that part of the subject, and would give every assistance in my power to meet the views of the Treasury in that respect. But the sanitary instruction must be given, and the hospital organisation must be introduced, if the Army is to be efficient.

"That is all I look to. I have given up a great

deal to it, and I shall do my utmost to carry the measures through.

"It is absurd to appeal from men who know the subject to others who do not. I, at any rate, will be no party to the proceeding. I return the memo.

"I can only again urge *you* to *decide* these questions, and have something done before Parliament meets, and I repeat my offer to endeavour, in conjunction with the Director-General, to modify the plan so as to enable you to commence it on a temporary footing at Chatham. But I protest against all devices re-opening settled questions, and introducing unnecessary delay."

General Peel did that which in the circumstances he could hardly help doing: he yielded.

But now the composition of the Medical Council raised a fresh plea for inaction. Sidney Herbert had proposed that the Council should consist of three persons: the Director-General, a Sanitary and a Statistical officer, each of whom was to direct his own special branch of work, but who should advise the Director-General, on whom the ultimate responsibility rested. Sir Benjamin Hawes considered that it was essential that there should also be a *medical* member of the Board in addition to the Director-General, and that he should have precedence over, and higher pay than, his two colleagues, and such being the case, he "feared" that the Treasury might consider such an establishment too expensive to be allowed.

But Mr. Herbert would have none of this.

MR. HERBERT TO SIR BENJAMIN HAWES.

"January 9th, 1859.

"MY DEAR SIR BENJAMIN,

"I confess I am alarmed about the Medical Council. As regards expense I care little, provided you can get the men—*i.e.* capable and independent men. I

originally did not wish to have a medical councillor at all. The Director-General would, I thought, be the representative of the purely medical element, and be quite competent to advise himself thereon, and I proposed only a Sanitary and a Statistical councillor. I still think it might be so worked. The Director-General would always have in his office a medical subordinate to do the drudgery of his work; but the proposal of making the Medical councillor (who would be the only one *not* head of a branch) the first in rank is, I think, fatal.

"If one must be of a higher rank than the others, it should be the Sanitary or the Statistical, though the Sanitary has this superiority, that he could, in the absence of the Director-General, more fitly represent him. Two councillors, one sanitary, one statistical, both of the same rank, and sufficient rank to secure the best man in the profession, would cost no more than your plan, and would be more efficient for our object. I do not see that a medical councillor is absolutely necessary, though he would make the thing more complete; but to put the other two on a *lower* footing would be most mischievous.

"You *want* to show to the Army and the medical profession that at last we have come to the conclusion, on which all great military commanders have been agreed, that the science of prevention is better than the science of cure:—your proposal *reverses* this. I hold likewise to the quinquennial appointments, and, above all, to the modes of transacting business, keeping each to his own work, and avoiding as far as possible the system in vogue at the War Office, where each man does somebody else's work as well as his own, and time is consumed through the multiplicity of hands through which each matter passes.

"I want responsible action on the part of the Director-General, and responsible advice from the Council. It is the only form of administrative despotism which has worked well whether in India or in England. I think there is an error in your estimate of the cost of the Director-General's office. I took Smith's office as it was; not as it showed on the estimate for the department. But it had men in it paid under *other* heads, which in a new office there ought not to be. You ought to have none but very good men to assist

the Director-General. The difference in the cost of getting them is the difference between the pay of an Inspector and a Deputy-Inspector. If you had had a competent Sanitary Councillor in Smith's time, we should have saved from £100,000 to £200,000 at Netley, where we have twice as much building as we want, with an enormous expense in administration from defective structure on a site which is disastrous.

"Our Commission is now doing much of the work of a Sanitary Councillor. I asked Alexander to give me some statistics about Aldershot; on these may depend an expenditure or a saving of a sum which in the long run must be counted in millions. He told me, and with truth, that his office could not work them out. He has no one capable of it in his present establishment, nor are the materials in working order for any one that can.

"It will end as penny wisdom generally does—in pound folly. Wherever I have been in our inspections, I have been struck by lavish expenditure in pounds, and the niggardness in small coin.

"Pardon this long letter, but I am afraid of what you are going to do, and I would sooner you delayed altogether than start on the wrong principle, for you cannot reconstruct an office once a week."

Sir B. Hawes replied, partly explaining away his former letter, and in a measure, but only to a limited extent, acquiescing in Mr. Herbert's views. He rejoined:

"WILTON, *January 11th*, 1859.

"MY DEAR SIR BENJAMIN,

"We are clearly each writing in ignorance of the plans of the other. I thought you were going to make a Board, and, my object being to avoid division of responsibility, I object; but, if I require undivided responsibility, I must give my autocrat every means of coming to a right decision. Boards don't do that, and have accordingly been swept away. We have swept away the Government of India, and have now substituted an autocrat with a council. The Governor-General governs so—so also do the Governors of the

Presidencies; but the responsibility is undivided, because the Governor's autocracy is preserved. Now as to ranks. I never objected to a medical Head in the shape of the Director-General. What I say is that the *three* subordinates (if three are necessary to your plans) ought to be of equal rank. I object to any superiority, and I particularly object to it where the sanitary, which is the most important, and the neglect of which subject has cost thousands of men in the last war, in Bulgaria, before Sebastopol, at Balaclava, and at Scutari, and is now so doing in India from all I hear, is put on a lower rank than the other, or than any one. I do not ask for a civil statistician. If you could not get any one of the councillors from the Army, I would go to the civil professions without scruple, but we can get them from the ranks of the Army medical profession.

"Balfour is quite as good a statistician as Bullock. I must have made some great confusion in my letter if I implied otherwise: but without proper rank and pay you won't get men from the Army who will carry weight. I fear you greatly undervalue the qualities required, and the difficulties of finding a good sanitary opinion;—you will find 50 good *curative* for one *preventive* opinion. There are perhaps not three in England. Please read the programme of the sanitary lecture in our report on the medical school. It requires a thorough knowledge of physical geography, geology, chemistry, and almost every science in a practical shape. It was the belief that uninstructed common sense is sufficient that has destroyed our armies, and makes them so costly now. I should be very glad if you would read also (they are very short) the passages in the Report of the Royal Commission on the sanitary duties and on the constitution of the office of the Director-General. I think you can get a fair sanitarian from the ranks of the Army, but the science is new, and few have as yet adopted it; you will get better soon. There was a time when I thought on this subject as you do, but since I have gone so deeply into the matter, I confess I have formed a very different opinion. I am certain that unless every encouragement is given to the study of sanitary *prevention*, we shall never be able to reduce the cost of our Army, as it ought to be reduced, if it is to be

maintained on the scale which the state of India and Europe requires. I have, however, said my say, and the responsibility does not rest on me. The *action* lies, and very properly, with others. My reason for liking appointments limited as to time is that you can then get rid of a man who is not up to the mark, but not so inefficient as to be dismissible. You also get occasionally a new broom, which is an advantage, and more men pass through the office and leave it. The Director-General is only appointed for a limited time—you can always re-appoint a first-rate or necessary man."

A month later the discussion still continued, and on February 18th, 1859, Mr. Herbert summed up his remarks on the War Office minutes as follows :

"I have read over these various minutes with care, and I have read again the proposed instructions from the Secretary to ascertain what words in them could have given rise to the interpretation put on their meaning.

"One of the minutes very properly observes that the instructions are meant as a sketch of how a Council would work, and would necessarily have to be greatly modified and generalised in practice.

"The evils which you have to guard against are those from which the War Office Administration is supposed to suffer, and which are with some exaggerative smartness described by Mr. Russell in his description of the working of the Indian Council at Calcutta, which he would assimilate to another Council—namely, the Cabinet Council in Downing Street.

"It appears to me necessary to lay down in the draft instructions that each man is to minute his own papers, and not those of his colleagues. One of the minutes oddly advances against the instructions the charge that each of the three Councillors are to minute the papers on the subjects belonging to other than his own department. This is exactly what he is not to do.

"The Secretary of State now works by means of a Council held every Saturday. I am told that much writing and much difference of opinion have been saved by this simple form of meeting.

"There is no such waste of time, temper, and stationery as men sitting on stools and writing at one another through a partition.

"When an object is to be effected by joint and simultaneous action, unless there be previous concert *vivâ voce*, it will be days before an agreement is arrived at.

"I therefore proposed a Director-General to be made the immediate authority of the Secretary of State, and three, with three subordinates, of equal rank and pay. I make them equal because, though the Sanitary is the most important, any difference in position would be invidious.

"I say 'most important' because prevention is more important than cure. Prevention gives us soldiers. Cure gives us pensioners.

"I propose that each, under the Director-General, should do the routine of his own department, but that in a case of any novelty, difficulty, or importance, the Council—*i.e.* the Director-General and all three colleagues—should be made acquainted with it, and the Director-General decide what should be done.

"A number of cases must constantly arise when the co-operation of all three branches will be necessary. The Statistical branch will have detected an evil by the returns, the Medical will have killed or cured so many men, and the Sanitary are responsible, and must ascertain why the men were ever ill.

"I want this to be done, not by a lengthened correspondence, nor an infinity of minutes, but by a *vivâ-voce* discussion of the facts over the papers. Thus you can hope for speedy, and at the same time well-considered, results.

"As to expense, do it as cheaply as you can, consistently with getting the best men. Whether they be Inspectors or Deputy-Inspectors need really make no difference in net cost. You have some Inspectors in foreign stations who would be better at home. Hard work and expense in this field require youth and vigour; office work at home requires experience, judgment, and caution. As an illustration of this, I would observe that we have an Inspector in the East Indies whom the Commander-in-Chief, rightly or wrongly, will not allow to join the Army. We have, perhaps, too many Inspectorships abroad, and too few

at home. In some of our colonies a Deputy-Inspector would do as well, or better, than an Inspector, and the rank might be transferred to an appointment at home.

"But if they are *all* to be not additions to the existing numbers, and not, as in ordinary times one would contemplate, men already possessing the rank and appointed for a limited period to the office, it would not at any rate, as is supposed in one of the minutes, add to the number of promotions."

In the end Sidney Herbert succeeded in getting his own way, but at the cost of much friction, delay, and worry of the most wearying character. It is easy to sympathise with the mood in which the following sarcastic draft Report, as to the nature of the existing Medical Board, and that by which it was proposed to replace it, was penned :

Draft Report addressed to General Peel.

"SIR,

"We have the honour to say :

"1. As to the Army Medical Board.

"It has nothing but administrative duties to perform, not one of which it performs in an administrative manner.

"2. As to general hospitals.

"They do no one thing efficiently but put the sick to death.

"3. As to sanitary duties of Medical Department.

"It waits till the men are dead before it takes their health in hand.

"We propose in future :

"1. To give the Army Medical Department something to do, and leave it to *you* to make it do it.

"2. To give the sick, who are unfortunate enough to find themselves in general hospitals, a fair chance of escaping alive therefrom.

"3. Not to inquire why the men died, after they are dead."

Sidney Herbert's position during 1858 and the first half of 1859 was a very singular and probably an

unprecedented one. Not in office himself, and, indeed, an avowed member of the Opposition, he virtually relieved the War Office by performing some of its most important duties. For it will be remembered that the Sub-Commissions of which he was Chairman had power not only to make recommendations, but to carry them at once into execution if their cost did not exceed certain limits.

The preceding pages substantially set forth the recommendations made by the third and fourth of these Sub-Commissions. The other two had meanwhile not been idle. That on barracks and hospitals diligently visited and reported on those institutions. It was speedily discovered that the amount of money placed at its disposal, to effect urgent and necessary alterations, was altogether insufficient; and with much trouble some augmentation of the sum was secured.

Of this Sub-Commission Mr. Herbert was the head. Its Reports were in most cases written by him, and those which were not so were subjected to his careful revision. The proof sheets of the draft Reports are covered with emendations in his handwriting, and the Reports themselves are of the most thorough and detailed character. Every barrack visited was found to have its rooms overcrowded in a greater or less degree. In many they were low, cold, dark, and unsuitable. In none was there rational or sufficient ventilation. Few barracks had a bath, and the ablution-rooms were usually narrow and inadequate. All sanitary arrangements were of the most defective character. In the cavalry barracks the dormitories were in most cases immediately over the stables. At Northampton, by a singularly unfortunate attempt at ventilation, the foul air from the lower storey was conducted into the rooms above, while that of the upper rooms was

drawn down and discharged into the sleeping-rooms on the ground floor. Day-rooms and recreation-rooms were all but non-existent. Libraries were few and far between.

At Dover and at Plymouth the casemates were used as barrack-rooms, or married quarters, overcrowded with women and children. Such an arrangement, Mr. Herbert wrote, "might, during a siege, tend to preserve life; at other times it has an opposite tendency."

The first Report on the London barracks was sent in on May 18th, 1858, and the last which bears Sidney Herbert's signature—that on the Cavalry Barracks at Chichester—is dated March 23rd, 1859.

After Mr. Herbert became Secretary of State, this Sub-Commission continued to pursue its useful labours without his direct aid, but the Commissioners had the satisfaction of knowing that their Reports were addressed to a 'Chief thoroughly in sympathy with them, and by whom their recommendations would be listened to with a desire to execute and not to thwart them.

The Statistical Sub-Commission had nearly completed its useful work before the fall of Lord Derby's Government, and little more remained for Mr. Herbert, when he came into office, than to give his formal sanction to its recommendations—that is to say, his own.

The difficulties which Mr. Herbert, however, encountered in getting his plans executed, even when possessing all the powers of the Secretary of State, will be dealt with in another chapter.

CHAPTER V

FALL OF LORD DERBY

1859

AT the beginning of 1859 Lord John Russell, restless as usual, was full of plans for overthrowing Lord Derby's Government, and himself replacing it. In these schemes he sought the aid of Sidney Herbert, but his overtures, though kindly met, did not elicit any very hearty response from either Mr. Herbert or his intimate associates. Sir James Graham, writing on January 9th, after making a proposal to visit Wilton, says :

“ Lord John Russell, I daresay, has made to you an offer of another kind. He has intimated to me a desire that you, Lewis, and I should form a little coterie around him for the purpose of concert on questions of Reform and of Finance. He excludes questions of Foreign Policy, because he knows how much I differ from him with respect to the invasion of Italy by France and Piedmont under the mask of liberty. But in civil terms I have declined any such compact. I told him, with truth, that I had no desire for new combinations, that ‘I have had my hour,’ and that the time for my departure is drawing nigh. I added that I was on the kindest terms with you, and that I regarded Lewis always as a friend ; but that Lewis by natural affinities was bound to Clarendon and Palmerston, and that you, though perfectly free, could not be regarded as an

ardent reformer. At the same time I assured Lord John that I was always ready to communicate with him frankly and confidentially on public affairs.¹

* * * * *

I am most anxious to remain unfettered by any private engagements, and to be free to act as sense of duty and of public safety may prompt in a critical emergency. This resolution by no means precludes the most free and constant communication with friends whom I love and trust like you and Lord Aberdeen. Indeed, I wish to correct my opinions in difficult circumstances by the light of others, but I am afraid of ambitious intrigues and of dangerous steps in clambering to power, or in clinging to office, on the part of rival Premiers. But we will adjourn further discussion till we meet."

Sidney Herbert replied on the following day :

"WILTON HOUSE, SALISBURY,

"January 10th, 1859.

"MY DEAR GRAHAM,

"I have been anxiously waiting for news of the date of the commencement of the Session, to write and remind you of your promise, and I am delighted that you have so honestly recollected it. Pray come on the 27th. You will all be right welcome. I shall be very glad, too, to talk over the black future before we have to grapple with it.

"I am very much pleased at the answer you have given Lord John. He and the Whigs are incurable in their superstitions about ducal houses. I see no prospect of the formation of an efficient party, let alone Government, out of the chaos on the Opposition benches. No one reigns over or in it, but discord and antipathy. The aristocratic Whigs seem to be nearly used up, and the party produces no new men, but at the same time complains of the old ones. Middle-aged merchants, shrewd men of business, feel their vanity hurt that they have not the refusal of office, which the absorbing love of

¹ The body of this letter will be found in Mr. Parker's forthcoming Life of Sir James Graham.

their own pursuits prevents them from accepting, and for which they have not had the leisure to qualify themselves.

"If Lewis spoke his mind at Hereford, he is against all Reform. It is very difficult to find any one very keen for it, the tide of discussion of late having set strongly against it. I was surprised to find even Dr. Chapman, of *The Westminster Review*, against any large extension of the suffrage.

"On the whole I still incline to think that the country and Parliament will prefer to keep this Government to trying a new one, be the chief who he may.

"If Louis Napoleon attacks Austria, the reputation of the Emperor Nicholas will be avenged. It will be, unless some very new and different cause of quarrel arises, a flagitious crime. Has Derby the go in him to say 'you shan't'? Our foreign seals are not in strong or even in prudent hands, and I am afraid Louis Napoleon knows that better than most people. I like our projects, whether abroad or at home, very little indeed.

"We shall look for you on the 27th, unless Parliament should meet earlier, in which case you must come earlier."

This elicited another letter from Sir James Graham, written on the 17th :

"I have not heard much from any one since I last wrote to you. I expect Ellice here to-day, and I shall then have enough and to spare. But we have only dark visions in this twilight which precedes the dawn. Lord Aberdeen writes in bad spirits, and apprehends a war in Italy as almost inevitable. This Piedmontese marriage is an evil omen. The unhappy female descendants of Maria Theresa never enter France in bridal array without war and bloodshed and sorrow in their train.

"What is Gladstone about? I never hear from him. He knows how entirely I dissented from the policy of his mission; and I particularly dwelt on the awkwardness of his position towards Young, if it were intended that he should be the instrument of displacing an old friend and colleague. Is this really

to be the result ? and can he accept the office in the Ionian Islands without vacating his seat in Parliament ? *'Hic finis Priami fatorum ? hic exitus illum. Sorte tulit ?'*

"It is sad that it should be thought possible ; sadder still if the event should realise the fear. An early attack will be opened on this ground, and I know not what the most attached friends can urge in defence of this strange proceeding. Lord Aberdeen dislikes the subject, and will not write upon it ; but silence will be difficult when Parliament meets.

"'Noisy John'¹ is to open his Reform Bill in detail at Bradford this evening. He thus gives to his opponents every advantage. He is very rash, if he really desires to carry his measure ; he is very dishonest if, not intending to carry it, he himself takes the surest means of rendering it abortive."

Sidney Herbert's answer was as follows :

"SAVANAKE FOREST,

"January 19th, 1859.

"My DEAR GRAHAM,

"I have just received your letter, and rejoiced to hear that you are true to the 27th.

"I cannot say how much I am annoyed about Gladstone. His appointment without salary went out to him, I believe, last Friday ; but I doubt very much whether the absence of salary can affect the tenure of his seat. It will be very awkward for him to have to be re-elected. His course is unintelligible. He writes to Hayward that he sees no prospect of doing any good ; that it is now only for England a question of character, in which the balance is not now on the right side, and he praises John Young's administration as deserving of much credit ! Then Young writes that he has no intention of resigning, but supposes he shall be recalled, 'as Gladstone *has recommended it!*' What an infernal position he has placed himself in ! He really is not safe to go about out of Lord Aberdeen's

¹ Bright,

room. It is heart-breaking to see him throwing so much away.

"Lord Henry Lennox is quoted to me for these things—all not unlikely:

- "(1) That the Government will bring in the Reform Bill early.
- "(2) That it will be of rather a liberal character.
- "(3) That they apprehend no danger from this, as their supporters will swallow anything."

MR. HERBERT TO SIR JAMES GRAHAM.

"49, BELGRAVE SQUARE,

"February 16th, 1859.

"MY DEAR GRAHAM,

"I agree with you that this letter¹ indicates a very unpleasant state of mind. It looks like the irritation of conscious failure. Unfortunately, as far as one can judge from a perusal of the speech to the Parliament,² failure in carrying the reforms will be the best termination, for if they be carried it seems to me that the Government of the Ionian Islands will be at once at a deadlock.

"I do not see that England is bound in honour to give to the Ionians an exact counterpart of English institutions; on the contrary, the further we go in that direction, the more inapplicable to the Ionian character, and consequently the more noxious, those institutions will become. It is a very bad business."

MR. HERBERT TO MR. GLADSTONE.

"49, BELGRAVE SQUARE,

"February 19th, 1859.

"MY DEAR GLADSTONE,

"Graham tells me he has written to you, so you probably know all the last phases of politics here. The Navy Estimates, announced by Pakington, with one of his loudest flourishes, as a 'reconstruction'

¹ From Mr. Gladstone.

² *i.e.* the Ionian Parliament.

of the Navy, come on on Friday next, the 21st. The phrase gave rise to much expectation here, and some alarm abroad, and was certainly ill-chosen. Now, people having seen the Estimates (£1,000,000 increase) are positively disappointed, and want more.

"But before we get into the Navy Estimates, Palmerston, in concert with Lord John, is to raise a discussion on the Italian question. I see nothing but mischief in the proceeding. Their Italian speeches will act as an encouragement to Louis Napoleon in his aggressive designs, and a spark will now set the train on fire. I do not myself see how peace is now possible, but I hoped that England and English statesmen would in no way share the responsibility of the French designs. Europe is passing from a state of terror to one of wrath, and I suppose we shall have some years of blood and waste and crime, of which, before it is ended, we shall have our share.

"I do not think you ought to delay your going home; there is a storm brewing, but it awaits your return, when I have no doubt a motion will be made impugning your mission. If the Ionian Parliament accepts your reforms, the motion will be a serious affair. If you fail, so will the motion here, I think.

"Poor Thesiger has got into a dreadful mess in appointing his son-in-law (little Higgins) a Master in Lunacy. At the eleventh hour, and after being installed, he was obliged to resign.

"Seymour Fitzgerald answered one or two awkward questions connected with his department remarkably hardily yesterday, including Malmesbury's letter on the Navigation Laws.

"The House is more dead than I ever saw it, but there is stormy weather ahead, and the Reform Bill on the 28th will effect great changes in the aspect of parties in the House."

On the meeting of Parliament, the Government produced a Reform Bill. Its chief principle was the establishment of one uniform franchise qualification, and one of its prominent features was the

abolition of the votes of the forty-shilling freeholders in counties. This latter provision was immediately denounced as a "retrograde" step, and Lord John Russell began to concert measures for the introduction of a Resolution condemning it, and asserting the desirability of a further extension of the franchise. After a conversation with Lord John, Mr. Herbert, at his request, drafted a Resolution to this effect, and sent it to him with the following letter. Lord John's motive in requesting Mr. Herbert to draft the Resolution had been that he was known to be by no means enthusiastic in the cause of Parliamentary Reform, and it was supposed that what he was willing to adopt would probably be accepted without difficulty by other men of moderate opinions.

MR. HERBERT TO LORD JOHN RUSSELL.

"MY DEAR LORD JOHN RUSSELL,

"I enclose a draft Resolution comprising the same objects which are set forth in the one you showed me to-day, but altering the wording of the latter portion of it. In the first part I only propose to substitute the word 'hitherto' for the word 'now,' as it implies long existing rights on the part of the forty-shilling freeholders. This I think you will not object to. I would suggest also that better words could be found than 'interfere with' the freehold franchise.

"I have discussed the matter with Graham, who agrees with me that it is desirable to exclude from the wording of the Resolution any phrase which has become the catchword of any particular section of reformers, and would give rise to apprehension as implying an intention to adopt any particular and extreme franchise.

"The term 'industrious classes' is not a good one, for the artisan class is not more industrious than

other classes, but it has been used to designate those masses who, if admitted wholesale to the franchise, would, it is held, swamp by their superior numbers all other classes put together, and points to a measure larger, I think, than is contemplated by any one who wishes to preserve something like the present balance of interests.

"For the same reason, after discussion, we omitted the word 'householders,' which suggested itself as an alternative expression, but which would be thought to point to 'household suffrage.' So much for the wording of the Resolution.

"As regards the measure to be carried, I shall be quite content to take the borough franchise proposed in the Bill of 1854; but I must add that I attach far more importance to length of residence and payment of rates than to any amount of value, as being a better test of habitual industry, sobriety, and respectability than any other.

"As regards the counties, I do not know whether it is possible, after the Government proposal, to recede from the £10; but there were indications in the debate on Mr. Locke King's Bill last year, that the House of Commons would have been better pleased with a higher franchise—the precise amount was not then fixed, as the Bill never went into Committee. I am an advocate for maintaining a marked difference between the county and borough franchise.

"There ought to be disfranchisement of pure nomination boroughs, and I should myself like, with a view to permanent settlement, to see a somewhat larger disfranchisement than that contemplated by the Government Bill; but every additional borough disfranchised creates a fresh difficulty in redistribution. The selection, too, is very difficult, for population affords no real test of nomination or independence. This, too, is certain, that every additional borough disfranchised diminishes the chance of passing the Bill. A Bill, however, without any disfranchisement would invite and justify immediate agitation for a further measure. It is therefore wise, as it seems to me, to restrict any future proposal on this head to the limits, or nearly to the limits, of the Government Bill.

"We know much more of the temper of the country

on this subject, and we know much more of the subject itself now than we did in 1854. I might add, more than we did a fortnight ago. There is little enthusiasm, but much alarm, more, perhaps, than is justifiable, nor will it be allayed even by the franchise I have mentioned; but without some such extension we cannot reckon on effecting, I do not say a final, but a durable, settlement.

"I am satisfied that the House of Commons is, for the most part, too deeply impressed with the immense importance of the subject to allow any party considerations to have much influence on their decision, and they will not deal summarily with the Government Bill, bad and dangerous as it is in principle, unless they see clearly the prospect of obtaining a sound and prudent measure in its place, from whatever quarter it may proceed. I entirely share this feeling. It becomes, however, the more important that the Resolution to be moved by you should be so worded as to give rise to no misapprehension which may raise false hopes or excite fears which would be fatal to its success.

"Pray pardon this long letter, which is the fruit of the anxiety with which I regard the whole subject."

In the closing sentence of the proposed Resolution, Mr. Herbert had written that no settlement of the question would be "satisfactory or permanent" which did not include some extension of suffrage. Lord John, before reading the accompanying letter, had no sooner glanced at the Resolution itself than he at once wrote to make the odd objection that the words "no arrangement can be final or satisfactory" had formed part of the famous Irish Appropriation Resolutions, the withdrawal of which had not been a glorious incident in his career, and observed that "a burnt child dreads the fire." In short, the words being connected with one discomfiture, he seems to have had a half-superstitious fear that a repetition of their use might forebode another.

Mr. Herbert, of course, complied with Lord John's request for an alteration in the language of his draft, but confessed that, though he "had tried it different ways, he was fairly beat," and that though he sent a new sketch as desired, he owned that he "liked the one you have already got best," adding the very natural remark that there was "so wide a difference in the two subjects of Parliamentary Reform and Irish emoluments," that he "should not mind the similarity of phrase with the Appropriation Clauses. The extension of the suffrage is sure to be carried in some shape and to some extent."

Lord John, of course, had his way, and altered the terms of the Resolution, which he divided into two: one to the effect that no settlement without extended franchise would "satisfy the House of Commons or the country," and a second condemning the withdrawal of the rights long enjoyed by forty-shilling freeholders. When, on March 21st, the second reading of the Government Reform Bill was moved, Lord John proposed his Resolutions as an amendment.

The debate on these Resolutions was remarkable. Mr. Gladstone spoke in favour of rotten boroughs, and Mr. Disraeli made use of language which called forth the indignant denunciation of Sir James Graham. He had been ill, and wrote:

"I am better this morning, and hope to call on you in an hour or two. Light does not dawn on me after this wintry night of darkness which may be felt. It is too impudent to laugh and to make fools of us from the Treasury Bench by alternate declarations of tame subserviency and of high honour. We used to boast that we were a body of English gentlemen. There was a day when conduct of this kind would have been scouted as intolerable with unanimous scorn; but the House of Commons had never then consented to be led by a Jew Adventurer."

Among the best speeches made—it was said by good authorities to be the only striking one made on the side of the Opposition during the first two nights of the debate—was Mr. Herbert's.

Much of his speech consisted of references to incidents in the debate, and retorts on previous speakers, which, though highly effective at the time, have now lost their point and interest; but he stated in clear terms his own views as to the moderate and conservative reform he desired to see effected. Court-ously, but firmly, he repudiated all association with Bright and Cobden. He was, he declared, no democratic reformer, he had no sympathy with the sentiments expressed by them, and as little for the Bill introduced by the Government.

“I occupy a middle position, a position which I believe is occupied by the great mass of the country who are attached to our ancient institutions, who look upon them as sacred traditions handed down to them from their ancestors, and which it is their duty to maintain inviolate. Enlarge them if you like, improve them if you can, but still keep them unimpaired in their vitality. Such would be my policy, and, entertaining those opinions, I cannot refrain from speaking them frankly, notwithstanding that their expression may give to some gentlemen temporary offence. Does, then, this Bill, with its principle of uniformity, meet the requirements which I have specified? For my own part, I must confess that, looking beyond the morrow and into the future, I regard it with the greatest alarm. It sacrifices everything to uniformity, a principle which is unknown to our constitution.”

He saw great danger in the Bill—uniformity of franchise, which was its only principle, was novel and alien to our ideas and traditions. Ancient ways might be improved; but to get upon a wrong track was another matter. There were several courses which might be followed.

"One of them is to vote against its second reading if you dislike the principle of this Bill. Another is, if it be not the principle but the details to which you object, then go into Committee and discuss its provisions there. A third is not to vote against the second reading, but to vote for this Resolution. If you vote against the second reading you throw out the Bill contumeliously, and do not even specify to the country what you object to and what you approve. If you want to turn out the Government, then vote against the second reading. That is intelligible and according to precedent. Precedent is a great thing in these matters, and I ought, perhaps, to apologise for not taking notice of this argument. Yet this species of Parliamentary red-tapism really does not require much reasoning to dispose of it. I see a bad Bill before me. I want to get rid of it, and I think the weapon that comes to my hand is about the best I can use for the purpose. I wish to destroy this Bill, and to get another in its place founded on a different principle, and I should like the Government, if they could be induced to do it, to bring it in."

He ridiculed the idea, much pressed by supporters of the Bill, that it could be substantially recast in Committee, and showed the absurdity of attempting in that manner to construct a rational and consistent measure.

"Why, when a Cabinet of 15 or 16 members want to construct a Reform Bill they find themselves too many for so delicate and difficult a task. They therefore appoint a Committee of three or four out of their number to frame a measure for them, and then the Cabinet discuss it." What he desired was "not a Bill framed—as Lord Stanley had told them this Bill was framed—to pass: he wanted a Bill that would last."

In a remarkable passage he predicted—in which, however, he had been anticipated by Lord Stanley—the decline of party influence in the House, and marked the growing influence of groups and individuals.

"I wish the House to listen for a short time while I ask this question. We are a mixed body in this House, to an extent that I never knew before. The noble Lord, the Secretary for India, says that the Government is in a minority, party government is a thing of the past, the House is divided into sections, and Ministries must for the future depend not upon the organised machinery of party, but upon the measures which they may submit; if good, he adds, those measures will be carried; if bad, they will fail; but all must be tentative, and all that Ministries can henceforth rely upon is a clear insight into the wishes of the people, and of the House which represents the people. Now, I confess I have come to very much the same conclusion myself, I believe the old system of party government to be pretty well at an end. The change of policy which it will entail will be a very difficult one. It will require in the Minister who is Leader in this House, all the tact, all the ability which I am bound to say the right hon. gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer displays in the leadership of the House. But the phase through which we shall have to pass will be a very difficult and a very dangerous one, and Governments will be unwise who refuse to listen to the voice of large numbers in this House, bound together by no party ties, who try to lead them in the direction in which they believe that the safety of the country lies.

"I say your principle is new to this House, new to the country, and new to the Government themselves. They cannot have any great affection for a scheme which has been familiar to their minds but for a few weeks. They have not hit the public wishes, nor the wishes of this House. I ask them again, therefore, to look upon this Resolution as an indication of what it is that this House objects to, and what it is that it wants. When you speak of the two sections of a great assembly like this, there must, no doubt, be many men on both sides occupied with party objects, and animated by party spirit; but the great majority of this House, I am persuaded, think it of far more importance than any change of Ministry that the country should be satisfied. I am not one of those who attach so much importance as many do to the formation of particular Governments or to changes of Government. I have

seen many changes of Government, and small change in the conduct of public affairs. But of this I am certain, that even if you impose on us a change of Ministry, very inconvenient and much to be deprecated as that may be, we have a stronger attachment to the constitution of the country than to allow personal feelings, and considerations of convenience, to influence us in the settlement of a grave question like this. Some years hence what man will ask, 'Who was Prime Minister in 1859?'"

The debate was continued with great spirit till April 1st, on which night Lord John's Resolution was carried by a majority of 39, and the Government resolved on an immediate dissolution. So far as his own seat was concerned, Mr. Herbert was able to anticipate the result with confidence.

"I suppose," he wrote on the 10th to Mr. Gladstone, "you will in a day or two be the 'last man.'"

"Tuesday's foreign policy debate will probably conclude the Session for all who have or fear contests, so I trust to you to let me know of anything eventful which may occur. This suggestion arises from the fact that I was informed after church that rumours had come down by the wire that war had actually commenced, etc., etc., etc.

"All seems quiet in this county. The only fear is the return of Danby Seymour from Cuba, who will find himself ejected from Poole, and is restless and wrong-headed enough to try and get a beating in the county, which he certainly would do if he tries it; but the attempt would, of course, involve me in all the trouble and expense which I wish to save myself.

"Dizzy's quibblings about the date of dissolution are very disgraceful. No possible public reasons can justify delay. Every possible public reason must be on the side of celerity. But the rogue is capable of anything for a party or personal object."

The fears of a contest in Wiltshire, here expressed, proved groundless, and Sidney Herbert's return was unopposed. It was destined to be his last election.

But the interest of party squabbles at home paled before that of the impending war between France and Austria. Mr. Gladstone wrote (April 12th):

"You are quite right about Disraeli's quibbles on Friday. Graham and I continually had to observe to one another on the lengthening catalogue of his fibs, and we thought, as we looked over the shoulder, that we could see Walpole and Henley doing much the same. All is in suspense about foreign affairs. For the moment the turn of the scale is towards peace, but I suppose it has now become almost beyond hope. Lord Aberdeen, as you know, has stuck to his text throughout, and always anticipated war. The foreign debate is to be on Friday, and one must still suppose that the Government expect that before that time the matter will have been decided; if decided then, it must be the wrong way."

And a few days later (April 23rd), he writes :

"War seems to be all but a fact now. Horrible as it is, and while fears predominate, I am not without hopes from it. I trust we have blown up the plan betrayed by Disraeli's observations on Trieste. Is not Graham's speech at Carlisle superlative? I am rather sorry to add, however, that it is so in more senses than one. However, it is not so bad about ballot as it was first reported in epitome."

Whatever opinion may be entertained as to the causes and results of the Italian War of 1859, there can be but one as to the unscrupulous perfidy of the French and Italian Governments.

We know now that war with Austria was a foregone conclusion, and that when the Emperor Louis Napoleon succeeded in completely hoodwinking Lord Cowley, and in deluding half Europe into a belief that he earnestly desired peace, the treaties which bound France to aid Sardinia, and Sardinia to give up Savoy, Nice, and Mentone to France, were actually signed and sealed; but this, of course, was unknown at

the time. In January, 1859, few believed that the Emperor Louis Napoleon's "rash" speech to Baron Hübner, (in point of fact a coolly calculated one) would be followed by grave results. Rather later, no doubt, serious uneasiness prevailed, but some faith was still given to the Emperor's disclaimers of any war-like intention, and it was thought that though he might have gone dangerously near the brink of war, he would, when the decisive moment came, throw over his Sardinian friends. Nor is it at all impossible that he might have done so, had he not put himself so completely into the power of Count Cavour, and known that the menace of the latter to publish to the world full evidence of the engagements into which he had entered was no idle threat, but would certainly be carried into effect without the slightest mercy or compunction. By the middle of March, war was recognised as inevitable, and at the end of April it was declared.

The position of affairs in Italy had an important influence on the working of party politics at home.

During 1858, Mr. Gladstone had, step by step, drawn nearer to Lord Derby's Government. He had accepted from it a mission to Corfu, and was in that island at the beginning of 1859. He had no wish for a fresh measure of Parliamentary Reform, and he abhorred the system of election by ballot, which a few years later became law on his proposal. But he had a profound antipathy to Austria and the Austrians, and an equally profound sympathy with Italian aspirations for unity and freedom; and as the Conservative Ministry was strongly prejudiced against the Italian cause, and the Liberal leaders as strongly in its favour, this powerful attraction produced a great change in the attitude, and even in the opinions, of Mr.

Gladstone. Parliamentary Reform, when accompanied by a sympathetic attitude towards Sardinia, seemed to him a far more tolerable thing than it had appeared to be shortly before.

In like manner, Lord Palmerston, who, since his expulsion from office in 1858, had shown no great cordiality towards Lord John Russell, and had been suspected of more or less friendly approaches to Lord Derby, hastened to lay aside his known aversion to Parliamentary Reform, and declared himself in entire agreement with Lord John on that point—a declaration, however, which deceived nobody. The desire on the part of Lord Palmerston to replace the existing Government by one more in harmony with his own views on the Italian question was only natural, and might have been anticipated; but as it had hitherto been assumed that if not animated by hostility to Lord John, he at least felt coldly towards him, this declaration made no slight difference in the position of the latter, and introduced a fresh and perplexing element into the impending scramble for power. In writing to Mr. Herbert on March 10th, Sir James Graham mentions that he had met Lord Palmerston at a ball at the Palace, and adds:

“He held out his hand, and we conversed freely. The new complication is inextricable, it cannot be unravelled; cutting is the sharpest and most ready process, but not always the safest. The ‘immortal truth’ of time and opportunity must not be disregarded.”

Parliament was dissolved on April 22nd; the General Election followed immediately, and at its close it appeared that the Government had gained about thirty seats, but that it was still in a minority, though a minority so small as to make it doubtful whether

the Opposition, split up as it was into factions divided by mutual jealousies and animosities, would be able to replace Lord Derby's Government by a new one, if it succeeded in ejecting him from office. It was difficult to suppose that Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell could be sincerely reconciled, or that Lord John would long consent to play a subordinate part in a Cabinet formed and headed by another man. Still more incredible did it appear that Mr. Gladstone, who for the past three or four years had constantly, in season and out of season, assailed Lord Palmerston with a vigour approaching to violence, and at the General Election in 1857 had dilated on his iniquities in almost every town and village in Flintshire, should consent to take office under a man whom he had denounced as the most profligate and mischievous Minister of the nineteenth century.

The history of the negotiations which preceded the overthrow of Lord Derby's Cabinet, and the share taken in them by Mr. Herbert, are so fully set forth in the following correspondence that it seems to me better to let the actors themselves speak, than to give in my own words a summary of their letters :

LORD JOHN RUSSELL TO MR. HERBERT.

"PEMBROKE LODGE, *May 16th*, 1859.

"There has been much talk lately in London of an amendment [on the Address], and I have now received, through George Lewis, a communication from Palmerston on the subject.

"As I understand, he thinks an amendment might be based on the four following topics, the last of which only he approves :

- "1. Censure of the dissolution—inexpedient.
- "2. Foreign affairs—inexpedient.
- "3. Pledge for immediate Reform—inexpedient.

"4. Vote of want of confidence, either as an amendment to the Address or as a separate motion. This he thinks the right course to take.

"I entirely concur in this view, and think Peel's amendment to the Address in 1841, moved by S. Wortley, the best precedent to follow.

"I told G. Lewis that I would consult you, and ask you to communicate with Gladstone. I don't know how far Gladstone is willing or averse to a direct motion of want of confidence, but he must see that the foreign policy of the present Government, intended to abet Austria, but 'letting I dare not wait upon I would,' is most dangerous to our position, and to the peace of Europe. France will not forget it if the Emperor has any success, and Lord Derby remains in power.

"Many Liberals of cool heads and cautious tempers say they cannot approve of an amendment unless the Liberal chiefs are agreed as to what is to follow.

"For my part, I should like to see Graham, you, Gladstone, and Milner Gibson members of any new Cabinet. If that could be accomplished, I should not be difficult about the post, or no post, that I was to take. Perhaps, however, this is too much to say. I shall be quite content to stay out of office; but if I am to hold any office, it must be at least equal to that which I held under Lord Melbourne and Lord Aberdeen. Reform must, of course, be a matter of clear understanding as to the principles of any new measure."

MR. HERBERT TO LORD JOHN RUSSELL.

"May 17th, 1859.

"There will obviously be great difficulties in the new Parliament. The Government will muster 300 men at least, who will run together like a pack of hounds; add to these some half-dozen Irish Roman Catholics, who will always be glad to support them on a pinch, a few extreme Radicals, who will support them on the ground that they will yield more to extreme demands than any one else, and a few crotchety Liberals, who will vote as they did the other day upon your Resolution. This brings members nearly

to a tie, and at any rate does not constitute a very encouraging prospect on which to form a Government if a vote of censure be carried. We could not have carried such a vote in the last Parliament, when the Liberal majority was much larger, but it is true that the position of the Government was then different, and there was a kind of tacit understanding that the Parliament, which had tolerated the formation of a Government by a minority, was also to tolerate its continuance.

"Since that, the Government has set up for itself, has spurned the understanding, and defied the Liberal party. An acquiescence in their continued exercise of power would be an avowal of helpless disunion, which I should be sorry to see, *unless there be hopeless disunion*, in which case, the sooner it is plainly avowed the better, with a view, in default of a good Government, to contribute as good an Opposition as we can, to direct and control a bad Government.

"But if there be a good prospect of a fair co-operation among the Liberal party, the present Government ought to be put an end to. Their system of government is eating away all political morality, and destroying all confidence in public men. Jews let in by men who think this very measure destructive to Christianity, and Reform Bills brought in by men who think no reform necessary and any reform hurtful! But I agree with the 'Liberals of cool heads and cautious tempers,' that on this subject of Reform there should be a clear understanding before the move is made. I fear that there will be more difficulty in coming to an agreement on this subject in this Parliament than in the last, and more difficulty in carrying a Bill. Mr. Disraeli and his friends will no doubt contrive to add their weight to some embarrassing amendment moved by some man of extreme opinions. Still, with the prospect of an early post-Reform dissolution, I think it could be done, if we have the first condition of a real wish on the part of the mass of the Liberal party to unite for the practical carrying on of affairs. As regards foreign affairs, there was a time when the Government could have used strong language against whoever should break the public peace, but now that it is broken there must be an honest neutrality, I agree with you that the late

antecedents of the Government make it almost impossible that their neutrality should be so looked upon.

"It appears, therefore, to me that the conditions necessary to a successful move are:

"1st. The establishment of an union among the mass of the Liberal party.

"2nd. A clear understanding as to Reform—*i.e.* as to the borough franchise.

"3rd. A certainty that the proposed motion can be carried.

"What you say of your own position is most honourable to yourself, but your absence would be fatal to the constitution of a new Government. The matter, however, is too delicate to discuss on paper.

"I send a copy of your letter and mine to Gladstone by this post."

MR. HERBERT TO MR. GLADSTONE.

"WILTON, *May 17th*, 1859.

"I this morning received a letter on the public prospects from the 'little man,' and, as it concerns yourself as well as me, I think the best thing I can do is to send a copy of it on to you, with a copy of my answer. Knowing his precipitancy, I have thought it best to put all the difficulties before him. You will observe that the propositions come from Palmerston to him, and from his language about himself I deduce that he contemplates Palmerston *Prime Minister in the Lords*. I think the future very gloomy. The new Parliament looks thoroughly obstructive, whichever party be in. I thought Dizzy's foreign speech a dangerous one. My wishes are all for a result which is impossible—namely, the threshing of *both* the Emperors as the only hope of Italian freedom. Did you observe the French Minister's announcement to the bishops that the Pope's Government must be preserved, and demagogic doctrines (we know what that means) be prevented from spreading in Italy?"

MR. GLADSTONE TO MR. HERBERT.

"*May 18th*, 1859.

"Like other people, I find the situation of public affairs extremely embarrassing. Two great questions

at this moment predominate: the War abroad, and Reform at home. As respects the former, I was much dissatisfied with some declarations of the Government, nor can I place implicit confidence in Malmesbury's future course; but the latter bears more upon immediate duties. For one, I am earnestly desirous to have it settled or put in train of settlement, and by this desire my conduct will be principally governed. Your test on this subject is a formidable one. If you will not have Reform Bills brought in by men who think no reform necessary, and any reform hurtful, you will have room to spare in your Cabinet. I am not prepared to dismiss the Government on grounds of political morality; but I admit that they have lost the great opportunity they had before them: nor do I feel it a duty with reference to Reform that I should assist to keep them in power, but only that I should consider what better prospect is opened by any measure proposed to be taken for their removal.

"I do not know the reasons which may have recommended to the minds of others a vote of want of confidence, but I regard it both individually and generally with scruple. I could not, as at present advised, undertake to support it. In a more general view I should much doubt whether it will be carried. Again, will the personal difficulties in the way of constituting a new Cabinet be got over? Will there be the necessary agreement on Reform? Let me assume both affirmatives; no small assumptions, though to the first Lord John offers a handsome contribution. It would remain to see in what way a moderate measure of Reform, which we suppose to have been agreed on, is to be *carried*. I apprehend in no other way than by the aid of a section of the supporters of the present ministry; but the chances of obtaining such aid will be better or worse, according to the nature of the measures which may have preceded the downfall of the Cabinet now existing. If recourse be had to the most summary and forcible process, those chances will be lessened, Disraeli's force in opposition will be increased, and he will use it, if a judgment is to be formed from the past, with very little scruple.

"Like you and many more, I had hoped to see Reform settled by Lord Derby's Government *pur et*

simple. This can now hardly be. As affording the next best chance, I should have been glad if they could have effected it by a combination with moderate Liberals. I presume that all chance of this, too, has now disappeared. If so, there remains only the alternative of a Government founded on the ruins of the present one. I can well understand that it might become a duty to support or to promote the formation of such a Government, but only with a fair prospect of its doing its work—a prospect now hard to make, and very easy to mar.

"In this reply I do not know that I start greater difficulties than are offered by your three conditions of successful action, but I have looked at the subject from a somewhat different point of view.

"I am sorry you are not likely to be here soon, the more so as I fear there is no hope of our escaping to Wilton, which Mrs. Herbert kindly suggests. Graham is not come up, and Lord Aberdeen thinks not coming soon. Did you mean me to speak to Lord Aberdeen? I told him in general terms that I believed there were communications afloat about a vote of no confidence, to which he emphatically replied: 'I hope it will fail.' He is not *very* well."

MR. HERBERT TO MR. GLADSTONE.

"May 19th, 1859.

"One line to ask whether you wish me to send your letter to Lord John, or whether I am merely to give him the substance.

"It seems to me that the result of a dissolution almost of necessity involved a duel to the death between the two parties. I only wish it were to be one with a more decided advantage on either side.

"What I mean about Reform is that it will be brought in by men within the scope of whose avowed principles it lies. The present men had been open and bitter opponents of their own measure up to the time of its introduction."

LORD JOHN RUSSELL TO MR. HERBERT.

"PEMBROKE LODGE, May 21st, 1859.

"I had Palmerston here yesterday for two hours, and we talked over the four points: 1. Foreign affairs.

2. Reform. 3. Amendment on Address. 4. Composition of any Government that might succeed to the present. On the first we were quite agreed that the continuance of the present ministry was dangerous to neutrality and to peace. Palmerston had a long talk with Persigny, who blames his Emperor, but says he is still ready for peace. 2nd. On reform we came to an agreement about the county and borough franchise. 3rd. The amendment or Resolution of want of confidence we thought ought to be as simple as possible. 4th. The future Government, we agreed, ought to be on the broadest basis. I reserved my entire freedom about accepting office myself, which Palmerston said was quite right, and, indeed, nothing could be done till the Queen made the first move.

"Palmerston said he understood from Granville that Gladstone wished his former score to be rubbed out. But, as you say, Oxford University is a drag not easily shaken off. Peel shook it off though."

MR. HERBERT TO MR. GLADSTONE.

"WILTON, May 22nd, 1859.

"I have another letter from the 'little man,' who has had 'two hours' with Palmerston, with whom he seems to be wondrously agreed! Being anxious to get Palmerston's views at first hand however, I wrote to him, confidentially, on Saturday morning, and I hope to hear from him either to-morrow or next day. Lord John says they are agreed both as to county and borough franchise—agreed as to neutrality. On the archdelicate question they were agreed that nothing could be settled till the Queen had sent for some one, but Lord John reserves his entire freedom as to acceptance. So far for counting the chickens. *Reste à voir* about hatching them."

Lord Granville wrote on May 23rd:

"I believe it was owing to a letter of mine to Palmerston, and a subsequent conversation, that he sent Lewis to Lord John yesterday week. That communication produced a very cordial letter from Lord John to Palmerston, which was followed by an interview on Thursday or Friday last. The pith of what took place there, as related to me by Palmerston,

is as follows : Lord John and he agreed that it was desirable that a vote of want of confidence in the present Government should be proposed by some independent member ; that it should not touch on the questions of the criminality of the dissolution, or Reform, or foreign affairs, but should simply declare that the Government had not the confidence of the new House. The mover to be subsequently settled, and the whole matter to depend upon the ascertained wishes of the party. They also agreed that it would not be difficult to frame a Reform Bill upon which they would both agree. They did not pledge themselves as to details, but they neither of them appeared averse to a measure with no Schedule A, with a six-pounds rating for boroughs, and a ten-pound franchise for counties. They agreed as to the character and composition of a new Government to be as comprehensive as possible. You, Gladstone, and advanced Liberals. Lord J. Russell thought Milner Gibson, Palmerston, Cobden, and the best of the Whigs. They both abstained from pledging themselves as to their own course on the formation of the Government. They thought it not right to anticipate any decision of the Queen. I have not the slightest idea whom the Queen will send for of the two. She does not like Derby or Dizzy. She is not very averse to Malmesbury, whom, however, she thinks incapable. She is full of criticisms upon the Austrians, but her strong feeling is detestation of the Emperor of the French, and of Russia. I do not know whether either of the Lords, if sent for, would propose to me to join. I should be sorry for their own sake and for mine own, to encourage either to form a feeble Government.

“ My view of foreign politics is neutrality, impartial and watchful, taking an opportunity of making the best settlement for Italy which circumstances would allow at the proper time. I should be most anxious that a distinct pledge should be given that the Cabinet should be kept informed of everything that was done.

“ I believe Bright is in a very excited state of mind, writing in different senses every day, and generally abusive both of Lord John and Palmerston. I think him out of the question for office. I should be very anxious to get Cobden : if Palmerston was in the Government people would not be afraid of him, and

he is an honest and clever man, and would remain a real but very practicable representative of the middle class. Milner Gibson would lose this character in office."

SIR CHARLES WOOD TO MR. HERBERT.

"10, BELGRAVE SQUARE, *May 24th.*

"DEAR HERBERT,

"I am very sorry indeed that I cannot come down to you, as I should much have wished to do so, both for private and public reasons, but I had made several engagements for this week which I could not throw over, and I have been obliged to decline going down to Barings as well as to Wilton. My boy comes up from Oxford to-morrow, and I have more than one other engagement that I cannot postpone.

"You will know from Lord John what has passed between him and Palmerston. The latter is quite satisfied. There is a general disposition to vote the Government out; but then people very naturally ask what is to come next, and expect to see a reasonable prospect of forming a Government as strong as possible, in existing circumstances, in the place of that which now exists. Now, in my opinion, the man who can form the strongest Government at present is Palmerston. The fear of Lord John's connection with Bright, unreasonable as it may be, and the unforgiving dislike (to say no more) of the Roman Catholics, render it impossible for him to be the head of a Government at present. Men enough of our side would withdraw their support to put this out of the question. Palmerston, therefore, must be the head, and his opinion on Reform is much more in accordance with that of the majority of the country than Lord John's.

"Palmerston, Lord John, and Gladstone I suppose agree pretty well on foreign politics in present circumstances; and, indeed, the latter concurred so much in opinion as to the merits of Lord John's Resolution, though he voted against it, that there can be no great difference of opinion there. I have not seen him, but I hear that he is anxious to see a strong Government, and, if he is sincere in that desire, he

ought to join in removing a very incapable one and forming the best possible Government as things stand. As regards Lord John, I have not spoken as plainly to him as I am writing to you, but I believe that he is aware of the difficulty which would attend his attempt to form a Government. I do not suppose that he is convinced of its being impossible, but after what had passed I do not think that he could do otherwise than serve under Lord P., if the Queen sent for the latter. He has not said as much, and, indeed, he has not been *called upon* to say as much, and Palmerston does not think that he could have said more in this sense than he did.

"If, however, you agree with me in my view of the only possible Government, you would do very good service by talking to him in this sense, and seeing how far he will say that he would take office under P. In order to ensure a majority, our friends must be convinced that such a Government will be formed. If they are so assured, our majority I believe to be safe enough. The Government admit a majority of thirteen against them on a vote of no confidence.

"The move should be the same as Peel made in 1841, not referring to any particular subject, but general. This Palmerston and Lord John agree to, and it seems to meet everybody's views. I have been looking over the names with Hayter and Brand, and we are to do so carefully to-morrow. There are some absent and some doubtful, but Hayter's calculation is twenty-seven. The accidents are generally pretty equal on both sides, and when the majority is so small, three or four make a great difference on the poll.

"Yours truly,

"C. Wood.

"Gladstone's concurring would of course make a great difference, because it would exclude all notion of Derby's strengthening himself."

LORD PALMERSTON TO MR. HERBERT.

"May 24th, 1859.

"I have duly received your letter of the 21st. I went on Friday to Pembroke Lodge, and had a long and, as relates to the topics discussed, a satisfactory talk with John Russell. We agreed that if a move

is to be made, it should be a simple Resolution of no confidence in the present Government, in answer to the question put by the Government to the country by the Queen's Speech and the dissolution ; but that whether such a move should be made as an amendment to the Address or as a substantive motion, as well as the question whether it should be made at all, should remain for further consideration on communication with the learned in such matters. But I think we both leant to the opinion, that it would be best made as an amendment to the Address, and that this question put by the Government to the country ought to be answered, whatever the answer to be given might be. We both agreed that the motion, if made, should be made and seconded by some independent members.

"We talked over the leading details of a Reform Bill. We agree as to a six-pound rating franchise for boroughs, and to a ten-pound rating for counties. I should much prefer eight-pound value for boroughs, and twenty or fifteen rating for counties, but after what has passed on these matters I fear that I must give up my preferences. I think John Russell has not quite abandoned the notion of a Reform Bill this session ; my own opinion is that a House of Commons fresh from the expense and trouble of a General Election, would not like a measure which would lead to another dissolution in a few months. John Russell thought that the registration under a new Bill might be put off till next spring, and the dissolution till May or June of next year ; but that would not make much difference. On the other hand, I should be glad to get rid of the question by a moderate measure, which would be more easily done when people are sick of the subject than when the fever returns. As to transfer of seats, he would disfranchise no place entirely, but wishes to make a somewhat larger transfer than was proposed by the Government ; but I said that was quite a matter of detail.

"As to the formation of a Government, in the event of the present one being upset, you may well imagine that the subject was one which each of us felt difficulty in touching upon. He only said at the end of our conversation, that in the event of a change he must keep himself free from engagements. I said, of course we must hold ourselves free, and that we had no right

to assume who the Queen might send for in such a case; we cannot discount the Queen's intentions.

"Whatever difficulties there might be as to arrangements in such a case, those difficulties would be more easily overcome by the pressure of the moment. But if you and Gladstone and some others were willing to form part of any new Government to be made, I should not fear any insurmountable difficulty in forming a very efficient administration, and if the administration was good and strong, it seems to me that for a time at least it would be sufficiently supported.

"I may as well say with reference to a part of your letter, that I should not like to go to the House of Lords, at least at present."

SIR CHARLES WOOD TO MR. HERBERT.

"May 26th, 1859.

"DEAR S. HERBERT,

"Thanks for your letter. I am glad to hear what you say of Gladstone. I do not think that there will be any difficulty about Church patronage. I always thought that when you three quitted Palmerston's Government, you threw away a power which might have been usefully exercised in Government in more ways than one. I am against all party patronage in the Church; but you cannot be much surprised that a man exposed to strong influences in one direction, and uncounteracted by anybody, should lean to one side. It will be a very good thing if a counter influence should be brought into play by the presence of Gladstone and yourself in the Government. I wrote once from Wilton about some Church appointment, but I have no claim to speak with authority on such matters. He would be able to do so, and might ensure a less one-sided description of appointments.

"With regard to the House of Commons, I have in my own mind no doubt of adequate support to a Government if it is formed. I have no doubt of a majority if one condition *precedent* is fulfilled—that is, if the members of the House of Commons are convinced that the chiefs of the Liberal party are united in their determination to form a Government. If Palmerston, Lord John, Gladstone, and yourself are

shown to be now acting cordially together, with the *bonâ fide* intention of acting together in a Government, I have no fear of our not having a fair majority. But our majority depends on their being assured of that union, and it is most desirable that some outward and visible sign of this should be given. The Duke of Bedford suggests to me that Lord John should dine with Palmerston on the 6th, and I wrote to him accordingly; but he declines. There is a great objection to a public meeting, where awkward questions might be asked, and the extreme party might endeavour to impose terms which could not be assented to. I have written to Lord John by to-day's post to ask what he would suggest as the best mode of doing what is indispensable, not only *effecting*, but *proclaiming* the union. I wish you would talk it over with him, and see what can be done. The more I see, the more convinced I am that no strong Government can be formed, except by such an union as I have contemplated and pointed out, and that such an union would form the strongest Government which the present elements of the House of Commons render possible.

"If it is not made, we shall have the present weak Government tottering on, liable to be upset on any accidental question, and that which all men deprecate inflicted on us—an unsettled state of things prolonged.

"This is my real opinion, and certainly not dictated by any wish to put ourselves in office at such a time."

MR. HERBERT TO LORD GRANVILLE.

"WILTON HOUSE, SALISBURY,

"May 27th, 1859.

"MY DEAR GRANVILLE,

"Lord John left us this morning. I had two conversations with him of some duration. He is in a very unsettled state of mind: thinks a great deal of what 'my friends will say'; what the Liberals will think, etc.

"He sometimes talks of serving under Palmerston—he leading the Commons, and Palmerston, of course, going to the Lords; sometimes of Palmerston

forming a Government, and he supporting it out of office.

"The latter is simply impossible, and the former depends on Palmerston, who, I have been led to believe, objects to such a course for himself, at least for the present. They are very well agreed as to a Reform measure—*i.e.* to a franchise of £10 in the counties, and £6 in boroughs *rating*.

"I tried to impress on him that the man who forgets himself the most will be the best remembered by the country, and I told him very unmistakably that neither he nor Palmerston can form a Government without the other, and that Palmerston, Prime Minister, would have a far better chance than he, Lord John, would in that position.

"I do not think it a fair proposal to urge on Lord John that he should dine at Palmerston's dinner in order to give an outward and visible sign of union, for that would imply following a lead, whereas the junction should be formed in the face of day, for public objects, on terms of previous equality. I am satisfied that if any step is taken to turn out the Government, two things are necessary—viz.:

"1. That the two rivals should agree to serve together as the Queen may direct.

"2. To take the whole Liberal party into council, discuss the risks to be run, and the objects to be attained. They will no doubt say very disagreeable things, but they had better be said *now* than later—better in a dining-room than in the House of Commons. It is well to know how far the two sections are willing to sink differences and support a Government if formed. The party require it, and have a right to demand it. They are very independent in habits and feelings, and the time is gone by when they will vote like a flock of sheep for whatever some half-dozen men may concoct in a library. Depend upon it, without previous frank consultation and interchange of opinion, no estimate can be formed of the chances of durability of a Liberal Government, and without such an estimate it is madness to turn out the existing Ministry. Even if you can get a bare majority to turn them out, which I doubt, without a clear understanding as to the future, who would risk the humiliation of having to take them back and submit to their rule

after having declared our want of confidence in them?

"I hear that Palmerston is very averse to a meeting, so I think is Wood; but I am satisfied that you will not succeed without one, and may get into the most serious hobble if the consent or zeal of men is counted on, when they have not been consulted nor made responsible for the move to be taken.

"Lord John told me he had no complaint against Palmerston, but only against his subordinates, who had treated him very ill."

MR. HERBERT TO MR. GLADSTONE.

"WILTON, *May 28th*, 1859.

"The 'little man' went yesterday in rather an unsatisfactory state of mind. He says sometimes that he would lead the House of Commons for and under Palmerston in the Lords, but he does not like it, and talks then of supporting out of office a Government formed by Palmerston, which is nonsense. I endeavoured to impress on him that abnegation is his best, safest, and wisest course; that neither he nor Palmerston can form a Government without the other, and that the one who leads the Conservative element in the Liberal party must inspire the most confidence at this juncture, when fear of Bright is the predominant feeling in the country; that it is the belief in his—Lord John's—sincerity on the subject of Reform which rendered people timid with regard to him, a disadvantage from which Palmerston is free. They *are* agreed on a Reform measure!—£10 in counties, and £6 rating in boroughs, which were the franchises in Lord Aberdeen's Bill; also on no Schedule A, and disfranchisement of one seat carried rather further than in the late Bill. So far good; but I urge on all that, if any move is to be made, a meeting of the whole Liberal party should be held, and we should have it out with them. Palmerston, I understand, objects on the ground that they will say disagreeable things, and ask awkward questions. Of course they will, and if they have not the opportunity in a dining-room, they will do it in the House of Commons. Unless the men who are to turn out the present Government are prepared to support the

Government that is to follow, it is folly to make any hostile move; but, before such a meeting is called, the two leaders must have come to this understanding that both are willing to serve the Queen together, and in such mutual relation as she may herself think best. If they do not do this, the party will not be satisfied, nor will the leaders have any security till they have had a frank explanation with the party. This said Liberal party consists of men who think for themselves, and when they don't, think they do, and their independent habits of thought and action must be considered. They must be made parties to, and responsible for, the course to be taken, by previously being taken into council. They won't blindly follow a course concocted by some half-dozen gentlemen in a library."

MR. GLADSTONE TO MR. HERBERT.

"May 29th, 1859.

"My position is a very odd one. The paramount question of the day is our relation to the war in Italy. On that subject I agree more nearly (indeed, I believe myself to agree exactly) with Palmerston and Lord John than with any other, so far as I know, of our public men. On the other hand, I believe Malmesbury to be quite unfit for guiding the country in its foreign policy at such a crisis. Under such circumstances it will not be pleasant to me to have to give a vote which will appear to mean confidence in the Government, of which (apart from any other point) Malmesbury is at this moment nearly the most important member. Such, however, seems likely to be my fate. For I have not brought myself to think that a man who has been acting as I have wholly out of concert with Opposition, can safely, I would almost say can honourably, *enter* Opposition, so to speak, by a vote of such sweeping and strong condemnation as a vote of no confidence must always be—and one avowedly, and, of course, intended for the resumption of office.

"This personal difficulty I have intimated to Ellice, to Wood, and last night to Lord Palmerston, who

broke ground with his usual good humour, at his party, on the subject of the coming vote.

"I admit that the vote is one perfectly legitimate for an Opposition. There are differences between your position and mine in regard to it, such, for instance, as the opposite courses we pursued on the Resolution, in punishment for which I have figured as a Derbyite and Disraelite to boot throughout the tabular account of the elections.

"For a motion disapproving of the Dissolution in any moderate terms I must certainly have voted, and I think that such a motion would (despite of Bright) have yielded a better division; but it would not have had the same certain and immediate killing quality.

"I told Wood that at this peculiar crisis a 'broad-bottom' Government would have pleased me best. His reply was: 'Who can be expected to join with Disraeli?'

"Lord Aberdeen is in the main for Derby, but can look at nothing except through Austrian spectacles. At this juncture he holds me to be the most extravagant and abandoned of English politicians. It is rather odd that he and Lyndhurst are at each point the opposites of one another. The domestic part of Lord Aberdeen's opinions, and the foreign part of Lyndhurst's, would make a stout Liberal when put together, and the other parts respectively a very considerable Tory."

MR. HERBERT TO MRS. HERBERT.

"June 3rd, 1859.

"People seem very doubtful about the proceeding to be taken,¹ and feel, not without truth, that it is a desperate undertaking, requiring much more hearty co-operation and goodwill than we all possess. In this sense talk the Speaker, E. Ellice, and others.

"I saw Gladstone yesterday. He objects, after having supported Lord Derby's Government up to the last moment, and even spoken and voted for them on Lord John Russell's Resolution, suddenly to vote no confidence in them, but he would vote any censure of

¹ The meeting of the Liberal party.

a particular act. He is evidently now anxious to see them upset, and ready to join a Government to succeed them!

"June 4th.

"There is a good deal of adverse opinion as to the course to be taken; the Whigs at Brookes being, I am told, inclined against any move, much nervousness also as to the meeting, of which I am not a bit afraid, for if it turns out that there is no unanimity, and no prospect of carrying on a Government, it will be well to know before we are committed, and so avoid a still more disgraceful *Cardwellisation*.

"June 6th.

"I am just returned in a state of liquefaction from Willis's Rooms. There were about 280 members present, which is thought very large, as the Irish members are not yet come over in any number. Pam. first got upon the raised dais, and when he helped Johnny up by the hand there was a droll burst of cheering. Pam. spoke shortly and well, described the challenge in the Queen's dissolution speech, alluded to the failures of the Government in legislation, and the danger of their involving us in a war, said that he and Johnny were at one (great cheering). Then there was a pause, and a call for Lord John, who spoke in the same sense, and said if the vote succeeded it was necessary to look forward, and if the Queen sent for Pam., he, Johnny, would cheerfully co-operate with him in the formation of a Government—broad basis, etc.—and then Pam. whispered to him, and he added as much for Pam. Then calls for Bright, who spoke in a—for him—decent manner enough; said the differences had been in the party as well as the leaders, and the fault of the leaders. Wanted some clearer assurance about war, but upon the whole promised co-operation. Pam. gave the clearer assurance, and I got up: said I also came from below the gangway (here comes Edward, who says it is post time). I preached union, and said I did not mind if we were beat, as if we are a minority we should know our place and watch, but also support the Government in all national matters. Then came Mr. E. James, Mr. Loch, Mr. Monckton Milnes, Mr. *Roebuck*, Mr. *Horsman*, Mr. *Lindsay*, Mr. Ellice, Col. Dearing. The

underlined [italicised] men *against*. Roebuck very ill received, Horsman only raising difficulties, and wanting it put off for ten days, but the rest all for. So the proposition was put and carried amidst loud cheers, and Lord Hartington and Mr. Hanbury are to move and second the identical amendment which Peel carried against Lord Melbourne in 1841. On the whole it was very successful, no one objecting who was not expected to do so, and others concurring who had not been reckoned on."

The alliance thus effected was not long in bearing fruit. A vote of want of confidence, in the terms referred to in the preceding pages, was moved by Lord Hartington as an amendment to the Address, and on June 11th was carried by a majority of 13. Lord Derby resigned, and the Queen, to the mortification and disappointment of the two elderly rivals for his post, sent for Lord Granville, a man, as Charles Greville observed, young enough to be the son of the one, and the grandson of the other. Lord Palmerston consented to serve under him. Lord John refused to do so. Lord Granville upon this relinquished the task which, at the Queen's commands, he had undertaken. Lord Palmerston was then sent for, and succeeded (though not without some difficulty) in forming a Government.

Immediately on its formation, Sidney Herbert wrote as follows to Sir James Graham :

"49, BELGRAVE SQUARE,
"June 14th, 1859.

"My DEAR GRAHAM,

"I saw Palmerston yesterday evening. He offered me the War Office, which I accepted, but on the condition that I should go to the Lords if I found the work too much, together with the House of Commons; and I even offered (in homage to advice) to go there now if convenient to the Government.

Palmerston declared it to be highly *inconvenient*, spoke of the great battle to be fought under great difficulties in the Commons, and 'after compliments,' as the Indians say, begged me at any rate to try the Commons with the Office. The only other office then settled was Johnny in the Foreign Office, but others were settled last night.

"We have met to-day and sat for five hours, going through all the appointments, as no new writ can be moved till Wednesday the 22nd—*i.e.* after the expiration of fourteen days from the meeting of Parliament—and, as there can be no council till Saturday, it was agreed that the arrangements should not be announced till the formal acceptances, and this arrangement will, no doubt, be strictly kept, barring a leading article in *The Times* to-morrow. There met this morning Gladstone, Chancellor of the Exchequer (I found he would not have joined the Government otherwise); Wood, India; Lord John, F.O.; Lewis, H.O.; Sir G. Grey, Chancellor of the Duchy; and myself. I fear we must run the risk of the three Dukes. Granville cannot do without Argyll to help him; all wish to do an act of justice by Newcastle; and Somerset seems to be the only available man for the Admiralty, where he would have the incalculable advantage of constant and intimate intercourse with you. I think Palmerston will offer the Chancellorship to John Campbell, the only man who could, without offence, be put over the heads of both Cranworth and Bethell, and with the advantage of an early succession to some one. The one thing which most annoys me is the absence of Clarendon. I believe the Queen has made personally every effort with him, but in vain. I think he greatly dislikes Johnny at the F.O.; but with our too Italian complexion, his presence would have been most valuable, both in appearance and in substance.

"I urged, I hope with success, Sir B. Hall's elevation to the peerage, which would make room for Cardwell, who will be very valuable in the Commons.

"We had much general discussion on many topics. I started the necessity of an Embassy at Vienna, so as to displace Lord A. Loftus, and give all due weight at this important moment to our communications. I think Elgin would do well there—at any rate he will be somewhere, possibly P. O. Newcastle, probably

Colonies. Nothing finally settled about Ireland, except Carlisle's supreme claim. Brewster's name was very favourably received. Sir George Grey wished to retire altogether, but consented to join in a nominal office. Ben Stanley does not now stand in the programme. Lord John seemed in high good humour—may at last!

"Palmerston seemed much touched at your kindness and *bienveillance* in making suggestions, which he seemed much struck by. Berkeley, I have little doubt, will have a peerage. Sir F. Baring refused one when Palmerston was last in office. They liked all your proposed Board of Admiralty, except Duncan, and I think they are disposed to risk the Green connections and take Clarence Paget.

"This is my budget in strict confidence. I hope to see you on Monday night."

The Cabinet thus formed was of the old Whig type. It contained three Dukes, and the brother of a fourth. Of its remaining members five were peers or the sons of peers; three were highly connected Baronets of good family and estate. Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Cardwell, and Mr. Milner Gibson were the only three men without titles who found place in it.

In spite of elements of discord which in ordinary circumstances would have caused its early disruption, this last of the aristocratic Whig Governments retained office till Lord Palmerston's death, and for some months subsequently—a period of about seven years.

CHAPTER VI

NATIONAL DEFENCE

1859-60

SIDNEY HERBERT was now, for the first time, Secretary of State for War. He held the office for only two years, during nearly the whole of which he was in bad health, and for the last six months so ill as to render work difficult and painful. But in that short time he did more, and effected more salutary reforms, than most of those who have held the post for a much longer period.

They were not easily accomplished, nor must it be supposed that it was only necessary that he should give an order or prepare a plan, to see the one carried out by docile subordinates, or the other adopted by acquiescent colleagues. On the contrary, the measures he proposed were strongly, and sometimes successfully, resisted, and often marred and mutilated by other members of the Cabinet, or to a great extent neutralised by the *vis inertiae* of his own subordinate officials.

The daily life of a Secretary of State is not an enjoyable one, and presents little resemblance to the popular picture which represents him as sitting serenely at a table, writing decisive orders on minutes and questions submitted to him in regular order, and in a complete form.

The earlier hours of his day, whilst at home, are

probably devoted in the first instance to catching up the arrears of the past night, by initialling or commenting on the minute papers which his Under-Secretaries of State have sent up to him on the previous evening. The rest of his morning is employed in finishing some piece of work during which it is imperative that he should be free from interruption, in attending to such private correspondence as he finds it possible to carry on, and perhaps, at rare intervals, in taking some hasty and imperfect glance at his private affairs. If he is careful of his health, he seizes this time also for such little exercise as he is able to obtain, but which he often is obliged wholly to forgo.

About noon he goes to his office, and on ordinary days when Parliament is not sitting remains there till seven o'clock or later. While there he has to see many persons on business of the most varied character. In the intervals he endeavours to consider the fragments of information placed before him daily with regard to the many questions pending, but he is seldom many minutes free from interruption. A "circulation" despatch-box arrives, the contents of which have at once to be read, considered, and perhaps minuted on, before the scarlet box with its long projecting label is carried on by the waiting messenger to the next minister on the list. A colleague calls to speak to him on some urgent point, and cannot be denied. Some local magnate, not on the list of appointed audiences for the day, asks to see him, and, though his business may be trivial, it is inexpedient to refuse him admission. Notes come from the Prime Minister, or other important members of the Cabinet, to which a reply is necessary. When the Minister is at length able to leave his office, jaded and wearied, it is with a sense of

dissatisfaction, produced by a consciousness of unfinished despatches, imperfect interviews, and a general sense of incompleteness. He goes home, taking with him a pile of red boxes full of papers to sign, initial, or consider. After a hasty dinner, he almost immediately sits down to grapple with these papers, and is busy over them till an early hour of the morning, when overpowering lassitude compels him to relinquish the task, probably unfinished, and to seek a few hours of as probably unrefreshing sleep.

This is his ordinary routine during those months of the year when Parliament is not sitting, and, but for an occasional Cabinet, he has only his own department to attend to. But during the Session, if he be in the House of Commons, his work and the amount of worry he is exposed to are both greatly increased. He goes earlier to his office, abandoning all thought of his private affairs, and all attempts at private correspondence or domestic life. It is only too probable that want of time will tempt him to sacrifice the already short space of the day which considerations of health have led him to devote to exercise, and which he knows to be essentially necessary to him. But though he goes earlier to his office he has to leave it so much earlier that the time spent there is even more cut into fragments than before, and even more dissatisfying to him. He must attend the House of Commons, and in that heated and unwholesome atmosphere he must remain till one or two o'clock in the morning, when he goes home exhausted to see the pile of unopened boxes yet accumulating, to be wrestled with when he wakes, imperfectly rested, a few hours later. On the days when the House of Commons does not sit there will probably be a Cabinet which will last some hours.

Of course the Minister's labour will be greatly increased in both Parliament and Cabinet if, as must often be the case, he has to speak in the one, and to urge or defend in the other, some measure in which he takes special interest.¹

A few days of such a life would be sufficient to induce great fatigue, but that which renders the Minister's burden wellnigh intolerable is that it is not for a few days only, but that, for month after month, one day of this description follows another without respite or intermission. There is no interval of repose. Even Sunday shines no Sabbath day to him. He may rise later, may have a quiet morning, and even be able to attend church, but later in the day there are sure to be interviews and discussions which it is impossible to avoid. And however assiduous and watchful his private secretary may be, there must always be a mass of letters for his own personal consideration²—those from colleagues, from high officials, or from private friends, bearing the agreed secret mark which acts as defence against the inspection of a private secretary. And I fear that the quiet and comparative freedom from interruption on Sunday too often tempt successfully to its employment for the composition of papers requiring some elaboration, instead of giving the overworked and over-harassed brain the rest it so sorely needs.

Under such pressure an indolent and self-indulgent

¹ In the present day the Minister's Room gives some refuge to a Minister not immediately engaged in debate, but no such accommodation existed at the time of which I write, and a Minister had then no escape from the House except the library or smoking-room, nor was it thought "seemly" for a Cabinet Minister to frequent these, though I have seen them working in the library. The place for a Minister if *at* the House was held to be *in* the House.

² Cabinet Ministers receive their letters on Sundays, even in London.

man throws off on his subordinates his own responsibilities and work, leaves Under-Secretaries and clerks to read despatches, and suggest the answers to them, and contents himself with reading and approving their minutes, and performing the external functions of the office, representing it in Parliament, and granting personal interviews. Much the same result is arrived at if the holder of the seals be commonplace, ignorant, and stupid, though honest and conscientious. He soon discovers that he can lean on his Permanent Under-Secretary (of whom, as being fully acquainted with matters as to which his own knowledge is imperfect, he is, in his heart, a little afraid), and enjoys the luxury of being able to do so. It is with genuine surprise and some self-satisfaction that he finds how invariably his own more sluggish judgment coincides with that of his adviser. He works harder—that is, he reads more papers and sees more people than an idle Minister—but he does not work so hard as to injure his health, for he does not really tax his powers of decision and judgment.

Very different is the case of the man who has a serious sense of his own responsibility, who has set great objects before him which he passionately desires to effect, and whose conscience forbids him to delegate to others, powers which it is his own duty to exercise, and decisions which it is his own duty to make. If he be a man of cold heart, patient temperament, and iron constitution, he may with credit perform his work, without suffering materially in health; but if he be a man of sensitive feelings, working not only with his head, but with his whole heart thrown into his task, and is at the same time of but weakly frame and in indifferent health, his giving way under the strain is inevitable.

Sidney Herbert sank under it in little more than two years, but not before he had succeeded in accomplishing administrative reforms of the highest importance.

The subjects which chiefly occupied the thoughts of Mr. Herbert when he entered office, and which, so far as the exigencies of departmental work and the pressure of unforeseen events permitted, most interested him till the end, were improvements in the barrack accommodation, social condition, and physical comfort of the private soldier, the better education of officers, the entire reorganisation of the Army Medical Service, and the more effective defence of the coasts of the United Kingdom.

As regards the three first of these objects, no difference of opinion exists. Mr. Herbert's efforts to attain them commanded a large measure of public sympathy in his own time, and are, perhaps, even more justly appreciated now than they then were. But it is otherwise with the measures for defence of which Mr. Herbert desired the adoption. It was disputed at the time, and is disputed still, whether any defensive preparations were required, and if they were so, whether those suggested by Sidney Herbert were those best calculated to effect their object. It is to this subject alone that I propose to devote the remainder of the present chapter.

The Crimean War closed in 1856, and from that time forward the cordiality of the relations between the French and English Governments rapidly cooled. The menacing language of the French colonels, excited by the failure of the "Conspiracy to Commit Murder" Bill of 1858—language, the use of which was permitted, if not encouraged, by the Emperor—may be said to have called into existence the Volunteer

Force of England. The Italian campaign of 1859 excited fresh alarm, and when Sidney Herbert received the seals of the War Office, he regarded a rupture with France as probable, and perhaps imminent. He consequently deemed it as his duty to make preparations to meet such an eventuality.

Shortly speaking, those measures consisted in the construction of fortifications for the protection of our Arsenal, the increase of the Army by about twenty-six thousand men, and the reorganisation of the Militia on a better footing.

Before making any formal proposals to the Cabinet, Mr. Herbert had assured himself of the strenuous support of the Prime Minister, Lord Palmerston.

In earlier days Lord Palmerston had been the apologist of Louis Napoleon. He had condoned and defended the *coup d'état* of 1851. He had been the warmest partisan of the French Alliance in 1854, and a firm believer in the friendliness of the Emperor to Great Britain. Before the end of 1859, however, these sentiments had been greatly modified, and he had come to regard Louis Napoleon with suspicion and dislike hardly less strong than the goodwill he had once borne him.

A great majority of the Cabinet shared with more or less earnestness the views of Lord Palmerston, and though the Duke of Argyll and some others did not conceal their distaste for increased military expenditure, they were not prepared to contest its necessity when that necessity was pressed upon them by Lord Palmerston and Mr. Herbert. One, however, of the most important of his colleagues failed to share his views as to the danger incurred, and disapproved the measures by which he proposed to meet it.

Mr. Gladstone disbelieved in the existence of

danger; he objected with all his might to any augmentation of the Army, the strength of which he thought should rather be diminished; to the construction of fortifications, which he deemed unnecessary, or to any delay in the disembodiment of the Militia, and declared his inability to provide for the vast sums which would be required for the purposes Mr. Herbert had at heart.

The note of dissatisfaction had been early sounded, and the interference and criticism of the Chancellor of the Exchequer was not confined to considerable questions of finance, but exercised on even minute matters of purely departmental moment. One example of these somewhat petulant censures, only a few months after the formation of the Government, may suffice. The moat of Fort Augustus, on the Caledonian Canal, was crossed by a wooden bridge. The damp and variable climate of the Scottish Highlands is not favourable to the long life of wooden structures, and when, in 1859, this bridge required entire renewal, the Engineer officer in charge suggested that it should be replaced by one of stone, which would be permanent, needing neither constant repair nor frequent reconstruction. Some one reported the erection of this bridge to Mr. Gladstone, who, forgetting that stone is not a luxury in the Highlands, but the material of which every cottage and every fence is built, at once took fire, and wrote to Mr. Herbert to denounce what seemed to him a profligate expenditure. Mr. Herbert explained the facts, but Mr. Gladstone, far from being satisfied, rejoined that it appeared to him—

“a case of wanton extravagance on the part of the officer who recommended a stone bridge to Sir John Burgoyne, and who, I submit, ought to be called on for his reasons, and, if they are not satisfactory, reprimanded and desired to do better in future.”

In the same letter he suggests that economy may be effected by reducing the number of company officers in the Army.

"I have never," he writes, "heard a reason intelligible to me for maintaining in time of peace the present enormous number of subalterns. It is to me a perfect mystery, which I suppose I must regard with the same silent reverence as the mysteries of religion and Providence."

Mr. Herbert was, therefore, well aware that any proposals for increased expenditure would meet with anything but a favourable reception, and in writing to Sir James Graham on November 13th, says:

"It is indeed a time of great care and anxiety. I am preparing a paper for the Cabinet on the amount of force to be maintained. It will be a heavy bill. I do not know how Gladstone will stand the demands made on him by Seymour and myself. I am pressing on arms, cannon, ammunition works; everything is going on at full work. I have closed altogether the Royal Gun Factory at Woolwich, not without much gnashing of teeth. But I satisfied myself that the concern was a failure, not producing better guns or cheaper guns than the French, and, what is worse, not producing them at all. The whole building will now be thrown into the Rifle Cannon Factory under Armstrong, and will make his guns, and hoop cast-iron guns, to strengthen them for rifling. Woolwich will, therefore, be devoted to doing what the trade cannot do for us, and we shall trust to the trade to do for us that which it can do, and do well. The Royal Gun Factory was a child of Monsell's, and a very ailing child it has been; but I expect a searching coroner's inquest on the body by him in Parliament, for he was tenderly attached to it. His other child, the Enfield Factory for small arms, is a noble contrast to it. It is the best-managed concern I ever saw, the model of what a public institution should be, and, in the intensity of the work, a great contrast to the dockyard steam factories."

A few days later, Mr. Herbert had prepared and

circulated to the Cabinet the Memorandum referred to in the foregoing letter. In it he stated the reasons which led him to entertain suspicion as to the designs or dreams of Louis Napoleon, and, after reviewing in detail the existing force of the Army and its distribution, he proposed its augmentation by about twenty-six thousand men, the chief increase being in the Artillery. He next discussed the position of the Militia, and after showing the forcible objections to treating it as, *ex necessitate*, it had been treated during the Crimean War, as little more than a recruiting agency for the time, he proposed gradually to disembody the whole force, which, however, he would have had strictly called out every year for training, and to recruit which he proposed to revert to the still legal agency of the ballot.

This paper is so important a one that I have thought it well to quote here its most salient passages.

"For many years previous to the Russian war the numbers of the Army were annually fixed without much reference to the state of our foreign relations.

"Europe, exhausted by the long wars of Napoleon, was the source neither of jealousy nor apprehension.

"Differences there were, and war even there was; but at a distance, and generally over the *corpus vile* of some Asiatic or African Power, whom all felt not to be worth permanently quarrelling about. For these objects, augmentations of the Navy sufficed, and our own insular security at home remained unchallenged. The Navy was looked upon as our only and sufficient defence. In fact, the *cadre* of the Army was fixed more with a view to Colonial service than to Home defence. It was only necessary, after fixing the number of regiments or men for Colonial and Indian service, to add such a number to remain in England as should give a fair share of home service to recruit their health to the battalions returning from abroad; the general rule being ten years abroad to five at home except in India, where they usually remained longer.

"We must look at our Army now altogether from

a different point of view. Our insular security as such is lost. No mere preponderance of our fleet in the Channel can insure perfect safety. Steam has in a great measure deprived us, even if preponderating, of the power of blockade.

"Neither adverse winds nor adverse currents can prevent a fleet putting to sea in a dark night. Indeed, such conditions would tell more for the blockaded, than for the blockading, fleet, who would be forced, for their own security, to stand out from a lee shore. Nor could the blockade be maintained by the whole force, a portion of which must always, at intervals, be returning to our own ports to coal.

"The popular expression that steam has bridged the Channel is a very insufficient description of the change that has taken place in our position. A bridge is a known point, and can be made, by a *tête de pont*, by a few well-placed batteries raking it, or by a mine under an arch, much more impassable than any sea. The passage by sea cannot be mined, and has no known terminus.

"An eminent writer on the defence of England has said that England would be far safer if she had no Navy. This paradox, in itself exaggerated, means, that we put an undue trust in our first line of defence, which may constantly be evaded, if not broken through, and that, putting that blind confidence in it, we neglect the second, which must resist aggression on our own shores.

"We must, therefore, now consider our Home Force as something more than a recruiting dépôt for our Indian and Colonial Armies. We must, in some degree, measure the proportion of our forces at home by the numbers which our neighbours maintain abroad. I apprehend that if the Great Powers of Europe were to reduce their Armies to the numbers which we now have in England, we should disband two-thirds of our force. In fact, our strength must bear some relation to the strength of others. We must look, then, to the moral and material state of Europe in deciding what are to be the forces which we must in future maintain.

"In 1854 the spell of the long peace, which had lasted between the Great Powers since 1815, was broken. Since that time, Europe has resounded with

the din and rumours of war, and the preparation for it. A Bonaparte has seized on the throne of France, backed by the immense majority of the votes of the French people, whose choice, if only for his own security, he seeks to confirm as well as to justify, by adding in every way to the power and influence of France.

"He has, in his writings, when it seemed very improbable that he should ever have it in his power to accomplish his designs, announced it to be his mission to destroy the treaties of 1815, and to punish those who were parties to them.

The treaties of 1815 have already received a heavy blow at his hands. Of the Great Powers who forced those treaties on France, he has, in concert with others, humiliated, first, Russia, and secondly, Austria; and he has had the skill, by great and sudden moderation, in the hour of victory, to secure each of those Powers as allies, almost as confederates, against those whom he might afterwards attack. Prussia and England still remain.

"These opinions or speculations may appear fanciful; but we have to deal with a man who has himself proclaimed his readiness to make war for an idea. He clearly has no horror of war, nor any scruple in making it. The traditions of his family have leavened his whole mind, and in his statecraft, peace and war are two alternatives which it is always at the option of a ruler to choose from, as the convenience of the moment may suggest. There is, however, more tangible evidence in the enormous preparations, naval and military, and the accumulation of warlike stores which is going on in France.

"The Italian war is concluded. When peace was made, a reduction of the French Army took place; but not to numbers so low as the peace establishment previous to the war. This reduction was effected by the granting of unlimited furloughs to the number of men by whom it was intended that the total of the Army should be reduced; but in doing so, the Emperor made a change in the terms hitherto imposed on the men, and reduced from thirty down to fifteen days the time within which, on his call, these men were to return to their standards.

"The vast number of horses which had been

collected for the Italian war were not sold, but lent to the farmers, to be resumed at any moment.

"The gun-boats which had conveyed the Army and its stores and munitions from Marseilles to Genoa were paid off, but not at Toulon. They were sent round to be laid up at Brest and Cherbourg. Since that time ninety guns have been added to the armament of Brest.

"The islands adjacent to the coast, and the forts along it, have been connected by electric telegraphs.

"At Cherbourg, as we have just read in the report of Mr. Hamond, ten forts mounting rifled guns are about to be added to the sea-face of Cherbourg, and a large additional fort is to be erected on the shore opposite to Isle Pelée.

"Immense contracts for coal have been entered into with Belgium with a good deal of secrecy, where the Emperor has paid a much larger sum per ton, for a very inferior coal, than he would have done had he made his contracts at Newcastle. About 35,000 tons will thus come by rail, in addition to 15,000 tons of English coal. At Brest a similar enormous accumulation of coal is being made. The railway is also bringing large supplies of ammunition.

"Enormous deliveries of hemp are also being made from Russia, though this last contract, says Mr. Hamond, was made before the Italian war: (though how far a great outlay in naval stores was necessary for an attack on Austria may be doubtful). At any rate, Cherbourg was not a natural selection for a base of operations against Lombardy. On the other hand, it is fair to state that no extraordinary exertions are being made at Toulon.

"In England we know of large contracts now making by France for every description of store: one house alone in Liverpool contracting for iron plates to be applied to ten frigates, and to be delivered in the year. We know of a contract for 2,500 guns for some one European Power, name not stated. But the French Government is in treaty with Mr. Whitworth for the use of his patent, and Mr. Whitworth is erecting large factories for the making of rifles and guns.

"The French Government are not about to use, in order to convey their force to China, the large amount of steam transports which they bought or

built during the last few years, but are going to buy steam-transport here, as being cheaper than hiring.

"These are some of the indications of coming mischief, and of warlike intentions on the part of the French Government. Each may not be of importance in itself; but the aggregation of them is not without significance. At the same time there is an immense amount of exaggeration afloat, which adds to the fears by which it is generated. I have referred only to facts authoritatively known. But what is far worse is the hostile feeling in the French nation, brought about, no doubt, in great part, by the constant and unmeasured abuse of the Emperor by our Press. War with England is the popular topic. It is canvassed in every *café*. The expectation of it seems universal. At St. Malo the tradesmen send in their bills to the English residents, fearing a sudden departure.

"Colonel Claremont tells us that the plan of lending out the superfluous horses failed entirely at Châlons; the farmers refusing the loan of them on the ground that it was not worth while when they would have to give them up so soon for a war against England.

"The provincial Press is much more under the thumb of the authorities than the Parisian. In Paris there is some decency observed and some latitude allowed. In the provinces matters are carried on with much less delicacy. The result is that "*La Presse de la Préfecture*," as it is called, reflects exactly the wishes and feelings of the local authorities, and it is far more open-mouthed against England than the Paris Press. So far back as the Queen's visit to Cherbourg, pamphlets exciting hostility to England were distributed among the troops. This has been since continued. It is impossible to believe that this is done without the cognisance of the highest authority.

"France has become much more mercantile than formerly. Being so, she was much opposed to the Italian war. She feared the disturbance to trade, and the lowering of securities which a war was sure to create. The Emperor for a time apparently yielded to the feeling, but he ultimately made war, and France, which was so opposed to it, became reconciled to and adopted it the moment a successful battle was fought.

There is no such feeling to restrain the Emperor now; nor much sign of the Emperor desiring to restrain the people. There is, however, much commercial uneasiness at Paris, and trade is said to be much checked.

"Other nations in Europe are alarmed. Prussia is reorganising her Army and Landwehr, and making immense exertions in the creation of a new artillery. Russia has, by Colonel Simmons's report from Warsaw, made an increase to her Army which he estimates at 100,000 men. After her successes in Circassia it is difficult to understand why this sudden increase is made. I mention it merely as an instance of the general uneasiness and preparation against danger.

"Lastly, we must not omit to take into our consideration the deep suspicion and fear of the designs of France which fill the public mind at this moment. These national instincts are not often entirely wrong, and, if there be evidence of their being well founded, we must not throw them out of consideration. At any rate, be they right or be they wrong, they are an element of danger, for they contribute to familiarise the public mind, on both sides of the water, with the prospect of the war which one hopes for and the other fears.

"It appears, then, to me, that, in fixing the amount of military force in future to be maintained in England, we cannot throw out of view either the altered position and the diminution of our security which the universal application of steam has effected, or the immense armaments within two hours' sail of us to which I have already alluded."

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Elaborate calculations as to the amount of force at home, and the manner in which it could be employed, follow. These it is unnecessary to reproduce, but the conclusion arrived at, and very clearly shown, was that, in the event of any sudden outbreak of war, that force was quite insufficient even for defensive purposes. "We cannot now produce in the field as many men as the French *lost* in the Italian campaign."

Mr. Herbert next discusses in much detail various rearrangements as to organisation and the location of regiments, which have now lost all interest. The problems presented by the reorganisation of the Indian Army are also dealt with, and he then proceeds to the garrisons in Colonies, since withdrawn from all points save those of Imperial importance.

"A plan for the regulation of our military colonial expenditure will be shortly before the Government. By this plan I hope we shall be enabled to place the Imperial contribution to the defence of the Colonies on some better and more intelligible footing. At present, places which we occupy as garrisons for Imperial purposes alone, such as Malta and Corfu, contribute to their own defence; while Colonies not important as Imperial garrisons, with a large population and a thriving revenue, contribute nothing. I entertain hopes of some ultimate saving in men and in money from the adoption of this plan, if approved; but the proceedings must be cautious, and the good effects proportionably slow. It will operate, probably, in two ways: partly by reducing the amount of force now called for by the Colonies, and partly by relieving the Imperial exchequer of a portion of the cost of maintaining those forces. Perhaps, on the whole, it will tend more to the diminution of the Imperial force in the Colonies than to their payment from the colonial exchequers; but the Colonies are distant, and the proposal will not be agreeable to them, so that their future relation to the Imperial Government as regards defence must be a matter of negotiation.

"I cannot venture, therefore, to reckon on the withdrawal, during the next year, of more than two battalions, if even I can get them. Between India, China, and the Colonies, however, I hope to have nine or ten battalions home by the end of the year 1860-61.

"What I am anxious, therefore, to do is, to make the augmentation which is imperatively necessary for our safety now, so far as it is possible, in such a manner

as may enable us to reduce our Home and Colonial force without difficulty or expense as the regiments from India and China return, and gradually so to redistribute our forces between the Colonies and India as to give us the benefit of a larger force at home."

He proceeds to point out that the pay of the soldier in 1859 is what it was in 1797, and proposes its increase to fifteen pence a day.

He next turns to the Militia Force and shows that it was at that moment maintained at a maximum of cost and a minimum of utility. Less than half the nominal strength was present with the battalions.

"An embodied Militia costs as much as an equivalent force of regulars, nay, sometimes more, for under the volunteering system it is generally short in numbers as far as the privates are concerned, while the complement of the officers is always full.

"It is not, therefore, a cheap substitute for regular troops, and is a great weakening of the Reserve. It is bringing into the first line in peace that which ought to be reserved for war.

"As, however, it is clear that if embodied it is just as important that the battalions of Militia should be kept in the highest state of efficiency as the battalions of the Line, it is a mere waste of money to give bounty to men volunteering from the one to the other. It is simply an attempt to lengthen the blanket by sewing on at one end what has been cut off from the other. If men were encouraged to volunteer from one half of our regular battalions into the other, and paid money for so doing, it would not be more absurd or more wasteful or more destructive to discipline. I propose, therefore, to put an end entirely to the system of inviting or encouraging volunteering from the Militia to the Line, whether from embodied or disembodied regiments. . . .

"If the Government will consent to the additions to the Regular Forces which I have already proposed, I strongly advise that the whole force of embodied Militia should be gradually disembodied, and that we

should return to the system recognised and established by the Militia Law, keeping the Militia permanently disembodied but annually trained.

"No one is more responsible than I am myself for another part of the present system, not meant ever to be a system, but introduced under the pressure of circumstances, and as a temporary expedient, during the Russian war.

"We called out the Militia in a war in which invasion was not only not apprehended, but impossible. Every part of Russia was blockaded, and France, the only other European maritime Power, was our close Ally.

"We had no Army, and we wanted to create one to operate immediately, and I thought then, and I still think, that many who were unwilling to enter the Army, and undertake its lengthened liabilities, would enter the Militia with its short and comparatively lucrative conditions, and thus contract such a taste for military life as would induce them afterwards to volunteer for the Line. As an expedient—a costly but very effective expedient that was completely successful—every encouragement was given to volunteering from the Militia unto the Line. The Militia was for a time ruined, but the regular Army was recruited.

"The numbers who so passed through the Militia into the Line were very great, amounting altogether to 71,182 men formally released, but a vast number likewise joined the regulars, of whom we have no account, they having so passed surreptitiously from the embodied or the disembodied Militia, and not under the regulations adopted in order to promote the movement.

"Unfortunately, however, when the necessity passed away the practice was continued. The War Office, who are responsible for the expense, did not interfere, and the military authorities were, of course, not likely to originate the abandonment of a system by which they got for the Army not only many recruits, but also partially, and sometimes perfectly, trained men.

"I have slowly, and most unwillingly, arrived at the conclusion that here again our true policy is to

return to the old and traditional system, and to the practical execution of the law as it now exists.

"With our jealousy of a standing Army we have never permitted a conscription for the Queen's forces. But time out of mind we have ruled that all males capable of bearing arms are liable to be called upon for the defence of the country.

"The ballot is now the law of the land. By merely abstaining from an exceptional proceeding, with a view to its suspension, the ballot comes into operation; but its machinery is very complicated. It ignores altogether the existence of a census, which, indeed, did not exist when the present Militia Act was first passed.

"It takes us a year to augment our Army to any sensible extent. When it is augmented it is still a raw, young, unseasoned, and weak augmentation, and when the emergency is over, whether we maintain the augmentation or reduce it, either course is still most expensive.

"This panic is growing, and a resistance to its demands only irritates and increases it. What men want now is security against a danger which they see clearly, but which, not seeing the means of ready resistance, they perhaps overrate. I think their fear not unfounded, and their estimate of our means of defence just in principle, even if it be exaggerated; but if allowed to grow, it will invite, and perhaps provoke, the very danger it fears, for nothing is so dangerous as panic, and fear soon turns into hate.

"I propose, then, to bring in a Bill to amend the Militia Law, by rendering the processes of the ballot shorter, more simple, cheaper, and, I think, less oppressive. If this be passed, I propose to introduce a Bill for the consolidation of the whole Militia Law, which is now scattered through many Acts of Parliament, and, from their partially repealing one another, very nearly unintelligible."

As might have been expected, the views expressed in this Memorandum were by no means palatable to Mr. Gladstone, and the following correspondence took place between him and Mr. Herbert:

MR. GLADSTONE TO MR. HERBERT.

"DOWNING STREET,

"November 27th, 1859.

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"I have some remarks to offer on your printed paper. They shall be as few and brief as possible, and they are rendered with every readiness to submit, where they touch on military questions, to the most summary correction.

"I pass by the prefatory part, at present, with the single remark that the statements which it contains respecting warlike preparations, and respecting the temper of the people in France, considering that they are made to carry in the sequel a very heavy weight, should surely enter more into particulars both of detail and of verification. I mean, for example, where you speak of 'the vast number of horses' lent to the farmers, the 'immense contracts for coal,' the 'enormous accumulation' at Brest, the 'large supplies' of ammunition, the 'enormous deliveries' of hemp, the 'large contracts' in England for 'every description of store.' You may have measured the amounts, and verified the sources; but neither of these is made to appear. This seems the more needful, as some of the statements are such as scarcely can be correct in the breadth with which they are stated.

"It is true that we live at a moment when passion in its various forms will supply any deficiencies of evidence, but this is not the resource on which you would wish to depend.

"I go, however, to the other parts of the plan.

"1. Your expectations from improved arrangements with the Colonies are feeble, for they come only to this, that you 'entertain hopes of some ultimate saving.'

"In this matter little or nothing will be effected, unless language is held, however cautiously, showing that the people of this country have their rights, and that its Government will no longer continue the follies in which they have so long indulged. I do not mean that these are the terms to be employed, but they are the ideas to be conveyed, and they are the only ones which will do any justice to the subject.

"Time, as you say, will be requisite for working the plan fully out, should it be adopted, but why should nothing be done at present? Why should not the force in British North America be nearer the point at which it stood in 1855? (The latest statement before me is that of 1857.) Why should not the work of reduction be prosecuted in the West Indies, which it might almost be said are safer without our troops than with them?

"2. In the Mediterranean Colonies you propose to increase the force. I do not see the reasons stated for this increase in Gibraltar and Malta; but with regard to the Ionian Islands I go a step further, and avow that I am more than sceptical about the expediency of maintaining there a force of 3,876 men. Some eleven or twelve hundred of these men are in the outlying islands, and are merely a bait to an enemy. It would be, in my opinion, ludicrous to say that such a force was required for maintaining order. There is no fear of political outbreak. I venture to tell you that much more harm than good has been done by the maintenance of so large a force in Cefalonia. It first encouraged men of the highest class in very oppressive proceedings against their tenants, and then gave them the opportunity of throwing upon England the immense odium (known throughout Europe, though not here) of repressing the consequences of their acts. But even for that purpose no such amount of force is requisite as we keep in the outlying islands: I again say, a prize to our enemy and a trap to ourselves.

"3. You propose, if I understand you rightly (but I cannot make the figures square), to add 26,500 men to the Army. A large part of this increase is to be in the Artillery, and from something you say I presume that you do not think we shall even then have done with the augmentation of that particular arm. (I would, in passing, just beg you again to inquire whether Corfu requires 700 artillerymen; the guns in the other islands are, as I believe and have always understood, a pure and sheer folly, unless for saluting.) Your reasons for a present increase are clear, and I do not doubt that, as you propose, it may be right to set about recruiting immediately.

"4. But as regards the proposed general increase of force, I would again suggest to you that the time

is not yet come when it is desirable to fix the precise amount of force for the coming year. We shall soon know whether the French are sincere in the intention of making a commercial arrangement. If they make it, the moral and political significance of the measure will be such as to deserve being taken into full consideration in fixing the Estimates for the coming year. Unless within a few weeks there is progress on their side, we must, I fear, come to the conclusion that nothing is likely to be done. And I do not know any other early hope of acting on the public mind in a sense favourable to peace.

"5. Apart from this consideration, I find you appear to propose an augmentation of the regiments of the Line, which is temporary in two senses and in two different degrees. You propose to provide for the interval before twenty-six battalions shall have returned from India. Considering how uncertain is the time of their return, I do not venture to say you can wait for all these. Still I do not see that it would be unreasonable to put pressure on the Government of India, and require the sending home forthwith of some not inconsiderable force, unless upon its responsibility it shall declare such a measure to be dangerous. This is what would at once be done if there were at home an impatience of taxation. I submit that we should act, as nearly as may be, as if such impatience existed. For its turn will assuredly come, and then we shall not be excused for having put the country to needless charge, because we may plead that it was disposed to be liberal.

"6. But, secondly, your augmentation is to be temporary in the sense of supplying a gap which will most probably be supplied of itself to the extent of nine or ten battalions, by the end of the year 1860-61. You say you will take them into account. But the calculation you proceed to make, which is the basis of your subsequent proposal, is founded on a previous computation, and *omits* them. I would argue that we ought not *now* to raise men to supply the place of these nine or ten battalions, or of such others as might also be obtained by prompt measures within moderate limits from the Colonies or from India.

"7. The objection which I cannot but feel to antici-

pating, in the apparent absence of all immediate danger, supplies that are likely to be available within six, twelve, or fifteen months, is greatly strengthened when it is proposed to throw a fraction of the recruiting into this year, or, in other words, (1) again to unsettle this year's Estimates over and above what events in China may be requiring, justify; and (2) to do this in the hope of relieving somewhat the Estimates of next year.

"The practice of Supplemental Estimates is most injurious, not only to all financial arrangements, which they throw into confusion, but likewise to Parliamentary control, which, pushed a little further than they now have gone, they would reduce to a nullity. I feel it my duty to resist, to the best of my power, all new demands growing up after the Estimates have been voted, unless when they are founded upon circumstances of an urgent character that are also posterior to the annual settlement, but specially if they be in any degree intended to relieve the coming Estimates.

"8. I have not a word to say against the proposal, if you think the time has come for it, to increase the pay of the soldier. I should have been very glad if the increase could have been so adjusted as to work in favour of merit; but probably you have considered this, and found it impracticable. I ask, however, two queries: First, why the pay of the Artillery is increased if the artilleryman has in fact a much more agreeable duty, and if, as I gather from your paper, you recruit without difficulty for that service. Secondly, is it not possible to improve the condition of the soldier and his character by allowing him, more than is done in our service, free use of spare time for occupations which might bring him some gain, and which would even in many cases be of great service to him, and through him to the State, during the operations of a campaign?

"9. There is a great deal of interesting and valuable matter in the development of your plans, on which it is needless for me to attempt any comment; but my last criticism on your paper is this, that it does not clearly state whether on the basis of it you will ask the Cabinet to decide on the proper amount of force for the coming year. Independently of such

remarks as I have made above, let me observe that if this be intended, and if you ask for that decision now, we ought to be informed more fully and clearly what is to be the amount of charge. The estimate you have given includes a part only of those additional charges which your plan seems to entail; nor do I see that, on the other hand, it takes credit for the relief which, as I understand, some parts of it would bring. Above all, it contains no specific statement of intentions with regard to the great subject of a system of new fortifications and their cost. This, I apprehend, ought clearly to be before us, as forming a very weighty part of a scheme which we ought not to dispose of piece-meal, were it for no other reason than this, that it will be issued and judged of as a whole by Parliament and the world.

"On some points I may have failed to apprehend your meaning, and I am not sure that in every place it is quite clearly expressed; but what is wanting on my side you will easily supply.

"Ever yours,

"W. E. GLADSTONE.

"The formidable question of the ballot [*i.e.* for the Militia] is opened to me for the first time; it requires to be considered in many points of view."

MR. GLADSTONE TO MR. HERBERT.

"12, DOWNING STREET,

"November 28th, 1859.

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"This is my second barrel, and is aimed at your general views of French invasion, expressed in your letter of the 23rd, and in the prefatory portion of your confidential paper. Take this as a notice generously given that you need not read the letter forthwith unless you please.

"As I understand you, your former disinclination to give credit to the scheme of a French invasion has been overcome by evidence, and you are now convinced that 'a great calamity is impending.' You do not think Louis Napoleon will be deterred by principle. You think he has no serious difficulty to

overcome in the interposition of the sea between us, for that is now easier to pass than if we were divided only by a river. You state that the French Army has for years been inflamed by pamphlets distributed among them, and recommending invasion: if, as I presume, that is the meaning of your words 'provoking hostility.' You describe the upshot as being that war with England is discussed in every *café* and is universally expected.

"To one of these opinions I subscribe. I do not believe that any scruples would deter the Emperor of the French if he saw, or thought he saw, a clear interest in the invasion of England.

"Yet I cannot think it right to assume, as you seem to me to do, that in his character of an ideologist he is ready for that desperate measure. All the great steps of his foreign policy are under our view. Some of their features are clear. He has had in them a large regard to his own personal position. Feeling has, as in the case of the Italian war, entered into them. But they have been generally, almost uniformly, governed by a spirit of great moderation—a moderation which I do not think equally traceable in the proceedings of our own Foreign Office during the same period; a moderation which we turn against him in the spirit I think of an almost paradoxical partisanship, when we say that his plan is to go round the nations of Europe, and first by beating, to humble, then by coaxing, to attach them.

"I have too good an opinion of his understanding to suppose he entertains a scheme so chimerical. And I say if this was his object, he has not succeeded; he has not attached either Austria or Russia. Temporarily associated they may be, attached they cannot be, to a revolutionary dynasty, of which it is one among the curses that, however destructive it may be to liberty, it cannot solidly or permanently harmonise with authority.

"Russia had two enemies: of these one proved to be less, and the other more exacting. If you are convinced that where we differed with France about Russia we were right and he was wrong; if you think it would have been wise to continue the war after the taking of Sebastopol instead of closing it; if you think the language (not of armed neutrality, but of

disarmed hostility, or peace in the spirit of war) held in this country by the Press and otherwise was the wise and the right language,—then there is room for the inference that Louis Napoleon was engaged in the coaxing policy. But if our course was on the whole less reasonable than his, if it was better to give Russia credit for having smarted under her terrible inflictions, and to put a fair construction on her acts and words where they could bear it, then any advantage which France gained after the peace, from greater favour with Russia, was really owing to our own acts more than hers, and was in the main a fair advantage.

“But this I assert: that if we will but divest ourselves of that arrogance in tone and bearing—I must add, of that onesidedness in our modes of judgment for ourselves and for others, which are so much complained of—then we, though we have a free Government, have it in our power to stand better in the long run as the real props of peace and of order even with the despotic governments of Europe, than France with her revolutionary and really—*i.e.* ultimately—anarchical despotism, her greater means of injuring the rest of the Continent of Europe, and the temptations to such a course, greater in proportion to those means.

“Now, with regard to the evidence of a coming French invasion, you evidently fear that I ‘shut my eyes to an immense risk’; and I frankly retaliate by telling you that I do not think you handle the testimonies altogether in a judicial spirit, and that I doubt whether among the agencies that have produced your conversion is not included the power, influence, and infection of national emotion upon a generous and sympathetic mind. I will first criticise a little what you say of it, and then lay myself open to your fire in return.

“First, I frankly own, that notwithstanding your disparaging comparison, I still greatly prefer the Channel to the Rhine, and I shall attach far greater value than you do to our nautical means of defence when once we begin to correct (as we may very rapidly do) our senseless system of dispersing force all over the world, mainly for purposes, and with consequences either null or absolutely mischievous. No army but an overwhelming one would land in

England for the purpose of occupation. I do not believe in the facility of landing an overwhelming army (of course I mean overwhelming as compared with our force) with its *matériel*; I am yet more sceptical as to the chances France would run in establishing a base of operations. It not only seems plain to me that it would not answer for her, in point of that miserable abortion called *prestige*, even to occupy London itself, and then see her occupying army reduced to surrender; but I am convinced that this is plain to her also—not indeed, to every wiseacre in every *café*, but to the minds that direct the policy.

“You seem to infer the English from the Italian war. I think it an illegitimate inference. For four hundred years France and Austria have struggled from time to time for supremacy of influence in Italy. The renewal of that struggle, when for nearly half a century Austria has had the upper hand, presents in itself nothing so very strange. The occupation of Ancona in 1831 wanted but a little of renewing it; but this was not a mere renewal of the ancient contest. Italy has been confessedly for years an European danger—quite as much an European danger as were, in 1853, the relative positions of Turkey and Russia. We used force in that latter question (at least so we said) for European objects. Had there been the same union of sentiment among the Great Powers, they might just as rationally have compelled Austria to come to an arrangement. There was not that union; and we wisely held off. France thought otherwise, and doubtless had aims of her own; but still the fact remains that she used force to deal with an European danger. The further facts remain: first, that she earnestly besought us to concert with her (Blue Book, p. 328) the best means of attaining the objects professed by our previous policy; secondly (I must say), in the course of the negotiations, she over and over again bound herself to fair and moderate terms of adjustment. It is no just inference from her having made such a war (apart from all questions of comparative danger or facility) that she is ready to invade England.

“But this invasion seems to be at our doors, for the farmers at Châlons refused the loan of horses from the Government, on the ground that they would be wanted so soon for a war with England. I know

Colonel Claremont is believed to be a good witness ; but surely such a statement, put into so prominent a place, was well worth verifying and testing. For if this was the real ground of the proceeding, the farmers about Chalons must be very extraordinary farmers. It is to be presumed that they were not full stocked already, otherwise the offer would fail on other grounds. Did they then suppose, when this offer was made in autumn, that England was to be invaded before winter? Hardly; and if they did not, and wanted horses for their ploughing and seed time, and would not accept the loan of them, because in the next or a future year they would be reclaimed, I again say they must be very extraordinary farmers. Now, do not condemn this as minute criticism. My meaning is that the evidence is unsifted evidence, and I avow my opinion that such evidence, until sifted, should not be used nor reported as part of the foundation for the proceedings of a Government—proceedings which, by multiplying preparations for war, have in the present state of men's minds no small tendency to bring it about.

“ If you ask me what I would do with this evidence, I answer at once, Sift it; appoint men; use your multitude of agents abroad, and your ample means, to examine every one of these stories, which may be mountains or may be molehills, and let us have, with the *utmost* degree of particularity that can be reached, the whole attainable evidence on such a vital matter.

“ It seems a little hard to say that the treaties of 1815 have already received a heavy blow at the hands of the Emperor of the French, when our great complaint of him is that, having entered into his work, he did not go through with it, but left Venetia in the hands of the Austrians; and that he has since been endeavouring, above and under ground, to bring about the restoration of the Grand Duke of Tuscany—in conformity with the treaties of 1815.

“ If pamphlets exciting hostility to England have for years been distributed among the French troops, cannot ‘English gold’ buy a single copy? Would it not be well that we should see one or two, or know something of their contents? Particularly as our informants know them, since they tell us that they excite hostility against us.

"It appears to me hardly impartial to speak of the evidence of coming war as if it were consentient and universal. You heard the other day, at this house, of a witness who seemed to be, from the descriptions, competent, trustworthy, and of wide experience, and who reported that he could not find any of this evidence. Mr. Charles Sumner has lately spent some time in France. He mixes largely with men, and is alike constant and acute, as I know, in his endeavours to learn their views. He says he found that when they knew him to be an American they spoke to him about England without reserve. He declared (at the Duke of Argyll's table) that he had nowhere found any trace of a desire for war with England.

"But as I have said, the whole question of the state of feeling in France, and of the preparations made by the French Government, appears to me to deserve, I might say to require, a secret, comprehensive, and searching investigation, which might furnish us with definite and collected results, at least for parts of the question.

"Now I will venture on some general observations of my own. They are by no means offered as conclusive. I admit that I cannot dismiss all uneasiness at French preparations, but I think that such observations may present to view true elements of the case.

"There is no question with us of an aggressive war against France. The question is of a war in which they are to be aggressors without cause, and we are innocently to defend ourselves, I mean to begin with defending ourselves.

"There are some evidences of fact against the supposition that such a war is intended. It cannot well, I assume, be brought about without a previous development of acrimony in our mutual relations. There was strong acrimony in the relations of France with Austria long before the declaration of January 1st to M. Hubner; and yet, as I have said, France was willing (at the least) to have waived that war long after the date of the declaration.¹ Has France shown any tendency to bring this acrimony into her relations with us? I must confess it appears to me that she has, on the contrary, been most friendly, eminently and peculiarly so, in the management of those relations.

¹ No: the engagement with Sardinia had been previously concluded; but this was not known at the time.—S.

"In some cases, such as the Principalities and the Suez Canal, we have, whether rightly or wrongly, pressed very hard upon her. In the former, we pledged her publicly in the face of Europe to a policy favouring the Union, and then turned right round upon her, joining with Austria, and ourselves turning the scale against the measure we had formerly promoted. In the affair of Perim, in that of Morocco too, and perhaps other examples might readily be found, there has been a like spirit shown by France. It may be said, 'Yes, but she is storing up a catalogue of grievances to be produced at the proper time against us.' It is, however, a little hard that if France (as in the Austrian case) complains, it is to stand as proof of hostile intention; if she does not complain, but shows much patience and long-suffering, that is to stand as proof of hostile intention too.

"Her great anxiety to obtain our support and concurrence in the Italian congress does not square with the assumption that she is resolved on a rupture. It may be replied that she does this in order to extricate herself from the embarrassments of Villa Franca, and therefore for her own interest. Yes, but this is one proof among many, or one instance how much her interests run in the same track with ours, and how unlikely we are to have legitimate causes of quarrel.

"The common effort against China, so much desired and urged by her, much more than by us, is an important circumstantial proof in the same sense. She cannot fight beside us there and against us here. She cannot limit the time which operations in that distant quarter will occupy. We hope there may be none, or, if any, that they may be short; but this we and she can neither guarantee nor effectively control. It is most improbable that, if she had a fixed purpose of quarrel with us, she would place the time of beginning that quarrel by any voluntary act beyond her own command, or hamper herself in any degree on a point so vital to her aims.

"A short time ago we were in a desperate emergency, and every available man was sent to India. France had, at the very same moment, a plausible cause of war in the affair of the conspiracy of Orsini. On that question the feeling of all the despotic States would have been cordially with

Napoleon. Had he not *more* than a plausible cause of complaint when not only was one Government overthrown upon the Conspiracy Bill, but another, which for its first act promised him to proceed with the measure, for its second turned round upon him and broke its word? But 'he was not then prepared.' Let that pass. Why at least did he not then, under circumstances so incomparable, lay his ground for a change in relations when convenient?

"There is a mode of judging the conduct of France which makes the attainment of truth hopeless. Do what we will, we may err; but with this mode we are certain to err, and that not only with error of the understanding, but also with moral error. It is that mode, too much in vogue among us, of requiring the best construction to be put on our own acts, or, worse still, of forgetting that they can bear more constructions than one, and at the same time resolutely putting the very worst construction on the acts of others.

"There is an act of ours, or rather a continuing action, which, if judged in the way in which we judge others, appears more purely *offensive* than anything we can charge on France. I mean the harbour and fortifications of Alderney. If there were a French island at the distance from Portsmouth which lies between Alderney and Cherbourg; if upon this island, worthless for any other purpose, a sum of from two to three millions of money were being laid out on considerable fortifications, and on a harbour which was to have contained (for so we were positively assured) a large fleet in perfect security; if, in short, it were known that French engineers and naval authorities had promised that Portsmouth should be hermetically sealed; we should not merely have seen general complaint and alarm, but in all probability it would have become a subject of formal remonstrance to the Government of France, possibly with ulterior consequences.

"I by no means dismiss the subject of French preparations—I wish to be far better informed upon it; but I think we should remember that they may be susceptible of some explanations, and even if these explanations be insufficient to meet the reports, they might not be inadequate to the true dimensions of the facts when ascertained.

"The English piously believe themselves to be a peaceful people; nobody else is of the same belief. The English Press is in constant war against France, and claims that this shall go for nothing, because the Government has no control over newspapers. The answer, from the French point of view, is obvious. If the newspapers do not write to order, they write to live, and the tone they take is the true measure of the public feeling on which they depend. *We* may offer explanations, but in order that those explanations may tell, they must be received in a spirit of calm and impartiality, very different from our own.

"We desire to be strong, but without purposes of offence. If France desires to be strong at sea, we assume that it can be for offence only. She has no Colonies to defend (I would to God she had)—that is, she has a few; she once had a great many, but we took them from her. An excellent reason, indeed, why all her attempts to extend a Navy should be offensive only, and why she should believe that we never injure anyone.

"The impressions of a people are formed mainly by their traditions. The tradition of France respecting England is that at a very early period of history her constant policy was invasion of France; at all later periods she has been active in leagues against France. France knows that she is, from her great power on the Continent, a natural and standing object of hostile European combinations. She probably does not yet fully believe, what we know, that the English nation has ceased to regard her as (in the language of Mr. Fox) our natural enemy. But she may, nay must, act in no small degree under the habitual apprehension of European combinations; and, although it might be absurd to suppose England making war upon her, it is not so absurd to suppose England a member of one of these combinations. England was not far from a position of this kind at one period of the present year.

"I think, I believe in common with you, that we may, before the year expires, have some further evidence of French intentions; and I am very sensible that in this country we must act with reference not only to what we think ourselves, but likewise to what the people think, and may, under all the circumstances

of the case, be expected to think. I will therefore not pursue the detailed consideration of the supposed plans of France which you think to be settled, but will add one or two words of general remark.

"I do *not* believe the French to be a 'godless nation.' It is admitted that the wise and good of that nation are against war with England, and I see no proof as yet that the wise and good there will fail to have as much influence over foreign policy there as they have here.

"The scheme imputed to France is not merely wrong, not merely wild and wicked, it is diabolical. The supposition is that in the middle of the nineteenth century the first nation of the Continent, and the one which most exults and least admits any question about its realised wealth in military glory, is resolved, with such a resolution as is to bear down all opposition, to make a murderous invasion of England, and to shake the world with the convulsive conflict of its two by far mightiest nations, in the total absence of any rivalry of interest or cause of quarrel, and upon the contemptible ground that half a century ago England had the principal share in the last decisive action of the revolutionary war—England, with whom France has been ever since at peace, and for more than half the time in peculiar and close alliance.

"Upon the whole, unless in the face of much public and clearer evidence, I do not believe in this Satanic wickedness. I have more faith in France. I have also more faith in the public opinion of Europe. Amidst many evils and sorrows of the world I see with joy that that power is gradually ripening and gaining force, and imposing salutary restraints on all individual States, at least as to their proceedings in this quarter of the globe. I believe the action of that power to be unfavourable to the perpetration of great crimes, and unfavourable to an assault, alike gratuitous and murderous, by France upon England, which, after all that can be said about our Foreign Office, and our arrogance and insularity, would still be, and would still be admitted to be, a monstrous and a hideous crime. For in the mind of foreign nations the account after all is not wholly against England, it is against her chiefly in things partial and superficial; she is not the less known and felt to

be, in things more substantial, a mainstay of the European order, and a great benefactress to the world.

"On the other hand, I cannot think we are sufficiently alive to the shame and scandal with which (not, perhaps, minutely apportioning the blame) posterity, and that an early posterity, will look back upon the present state of things; that we labour sufficiently to find means of counteracting the evil, or are sufficiently anxious to take care for removing small causes of offence given by us which, under given circumstances, may be taken for great. Neither, I must own, does it seem to me that we have any adequate idea of the predisposing power which an immense series of measures of preparation for war have in begetting war. They constantly familiarise ideas which when familiar lose their horror; and they light an inward flame of excitement, of which, when it is habitually fed, we lose the consciousness. I do not share all your dread, I cannot share all your hopes. *If* your fears are well founded, safety will not be found in using convulsive efforts 'to make the attempt (at invasion) so dangerous as to be almost impossible.' These calls which Lord Brougham has thundered forth prove nothing so much as that we are drifting away from the calm which is the first (though not the only) condition of safety; and there remains behind the melancholy but undeniable possibility that what may have been a dream may also grow to a reality by virtue of the very measures adopted for its prevention.

"Ever yours,

"W. E. GLADSTONE.

"P.S.—I *hear* that the Addingtons are come back from travelling in France, and that they report they have been unable to find evidence of enmity or wrath, but have heard something to the contrary effect."

MR. HERBERT TO MR. GLADSTONE.

"WAR OFFICE,

"November 28th, 1859.

"MY DEAR GLADSTONE,

"Thanks for your letter. It would have been better perhaps if I had put marginal references to the facts I quote, showing my authority. There is

only one which I have any doubt about, and I have sent to Wodehouse to look out the despatch for me—namely, the statement that the French tradesmen at St. Malo (not Brest) sent in their bills to the English, thinking war coming. That, I think, and all the others I know, I copied from the consular reports which came round in the red boxes, or from Colonel Claremont's despatches or reports. The inference, of course, may be wrong; but I assume the facts to be good.

"The only statements I have made with regard to contracts entered into, or attempted to be entered into, by the French Government here, are founded on the word of the contractor, or a report made to me by our officers on the word of the contractor to one or other of them.

"Where I have said vast accumulations of coal at Brest, I should have stated 50,000 tons. I cannot give the number of horses lent out, but I can give the number of horses which the Emperor bought in England alone for the Italian war, as I have the returns of the report from the custom house.

"You say that my expectations from the Colonies are feeble. I am only attempting to estimate what I think will be done. I am not Colonial Minister, and cannot and ought not to act in this matter as if I were, and I know the difficulties which beset the path, and the delay that will intervene.

"As regards North America, we have reduced the force and have withdrawn a battalion, to which loss the colonists will no doubt gradually accustom themselves.

"I am all for doing whatever can be done so soon as the Cabinet is agreed on the principle of action; but you will not, I fear, find the principle so readily accepted, and the distance of the Colonies will interpose delay, while they themselves will oppose every resistance. Even Godley warns us that the threat of separation will be loudly used. The truth is, the Colonial mind is in no way educated to or prepared for this change; nor is this country as ready for it as the bearing of the case on their pockets would lead one, at first, to suppose.

"I propose to strengthen the Mediterranean garrisons, because, next to England, their danger

would be the greatest if war be imminent. I am not by any means unwilling to reduce the force in the Ionian Islands, which stands on quite other grounds from Malta and Gibraltar. I go beyond you in this matter. I am ready to be quit of them and turn them over to Greece under the sanction of an European Congress, and with a general guarantee.

"As regards India, I have written most urgently to Canning. He spares troops for China with reluctance. He will give *us* none till he gets them back. We shall have them in the beginning of 1861-62. I am willing to concur in putting any pressure upon him; but, if there were an impatience of taxation here, the pressure would be the other way, and we should urge him to keep the troops where they cost the country nothing. But if he sends us troops, I can reduce to meet the cost of their arrival. I have between augmentation of rank and file, which can be instantly lowered by stopping all recruiting and the embodied militia, which can be disembodied, a power of reduction under my plan amounting to no less than 45,000 men.

"I mentioned the question of relieving the Estimates of next year in your interest. It must a good deal depend on your financial position. But there is another view which is more important. The recruiting is slow and difficult. It will take a long time to raise our increased force: the sooner we begin, therefore, the better. The sooner we have a respectable available force in the country, the sooner and more quietly will the present excited state of feeling subside.

"It is true that I have not given a detailed estimate of the cost of the plan I have proposed, or rather not an exact estimate. We cannot raise the men, and have to maintain them for a whole year in 1860-61. They will be short of the number during a large portion of the year. I have stated things at their worst, which is always the best way; but I want the principle of the scheme to be sanctioned, and steps taken towards its commencement.

"I have not included the fortification question, because, though I have an estimate in rough about £12,000,000, I am confident that it will be susceptible of much reduction in detail, and I had rather know more about it before formally proposing it. All these

questions, however, press for an early decision, for the Estimates will have to be moved earlier than usual, and they are being made up later than usual.

"Believe me,

"Yours affectionately,

"SIDNEY HERBERT."

To Mr. Gladstone's second letter Sidney Herbert does not seem to have returned a written answer. None could be found among the papers at Hawarden, and it was Mr. Gladstone's own impression that none was sent.

When, however, the time came for the preparation of the Estimates, the discussions of the Cabinet assumed a very animated character. Mr. Gladstone refused to consider the proposed augmentations of the Military and Naval Estimates, unless it were agreed that their whole cost should be defrayed by an increased Income Tax, and that his proposals for a repeal of the Paper Duty should not be interfered with. When expostulated with as to the impolicy of abandoning existing sources of revenue at a time at which an increased expenditure was contemplated, he answered that an Income Tax was the recognised mode of providing for exceptional military wants; and to the observation that the increased Income Tax would be highly unpopular, he virtually replied that he hoped "it would be so," and that nothing would sooner induce the people to demand the reduction of the expenditure he abhorred than the pressure of such a tax upon them. After much discussion the remissions he wished for were agreed to, and the amount of the charge to be incurred became the sole field of battle. At length Mr. Gladstone agreed to a total of £29,664,000 for the whole Naval, Military, and Transport Estimates, conditionally on the acceptance of his proposed remissions of taxation. But the prospect

of agreement thus raised became again immediately overclouded. On February 3rd Mr. Herbert received the following notes :

"There seem to have been mistakes either with Anderson, or in your department. The Estimates agreed to by the Cabinet—that is by the majority, and acquiesced in by me after the Cabinet, or rather again the majority, had determined on the remissions—were £15,050,000 and £500,000 for China. They have now come in, as sent to me by Anderson, at £15,600,000, irrespective of the China vote of credit.

"If this were so, it would, I fear, upset the whole affair. I have not a shilling to spare—*i.e.* my surplus is £247,000, on an expenditure passing seventy millions.

"Yours affectionately,
"W. E. G."

"I assure you, with pain, that the state of things is most serious. You heard me give the balances in the Cabinet founded on your statement. I refused to accept the decision of the Cabinet, which fixed the total Army, Navy, and Packet Estimates at £29,664,000, until the Cabinet had also made certain remissions of duty. I then accepted, and am prepared to abide by that total of £29,664,000—the whole taken together entailing an income tax of 10*d.*

"You now propose a further charge of about half a million. I cannot provide for it.

"Ever yours."

Mr. Herbert's answer shows how deeply he felt the sacrifices made to satisfy, or rather to appease, Mr. Gladstone.

"49, BELGRAVE SQUARE,
"February 3rd.

"The Army Estimates are exactly as I stated to you. The disembodied Militia Estimates are what Mr. Anderson has apparently added to the Army Estimates. They are entirely distinct from them, and moved generally at a later period of the session.

"If the disembodied Militia service has not been previously taken into account, I am afraid it will be

disastrous to you, but I do not see what remedy there is. I have reduced the number of men yet further to keep within my amount."

"February 4th.

"I have gone through the disembodied Militia Estimates and the Army Estimates. The first was considerably larger than you stated yesterday. By reducing £240,000 on the Army Estimates I have made it come right.

"You have got all the heart's blood out of me."

Meanwhile, the apprehensions of a rupture with France daily increased, and the annexation of Savoy and Nice by the Emperor did not diminish them. Sidney Herbert came to the conclusion that in the existing circumstances it would be imperative to suspend the disembodiment of the Militia force, which it had been proposed to carry out gradually as regiments of the Line returned from India and other foreign stations. But such suspension would render it necessary to resort to a Loan for the purpose of carrying out the fortification scheme agreed on, as the whole of the sum which it had been intended to place on the Estimates for that purpose would be swallowed up by the pay of the Militia regiments which it had been intended to disembody. Sidney Herbert was well aware that Mr. Gladstone would strenuously oppose any pause in the reduction of the Militia force, and that he, on principle, altogether objected to a Loan for the construction of fortifications. Nevertheless, after full reflection, Mr. Herbert addressed the following letter to Lord Palmerston:

"BELGRAVE SQUARE,

"March 27th, 1860.

"MY DEAR LORD PALMERSTON,

"The last few weeks have seen many rapid changes in the prospects of Europe. War between France and Austria. Close friendship between France

and Austria. Coolness between France and Sardinia. Treaty between France and England. Hostility between France and the Pope. Treaty between France and Sardinia. Friendship between France and Russia. Reconciliation with the Pope, etc., etc., etc.

"No one can tell what the next day may bring forth; but this is certain: that whereas a few weeks ago we thought we might reckon that there was no danger of an immediate interruption of our good understanding with France, a coolness, to say the least of it, now exists, and a new point of departure now exists, which make it necessary to be on the watch for any indications of a coming storm.

"We have to deal with a man very uncertain in his conduct, wielding an immense power, and acting on his decision, when it is made, with great rapidity and vigour.

"If we have a rupture with France, there is a risk that we may have to bear the brunt of it alone. Spain, with the hope of Gibraltar as a prize, could, I think, be induced to join France; and her recent military successes,¹ of which she probably greatly overrates the value, have possibly renewed in her the taste for military glory. On the other hand, Russia has never forgiven us the Crimean war, and she cultivates intimacy with France; Austria will not soon forgive us our Italian policy; and Prussia leans on Russia, not on England.

"There is very little material as yet for an alliance strong enough to face danger. We ought, therefore, I think, to take a careful review of our state of preparation, in case of any sudden rupture with France.

"On February 1st we had, on the British establishment at home, in round numbers 76,000 men and 25,000 Militia, together, 101,000 men. It was then decided to disembody a portion of the Militia; and on April 1st we shall have in round numbers about 80,000 men, including a regiment of cavalry not yet arrived from India, and 20,000 Militia—making a total of 100,000 men.

"According to the plan for the gradual disembodiment of the Militia, 8,000 men would be disembodied next month, leaving 92,000 men. Another regiment

¹ In Morocco.

of cavalry from India, and increase by recruiting, would give us 93,000 men; and we had intended now to maintain a force for the rest of the year of about 94,000 men, which we should do by disembodiment of an equivalent number of Militia for every battalion arriving from India, which, when all shall have arrived that have been announced, will leave us a remainder of about 5,000 Militia till March, 1861.

"The result of these arrangements is simply a reduction of 13,000 infantry against an increase of, say, 1,000 Cavalry coming home from India.

"The reduction of 5,000 men is already effected. There remains, therefore, to be carried into effect a reduction of 8,000 men, which, as now arranged, will be effected next month.

"Since this was decided, however, as I said before, our position is materially altered. It is impossible to deny that it is very much altered for the worse. To increase our force at this moment might have a bad effect, as implying intentions of quarrel which we do not entertain; but to diminish and disband an existing force is to invite the belief that we are not in earnest, and will yield rather than meet the possible consequences of our remonstrances. Add to this the danger of generating a fresh panic at home, which the appearance of defencelessness is sure to create.

"Taking all these circumstances together, I do not see how a further reduction of force at this moment can be justified.

"But the question next to be considered is, how can the cost of maintaining this force of 8,000 men be met; if not for the whole year, at any rate for part of it? If the Government decide on adopting the proposal to complete the fortifications of our dockyards in three years, by means of money raised on terminable annuities, the difficulty could be met. I have taken on the Estimates a lump sum of £645,000 for fortifications, of which in round numbers £415,000 would be devoted to the works round our dockyards if no Loan were taken. The rest is for our foreign fortresses, repairs, alterations, etc., etc. Of this sum of £415,000 a portion, say £200,000, must be reserved for payment of interest on the capital sum of £3,000,000 borrowed in the first year.

"There remains the sum of £215,000, which, without

adding to the gross amount of the Estimates or trenching on our prearranged financial arrangements, could be transferred to the Militia vote, and would maintain the 8,000 men for six months, giving us, at any rate, time to see how matters go, before depriving ourselves of this force.

"But for this purpose it would be necessary for the Government to decide, forthwith, whether they will adopt the system of Loan or not; as it is necessary that the recasting of the fortification vote, if decided upon, should be shown on the reprinted Estimates.

"I know the internal difficulties which beset us on this question, and I have delayed as long as I can the raising of the discussion upon it. But circumstances are much altered since it was discussed before, and the uncertain state of our foreign affairs make the *Salus populi suprema lex* to a degree which it has not done before.

"I have no wish to press unduly on the Government matters which must be subjects of difference; but the responsibility on myself is a heavy one, and I should fail in my duty if I acquiesced now in a proceeding—namely, the reduction of our force—which though practicable a few weeks ago, seems to me in the present state of affairs so imprudent as not to be justifiable.

"Believe me, dear Lord Palmerston,

"Yours very sincerely,

"SIDNEY HERBERT."

MR. HERBERT TO SIR JAMES GRAHAM.

"49, BELGRAVE SQUARE,
April 1st, 1860.

"MY DEAR GRAHAM,

"You have kindly taken so much interest in these unhappy differences between two very old and close friends, that, as you have seen Gladstone's letter to me, I should like you to see the letter I wrote to Palmerston, the copy of which I enclosed to Gladstone. I have not a copy of my note to him. It stated *generally* the importance of not suddenly diminishing force at this juncture, and my wish to take no step without his full knowledge, with the hope, most earnestly felt, that the difference should

be political only. I quote from memory, and not accurately. Please to return me my letter when you have done with it."

Sir James Graham's commentary on the letter to Lord Palmerston was as follows :

"GROSVENOR PLACE,
"April 2nd.

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"I return the copy of your letter. It mixes two proposals, and the questions at issue are thereby complicated. By separating the two, and by treating them as distinct, the ground of difference would be narrowed, and in the spirit of mutual concession and accommodation a just arrangement appears to be quite possible. My earnest desire is that these means may be found. The final decision should be postponed to the last moment, if unhappily adjustment fail. Unforeseen events occur day by day, and three weeks hence some natural solution of present difficulties may present itself, which at this moment cannot be anticipated. An immediate rupture alone is fatal and irremediable, and is therefore avoided [*sic*] by friends and colleagues as the greatest evil, and at considerable risks."

As above stated, a copy of Mr. Herbert's letter to Lord Palmerston was also sent to Mr. Gladstone. He replied :

MR. GLADSTONE TO MR. HERBERT.

"DOWNING STREET,
March 31st, 1860.

"I had hoped, and I still hope, you will be able to devise some means of adjourning the formidable question raised in your letter until after we shall have finished our task, in which I will not voluntarily lose a day, of completing the main financial measures and carrying them through Parliament. After all that has been said, it is almost a matter of personal honour to me not to leave them unfinished. I also hope you will not, before it is *necessary*, raise this question in the Cabinet. I had heard *nothing* of it

until one this morning (or last night), and I think a conversation between us would be a good preparation.

"On the Fortification Loan you know my individual conviction and intention. When the financial measures are over that will be a matter of no great concern to any one but myself; and, rely upon it, the personal relations between us will never be in the slightest degree affected by your simply persevering in what you believe to be a public duty, even were you not sustained, as you perhaps are, by the prevailing feeling of the public and the Cabinet.

"The increase of force, apart from the question of charge, appears to me at this moment most undesirable. I mean increase as compared with what was determined two months ago. To the increase of charge there likewise appear to me to be insurmountable objections. You have (I believe) most kindly, and at great sacrifice, lowered your views. I, with the extremest effort, raised mine, and concurred in Estimates which, I believe, ought at the least to have been accompanied with the actual initiation of measures of reduction. The cord is at its utmost point of tension. But, apart from this, I think there are most serious questions connected with the character of the Government, and involved in any increase of the Military Estimates. I, for one, could not answer to the charge which would be made that the success of the Budget had been obtained under false pretences, and that we had entrapped Parliament by obtaining eleven millions of revenue without a single remission of duty having passed into *law*.

"When our plans are squared, probably a month hence, those who may think increase of charge necessary would at least be in a better position for bringing it before Parliament."

On Tuesday, April 3rd, Mr. Herbert received the following letter from Mr. Gladstone:

MR. GLADSTONE TO MR. HERBERT.

"DOWNING STREET,
"April 3rd, 1860.

"I must entreat you and the Cabinet not to come to a decision to-day to alter the amount of force and

increase the charge. I think you will hardly consider it unreasonable that I should petition to be allowed to present that subject deliberately, as it appears to me, in connection with the general considerations which it raises.

"I *see* no inconvenience attending this on your side, but that you should either separate the proposal from the reprint of the Estimates, or, as you say that is inadvisable, that you should delay the reprint for a week beyond the first day of meeting, when there will have been time to consider the whole.

"It is surely most desirable for us all that, with the fortification question in view, we should endeavour to bring our plans *together* and adopt something that will last for more than a few weeks. But if this cannot be, I again ask at least for time to review the considerations immediately concerned with your proposal, which I have not had since I first heard of it three days ago."

On the afternoon of the same day the Cabinet adopted a species of compromise between the views of Herbert and Gladstone. It was agreed that disembodiment of the Militia force should be arrested, but at the same time that no increase should be made in the Estimates. Mr. Herbert, for the sake of peace, acquiesced at the moment, but a very few hours' reflection convinced him that the position was one which could not be maintained, a view in which Sir James Graham concurred, as is clearly shown by a memorandum of the language used by him in conversation on the following day, taken down at the time and subsequently corrected by himself:

"April 4th, 1860.

"*Sir J. Graham*: What is Sidney going to do about the revised Estimates? I heard him tell the House he would produce them on Monday, the 16th.

"Now, at the Cabinet yesterday it was agreed that the remaining regiments of Militia were not, for the present, to be disembodied.

"I think this decision perfectly right. I agree with Lord Aberdeen that to disembody or otherwise reduce our force at the present moment would be perfect madness.

"Well, if this course be agreed to, how is it possible that Herbert should reprint his Estimates (as Gladstone proposes) at the same figure?

"It would be impossible. In the first place, General Peel, who is on the *qui vive* to pick holes, would instantly ask awkward questions. The House is already suspicious of these Revised Estimates. It is an unusual course, and betokens an increase of expenditure. But that increase will, I am convinced, be cheerfully met if stated frankly and honestly. But resort to delay and evasion, and what will be the result?

"Sidney must either equivocate, or state that his Estimate does *not* cover the whole intended expenditure, so that he means to ask for a Supplementary Estimate by-and-by.

"As to the first course, it is an impossible one for any honourable man. The question is sure to be asked, 'How do you mean to provide for the maintenance of the Militia?' Already there has been something very like equivocation in the matter of the China vote, and Peel hit the blot at once.

"As to the second, of course the House would at once say, 'We cannot give away more revenue without knowing clearly what our expenditure will be,' and the abolition of the paper duties becomes impossible.

"There is only one course for Sidney to take as an honourable man.

"Let him have his Estimates revised and reprinted, including all possible charges consequent on the maintenance of his present force. Let him, if he likes, leave the fortification question alone for the present, but for Heaven's sake don't let him meet the House *with a lie*, which could not be concealed, even for a night. No one was more in favour of delay than I; but now I think the moment is come when you can postpone the decision on these questions no longer. Herbert's honour is at stake, and in this case, as in every other, honesty is the best policy. Equivocation would involve him in endless difficulties, and ensure the break up of the Government far more than a present decision, however painful."

On reaching Netherby, Sir James wrote as follows to Mrs. Herbert :

" April 4th.

" I promised to write to Herbert from Netherby. Subsequent reflection, and a conversation with Lord Aberdeen, have convinced me that a letter such as I must write is better omitted. To be useful it must be shown to others, and in the present delicate state of affairs my interference would be considered an intrusion, and might be misconstrued. Herbert knows my opinion, and I can add nothing to what I said to you this morning. I could only repeat my sense of the dangers which beset an undecided course. Herbert is quite aware of them, and no friendly warning is requisite so far as he is concerned. With respect to *others*,¹ the iron is too hot to be touched with safety. Quiet and country air may cool down this excitement. I shall rejoice if they lead to greater harmony and united counsels."

After mature consideration, Sidney Herbert, on April 6th, tendered his resignation to Lord Palmerston in the following letter :

MR. HERBERT TO LORD PALMERSTON.

" April 6th, 1860.

" I have two subjects to write upon, both personal to myself, and at this moment very much mixed up with one another.

" I am very much shaken in health, so much so that I doubt whether I can get through the session. I need not trouble you with the how and the why, but I want rest, which I shall not get. On the contrary, the easy part of the session is now over, and the bad weather and late nights are coming. Few men have your frame; few men, I am glad to say, have mine, or they would break down very soon.

" I owe it to you to say this thus early,—a struggle is impending in the Cabinet on a question in which I take great interest. I do not know how it will be decided either in the Cabinet or in Parliament, but if it be decided in accordance with my views, it will,

¹ *i.e.* Gladstone.

I fear, entail the loss of one whom the House of Commons and Cabinet can ill spare, one whose energy and oratorical power are unequalled, and whose weight and influence have been greatly augmented by the wonderful ability with which he has conducted the debates on the Budget.

"I do not know whether, on the question of the fortifications, there is any possible mode of compromise with Gladstone. But if there be, you ought, I think, to try it, provided the main object is attained in some way, for his loss would be a heavy one to the Government. His temperament too is such, that if not in the Government, he will soon be in opposition to it. I think he would consent to the land being paid for by money raised by Loan, for the purchase of land is an investment, and the paper duty postponed till next year would enable you to take a very large sum for fortifications, as large, probably, as you could spend in the first year, in addition to the £400,000 taken on the Estimates for portions of the works in question. Be this, however, as it may, I am unable to look forward to remaining long in office.

"I come now to the second point, which is pressing, and requires an immediate decision.

"On Tuesday last the Cabinet decided that, beyond the 3,700 Militia who are under orders for disembodiment this month, no more Militia shall be disembodied at present. They likewise decided that no addition should, for the present, be made to the Estimates.

"I turned this over every way on Wednesday with those who are most conversant with these matters. The thing is impossible. It is making bricks without straw. If I present to the House Estimates founded on the assumption that the Militia is all to be disembodied by July, and yet announce that they are not to be disembodied, it will be at once seen by the amount of the Estimate that I have not taken money to effect what I have undertaken to do. It will be assumed, therefore, either that I intend to come again to Parliament and ask for more when Parliament will no longer have the means of granting the increase, or that it is the intention of the Government to denude the country of troops during the autumn and winter at a time when our relations with France are of a most precarious character.

"I am not proposing to raise additional troops; that might be objected to as tending to create distrust and precipitate the very dangers against which we wish to guard. But to disband troops which we already have, in the face of an increasing danger and uneasiness, is quite another thing.

"The Emperor of the French has just made a very *serious* addition to his field artillery, which by the way was announced in the *Moniteur* as a reduction.

"The French Estimates I see to-day have been voted for 600,000 men, a proposed reduction having been negatived.

"I cannot consent to present to the House, Estimates framed on the assumption that this is a moment when a considerable reduction of force can be made, nor to present Estimates which would be dishonest, as being inadequate to cover the pay of the men we profess to maintain.

"Since January the whole aspect of affairs is changed. We are estranged from France, and have not yet secured such an alliance with other Powers as would make the Emperor hesitate before he attacks us. Now, no man can tell from day to day what to-morrow may bring forth.

"These are the circumstances which justify the retention and maintenance of a large force. No one is less inclined to such a policy than I am. Men when not wanted are a waste. They consume pay and clothing and rations, and leave nothing to show for the future. I prepared the Estimates for the year with a view to the future rather than the present. I contemplated a large reduction of force, but a great increase of guns, rifles, fortifications, and *matériel* generally. This, however, was when a commercial treaty with France appeared to promise, at any rate for the time, most friendly relations. There was no appearance of immediate danger, and the risk could safely be incurred. This is no longer the case.

"There are then two things which I must decline to do: first, to be a party to a great reduction of force after the first summer months, in the present state of Europe; second, to produce Estimates inadequate to the maintenance of the force which we profess to maintain.

"The latter would be a deception on the House

of Commons, which I cannot practise. I shall be asked, Will these Estimates cover the maintenance of a sufficient force through the year? My answer is, 'No.' I shall be asked, Do you mean to apply to Parliament for a Supplementary Estimate? My answer is 'Yes.' It will be asked, Where is the Revenue to come from? I can tell *now*, but six weeks hence it may be all irretrievably gone. I have no right to calculate on Supplementary Estimates when there will be no Revenue left to meet them.

"It is best to deal frankly with the House of Commons, as with an assemblage of gentlemen. If you take them into council they will go with you; but a reticence or a deception they resent.

"Now, all these difficulties are the result of the judgment which I have formed as to the risk and danger attending the course proposed to me by the Cabinet. I quite admit that I may be in error in the opinion I have formed, but I am thoroughly in earnest in holding it. Holding it, I am asked to propose either what I believe to be an insufficient force, or what I know to be an insufficient Estimate.

"If this be so, and the Cabinet adhere to this decision, I must explicitly say that I cannot do either. I feel that the best and indeed only course I can take under the circumstances I have described is to retire from it at once.

"I can assure you I have not come to this conclusion in a hurry, nor without the most calm deliberation; but I can no longer in justice to you or to myself postpone the decision, or allow you to believe that I acquiesce in the opinion of the Cabinet on Tuesday last.

"This communication, however, may relieve you from some embarrassment, and me from a difficulty which, with my opinions, I cannot meet."

MR. HERBERT TO SIR JAMES GRAHAM.

"WILTON HOUSE, SALISBURY,

"*April 8th, 1860.*

"MY DEAR GRAHAM,

"I was very glad on my return here to find how completely your advice accords with the decision to which I had come. I have written to

Palmerston pointing out the risk of losing Gladstone, but declining on my part to produce Estimates which provide for a force which I believe to be inadequate, or amounts which I know to be insufficient, to pay what we propose to maintain, and I therefore proposed—if the Cabinet decision is to be adhered to—at once to leave office.

“To-morrow I expect to hear from him. I have no time to write more, as I have to write for the Indian mail. I cannot say how much I feel your kindness in all this painful matter.”

MR. GLADSTONE TO MR. HERBERT.

“11, DOWNING STREET,
“April 10th, 1860.

“MY DEAR HERBERT,

“Apart from other matters, your letter to Lord Palmerston is surely premature. It cannot be a matter of the first necessity that the Estimates should be presented in their new shape on Monday; even if it be indispensable that, when presented, they should contain the final judgment of the Cabinet as to the Militia. But unless it is one, why drive thus rapidly at any conclusion?

“Then as to the particular conclusion: How can you take such a step before you know the judgment of the Cabinet on the *main* question depending? Could anything be more out of place—to use a mild word—than that you should find yourself parting from colleagues with the great bulk of whom you may, for all you and I know, be agreed? Is it not alike required by justice to yourself and them that you should, at any rate, let it be seen what is the route of their minds? I am far from knowing it, but were I to guess, it would be that they, or the greater part of them, think with you; while, perhaps, some think the other way as strongly as I have done. It is, then, probable that if a case for resignation is to arise, it is on *me*, and not on *you*, that it will fall; but there are at least a hundred reasons why no such question should be entertained, unless and until a real necessity shall have arisen. Time removes many difficulties, and sometimes effectually cures one by another. Let him try his hand. I feel confident that Lord Palmerston will consider that we have

not yet reached the point when these matters need be brought to issue.

"It is certainly true that we differ on these wretched questions of defence in a manner which some two or three years ago I could not have believed possible.

"I am not conscious of having changed (unless *with* the tide). You may have passed from wrong to right, but I think your former self is on my side. I well remember saying to you, in 1857, and your apparently agreeing, that the defence Estimates might be, and should be, further reduced. Since then they have increased, I think, ten millions. But this is by the bye. What I really want is, in conformity with what you kindly said in the Cabinet (I mean to *me* as you went to your seat), whether it is not even yet possible for us to find a ground of common action with respect to the whole subject. It is, however, necessary to think and move deliberately, and, unfortunately, I have much distracting matter on my hands. I will not admit to myself, one moment before it is *necessary*, that one or both of us are such altered men as to make this impossible.

"Believe me, affectionately yours,

"W. E. GLADSTONE."

MR. GLADSTONE TO MR. HERBERT.

"DOWNING STREET,

April 11th, 1860.

"I have seen Lord Palmerston, but can only report very briefly.

"1. I found from him that the suggestion, adopted by the Cabinet, for total disembodiment in the autumn had been abandoned on the objection of the military authorities.

"This, I venture to say, and must say, is, so far as I know, quite a new method of government for us. Surely the amount of force is a political question. If it is to be fixed against the Cabinet by the military authorities, had they not better find the money?

"2. His whole heart is set upon the Fortification Loan, and, as I learned to-day, has been for a great many years. I cannot, in fairness, expect him to recede from this cherished idea now that he has a War Minister, and probably a Cabinet and a Public,

with him. Still, I think it right, on the other hand, that I should, when I have got the best Estimate of Revenue in my power, sketch out roughly the basis of that mode of proceeding which would seem to me admissible.

"3. I think he felt the force of the reasons which seem to me to show the great expediency of postponing the issue. The Reform Bill, or twenty other things, may dispose of us in the interval before you can go into Army Estimates, which, as well as I can judge, you can hardly effect, except, perhaps, just before the Whitsuntide recess."

Lord Palmerston's own account of this interview is given in the following letter :

"April 11th.

"MY DEAR SIDNEY HERBERT,

"I have had a talk with Gladstone to-day. He clings to the arrangement agreed to by the Cabinet at the last meeting, but only proposes that the Militia question should be put off for a short time. He expects in the course of the next week to be better able to judge as to the probable produce of the Revenue. The income-tax addition passed into law before Easter, and we cannot, therefore, put off the repeal of the paper excise duty without some event of a grave character which has not yet happened.

"I opened the fortification question, stating, in regard to it, my long-ago formed opinions, my sense of the urgency of the duty to provide for the defence of the workshops of our Navy, and my intention to propose the measure myself. He repeated his own opinions adverse, but said nothing as to any intentions on his part, admitting that the opinion of the Country is with us on these matters. He pointed out some technical difficulties, of which I am aware, in the construction of a Bill, but did not say that they were insurmountable. I am just off to Brockett."

MR. HERBERT TO SIR JAMES GRAHAM.

"WILTON, April 12th, 1860.

"MY DEAR GRAHAM,

"Palmerston came over here yesterday on his way to town—nothing could be kinder. He said

my going would relieve him from no difficulty, because no possible War Minister would take any other course.

"He was to see Gladstone in town, and I have to-day the result of the interview, which is not satisfactory. I send you copies of Gladstone's two letters: one on the receipt of mine, telling him what I had done; the other after seeing Palmerston. Clearly he shook Palmerston as to delay. I have written to him adhering to my text and determination. There is in Gladstone's letter a tone from which it will be inferred that he would yield or compromise. I do not believe that, when the time comes, he will do either. He is not capable of deliberately deceiving others, but he can deceive himself to almost any extent when it accords with his wishes, and he wishes for delay because it will make his finance safe—*i.e. irretrievable*. I write very hurriedly.

"His notion that the force is to be changed at the request of the military authorities is clearly a misunderstanding of something Palmerston has said."

MR. HERBERT TO MR. GLADSTONE.

"WILTON, *April 12th*, 1860.

"I am not aware that the objection of the military authorities has anything to do with the decision not now to disembody more Militia beyond a certain point, and to retain the means of keeping a portion of them through the winter.

"I merely undertook to see what could be done, and, finding that the delay now would force the disembodiment of every man in the Militia after harvest, I did not even consult the Duke of Cambridge on a proposed course of proceeding which my own judgment told me was clearly wrong. It is not wise or prudent to entrust the defence of England and Ireland to thirty-eight battalions of infantry, for infantry is the staple reliable force to which one must always look, and to which other arms are supplementary. We have now a strong Militia force in addition. As the aspect of foreign affairs looks darker, it is proposed to disband this force. But it is said, 'All may be again smooth by September.' No one, I think, would be justified in acting on such a calculation.

"I admit that I carried the reductions much too far, in January last, when the Cabinet had decided to make the sacrifice of revenue necessary to the Budget. I have regretted it, I frankly say, ever since; but at that time we had great hopes from the treaty. The suspicion and alarm which had existed as to the intentions of France were to be dispelled, and to be succeeded by close commercial relations and the peaceful feelings engendered by them. All this prospect, however, has been overclouded. France has shown an unmistakably restless and aggressive spirit. There is great and just alarm throughout Europe. Assurances from Louis Napoleon are of very little value. He maintains immense armaments, has enlarged his artillery (which the *Moniteur* stated was decreased), and has, since we parted, decreed a conscription for the year which is the opposite of a reduction, though he has 150,000 men on *congé* whom he can recall in a fortnight.

"By the end of this month we shall have 8,000 men less in England than we had in February. I propose as regiments return from India to reduce more; but to leave ourselves under the necessity of sweeping away the whole 17,000 by September, with the prospects we have before us, is what I cannot undertake to do. I think the decision urgent.

"On Monday the House will ask, Where are the Army Estimates? What are they intended to cover?

"If we wait till all the reductions in revenue are made, and new taxes are to be found, it will be too late.

"The Estimates now to be proposed must of course be final ones. Even if, as you say, the Reform Bill or anything else disposes of us in the interim, the Estimates will be there as evidence of our intentions.

"It is hardly worth while now to go back to 1857, or conversations held then, when the Emperor was our trusted Ally, and his empire supposed to be founded on a policy of peace. Since then everything has changed. Wars carefully prepared and lightly undertaken. Alarm and anxiety everywhere. No man can now count from day to day on what may happen to-morrow.

"I wrote to Graham to tell him what I had done. He has written me a letter of warm approval. He

says the revised Estimates should include what I consider to be the minimum of force and expenditure necessary for the year, 'but they must be stated fully and at once.'

"I feel that my own character for truth and straightforwardness are very much at stake. I confess I do not see what we should gain by delay or evasion of these questions, even if they were right and possible, except that we should be more completely deprived of the means of maintaining a portion of the force, if we should ultimately decide on so doing. But such a course will not be possible, for we shall be challenged at once, and must give an answer, 'aye' or 'no,' as to what the Estimates will cover.

"Palmerston must decide the question; I cannot pretend to impose my will or my opinion on the Cabinet, but my own course is clear."

MR. GLADSTONE TO MR. HERBERT.

"DOWNING STREET,

"April 13th, 1860.

"I was just about to reply to your first letter when your second arrived.

"My reply to the first is: First, that I am glad to find I was misinformed about military authorities; secondly, that you had plainly (but probably through my own fault) misunderstood me as to time. I did not propose that we should 'wait till all the reductions in revenue are made, and new taxes are to be found,' but simply that, having made up my statement in February from Estimates which were necessarily premature and inadequate, I should now, having arrived at the new financial year, have the opportunity of revising them, and so being in a condition to know what our means are with reference to increased expenditure. With this view I had written for the preparation with all practicable speed of the necessary information.

"I have a great deal more which I might say on receiving the peremptory demand in your second letter,¹ but I think I do better not to say it, especially on paper. I left Lord Palmerston on Wednesday,

¹ This second letter has not been found.

agreed with me that the presentation of the Estimates should be postponed. I presume that this being so, you will hardly press that demand; but if you do, my duty is plain, to decline compliance, and absolutely to ask the time and deliberation which my responsibilities require.

"P.S.—I should certainly think it my duty to argue in the Cabinet for the necessity of considering *as a whole* what yet remains to be considered with reference to the military expenditure of the year."

This was quickly followed by a second note :

"DOWNING STREET,
"April 13th, 1860.

"I write with very defective information, but to do what depends upon me towards preventing misapprehension, I beg you to notice that the demand to which I decline to accede without delay is that which reverses the decision of the Cabinet for the disembodiment of the remaining Militia before the winter."

MR. GLADSTONE TO VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.

"DOWNING STREET,
"April 13th, 1860.

"By the time I come back from Edinburgh I hope to know what are the Estimates of revenue and expenditure for the year, and what (either in augmentation or diminution) has become of the surplus as it appeared to stand in February.

"I did not understand you on Wednesday to recede in any manner from the opinion you had formed that, contrary to the opinion of the Cabinet last week, this £150,000 should be placed upon the Estimate, but only to agree with me, that, under the circumstances of the case, it was desirable that the production of the altered Estimate should be postponed.

"A very short delay would enable us both to know how we stand as to the revenue, and, likewise, to consider the bearing of this proposal on the larger and more important question,¹ which stands for early consideration.

"I send a copy of this to Herbert."

¹ The Fortification Scheme.

MR. HERBERT TO VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.

"WILTON, *April 13th*, 1860.

"MY DEAR LORD PALMERSTON,

"I have had a letter from Gladstone, in which he assumes that the difficulty as to the amount of force arises entirely from the opinion entertained at the Horse Guards.

"I have written to say that that certainly has nothing to do with it, as I have not seen the Duke of Cambridge, or heard from him on the subject, since these discussions arose.

"I cannot, however, see the advantage of delay. The House is very suspicious about these Estimates, has asked several times when they will be ready, what they will contain, etc. They have clearly an alternative attack. If there is an increase of charge, they will say that the Budget will not bear it, which will be to some extent true; and if there be no increase of force, they will say that the defence of the country is sacrificed to the Budget, which will also be true.

"In the meanwhile Gladstone goes to Edinburgh, and we shall have no means of holding a Cabinet on this subject till after questions shall have been put and answered. May I desire the Estimates to be prepared with the addition of £150,000? I will do it with less if I possibly can.

"If asked whether they make provision for a larger force of Militia, I can then say that the Estimate on the table will show. Here is what Graham says, in answer to a letter of mine: 'Whatever it is resolved to do should be stated *fully* and *at once*. You are bound in your revised Estimate to state the sum total which in present circumstances you consider necessary for the service of the year. If the means are not provided, you are right in refusing to continue responsible minister.' In truth, we have no excuse for further delay. The intention of reprinting the Estimates was announced a fortnight before Easter, and we have had a fortnight since. A further delay can only be accounted for by disagreement, or a fear of stating frankly what we are going to do.

"I see nothing to be gained in any way by delay, and a good deal in the way of suspicion, and

consequent loss of character. Gladstone is incapable of deceiving others, but he is very capable of deceiving himself when his wishes are strong in one direction. He asks for delay in the hope of agreement, but when once his remissions of taxation are irretrievably passed, he will find his objections to Force and Fortification alike insurmountable. He always reasons as his wishes go, and we shall have lost the means of carrying our measures into effect.

"I confess I am in great difficulties as to Monday. Will you therefore send me an answer by messenger as to whether I may do what I propose about the Estimates, which I have only one day left to prepare?"

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON TO MR. HERBERT.

"BROCKETT, *April 14th.*

"MY DEAR SIDNEY HERBERT,

"I have received your letter of yesterday, and one from Gladstone, of which he says he has sent you a copy. His was in answer to one in which I said that we surely could find an additional £150,000. You must judge whether you can put off completing your Estimates till after Tuesday, the day on which he returns from Edinburgh, and whether we ought to change the arrangement agreed to by the Cabinet, at its last meeting, without telling them the new intended arrangement. Your answer on Monday would be easy: your Estimates will be laid on the table in the course of a few days, in good time for the discussion on them, and they will show any changes that have been made. You might, however, go on in preparing them according to your last scheme, and we would have a Cabinet on Wednesday."

SIR JAMES GRAHAM TO MR. HERBERT.

"NETHERBY, *April 14th.*

"I hasten to return the copies of the two letters. Gladstone, not unnaturally in his position, is fighting for time; in yours you can afford none beyond the day when you are to present your revised Estimate.

"I, too, was an advocate for delay, until I was made aware of the fixed purpose of you and Palmerston with respect to the military expenditure of the current year. It is now clear that your views and intentions cannot be reconciled with Gladstone's.

"You think the Estimate as originally presented insufficient; he regards it as excessive. You seek to augment it; he does not promise to find the ways and means. You intend to ask for a Loan of ten millions for fortifications; he has told you distinctly that he will not be a party to any such Loan.

"This conflict of opinion is brought to an immediate issue, not only by the presentation of the amended Estimate, but by the advanced state of the Budget measures. In time of peace you cannot contemplate a Loan without the provision of a large sinking fund to secure the rapid extinction of a new debt so unusual in its character. The balance of the Budget, as it stands, is quite unequal to meet this new charge. The sacrifice of revenue under the French treaty is accomplished; but there remains the paper duty, yielding £1,400,000 a year. Is it possible for the Cabinet, in fairness, to press forward this large reduction of income, when at the same time they are resolved to propose an increase of expenditure, which they do not avow, and for which no provision has been made?

"You must remember also, that there is a debt of one million of Exchequer Bonds falling due within the year; and these also are left uncovered by the Budget.

"The question then really comes to this: Shall there be a Loan for fortifications and no repeal of the Paper Duty; or, a repeal of the Paper Duty and no Fortification Loan? I cannot bring myself to think that it would be right to advance the Paper Duty Bill another stage, at the same time leaving the House in ignorance of the resolution of the Cabinet regarding an addition to the military outlay. Jealousy in the House of Commons is a virtue, where the number and charge of the Army in time of peace is the matter at issue.

"I conclude, therefore, that before you present the amended Estimate, and before further progress is made in the Paper Duty Bill, you will come to a final settle-

ment among yourselves in the Cabinet, and agree either to compromise or to break. I must add that, in my opinion, evasions and delay are pregnant with public evils, and with great risk to the character of all parties concerned. I shall probably remain here for a week longer. I can do no more. In return for your generous confidence, I have stated my opinion frankly; it may be erroneous, but it is dictated by friendly anxiety in a case which touches so nearly both you and Gladstone."

When Monday the 18th arrived, the Naval Estimates were taken up, and the final decision on the Army Estimate a trifle longer delayed.

A Cabinet was to have been held on April 18th, but Mr. Gladstone insisted vehemently on further postponement, and on the 20th circulated an elaborate Memorandum, the first sentence of which betrayed the object with which, consciously or unconsciously, he had been fighting for delay :

"The financial measures of the Budget have now either become law, or been adopted in principle by the House of Commons, after full debate."

He therefore entreated the attention of the Cabinet to the prospects of the country with respect to its future finance. The sources of revenue, as well as the revenue itself, he states to be on the whole satisfactory.

"Our indirect taxation in general has been brought, by a long course of operations, nearly to a state in which its inconveniences will be at a minimum, and its productiveness at a maximum."

But he "observes with some apprehension that the sources of revenue are well nigh exhausted." "By a high income tax, such as now exists, in time of peace, we greatly narrow and weaken our reserve of taxing power for time of war. If we were also to resort to a Loan, we should not have then a single form of

financial resources left entire for a period of national struggle."

He then turns to the subject of expenditure :

"It has been shown, in a simple form, that the expenditure of the country, central and local, is increasing at a rate very much greater than its wealth." "The increase has been so rapid and extraordinary as to constitute a case wholly, I believe, without parallel in our history, and such as must convict of some gross folly either the present time and system, or that system upon which we acted for a whole generation down to the outbreak of the Russian war."

In the Miscellaneous Estimates some improvement had been effected.

"We have obtained, with much effort, a small result¹ in the Education Vote. We have resisted demands for telegraphic as well as packet contracts: the Gibraltar and Malta telegraph has been postponed. We have checked the growth of the Consular Service, and substituted for the vast demand on account of harbours of refuge, a scheme under which the public would not pay, but only advance.

"But we must not assume that this represents a solid and permanent retrenchment. With great labour we have beaten back the tide for one year, but it will probably return upon us.

"For the present year we may sum up as follows. With very high taxation, and with more than £1,500,000 appropriated from extraordinary sources, we are just able to show on paper a small surplus. A bad harvest might possibly—the continuance of the China quarrel would certainly—convert that surplus into a deficiency.

"Suppose that next year the charge for China continues; that an increased payment has to be made for fortifications; that our line-of-battle ships having then been multiplied so as to equal those of, perhaps, nearly the whole world, iron-cased ships shall have come into fashion, and we shall bethink ourselves that

i.e. in the way of reduction.

in this department France is really ahead; that a new and probably more costly scheme of naval reserve is devised upon the collapse of the former one, and that the miscellaneous Estimates resume their ordinary upward movement. Unfortunately, neither any one of these suppositions, nor the combination of the whole of them, in any manner strains probability. . . .

"In what form would the finance of 1861-62 then have to be presented to Parliament? . . . In a word, if the Cabinet are of opinion that an income tax of 14*d.* or 15*d.* in the pound is a safe experiment to try upon the people for a series of years, then, undoubtedly, I do not pretend that, presuming the continuance of peace in Europe, we have any reason to be uneasy."

Such an experiment, however, he considered neither safe nor right. He proceeds to comment on "the slight grounds upon which increase of charge is now ordinarily proposed and entertained."

"In 1857 the Military Estimates were about £20,000,000. They have risen in 1860 to nearly £30,000,000."

"We are so far from having attained a summit with a clear prospect of descent before us that a new and vast demand for fortifications is impending." He admitted that the House of Commons rather favoured increase than diminution. But he predicts there will be a change, and some day the public will make the discovery "that great savings might have been effected had they been prosecuted with one half the energy that is now displayed by the advocates of every form of large expenditure."

As for maintaining a Naval force at home, and the Mediterranean, it is "from the centre local demands for force may commonly best be met."

"We have doubled in men, and more than doubled in charge our system of ubiquitous Naval armament."

"In 1821 we had on foreign stations 9,791 men.

" 1829	"	"	"	8,606	"
" 1849	"	"	"	12,817	"
" 1859	"	"	"	17,090	"

"The meaning of the system seems to be that wherever there are British subjects and British trade, there shall be British force to protect them."

"This cannot be done, and leaves our shores exposed, if (as some imagine) they are endangered."

"The true principle" is "that there should be ships where there is service." "For instance, where there is piracy there may be service; where there is slave trade there may be service; where there is fear of actual violence there may be service. But . . . there was no service in June last in the Peiho. To send a minister with a fleet behind him was a positive mischief."

Then as to the building of ships.

France has afloat line-of-battle ships	...	...	33
" building	...	...	6
			—
			39
Russia has afloat line-of-battle ships	...	...	10
" building	...	...	6
			—
			16
United	...	...	55
England has afloat	...	...	40
" building	...	...	16
" convertible	...	...	13
			—
			60

"Is it not then the fact that we have done all, and much more than all, that is necessary in the matter of building line-of-battle ships? Yet it appears timbers are being prepared for three new ones."

He next remarks that in British North America,

the West Indies, the Cape, and Australia, the people of this country are put to a charge of £2,000,000. "For military and imperial purposes these colonial garrisons are, on the whole, rather worse than useless." It is discreditable to Colonies calling themselves free to have their defence provided for wholly or mainly at the charge of England.

He ends by calling for a reconsideration of our policy and measures, and declares that if "efforts of the kind" he indicates, "and the difficulties they entail, cannot be faced, then it is my deliberate belief that this country will have to travel, and is even now beginning to travel, into both general and military weakness, through the surest road of financial confusion."

Mr. Herbert's resignation had been tendered and refused. Mr. Gladstone's Memorandum had been considered by his colleagues, and on April 24th they deliberately adopted Mr. Herbert's recommendations, both as to the augmentation of the Army and the suspension of the disembodiment of the Militia. Mr. Gladstone's resignation was now in turn looked for. It was not, however, tendered, and the conclusion of the struggle, with its somewhat comic sequel, is told in a letter from Sidney Herbert to Sir James Graham. Mr. Gladstone acquiesced in the increase of the Estimates by £130,000, and the dispute was thus for the time settled. At this juncture it was discovered that there was £150,000 available in the Treasury, of which no account had been taken, and which rendered any additional Vote unnecessary. Had this discovery been made sooner, much trouble and much disagreeable antagonism would have been saved, and it is singular that the sum in question should have been overlooked.

MR. HERBERT TO SIR JAMES GRAHAM.

“WAR OFFICE,
“*April 28th*, 1860.

“MY DEAR GRAHAM,

“I have delayed writing to you, hoping every day to hear of your arrival in Grosvenor Place, where the open shutters and gas lamps inspired me with the hope of seeing you.

“Gladstone yielded the point of an additional £130,000 for my Estimate without much resistance. When it was all done, Anderson came from the Treasury and said they had a sum of £150,000 in the Commissariat chest since 1848, paid by the East India Government, and which would be paid into the Exchequer unless disposed of in reduction of my Estimates in the way of repayment to the East India Government for the troops coming home from India (on whom there is always a large sum to be refunded to the East India Government).

“I of course accepted, only wishing that this ‘*Deus ex machinâ*’ had interposed a fortnight before, which would have saved much correspondence and trouble. As it is, it places me comparatively on velvet, for I have got the increase without any apparent addition to charge.

“I have given notice for Monday of the reappointment of the Committee on War Office Organisation, but will wait till you come to appoint a day of meeting. If there should be any vacancy on the committee, Sir W. Russell is a candidate.

“I think I see daylight for the Reform Bill. The continuous debates, so far as Government nights are concerned, have brought us to a better prospect of a termination, and Lord John’s sensible and moderate speeches have inspired the hope of passing the Bill without much modification. He is reasonable about it, and sees the hopelessness of passing any but a very cautious and moderate measure. The discussion last night produced, on the subject of the accuracy of the returns, several important admissions. From Stanley and Paget the admission (before denied) that, as regards their constituencies, the returns after examination have proved correct. From others that no unfairness is attributed, but

that the return cannot be more than an approximate estimate of the numbers, and, lastly, that there is no way of getting nearer to the truth. A close division on the Church Rates. If the Lords are wise they will take advantage of this reflux to pass a compromise on very liberal terms; but Lords are not always wiser than other men.

"Lytton Bulwer made a brilliant speech against all reform; better than the one he made against the Bill of his own Government—which is natural.

"I hope we shall see you on Wednesday."

SIR JAMES GRAHAM TO MR. HERBERT.

"NETHERBY,

"April 29th, 1860.

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"The figures of your amended Estimate puzzled me in the absence of your explanation. I am glad that a godsend has been found in the Exchequer wherewith to stave off the immediate difficulty. The windfalls must be nearly exhausted—malt-credits, hop-credits, unappropriated balances will come to an end, and the day of reckoning between increased expenditure and inadequate taxation must arrive at last. I am willing to hope that it may not be an angry one. I conclude that the paper duty is gone. How are the interest and sinking fund of the Fortification Loan to be met?

"It is evident that the fear of dissolution predominates over every other fear in this House of Commons, and nothing will appease this apprehension but the *postponement* of the Reform Bill. I do not expect to see it come out of Committee in the present Session. In a calm the propelling power is insufficient; in a gale of wind the ship may miss stays and be stranded; but it is clear that the present is not regarded as the convenient moment for any change. The Committee which you have granted to Lord Grey will afford an ample excuse for delay, even were it less universally desired. Bulwer's speech is an admirable argument against the increase of popular power; but it comes too late. Mr. Canning urged the same objections. The Duke of Wellington thought that he could stand on them; but the tempest

came and swept them all away. The means of resistance were far stronger then than now. I am not impatient for the change; but it is inevitable, and those who live to see it will rue the day when moderate proposals were rejected or postponed.

"I hope to be in London on Wednesday evening. If you like to summon the Committee on Military Organisation for Thursday at half-past two o'clock we could then meet to choose the chairman and to consider the course of proceeding."

But though a *modus vivendi* was for the moment found, the controversy between the War Office and the Treasury was only adjourned, to be raised again, even more sharply, over the Fortification Loan.

Mr. Herbert had long been of opinion that in order to ensure the security of our dockyards it was necessary to construct works for their protection. This opinion was equally entertained by Lord Palmerston and the great majority of his colleagues, and one of Mr. Herbert's first acts as Secretary of State was the appointment of a Commission to consider in detail the nature of the works to be erected. He received the seals of office on June 18th, 1859, and on July 19th the draft of the proposed Commission was submitted to the Queen for approval. Some apprehension was at first felt by Her Majesty whether such a Commission might not rather retard than expedite the accomplishment of the end desired, and it must be admitted that past experience went far to justify the doubts expressed in the following letter, addressed by the Prince Consort to Mr. Herbert:

"OSBORNE,

"July 20th, 1859.

"MY DEAR MR. HERBERT,

"I have laid your letter of yesterday before the Queen, who wishes for some further information before coming to a decision upon it. Nothing has

impeded the vigorous undertaking and prosecution of public works in this country more than the appointment and re-appointment of Committees and Commissions of Inquiry. They are, in fact, contrivances to shift responsibility from the responsible departments of the Government on irresponsible persons—I mean irresponsible to the country for the advice they give, and irresponsible to the Crown for the carrying out of their recommendations. When the War Department was established this arose from the conviction in the mind of the public that responsibility for our military security should be fixed somewhere. Since that time a system has been introduced which has worked well as far as the *Works* are concerned. A defence Committee of the Cabinet, consisting of the Prime Minister, Secretary for War, First Lord of the Admiralty, and Commander-in-Chief, with, I believe, the Home Secretary, has discussed the political and general bearings of the schemes laid before it by the Secretary for War. He again has, together with the Commander-in-Chief, the Inspector-General of Fortifications, and Director-General of the Artillery, and (I believe) one Naval officer, gone through the details of the Works and frequently appointed committees of officers to report upon the special cases and projects of the Engineer Department. The Works when approved by them were laid before the Queen with a Memorandum of the Inspector-General of Fortifications, approved by the Secretary of State, justifying on scientific and military grounds the general features of the 'project' submitted, which received the Queen's signature; then followed the details similarly submitted and approved. When approved they were considered fixed, and the Works could begin with the certainty of not being disturbed again, and the signature to the plan fixed the responsibility. If the Works have not proceeded satisfactorily in many cases, this has merely arisen from the fluctuating condition of the yearly Estimates, and there is no doubt that nothing can be less economical and less conducive to the progress of Works than to make them dependent upon fluctuating yearly Estimates, and frequently stopping them in the midst of their construction to wait for the Estimate being passed, and this, generally in the spring and summer, just when

it is the best part of the building season, leaving frequently the Engineer officer unable to make arrangements from a want of knowledge how much he will have to spend.

"If the Committee you propose to appoint is to re-open the question of the Works sanctioned and approved, and to submit them to a discussion on first principles, in which many Engineer officers and civilians differ, or to a criticism of their details half constructed and wholly contracted for, the greatest injury would be done to the country which can, under present circumstances, be imagined. If, on the other hand, the Works already sanctioned are excepted from the reference to the Committee, and they are directed to consider merely what might further be wanted to complete our defences, good might come out of it, as giving the public confidence in the schemes of the Government. You have, however, already Major Jervois and Sir John Burgoyne's Memoranda before you, and two reports of February 22nd and April 7th, of a Committee composed of the Duke of Cambridge, Sir John Burgoyne, General Hay, Colonel Foster, R.E., Captain Sir W. Wiseman, R.N. (who carried on the experiments with Armstrong's gun), Colonel Dickson, R.A., and Colonel Smythe, R.A.—a Committee quite as strong in ability as the one you recommend. What has become of their recommendations? Are they to be set aside? and why?

"Mr. Horsman, I see, is going to move 'that the expenses of providing for the national defences should be paid by a sum specially devoted to that purpose, and independent of the annual Votes of Parliament.' I trust you will support this Resolution: it would save the country large sums of money, and tend more than anything else to gain for it that security for which it so anxiously calls out. Mr. Disraeli had promised us to do something of the kind *next year* (!). He intended to ask for a Loan for the purpose.

"Will you consider these points and let me hear again for the Queen's information?

"Ever yours truly,
"ALBERT."

To this letter Mr. Herbert replied upon the following day:

“WAR OFFICE,
“July 21st, 1859.

“Sir,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Royal Highness’s letter.

“I entirely agree with Your Royal Highness’s opinion that Commissions have often been appointed either with a view to gain time, or to shelve a question, or to throw responsibility on others. But they may also be appointed with a view to accelerate a Work and to secure the public confidence, which is necessary when a great outlay has to be incurred and the public has to provide the means.

“We have in this office, as Your Royal Highness observes, excellent and most scientific reports on the subject of our fortifications and defences, and the Government can desire little more; but these Committees are not known to the public. What I wish to show is, that the Government are not about to ask for the immediate outlay of immense sums without a thorough consideration of the plans to be carried into effect. The schemes on which it was proposed to defend Portsmouth and Plymouth have been greatly extended in radius, owing partly to the greater range of projectiles. At Portsmouth a Work which was contemplated at Porchester Castle is to be given up, and a Work in advance on Portsdown Hill substituted for it. At Woolwich, ground has never yet been broken nor any plans finally approved. The Works will be very large and very costly.

“I do not contemplate that the proposed Commission should spend their time in criticising what is done, but take existing and commenced Works as *faits accomplis*, and sanction the continuance of the plan, or suggest such changes as would make what we have already more available, if such changes are necessary. Without some such guarantee the Parliament will not be well inclined to deal with the matter on a large and comprehensive scale. My own opinion is that the works must be executed as rapidly as we can obtain the labour and material necessary to do them, and that a Loan for this especial purpose, repayable in annual instalments over the period which, at our present rate, the fortifications would take to complete, is the best way of meeting the difficulty.

But the Commission seems to me to be a necessary instrument to enable us to arrive at the second and more important object—namely, to take these works out of the category of Works to be proceeded with in a leisurely manner by the application of small sums voted year by year over a long period of time.

“But the manner of proceeding must depend upon two conditions:

“1. The total amount of money required.

“2. The amount of work which can be executed within a year, and the consequent period within which the whole can be completed.

“I shall have some difficulty to-night, in consequence of the receipt of your Royal Highness's letter, in knowing how to deal with Sir De Lacy Evans and Mr. Horsman, but I trust—an immediate answer being unavoidable—that if I appear to assume Her Majesty's consent, it will be attributed to my anxiety to further the public service, and to put the preparation of our defences, once for all, on a satisfactory footing.

“As regards the additional sums for fortification, taken in the supplementary Estimates, I thought it right to anticipate the vote of Parliament rather than lose so much of the building season and the long days, and the new works at Portland are commenced, and the increased rate of work is, I hope, begun in the other cases.”

Mr. Herbert's reasoning appears to have carried conviction, and the Commission, of which General Sir Harry Jones, R.E., was the Chairman, was issued on August 20th.

The report of the Commissioners was sent in before the end of the year. It stated that, while recognising the immense importance of the Channel Fleet and of the Channel itself as a first line of defence, they had unanimously arrived at the conclusion that in the existing condition of things, and for reasons given by them, “the nation cannot be secured against invasion if depending for its defence upon the Fleet alone.”

From the assumption that an enemy's force, small indeed, but large enough to hold the way open for the disembarkation of a larger army, might at any moment be thrown on our shores, they deduce the consequence that to ensure the safety of our dockyards and arsenals, either the regular Army must be greatly augmented, or fortifications must be constructed for their protection.

Any such augmentation of the Army as would be of effective use for this purpose was estimated by the Commissioners to involve an original cost of £8,000,000, and an annual expenditure of £4,000,000 in all subsequent years for maintenance. The same original outlay of £8,000,000 would, they pointed out, be more efficiently employed for the defence of the dockyards if spent in the construction of Works for their protection, while such Works would require a comparatively small annual outlay for their future maintenance. The erection of such defences was therefore recommended. "If," say they, "the inviolability of our shores cannot be secured by the Fleet alone, neither can our arsenals and dockyards rely on it solely for protection. To station permanently at each of them a Naval force sufficient for its defence and having no other object would be inconsistent with the duties of a Fleet, and would, in fact, be using the Navy to maintain the dockyards, instead of using the dockyards to maintain the Navy"—a sentence probably emanating from Mr. Herbert's own pen.

The remainder of the Report was devoted to recommendations in detail as to the defences required for the dockyards at Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Pembroke, the ports of Dover, Portland, and Cork, the approaches to Sheerness and Chatham, and the arsenal at Woolwich.

On December 13th, before the Report was actually signed, but after its contents had been settled and submitted to him for approval, Mr. Herbert circulated a confidential Memorandum to the Cabinet, strongly urging the necessity for defensive works of the character contemplated, giving reasons for raising the funds for their construction by a Loan, and ingeniously arguing that the cost should be regarded as, in truth, a Naval rather than a Military expenditure. From this Memorandum the following extracts are taken :

“Our Navy must be our first and greatest defence—but our Navy is not safe while we leave the dockyards, which produce that Navy and maintain it, exposed, in case of war, to constant risk of destruction. If it were not for our Navy, there is no reason that can be given why Portsmouth or Plymouth or Pembroke should require or receive greater care or defence against the danger of attack than Ramsgate or Brighton.

“You are defending the Navy, and not the land, when you defend the dockyards. Without the means of reproducing a fleet we cannot survive a defeat, nor scarcely even a victory.”

“Mr. Horsman’s motion was resisted by the Government on the ground that, before such a step as that he recommended, and of which the full importance was felt, could be taken, the Government and the country must have grounds for believing that the works were necessary, and were, if commenced, commenced on plans so well considered and matured as to give confidence that they would, when, executed, secure the great object in view. I avowed my own opinion in favour of the proceeding, and stated that I had made a proposal similar in spirit to his own to the Government ; but with the proviso that inquiry must precede the act, and that Parliament must be made cognizant of, and a party to, all the details of the plan.

"The House rejected the motion, with the spirit of which they evidently agreed, and which it is very questionable whether we could have resisted successfully, without giving a pretty plain indication of the intentions of the Government to adopt it in some shape or degree next Session.

"General Peel has repeated to me in private what he intimated in the House of Commons, that the late Government had intended to pursue this year a similar course had they remained in office, and I have received privately from another member of the late Government an earnest exhortation not to abandon it.

"I mention these things, not because they prove that the course is right or wrong, but because it may enable the Government to calculate what chance there would be of resisting Horsman's motion next Session when backed by the party opposite or by the strong feeling of the country. If the course be wrong, this would be no reason for adopting it. Believing it to be right, and urgently required, I should be quite ready to adopt it, even against strong opposition. Nothing, as Mr. Horsman observed, could be more unjustifiable than to borrow money to carry on the ordinary expenditure of the country; but this is no part of the ordinary or current expenditure of the country. We spend vast sums for men, and the men pass away, and the defence with them. The country which has successfully deterred attack by a standing army of, say, 300,000 men, is not a bit stronger afterwards than if it had been defended by 50,000, rather less so, indeed, for the withdrawal of so many men from industrial and productive pursuits must have weakened her material resources. We pay annually large sums for rifles and for guns. We are doing so at this moment to an almost unprecedented extent; but in a few years those implements will be worn out, even if not superseded by some newer and better arm. But the fortification remains to all time. Posterity will gain nothing from our men or our rifles or our shells, but everything from our fortifications, which will be useful to many generations."

"The Commissioners are about to report. They have visited all our dockyards and arsenals, including Cork and Weedon, which latter they condemn as the site

of any proposed arsenal or dépôt. They approve of the Works hitherto constructed, with one or two exceptions. They have sent me, at my request, a rough estimate of the cost of the Works which they propose. Of these proposals I have great doubt as to the adoption of one—namely, that having reference to Woolwich—which can be made safe from any attack by the river, but which cannot be defended by land, except at an expense which seems hardly commensurate with the results. Some *place d'armes*, or entrenched camp, is, however, recommended by many authorities within a certain distance south of Woolwich as likely to aid in the resistance to an advance on London or Woolwich from the south. These estimates are stated to be purposely high, lest any mistake should occur, and the Government led into a larger expenditure than they had reason to anticipate. At Spithead, however, the Commissioners think that the cost will exceed what they first put down.

“Till these Works are completed, unless we greatly increase our standing Army, which I trust we shall not do, the public, conscious of the insecurity of the great reproductive establishments on which our Navy depends for its efficiency, and apprehensive of the ambition of our neighbours, will be subject to alarms and excitements which tend to provoke the very evils and dangers which they fear. We are pledged to deal with this question this next Session, and it is important that we should decide on the mode of dealing with it as soon as possible.”

The Prime Minister and the great majority of the Cabinet shared Mr. Herbert's views as to the necessity of making further and efficient provision for the security of the dockyards, but this agreement was not unanimous, and Mr. Herbert found himself forced into sharp and painful antagonism with one who was not only an important and influential colleague, but one of the oldest and most intimate of his friends.

Mr. Gladstone's rooted aversion to all expenditure on works of fortification was unconcealed. He regarded the danger of invasion as altogether visionary; he

had a rooted and reasoned dislike of military influence and military ideas, which was unconsciously accompanied by a less rational antipathy to all military questions, and a distrust and jealousy of military men. He was, therefore, inclined to regard all military expenditure as more or less wasted, and especially to consider money spent on defensive works as so much treasure absolutely thrown away. He was, moreover, at this moment bent on making the first Budget of the new Government memorable by the repeal of the Paper Duty, and could not wholly shut his eyes to the inconsistency of, on the one hand, proposing a large increase in the public expenditure, and at the same time dispensing with an already existing tax, the pressure of which was not generally felt, and the only injurious effect of which (if it were injurious) was that it acted as a check on the unlimited multiplication of cheap periodicals and newspapers. From the first, Mr. Gladstone made it clear that he would be no willing agent in the prosecution of Sidney Herbert's plans for the construction of large Works of Defence. On receiving, in a letter from Lord Palmerston,¹ a rough outline of the measures contemplated, in which his concurrence appears to have been assumed, he wrote thus to Mr. Herbert :

"HAWARDEN,

" *December. 19th, 1859.*

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"I think you should see the enclosed letter, which appears to have been written at your instance.

"I hope you will see that in asking information as a preliminary to dealing with a question so novel and so vast in the shape it has assumed, and in hesitating to agree to an expenditure of many millions, and to a

¹ It is given at p. 268 of the last volume of Mr. Ashley's *Life of Lord Palmerston*.

proposal that the money for the purpose should be borrowed, while in ignorance of the Reports on which the plan is founded, I have in reality done no more than discharge an elementary duty of my office, and ask adherence to a rule which I have never before known to be departed from.

"You are aware that I have had no information from or communication with the 'War Committee,' of which I have known but recently, and only under its collective name.

"Directly that I receive your proposal in the form you may ultimately give to it, with the statements on which you wish it to rest, so that I may know I have the case before me, I will not lose a moment in preparing such observations and suggestions as I may think it incumbent on me to make.

"I am particularly anxious, and I state it now as time may thus be saved, that the information may be careful and precise as to the time within which it can be securely calculated that all the preliminary operations will have been accomplished. I mean such as the exercise of the powers of expropriation and obtaining possession of the land, the completion of working designs for the fortifications, with the specifications necessary for contractors, the issue of tenders and concluding contracts upon them, the collection of plant and of people, and finally the time after actual commencement and before the work will be, to use a homely phrase, in full swing, together with the probable monthly or quarterly rate of expenditure at each place, both *after* and *before* that period.

"I say this because my first duty is to consider the plan in its bearing upon the finance of the year, and to consider the provision necessary to meet the charge during the year; which will, or may, be a year of exception in some points that you probably may not yet be aware of.

"The other points on which I should anxiously look to be informed are such as I conclude the report must contain, and I understood you to say at the Cabinet that it was to be prepared with all speed.

"It seems to me that it would be highly advantageous if, in connection with this subject, you were to appoint some of your best men, such as Mr. Godley,

to make a special examination of your Fortifications and Buildings Vote. I heard you say you were at work upon it, but with all your activity and quickness I hardly suppose you can go into all the detail.

"There is no reason visible to me why the subject of the proposed fortifications should embarrass you in the preparation of your Estimates. Your civil buildings, and the sum requisite for necessary repairs, you can determine at once, and I am sure you will do all that is practicable to keep it within bounds. As to everything beyond this, without prejudice to any question depending, either about the particular works to be undertaken or the mode of obtaining the money, I apprehend it may with great propriety be presented separately to the House of Commons. We may, I suppose, assume that we shall not proceed simply as heretofore, but that some considerable step will be taken. If so, this seems a good basis for a *separate* proposal, which might, perhaps, be introduced by resolution. Pray read, if you have not read, the debates and papers of Pitt's time upon the subject.

"Yours affectionately,

"W. E. GLADSTONE."

MR. GLADSTONE TO MR. HERBERT.

"HAWARDEN,

"December 21st, 1859.

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"There is another point which I ought to have mentioned in my letter about fortifications. I am anxious to know, at any rate by rough estimate, how much of the £1,250,000 for land (if that be the amount) is to remain capable of profitable use, and how much to be (so to speak) consumed in fortifying. I take for granted we shall clearly gather from the report how the arsenals are to be defended against the long-range guns (such as those with which the Spaniards were to have cannonaded the Straits of Gibraltar). The French (when they come!) are sure to bring a good stock of them!"

Mr. Gladstone was told that the Report would be sent to him, and rejoined:

"Am I to take the Fortification Report, when received, as *your* plan and recommendation? Or when

(if it be not so) shall you be able to let me understand what *you* adopt and recommend?"

On January 26th he wrote again :

"January 26th, 1860.

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"I will send to Mr. Laing about Colonel James's paper. But we have more serious matters depending.

"Pray consider my suggestion that we should agree forthwith upon a *sum* which shall be the charge for the coming year in respect of fortifications. This you might put in your Estimates by means of a Vote, postponing all details and explanations; or, if such a plan be inconvenient, I could say in the Financial Statement how much we think ought to be borne upon the charge of the year in respect of fortifications.

"If, as I gather from your note, you intend to persevere in proposing a Loan, you would have to make provision for the interest, and would, I presume, take such a sum as would represent more than the interest on the first instalment. I, on the other hand, might take the same *sum* without prejudice to my views and intentions.

"But as I must be ready on Monday week with the results of our deliberations on a set of extensive and varied measures, which the Cabinet has not yet considered—as the Estimates are not fixed, and there may still be much to say upon their scale with reference to the present position of affairs—and as I presume it to be now impossible that the affair of the fortifications can be satisfactorily discussed and decided before the Budget, I make the suggestion I have mentioned in the hope of its removing a *present practical* difficulty without prejudice to the free discussion and deliberate settlement which may take place some weeks hence."

This scheme of voting in the Estimates of the year a sum which should be regarded by Mr. Herbert as the interest of a Loan, plus a certain amount to be employed in building operations during the year, while in Mr. Gladstone's eyes it was to represent expenditure wholly devoted to construction, naturally did not commend itself to Mr. Herbert or his col-

leagues, and was not adopted. But the keen contest which arose as to the amount of the Army Estimates had the effect of postponing, as desired by Mr. Gladstone, all discussion on the Fortification Scheme until after agreement had been arrived at with regard to the provisions of the Budget, and the Government had been irrevocably committed to the reduction of the Paper Duty. On May 26th Mr. Gladstone wrote :

"The question to which you refer has, as you know, been for six or seven months before my mind, and amidst all their varied vicissitudes it has never swerved. In truth, my belief is that this is a drunken time, and one which will hereafter be looked back upon with much surprise, and not high estimation so far as that point is concerned. I never come to conclusions before the time. On any question of mere amount I might shake and waver much ; but on the principles involved here I do not think that I shall ever change without a greater upsetting and transforming process within me than I have undergone in the whole lapse of a quarter of a century.

"I can understand how any one¹ who merely seeks to *burke* the Reform Bill should make light of the difficulty of launching your plan under present circumstances, but I do not believe this to be your case, and, unless it were, I think you must feel the difficulties of present execution to be very grave."

After the Whitsuntide recess, Mr. Gladstone circulated a Memorandum in which he deprecated the necessity or expediency of constructing Works of Defence, and intimated very plainly that he would not be a party to them.

Mr. Gladstone's position may be shortly stated thus : He was reluctant to incur any additional military expenditure, but was open to conviction as to its necessity, and prepared to make provision out of the revenue of the year for such works as were shown to him to be so. But he was firmly opposed to a

¹ *i.e.* Lord Palmerston.

Loan for the purpose, or to any enactment providing for an expenditure extending over several years. This, nevertheless, was the method which, to Mr. Herbert, and to most of his colleagues, seemed the only safe one to pursue. Its adoption was forcibly urged on Mr. Herbert in a letter from the Duke of Somerset. He wrote that, having deliberately considered every practicable alternative, he had come to the conclusion that resort to a Loan would be not only the simplest course to adopt, but that most in accordance with constitutional practice, and which would most commend itself to the House of Commons and the Nation. The Duke was an able man of eminently judicial temper. As Lord Seymour he had filled a prominent position in the House of Commons, and was a high authority on all questions connected with its working. His opinion therefore carried much weight, but no support from others could compensate Mr. Herbert for the continued opposition of Mr. Gladstone.

From the time they left Oxford, Gladstone and Sidney Herbert had been united by ties of close and intimate friendship. It is honourable to both that keen antagonism in the Cabinet left that friendship, clouded indeed, but practically unimpaired, and caused no disturbance of their relations in private life. Whether this would have been the case had Mr. Gladstone's "impetuous moods"—(his own phrase)—been met by similar impetuosity on Herbert's part may be doubted; but the latter well knew how to render quarrel impossible. Mr. Gladstone had not anticipated so unanimous a repudiation by his colleagues of his views on a financial question, and his letters assumed a tone which might almost be described as querulous.

MR. GLADSTONE TO MR. HERBERT.

"11, C. H. TERRACE,

"July 19th, 1860.

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"I have just got and read the memoranda on my paper of last Monday. To this hour, I am bound to say, I know neither the legislation nor the plans to be proposed. All that I know is that some day soon I may be asked to say Aye or No on them, with all it involves, at a quarter of an hour's notice.

"I gather from your paper, for the first time, that a selection is to be made. Can you tell me how much can be spent on the selected works during the autumn and winter—*i.e.* before the first of April next?

"You say you mean by the year, from July to July—that is, a year as yet unknown—not the natural year, nor the financial year, nor the year of twelve months from your announcement. You may fix that date, but it must be for some purpose.

"You say that it is not intended to commit the Government to the scheme of the Commission. Allow me to say this would be the only possible meaning of mentioning nine millions in the Bill. Parliament never gives powers to borrow money except on occasion shown. If a nine millions' scheme is not approved, it would be alike unusual and even unconstitutional to deal with the raising of the money at all. But it is really a significant mode of expressing the adoption of the scheme in principle as a whole, and though I think this in this point of view exceptionable, from any other it would be unintelligible.

"Let me remind you of another point—the *absolute necessity* of making known, before the scheme as a whole is adopted, or rather proposed for adoption, the opinion of the military authorities respecting the necessity of an addition to the regular Army.

"The regular course would have been for me to wait until you made known to me the form of your proposal with the cost, but the year is so far spent that I have gone out of my way to save delay.

"Ever yours,

"W. E. GLADSTONE."

Mr. Herbert wrote a few lines to deprecate any immediate decision. To these Mr. Gladstone replied :

" 11, DOWNING STREET, WHITEHALL,

" July 20th, 1860.

" MY DEAR HERBERT,

" It is my strong sense of the innumerable reasons against carrying matters to extremes that has led me to think it my duty not to decline being a party, even to such works as you describe, or to providing the means of meeting them, provided both be limited to the financial year.

" But to a Bill which at this time pledges Parliament to the scheme as a whole, and provides (though contingently upon annual votes) for executing it by Loans, it is *impossible* for me to be a party.

" It is better to be brief, and I do not dwell upon your kind words—they are not therefore unfelt."

But notwithstanding this apparently decisive rupture, there were reasons which might well make Mr. Gladstone reluctant to carry his threat into execution. He discovered to his surprise that those of his colleagues on whose support he had counted were not prepared to join him in quitting the Cabinet, and that if he left office he would find himself in a position of almost absolute isolation. The supporters of the Government and the Conservative Opposition were agreed in their determination to improve the existing means of national defence, and it was clear that the public opinion of the country was strongly on the same side. Mr. Bright and the extreme Radicals no doubt shared Mr. Gladstone's abhorrence of military expenditure, but he shrank at that time from any closer connection with men whose principles and modes of action he still regarded with suspicion and distrust. Nor was he prepared for the comparative equanimity with which the prospect of his secession appeared to be regarded by his colleagues. When, on May 24th, Lord Palmerston wrote to the Queen that Mr. Gladstone had, through the Duke of Newcastle, intimated his intention of retiring if

the Fortification Scheme were persevered in, he added that "however great the loss to the Government, it would be better to lose Mr. Gladstone than to run the risk of losing Portsmouth or Plymouth." In these almost contemptuous words he spoke the language of nearly the whole Cabinet.

Still, the loss of Mr. Gladstone would have been so serious a blow to the Government that it was felt worth while to make some concession to retain him. In the Bill as originally drawn, though the only enactment was the authorisation of a Loan of two millions, they were spoken of as voted on account as part of the expenditure on a scheme of defence costing £9,000,000 "to be raised by Loan." The Duke of Argyll strongly urged Mr. Herbert to consent to the omission of these words, which, as he pointed out, in no wise pledged the House of Commons to that expenditure, and were therefore useless.

THE DUKE OF ARGYLL TO MR. HERBERT.

"POST OFFICE, *July 20th*, 1861.

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"I really think that the Bill, as now drawn, is *nonsense*. Read the Preamble from the words 'cheerfully granted.' What is it that you cheerfully grant? It is the 'supply hereinafter mentioned,' and it is a supply 'to defray the expenses incurred in the year.'

"But the only supply 'hereinafter mentioned' is the *whole nine millions*, and the words 'such *further* supplies as we may from time to time grant' must refer to some supply *further than the nine millions!* What else can the word 'further' apply to? Further than what? Clearly further than the 'supply hereinafter mentioned,' which supply is specifically defined to be nine millions. The truth is that the attempt to reconcile the 'granting' of the whole nine millions, with a profession of granting only so much of it as is required in the year, is an attempt which makes a mess of the whole thing.

"You may amend the Preamble in either of two ways: you may either say, 'We have granted the supply hereinafter mentioned to defray the expenses of the year, *together with* such further expenses as may be incurred during the three years following,' and then mention your nine millions; or else you must say, 'We have granted, to defray the expenses of the year, a supply not exceeding (say) three millions.' Then the Bill is confined to the operation of the year, and is consistent with the first part of the Preamble.

"The Parliamentary course is to grant supplies for the year. The words in the Preamble referring to the year's outlay are intended to *sound like* an adherence to this constitutional rule. The succeeding words are wholly inconsistent with those preceding, and are intended as a sort of pledge that supplies beyond this year will be voted this year. I cannot see the use of this. Parliament is just as likely to withhold the necessary vote in another year, as to withhold the requisite Continuance Act.

"The Preamble also seems to me to pledge the House to raise *the whole sum by loan*—even if other modes of provision be possible. 'We have resolved that . . . *be* raised by annuities.'

"I think serious blame will attach to us if we persist in so anomalous a form of Bill, at the cost of schism among ourselves. Apart from this danger, it is an object of no small moment to make the whole proposal bulk as small as possible in the eyes of foreign nations. It is an act implying vehement suspicion—which may be only too well justified. But it should be done with as little noise as possible. We are choosing a mode which, with an united Cabinet, would meet strong opposition from its departure from usage, and which, with a divided Cabinet, will attract attention from all the world.

"I am, my dear Herbert,

"Yours most sincerely,

"ARGYLL."

"POST OFFICE,

"July 21st, 1860.

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"I don't wish to 'begin works this year and leave them off next,' or to proceed 'without a com-

prehensive plan.' But surely it is a delusion to suppose that you bind Parliament to the scheme as a whole, or prevent them from stopping the Works, so long as they have power to withhold the Vote.

"In the Minister's speech, and even in the Preamble, it is easy to set forth that the first year's vote is 'to account' of a certain specified scheme. But there is no need, or use, that I can see, in putting it in the Bill. And there is the objection (besides the great object of avoiding a split), that it proposes to bind future Parliaments, not merely to the Works, but to the special mode of raising the funds. It is quite possible that the Chinese War may be over next year, and there may be a flourishing Revenue, and though this may be improbable, it surely need not be concluded against in the very terms of the Bill. Some such words as 'unless otherwise provided for by Parliament' might obviate this objection.

"I think you over-estimate very much the practical value of the Bill appearing to commit Parliament to the whole, when it really leaves it open to them to stop. If there is any reaction in public feeling on the subject of fortifications, it will be quite as easy to stop the Vote as a Bill, which will be really nothing but a Continuance Bill.

"Gladstone, *under pressure*, is willing to submit, I think, to all you propose *this* year, and he can't object to the explanation that it is part of a scheme to be continued to a given result. I can't see the necessity of forcing him farther. His first concession will involve him in the whole. I approve of your plan, which is really and substantially *sea defences*, and I see no risk whatever of the works being interrupted, except such risk as must attend *all* forms of renewable Parliamentary sanction. If we split on such a point, both parties will be blamed for unreasonable obstinacy."

This reasoning prevailed, and it was finally arranged that the words referring to the scheme as a whole, and mentioning nine millions as its cost, should be omitted, and that the two millions needed for the works to be immediately commenced should be raised, not by a Loan of that amount, as originally intended,

to be paid off in twenty years, but by an issue of annuities terminable in thirty years; Lord Palmerston characteristically consoling himself with the reflection that "the mode of proceeding which we have adopted will have one advantage, and that is, that we shall not be tied down by any Parliamentary document to nine millions!" With these concessions, Mr. Gladstone professed himself, not indeed satisfied, but content to acquiesce in the proposed measure.

Resolutions, on which the Fortification Loan Bill was founded, were accordingly proposed on July 23rd by Lord Palmerston himself, and an animated discussion followed, in which Sidney Herbert took a conspicuous part.

He assumed that the House would agree with him, that of all the places to be defended, Portsmouth was the most important, and combated the notion that its defence ought to be entrusted to a Fleet.

"You want your Fleet to be constantly moving about, and if once you are induced to defend Portsmouth by a Fleet at Spithead, you have lost the use of that Fleet. You are then endeavouring to do the work of permanent fortifications with perishable materials. Those ships are invaluable because they have the power of moving to whatever point requires immediate defence, but if you condemn them to be the fortifications by which your dockyard is to be defended, you cannot move them, and lose that which constitutes their chief value. What is the object of a dockyard, except to make a Fleet? But if the object of the Fleet is to defend the dockyard, it would be cheaper and better to have neither the one nor the other. You must defend that which makes the Fleet by something other than the Fleet which is made by it. You must be able to send your Fleet at a moment's notice to act hostilely against the enemy; but, in order to do that, you must have something left behind which shall not be moveable, which shall be permanent, and capable of defending these dockyards. . . ."

He answered the objection that the existing weakness of Portsmouth ought not to be exposed, by saying that—

“in a constitutional Government we must risk a great deal. If the House of Commons is to deal, as I hope it will deal, in a generous and patriotic spirit with this question, you must take it into your confidence. You cannot use reserve; you cannot say to this House, ‘We call upon you to spend large sums, but we will not show any justification. You must take it upon trust. We will not tell you how the money is to be expended; it is a question of confidence in the discretion of the Government.’ The House of Commons would rightfully say, ‘Lay before us the materials upon which you formed your judgment, in order to enable us to form one for ourselves.’ In this country you must deal with Parliament in that spirit, at whatever risk, and it would be an immense risk if you had a doubt about the success of the measure. But I have no doubt as to the success of the measure. I do not care about showing up the weak places, if I know that you will assist the Government to make them strong.”

He then proceeded to state what were the Works contemplated at Plymouth, Pembroke, Portland, Dover, and the Thames.

“The hon. member for Birmingham (Mr. Bright) says he knows what public works are, and he will be much surprised if we get out of these under £24,000,000 instead of £12,000,000. The Government have excluded from their proposals the cost of everything which is perishable. It would not be honest to saddle posterity, even in the limited form of terminable annuities, with a charge for that which perishes soon after it is created. Armaments are perishable. Your cannon become useless and unserviceable after a few years. Floating batteries which are proposed as one means of defence, and which are popular with many gentlemen, would cost more than solid defences, because they are like ships, which live only about thirty years. At the end of that time, having cost an

enormous amount for repairs in the meanwhile, they would have to be rebuilt. The Estimates, moreover, have been framed studiously, and on purpose, upon the largest possible scale.

"We have taken a very large sum for the purchase of land, and I intend to introduce a Bill which will give us a power that, under the Defences Act, the Secretary of State does not possess. It will enable us, where we want land as a *rayon* round a work, not to purchase the fee simple, but to buy up the building rights, paying the difference of value between agri- culture and building land. There will be a considerable advantage in that provision. It will prevent us from purchasing more land than is absolutely necessary for our purpose, and as most of the places where the contemplated works are to be erected are Parliamentary boroughs, it is neither wise nor wholesome that Government should become large landed proprietors within them. Public opinion, moreover, is subject to sudden changes. We recollect the time when there were no apprehensions of war, and when in consequence of the economical notions which prevailed, land of immense value to the national defence was sold. The Committee will understand that it would be much less lucrative to sell a right of building upon land than the land itself, and therefore we shall not be exposed to one very obvious temptation. As I have said, the Estimates are very large because our defences ought to be made as perfect as possible; but the Government, as they were bound to do, have exercised a discretion, especially on the land side, as to whether or not, looking at the probabilities of attack, the whole of the works recommended by the Commissioners are absolutely necessary.

"It has been asked, While you are doing so much for the dockyards and arsenal, why do you not do something for the defence of London? Undoubtedly that is a very popular view. But how is that defence to be accomplished? A writer of great ability, and an eminent military authority, in a popular periodical, has proposed to defend London by six forts, placed apart at distances of something like seven or eight miles. What military commander, bent upon entering London, would stop because he knows he has got two small forts, one on either side of him,

each five miles off? Such a defence would not, I imagine, shake his resolution to make a raid upon London. But it is proposed that the forts in question should be built for fabulously small sums. The land, for example, is to be got for £200 an acre. I know something about the purchase of land in the immediate suburbs of London, and I say you would be more likely to pay from £2,000 to £5,000 an acre. Moreover, the very places you would select for your forts are just the sites which, from their height and picturesque character, are the best suited for villas and expensive gardens, and which consequently bring the highest prices. The *zone* around London is far more valuable than that round any town in the world. Each fort would require to be surrounded by a clear space—in fact, you would have to make a kind of desert round London, and the land would have to be purchased at a cost so enormous as to render the completion of the scheme impossible.

“That is the objection taken to the plans of the Commissioners. I am not certain whether it is a sound one. The plans have been modified, and a less force of men will be required than that contemplated by the Commissioners. We have to consider the relative expense of men and works: when works are cheaper let us take works; when men are cheaper let us take men. It so happens that we are strongest in raw levies. Raw levies cannot be manœuvred in the field, but they may make a brilliant and successful defence behind works. The most untutored nations in the world—the Turks for instance—fight stoutly behind works, but they cannot stand in the field. So your irregulars and raw levies should be used to defend your arsenals and dockyards.

“But it is said that there is no necessity for solid and permanent fortifications. It has been stated that Sebastopol is an instance of a successful defence made by earthworks hastily erected. But those earthworks were not erected on a sudden. We were never able to force the sea defences, regular fortifications which were eminently successful, and we gave the enemy three weeks or a month to make their land defences. That is a peculiarity in the case, and I believe that if Sebastopol had been defended by permanent works on the south side, to which we went because there

were strong fortifications on the north, it would never have been attacked at all. Such a step would have been looked on as impossible."

He concluded thus :

"I have laboured at the matter with great anxiety, and I confess I should despair of this country if I thought the people would hesitate to make the sacrifice we ask. Of course, a large expense is to be incurred, and to be defrayed not in the cheapest way—by means of terminable securities. It is said that the money may be had more cheaply and easily by means of Consols. No doubt ; but is it not important to show that we are not imposing a burden on posterity, and making no effort ourselves, and that this is an exceptional and extraordinary proceeding?"

The Resolutions were carried by a very large majority, and the Bill consequently introduced encountered no serious opposition in either House of Parliament.

Mr. Gladstone, however, absented himself from the House of Commons on the night when the Resolutions were proposed, and took little if any pains to conceal his disapproval of the step to which he had reluctantly assented.

CHAPTER VII

THE CHINESE WAR

1859-61

THE war with China, which resulted from the seizure of the lorcha *Arrow*, commenced early in 1857, and received the approval of the country at the General Election of that year. But its active prosecution was temporarily suspended in consequence of the outbreak of the great Indian Mutiny, and the imperative necessity for the employment of all available forces in its suppression. Operations were, however, resumed before the end of the year. They were attended with uniform success, and a Treaty, by which several additional ports were thrown open to trade and increased facilities for European enterprise secured, was signed at Tientsin before the close of 1858. That Treaty was described by Sidney Herbert, in a speech on the Navy Estimates on February 25th, 1859, as "a Treaty of Peace with a *casus belli* in every clause." The accuracy of this description was shown sooner than he had anticipated. For on September 11th, 1859, telegraphic news reached the English Government that the English and French Ministers in China, having been refused access to the Peiho River, on their way to Pekin—a right claimed by them under the Treaty—the British naval force had endeavoured to force a passage, and had been repulsed with a

loss of three gunboats, and nearly 400 killed and wounded, the British Admiral himself being among the number of the latter. The strength of the barriers in the river had been underrated, as had also that of the forts, an attempt to storm which ended in utter failure.

On the receipt of this intelligence, Mr. Herbert wrote to Lord Palmerston as follows:

"WAR OFFICE, *September 12th*, 1859.

"MY DEAR LORD PALMERSTON,

"This is very bad news from China, and the renewal of the war has come sooner than I expected. We have at Hong Kong 789 infantry, 321 artillery, and 198 engineers; total, 1,308, all ranks. But from this the officers and non-commissioned officers must be deducted, and a large further allowance must be made in that climate for ineffectives in hospital. This is a poor force. On the other hand, we have very large stores—ammunition of all sorts, siege guns, ships' guns in great plenty, and camp equipage for 10,000 men. I am having a list made out and printed for circulation in the Cabinet.

"Whatever is sent in the way of force must be sent from India. In the present state of feeling in France it would be unwise to send a man from here.

"The sepoys are even more unhealthy at Hong Kong than the Europeans. The latter die annually at the rate of 80 per 1,000. The sepoys, by the last return, 120 per 1,000. This is attributed to the low diet of the Hindoos. A Sikh regiment of Mussulmen, which come on from the Punjab, might make part of the forces to be sent (as it must be) from India."

Meanwhile, Lord Palmerston, who had received the news simultaneously with Mr. Herbert, had written to him that:

"This is very disagreeable from China. It is useless to conjecture whether sufficient precautions were or were not taken to ascertain the state of the defences before the attempt to ascend the river was made. But the question now is, What is to be done?

I should like to know what you consider the military force in China to be, and what reinforcements from India, England, or elsewhere could easily be sent thither.

"There seems to me three things we might do. First, we might attack and occupy Peking, but that would require a pretty strong military force to accompany the ships, and we do not well know how far up the river any sea-going vessels would go, nor what force we should be likely to meet with when we got to Peking, or on our way up to it. Upon these points Elgin and those who went with him might give information, but this would be an enterprise of some magnitude, and in which we should have to take care not to fail.

"Secondly, we might take possession of Chusan, which the Chinese would greatly dislike, but then unluckily we are embarked in these affairs with the French, and we should be obliged to have them with us in Chusan, and the Emperor would be very liberal in sending plenty of his Italian campaigners thither. We should soon be in a minority there, and that might in the end be inconvenient.

"Thirdly, we might take up a position in the Yangtse Kiang at the point where the Grand Canal opens into it, and we might there, and in the Gulf of Pechelée, establish a blockade of Peking, which, after a time, would bring John Chinaman to his bearings. This would require the least amount of force, and, indeed, would chiefly be done by a small Naval force. We should require possession of an island in the middle of the river, which we should make our depôt or headquarters."

The general impression that the disaster had been rashly invited increased as its details were better known, and Lord Palmerston (September 14th) wrote :

"I suppose our officers were piqued to do something desperate in the presence of France and America, but the whole operation seems, by the account in *The Times*, to have been ill managed."

A Cabinet was held on the following Saturday, at

which the opinion that the enterprise which had ended so unfortunately should not have been undertaken seems to have prevailed, but this, of course, did not remove the necessity for taking immediate steps to reverse the effect of so serious a check from so unexpected a quarter. It was determined that an expedition on a considerable scale should be sent to China in the spring, and that Lord Elgin should be asked to resume the position of Ambassador and High Commissioner in China. Viewed in the light of subsequent events, it may be regretted that the course was not adopted which, judging from Lord Palmerston's letter of September 12th, most commended itself to him. The blockade of the Grand Canal—undertaken at once—would probably have effected its purpose as thoroughly as the more extended operations of the following year, and that without the expenditure of treasure, the loss of valuable lives, and the vandalic revenge taken for them which actually occurred.

Though on every ground a lover of peace, it can hardly have been without a certain degree of satisfaction that Sidney Herbert found himself engaged in directing a war of some magnitude at an even greater distance from home than the Crimea. He had now an opportunity of showing how misfortunes, similar to those of that campaign, might be avoided; and how well, and with what complete success, he used that opportunity the result proved. But in justice to those engaged in the Crimean war it must be observed that it is easy to be wise after the event, and that mistakes made and detected so recently were hardly likely to be repeated; that the operations, if undertaken at greater distance from home, were on a far smaller scale, while the forces employed consisted largely of Indian troops, not so given to complaint, or

so able to make their complaints heard at home, as British soldiers. Above all, the risks of campaigning during a severe winter in a hostile country were in this case carefully shunned.

This, however, does not detract from the merit of the excellent foresight displayed in securing the health and comfort of the troops engaged, and in providing for every contingency likely to affect the success of the campaign.

The character of the expedition having been resolved on, it was in the next place necessary to determine its strength. Considerations of economy made it desirable that it should be as small as possible ; and not considerations of economy alone, for the suspicions entertained as to the attitude and intentions of Louis Napoleon rendered it unsafe, in the opinion of Mr. Herbert and many others, to diminish the strength of the forces maintained at home. At the same time it was necessary that the force should not be of inferior proportions to that sent by the French Emperor, who offered to the British Government a co-operation more embarrassing than welcome. His ships had not been engaged at Taku, but the honour of France was, he declared, wounded by the refusal of admission to his Ambassador, who was on board one of the English vessels.

Lord Palmerston wrote on October 5th that he had had a—

“letter from Persigny, telling me that the Emperor is preparing for his China expedition twelve battalions of infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, eight batteries of artillery, and twenty gunboats drawing only three feet water.

“I conceive that it would be very injurious to our reputation and position in Asia if our force was inferior to that of the French ; but have we the means

of sending from India the same number and description of troops? I should think we have. Some native cavalry would probably be a good match for the Mongols, but half of what we send might be British. How could we do about artillery, which would certainly be wanted? I forget how many guns go to a battery; but eight batteries at all events must include a good number. We could send all we want more easily and cheaply from India than the French can from France; but may it not be necessary to supply the place of some part of the force sent from India by troops sent to India from hence? The French guns will, of course, all be rifled—we have none such in India; but ours will probably do well enough for the Chinese. The question is whether, if we send Armstrong guns out for this conjoint operation, the French would be able to learn anything about them which we wish or can be able to keep from their knowledge. If not, it might be well to send some Armstrongs both for land and for sea service."

Mr. Herbert replied :

" WILTON, *October 7th*, 1859.

" MY DEAR LORD PALMERSTON,

"Our Ally is inconveniently liberal in the amount of his assistance; not but that by great effort we may maintain an equality in numbers, if native troops can count against French. But it is a drain which weakens us, and if he sent 50,000 men instead of 15,000, we should have almost to denude ourselves here, if the rule be laid down that our force is in any event to equal his. We can take one regiment from the Cape, possibly two. We could send two batteries, one with Armstrong guns and one with ordinary field pieces, or if going by the Red Sea, both with Armstrong's guns. I have suggested to Wood to get two battalions of infantry from Bombay, two from Madras, and one, perhaps, from Bengal. This, with what we have at Canton, would exceed the French proposal.

"But these preparations imply a plan of campaign which I think it is scarcely our interest to promote. The feeling among the English in China is very

different from what it was in the Canton business. They have no wish to humiliate the Chinese. On the contrary, their fear is lest we upset the whole concern by still further destroying the prestige of the present dynasty, and so plunging the country into a state of anarchy which would be fatal to our trade, the prosecution of which is the object of all our proceedings. Nor do I like sending even a couple of batteries away from home in the present precarious state of European politics. We have bad weather ahead, and must keep all our resources against danger ready. But even if we get all the force we hope for from India, if it is to be on the scale now talked of, we shall greatly have exceeded our Votes and the number of men authorised by the Mutiny Act. We must consider whether we must not have an autumn session. The Opposition will attack on this Chinese question, and the extreme Radical party say they *must* go with them. They cannot help themselves.

"In the present state of public feeling it will not do to appear to be dragged on beyond our opinion and intentions by France. Had we not better have a Cabinet next week? Say on Thursday or Friday, by which day all could be got together, and a clear exposition of policy as regards China ought to be made to the French Government."

Mr. Herbert did not at all relish the large amount of French aid proffered, and was glad to find that it was as little agreeable to Lord John Russell, who wrote to him from Haddo House on October 11th that there had now been—

"some correspondence with France, as Palmerston will have informed you, about troops for China. The French propose sending 15,000 men, and they kindly suggest that if we do not send so many, we might furnish transport for them, as in the case of the Crimea. Now, I decidedly object to being again beasts of burden for the French. I think it absolutely essential that we should send, of *European troops*, an equal number with that of the French of infantry, and as many cavalry, if not more.

"I confess the size of the expedition seems to me

too large, but there is no chance, I suppose, that the French would diminish their numbers."

Mr. Herbert was not only disposed to share Sir James Graham's opinion that the expedition would act as "a decoy"; he foresaw that the expenditure involved would excite grievous opposition within the Cabinet itself, and he dreaded the results to the stability of the Chinese Empire of a march on Peking, which he did his utmost to discourage. Such a march had in the first instance been advocated by the French Government, but they had seen the dangers involved, and had in the end given an opinion against going to Peking at all. It was ultimately left to the discretion of the Commanders of the allied forces.

The selection of a Commander also presented some difficulties. The choice finally lay between Sir William Mansfield, afterwards Lord Sandhurst, and Sir Hope Grant. The Viceroy and the India Office were in favour of the former. The military authorities preferred the latter, and the appointment was conferred upon him. How amply he justified the choice the event showed, but at the time there were not wanting, even among good and competent judges, murmurs of apprehension at his selection, and regrets that he had been preferred to his more brilliant rival, who was offered, but declined, the command of a Division. Sidney Herbert at once commenced his correspondence with Sir Hope Grant as follows :

"WAR OFFICE,

"*November 26th, 1859.*

"DEAR SIR J. HOPE GRANT,

"I trust that an early mail will bring your acceptance of the appointment to the command of the expedition to China. In that case our relations will henceforth be of such an intimate character that

I feel I may, without scruple, address you as I have done in this letter."

After giving numerous details as to the composition of the expedition, he proceeds :

"The command which has been offered to you is one requiring, from the peculiar circumstances which surround it, both temper and judgment, and I do not think the Queen could have chosen an officer more likely than yourself to discharge its duties successfully.

"There are two difficulties which beset our course—one as regards our enemy, the other as regards our Ally.

"As regards the Chinese, the deplorable mishap at the mouth of the Peiho makes retaliation unavoidable, unless we could in the interim receive, which I fear is very unlikely, a disavowal of the act, and some offer of reparation. But our quarrel is not with the people, but with the Government. At the ports where we trade our peaceful relations have remained unimpaired. Our object in going to China is to trade, and they trade with us uninterruptedly, though the Central Government fires on our ships and arrests the progress of our Ambassador. It is important to maintain, if possible, this good understanding with the Chinese people at the trading ports. The pressure, therefore, whatever it be, should be as far as is possible confined to the Central Government. They can be approached by the Gulf of Pecheli and the Peiho. I trust that the reduction of the forts at the mouth of the river, and—if that, though successful as an operation, should fail to bring them to terms—an advance up the Peiho to Tientsin, would enable us to dictate a peace to the Chinese Emperor.

"Our object is to get our peace ratified without being obliged to have recourse to an advance on Peking itself. With the numbers which the Chinese Government have at their command, the advance of what after all is but a handful of men into an enormous capital is hazardous, and the operation, if successful, might possibly, in the present disorganised state of the Chinese Empire, end in upsetting the existing dynasty and throwing the whole country

into a state of anarchy, fatal to the interests of commerce, because destructive of all production. Again, the Chinese capital is so situated that it is, first, from ice, and secondly, from the N.E. monsoon, almost unattackable till the beginning of May, and the great heats of June and July are almost as powerful for its defence. Should this season be missed, as I trust it will not be, an equally short season intervenes after the diminution of the August heat and the recommencement of the cold. An expedition, therefore, requiring time may involve us in a campaign at a time of year when the temperature may tell with fearful severity on European constitutions, and it is important to get our terms and finish our business as soon as possible. Add to this that the Government are most anxious, whether from China or from India, to effect a greater concentration of our troops in England as soon as possible. An early termination of our Chinese "difficulty" is, therefore, most desirable. Our Allies probably have different views. They have no great commercial interests at stake. The good-will of the Chinese, or the stability of the Chinese Empire, is not important to them; but the prestige of a bulletin dated from Peking would give great satisfaction to the French people. Our plenipotentiary, Mr. Bruce, may therefore have difficult cards to play.

"I need scarcely impress on you the necessity of a most open, cordial, and conciliatory bearing towards the commanders of the French forces. Although the two Governments are on perfectly friendly terms, it is impossible to deny that there exists between the two nations a jealous and uneasy feeling. A perfectly frank and unreserved course of conduct is, as in all such cases, the best and safest."

It was resolved that the expedition should consist of such European regiments in India as would in the natural course of events have been sent back to England that year, and of a considerable contingent of native troops. The consequent arrangements formed the subject of correspondence between Mr. Herbert and the Viceroy, Mr. Herbert's old and intimate friend, Lord Canning.

MR. HERBERT TO VISCOUNT CANNING.

"WAR OFFICE,

"November 10th, 1859.

"MY DEAR CANNING,

"It is difficult steering with our French friends. They have not been so seriously hurt as we, but they want to date a bulletin from Peking, and have no end of glory for nothing, and to secure the latter by levying a large contribution from the Chinese. We wish for neither. We don't want to upset the dynasty nor to ruin the Government, as on their stability and prosperity depends all our trade, which, after all, though of late years we have rather forgotten it, is the sole, or at least the first, object for which we go to China at all."

"November 26th, 1859.

"It will be a very delicate and disagreeable affair. We don't want to upset the Chinese dynasty, and, therefore, we don't want to go to Peking. The French don't care about the dynasty because they do not care about trade, and they want to date a bulletin from Peking. Then, above all, we want a quick operation, because we want every available man home here as soon as he can be got. I trust you will be able to send us some battalions home soon. Nothing can be more suspicious than the enormous preparations of every kind making by France. We are going to raise our home force by 25,000 men, but we shall get them slowly, and when got they are but raw recruits. What we really want is twenty good battalions from India; we should then have some sense of security in the country, and I earnestly hope that you will make every effort, and even run risks, to send us as much as you possibly can.

"We have some doubt here whether you can find tonnage enough for the force we have asked for China. Whatever steam tonnage can be got should be used, as a quick blow is everything. But pray keep in mind our great want, which is *troops at home*."

Sidney Herbert submitted to Lord Palmerston the formal instructions he had drafted for Sir Hope Grant, and received the following reply :

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON TO MR. HERBERT.

" November 27th, 1859.

" MY DEAR SIDNEY HERBERT,

" I return you your Instructions, which seem very good, and provide for everything. I would, however, suggest a substitute for the passage I have marked A in page 13.

" I am myself entirely incredulous as to the supposed overthrow of the Imperial authority and dynasty by our occupation of Peking, and if we really thought such a result inevitable, it would be a graver question whether we ought to meditate an attack on Peking, and whether we ought not rather to have recourse to blockade of the capital and occupation of Chusan or some other place.

" I know that Elgin entertains the opinion that such might be the effect of our occupation of Peking, but it is not always true that those who have been nearest to an object have seen it best ; at all events I think it would be better to leave out of our Instruction the contemplation of the overthrow of dynasty and order by our getting to the points we are aiming at.

" Query instead of paragraph A, page 13, say :

" It is possible that the occupation of Tientsin, by so large a European force as that which the British and French Governments are about to send to China, may of itself induce the Emperor of China to yield to our demands ; but if that occupation should not produce this effect, an advance on Peking may, in the opinion of the diplomatic agents and of the military commanders, become necessary or expedient. It is impossible for Her Majesty's Government, at this distance of time and place, to give any definite instructions upon a point the decision of which must be left to the discretion of those who may have the direction of these matters at the time, and who will best be able to judge what course it will, under the circumstances of the moment, be fittest to pursue. But there are some considerations of a general

nature to which Her Majesty's Government think it right to advert.

"It may reasonably be expected that the allied forces would overcome every obstacle or resistance that might oppose their march upon Peking, and it may well be supposed that the near approach of such a force to the capital of China, or the actual occupation of that capital by such a force, would induce the Chinese Emperor to submit. In such case, the objects of the expedition having been accomplished, there would be no difficulty in making such ulterior arrangements as might be agreed upon by the diplomatic agents and by the military and naval commanders. But it is possible that the Emperor might retire from Peking and take refuge in his northern provinces rather than yield to our demands. In such case the occupation of Peking might become a serious embarrassment to the allied forces.

"Arrangements might, indeed, be made to preserve order in the town, as has been done at Canton since it has been occupied by the allied troops, and during the summer months there might be no material difficulty in securing quarters and provisions at Peking, and in keeping up communication with the coast. But the winter sets in at Peking with great severity in the month of October, and if the Emperor had quitted his capital on the approach of the allied Army, and had not yielded to our demands before the winter was setting in, the allied diplomatists and commanders would have to consider whether the troops should or could pass the winter at Peking, or whether they should, before the weather became too inclement for a march, retire to the south to some other winter quarter. The decision on that question would, of course, depend upon many considerations turning upon knowledge only to be acquired on the spot and at the time, and it must, therefore, be left to the discretion of the allied commanders."

Mr. Herbert sent this suggestion to Mr. Gladstone, saying that—

"Lord P. proposes to add a paragraph half desiring a march on Peking, but at the end suggesting dangers and difficulties which ought to involve a contrary

advice. We can't winter at Tientsin any more than at Peking, for we should be shut in there by the ice. Neither ought we to winter anywhere except in England. We ought to avoid all operations requiring time, or likely to lead us, or force us, to stay in the country. Tell me what you think."

MR. GLADSTONE TO MR. HERBERT.

"November 29th, 1859.

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"I agree with the letter and spirit of your Instructions. I have made one or two very slight notes in pencil, initialled.

"As respects Lord Palmerston's query on p. 13, I cannot doubt the evidence (to say nothing of Elgin) supplied by the Taeping rebellion as to the perilous disorganisation of the Chinese Empire. But it occurs to me that Lord P.'s Mem. well states some of the military considerations affecting, rather in an adverse sense, the question of an advance upon Peking. To occupy it, and then retreat *re infecta*—apparently no improbable contingency—would of itself be a great discredit to us, and at the same time a great blow would have been dealt to the dynasty. The Duke of Somerset's letter seems to suggest supplemental matter for comment. I should think that, as a general rule, where in an operation very distant from the centre of authority there is *such* difference among agents on the spot as to raise a difficulty, the doubt ought to rule, *cæteris paribus*, in favour of inaction, or of the course which risks the least at the moment."

To the proposed instructions the French raised some objections, which were dealt with by Herbert in the following Memorandum:

"The French object to our proposed instructions on three points:

"1. On the first, apparently, they so clearly saw the danger of an advance on Peking, that they proposed to leave no discretion to the commanders on that subject, but to insist on a reference home first, which, looking at the distance, makes the advance impossible. We have since heard, however, that the French Govern-

ment have withdrawn their objection on this head: Feeling the force of all that may be urged against an advance on Peking, I am still glad to find that the French have come round to our opinion as to the necessity of leaving to the authorities of the two countries on the spot a discretion on that point.

"2. The Military Commander should, in the opinion of the French Government, be at all times supreme over the Naval. I confess I still think our proposal the right one by which the Admirals are supreme on the sea, and the Generals on the land. The attention of the French Government should, I think, be called to the fact that the operation about to be undertaken must, at any rate, begin by being naval; and the Navy must not only carry the force thither and co-operate with them, even when landed, but must be there to support, to supply, and, lastly, to carry them away. Even the inland advance to Tientsin will probably be partly, if not principally, effected by water, and the operations of the Fleet and Army must necessarily be so interwoven that it is difficult to say where the one will cease and the other commence. Clearly, however, the men on the spot, who have passed the whole winter in examining and surveying the coast, are the most capable of directing the commencement of the operations.

"In the last Chinese hostilities we are informed that the French concurred in and acted on the system we now propose, and placed the Admiral, in case of division of opinion, over the General. We have hitherto done so in our previous expeditions, and our experience is in favour of a continuation of the same course. Captain Bourgeois in his late conferences with the Admiralty always assumed that such would now, as before, be the case.

"3. As regards the Generals and the Plenipotentiaries, we do not intend, by our instructions, to make the latter supreme over the Generals, nor to give them any authority whatever in military operations. All we propose is that the diplomatists should be judges of peace, as the naval and military commanders will be of hostilities. The whole object of these hostilities being the attainment of peace, if the Plenipotentiaries can obtain the latter, it would be absurd, and worse than absurd, to continue the former for the sake of

barren military successes, which can bring no prestige to our Armies, and which might materially impede the peace we seek.

"But we should clearly state to the French Government that while hostilities continue, and no offer of peace is made, although the Plenipotentiaries should be instructed to accompany the force, we do not contemplate the exercise of any authority by them over the Admirals or Generals, except in the case already specified; and, as the instructions do not appear to the French Government to be sufficiently explicit upon this head, we will gladly insert words to remedy the defect.

"But all this hypothetical conferring of authority of Generals over Admirals, and Admirals over Generals, and Plenipotentiaries over both under certain specified conditions, are merely rules laid down in the last resort for the settlement of possible disputes. Success must depend upon cordial co-operation and mutual deference and forbearance. All should concert together and act together, and if the occasion should arise when any party appeals to the Instructions, and stands upon his right as defined by them, we may feel pretty confident that the risk of failure will be imminent. Both Governments should, therefore, impress on their Plenipotentiaries and on their naval and military Commanders the necessity of acting in the most cordial and conciliatory spirit, and with the one desire to promote the common object which the allied nations hope to obtain."

That part of the expedition which was to proceed from India was organised with great celerity and thoroughness by Lord Canning and Lord Clyde, and a larger force detailed for it than had in the first instance been asked for, or contemplated, by the Government at Home. The increased expenditure involved was by no means regarded with complacency by the Treasury, and it appears to have been feared that every augmentation of force would or might furnish additional opportunities for friction with the French Army.

MR. HERBERT TO VISCOUNT CANNING.

"WAR OFFICE, *December 10th*, 1859.

"MY DEAR CANNING,

"Your letter has had rather a disturbing effect. You will see by Wood's letter that the French force is not to exceed 8,000 men, including five batteries of artillery. For some reason (they say on account of the impossibility of repair), they take a double set of guns for their batteries. We have done the same, lest our Armstrong guns, about to be practically tried for the first time, should fail.

"When our business is happily over, if it should ever be happily over, the French talk of a great impression to be made on Cochin-China.

"The French, I hear, are very nervous as to the terms the two Armies may be on, fearing that the feeling among Englishmen at this moment may be such as to make it difficult to keep the peace. I am not sorry that they have this fear, as it may make them careful.

"We cannot make any serious additions to the force now without an appearance of deception to the French; but as your battalions turn out much weaker than we had assumed them to be, the two additional battalions now ordered will be useful, and enable us to strengthen Hong Kong and Canton without weakening the expeditionary force. We will communicate the change to the French Government.

"As regards the Commanders. We must not, because we fear the French may try to jockey us, attempt on our side to jockey them. Between the two men proposed I take Grant to be the best soldier, but Mansfield to be a much abler and more powerful man. But his reliance on his own opinion is not, I suspect, unaccompanied by a contempt for those of others, which last peculiarity it is, I suppose, that makes him so many enemies. If he did not quarrel with the French I agree with you that he would very probably rule them. Bruce is present, and would do much diplomacy with our allies as well as our enemy, and he has no want of will if even he has not some to spare. We have had to-day a conference with the Duke of Cambridge (by *we*, meaning Wood and I), and have decided that Grant had best remain

in chief command, but Mansfield be put second in command with the rank of Lieutenant-General and the command of the infantry division. This gives two strings to one bow, and in that climate the appointment of a successor is a necessary precaution. Wood will have told you that this arrangement need not deprive Mansfield of his reversion to Bombay or to Madras—so he will be no loser by it.”

VISCOUNT CANNING TO MR. HERBERT.

“CAMP PHILLOUR,

“*January 30th, 1860.*

“MY DEAR HERBERT,

“I regret the decision about Mansfield, more than if you had negatived my proposal altogether, seeing how it has ended. You will see Mansfield’s letter giving the reasons of his request to be allowed to decline the Divisional command in China. I don’t know how this will be taken; but so far as the public grounds upon which he bases it are concerned, I agree with him. It would not be to the advantage of the public service that he should go.

“I have no doubt that Mansfield has, as you say, many enemies. No man could have discharged thoroughly the duties of a Chief of the Staff in this country, during the past two years and with two armies to deal with, without that result to himself. He is supercilious too. But his temper is not bad, or, if it be so, it is under complete control. It is, however, no longer necessary to discuss his pros and cons.

“Of the two Generals who have been appointed, Lord Clyde thinks highly of Sir J. Michel. I know nothing of him except that his work in Central India was well done. Sir R. Napier I know well. He is quite first rate in everything that he sets his hand to, and certainly the ablest military man of the local Army on this side of India. His only fault is inexperience of regimental discipline in European regiments, but this, in the position which he will hold, is not of much importance. It has not prevented his turning the Gwalior Brigade to the best advantage during the last eighteen months, and winning the good opinion of all under him and above him.

“Your reasons for not allowing a greater increase of the force for China, are conclusive, and I am glad to hear that the French are so moderate in their intentions. Of the regiments which will not now be wanted for China, two shall be sent to England immediately (the 53rd and 1st battalion, 60th), and two shall be kept under hand, ready for any call from China. One of these last will be stationed close to Calcutta for embarkation at the shortest notice. The two then kept in readiness shall go to England also, as soon as we can feel pretty sure that they will not be required in China, and probably two more. I admire you for asking for *twenty*, and I knew that Mansfield had given his opinion that *twelve* could be spared. But he and other soldiers are fond of assuming that when the chief military stations are occupied everything has been accomplished. This is a mistake, as yet. I must still keep some disposable regiments to be moved in any direction in which disturbance may arise, without taking away the garrisons of the chief stations. I do not expect disturbance. It is as certain as anything can be in this country that nothing of the kind will happen—in Bengal, at all events; but with new taxes impending, and amongst this inscrutable people, appearances must not be trusted too far, and any delay in showing a European force, if the need should arise, would be most injurious to us now. I wish too to avoid ostentatious reduction, such as the sending home of many regiments at once. I think that if in the course of the summer I can despatch six regiments to England (as I have indicated), besides providing those that you have required for China, you ought to be content. If the state of things at home really requires that risk should be run in India, the six shall be sent at short notice; but, unless you are pressed, let the reduction be gradual. I have no desire to keep a single regiment longer than necessary. They are costing us at the rate of £60,000 a year apiece, and more.

“As to China, steam transport is the only serious difficulty. The dates which you have prescribed—February 1st for arrival at Singapore, and so on—are impracticable for the cavalry and artillery, although a great part of the infantry will not be much in arrear. Whatever your naval authorities may say, all here,

without exception, are against the early passage up the China Sea. Admiral Hope (who is impatient for the arrival of the force), General v. Straubenzee, Admiral Wellesley at Bombay, the officers of the Indian Navy in Calcutta, and Captain Lacy, who came down with one of the steam transports from Hong Kong, the China merchants, the Superintendent of Marine at Madras—all urge the imprudence of sending the vessels to meet the N.E. monsoon. I told Wood that this shall not interfere with the despatch of the infantry; and I hope that the presence of our infantry in force will keep us from being at a disadvantage, even if the French expedition, or part of it, should arrive before our cavalry and artillery. But of what earthly use is it to send horses in transports plunging against a heavy head sea in half a gale of wind for 1,700 miles—that is, from Singapore to Hong Kong? The length of the whole sea voyage from India to the Peiho will be quite crippling enough to our animals under the most favourable conditions. Why should we make sure of losing many, and of landing the rest in a hopeless condition?

“Two of our steamers are quite incapable of towing a ship against the monsoon, and will have enough to do to make their own way.

“Oude is going on swimmingly. I want Granville to take a model farm there.”

The discussion as to the march on Peking had resulted in the omission of all mention of it in the official instructions. In Mr. Herbert's private letters any such enterprise had been discouraged, though not forbidden, and Sir Hope Grant, with a soldier's straightforward bluntness, begged to be informed distinctly whether he was or was not prohibited from going there.

“You stated,” he wrote from Calcutta, on February, 15th, 1860, “in a former private letter that the Government did not think it advisable that troops should advance above Tientsin, the head of the Grand Canal. I beg you will inform me if I am to consider this as a positive order of Her Majesty's Government, and that, should the French General wish to proceed

with a force to Peking, I am to withhold my troops from going there? This, of course, does not refer to any guard of honour which the Ambassadors might wish to accompany them to Peking for the ratification of the treaty, but only to a force proceeding there with hostile intentions."

This raised the question in a manner which could not be evaded, and Mr. Herbert sent on the letter to Lord Palmerston, observing (April 4th, 1866) that he had—

"marked the passage which requires an answer. In a letter to him [Sir H. Grant] I put before him all the dangers and difficulties which make an advance on Peking a very undesirable proceeding. He asks, is he to withhold his troops from going there should the French General wish to proceed there? I think he should use every effort to dissuade the French from such a course; but I do not know whether the French General is also warned against proceeding to Peking by his Government. We clearly cannot winter there, and if we advance to Peking, occupy it, and then withdraw, it will be looked upon as a defeat by the Chinese. I should like to know your opinion and that of Lord John on this matter, which is important."

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON TO MR. HERBERT.

"94, PICCADILLY,

"April 20th, 1866.

"MY DEAR SIDNEY HERBERT,

"I should be for leaving to the military commanders (who should, of course, consult with the diplomatists as to the diplomatic bearing of the question) full latitude of discretion as to advancing on Peking. I have never thought such an advance as formidable and hazardous as many consider it, and most of the reasons against it apply equally to an advance on Tientsin, or on any inland operation beyond the destruction of the forts at the mouth of the Peiho; and, in fact, would go against our expedition altogether, or, at least, against the amount of land force we and the French are sending. It is said that if we go to Peking, and the Emperor flies and does not

yield, we shall have to go away before the winter, and shall be deemed to have retreated in failure. But that would be equally the case, or rather much more so, if we took Tientsin and stopped, because if the Emperor did not yield we could not stay at Tientsin, but must go away before the winter, and then it would be said by the Chinese war party that we had not only retreated from being baffled, but that we had been afraid to encounter the Chinese army drawn up at Peking; and the damage to our prestige would be great and irretrievable. Our occupation of Peking would be a manifest triumph, and in all human probability would bring the Emperor to our terms, and perhaps even before we had got to the town. The occupation by a barbarian army of a capital into which even a barbarian diplomatist is not to be admitted, would go further to proclaim our power, and therefore to accomplish our ends, than any other military success, and I must own I have no belief whatever in the supposition that such an occupation would overthrow the Chinese Empire. Depend upon it, that occupation would bring the Emperor to reason.

"Besides, we might do many things and carry off many trophies and leave behind us many records of our having been there which would have a lasting effect. Besides, if we were only to winter where Elgin recommends, we could pay another visit to Peking the next spring, and the Emperor would by no means fancy a second visit."

Mr. Herbert accordingly informed Sir Hope Grant that, subject to consultation with the diplomatists as to the political expediency of such a move, full latitude of discretion as to advancing on Peking was left to the military commanders. He added:

"You will, however, on the spot judge far better than we can here of the prudence of the advance. I doubt now whether the French are much bent upon it. They have apparently some other designs in the way of settlement in some part of the China seas."

But while making every preparation to ensure the success of the campaign, Mr. Herbert eagerly desired

to see the return to England itself of the European force engaged in it, and the officers who had gained experience and earned distinction in the suppression of the Indian Mutiny. This is evidenced by the following extract from a letter to the Duke of Cambridge :

"I apprehend Your Royal Highness is apprehensive of disturbing the order of the reliefs, else the sending regiments back to India and others from India home will be a complicated, if not an expensive, arrangement, and I would suggest that this matter be kept open until Sir C. Wood returns, when a final arrangement can be made. There is no fear of its being too late; on the contrary, we are reckoning our chickens rather early.

"As regards Sir John Michel, Your Royal Highness is the best judge, but you know my hankering after these tried Indian officers for home employment. India ceases to be a school for our officers if we do not bring home the men who distinguish themselves, and when the Head-quarter Staff is to be renewed at home, I should look to some of these Indian officers, who, if given another spell in India, will be used up. We have more necessity, too, for men of tried ability at home at this moment than in India, where there is a calm after a great storm.

"Hope Grant would do excellently for Inspector of Cavalry, and Mansfield, I believe, would, under your eye and hand, make himself very useful to you at Head Quarters.

"I went all over the projected line of defence at Portsmouth. The three centre forts on the Alverstoke side are fine works. I wish we had had Jervois to plan the two flank ones. But looking at the smallness of our regular force, I should hope that some reduction will, or *might*, be made in size on Portsdown Hill, where Nature has already given great strength, and Hilsea forms a second line."

On the arrival of the expedition at Hong Kong, in the middle of March, Sir H. Grant found, to his great disappointment, that the French forces had not yet

arrived. General de Montauban, their Commander, had, however, done so, and with him Sir Hope Grant at once entered into communication. The bulk of the force General Montauban was to command did not arrive until two months later—a delay which involved a great waste of time. Meanwhile, Sir Hope Grant made preparations for occupying Chusan or some similar locality. The story of the campaign, as told in Sir Hope Grant's own unpublished letters to Mr. Herbert, is so interesting, that I venture to quote from them more largely than the space at my command would perhaps otherwise warrant.

SIR HOPE GRANT TO MR. HERBERT.

“GOVERNMENT HOUSE, HONG KONG,

“March 27th, 1860.

“MY DEAR MR. HERBERT,

“Everything here is going on very satisfactorily. I visited Canton last week and inspected the positions held by the troops, the barracks, etc. They seemed good and well chosen, and the Governor General, ‘Lun,’ appears willing and ready to do anything that is required of him, so much so that he has given a lease of the Kowlung promontory to the British Government as long as we please to retain it, for the small rent of £160 per annum. This, in my opinion, is indispensably necessary for the security of Hong Kong, as the nearest part of the promontory only lies three-quarters of a mile distant from the town, which it commands with the harbour. It is a decidedly healthy situation, being open to the south-west monsoon, and with much water. I strongly advised Sir Hercules to have, if possible, a lease made out with ‘Lun’s’ signature to it. ‘Lun’ at once agreed to sign the paper, and I occupied the promontory with the wings of the 31st and 44th regiments. This ground holds out great advantage to our troops, as, besides being healthy, there is ample room for drill and artillery practice, and the men are kept from many of the temptations of

Hong Kong. By this lease we prevent any other Power from locating on the ground; and, should afterwards a cession of it be effected, it would be most desirable for building barracks and store-houses, etc. The climate at present is most enjoyable. Warm clothing is worn, and a fire all day long is really an indispensable comfort. It surprises me to find such cold weather in a latitude the same as Calcutta, as a month ago there I found it very hot."

MR. HERBERT TO SIR HOPE GRANT.

"LONDON, *May 10th*, 1860.

"We have been surprised here at the large amount of native force despatched from India to China, making the whole force 18,000 or 19,000 men; our agreement with France included no more than 10,000 altogether, exclusive of the then garrison at Canton and Hong Kong. We were of opinion that in a country in which the climate will not permit military operations by Europeans for much more than three months, and that period intersected by a spell of intolerable hot weather, a small force, compact but well appointed, would have been more effective. Almost the whole operation will be on the coast or up rivers. We, therefore, spoke of a small proportion of cavalry and a reduced number of followers. In fact, I fear that you will find that you have not steamers enough to move rapidly so large a force.

"I trust you will not find difficulties as to feeding them, but we know very little of the country, nor of the possibility of drawing supplies from Japan or the neighbouring localities.

"Lord Elgin will be with you before this. He is, I think, too sanguine as to the probability of the Chinese yielding to mere demonstration. But his arrival, not having been mixed up with the Peiho affair, and having successfully negotiated before, may have a good effect on the policy of the Chinese.

"We have been advised here: first, that it is difficult to send furs or skins by the long sea route without great risk of injury; secondly, that they are very difficult to get good here where such things are little worn, and the mode of preparing them, therefore, not understood. But excellent sheepskin

clothing can be obtained at Bombay in great quantities, at low rates, and with a comparatively short voyage. But I should think the intense cold in China itself would cause the use of garments fitted to resist it, and that a supply of some description of warm clothing could be found there.

"Sir E. Lugard mentions that the military train make excellent cavalry in India when not wanted for train purposes. You will have been aware of that, and may possibly find them again useful in the former capacity.

"We shall soon be looking for the first indications of the effect of your preparations on the Chinese Government. Though the war is not popular here, every one sympathises with the men who compose and the officer who commands the expedition."

The "surprise" expressed in the above letter at the amount of force despatched from India was intimated to Lord Canning in terms which made it synonymous with displeasure.

MR. HERBERT TO EARL CANNING.

"WAR OFFICE, *May 3rd*, 1860.

"MY DEAR CANNING,

"I wrote for the last mail a letter which will only go by this one in answer to yours as to an increased force for China.

"Our intention was that the whole force, exclusive of what was in China before the affair of the *Peiho*, should consist, between natives and Europeans, of 10,000 men. We have to make war in a country very distant, in which the means of transport by sea are not abundant, and the means of feeding an army not well ascertained. The climate gives at the outside only three months suitable to active operations, those three months intersected by a period of intolerably hot weather. All, therefore, leads us to feel that a compact force that could be easily and quickly moved, that could strike its blow and be off again (for we cannot occupy in the north), was the force most available for what we wanted. But instead of 10,000 men we have something like 20,000 men in China; that is, you have sent 13,255 instead of 8,000,

exclusive of the 3,221 natives sent to relieve the three native regiments in garrison at Canton and Hong Kong. These, with the 1,235 Europeans already there, make up 4,456, and 1,578 since sent, being a total of 19,289. I say nothing of camp followers, baggage animals, etc., etc.

"But as our operations will in all probability be confined to the destruction of the forts at Taku, and an advance or seizure of Tientsin, where there is a water communication the whole way, our China advisers here think we shall be greatly embarrassed with this immense number of people and animals to transport.

"Lastly, the cost is, of course, double that for which any provision has been made, and altogether we are greatly scared at the magnitude of the dimensions which the expedition has assumed. Large armies are expected to do large things, and in this case there are no large things to be done unless great risks are run for the attainment of objects which are far from advantageous in themselves, such as the capture of Peking, which I trust they will not attempt. I enter into these details that you may see what are the reasons which make us here very averse to any increase of force, which seems to us to be already too large for the purpose for which it is meant."

EARL CANNING TO MR. HERBERT.

"CALCUTTA, *June 10th*, 1860.

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"The last mail brought your letters of April 25th and of May 3rd, chiefly about China. I think the last is a little hard upon me.

"A despatch which I wrote to Wood from Simla, on April 16th, and its inclosures, will have shown you how the numbers of the China force really stand. I send you in another cover copies of these papers for convenient reference. If I have construed my instructions too liberally (and I acknowledge that I have felt greatly tempted to overstep them) I am of course open to censure in proportion to the excess committed, but I have not exceeded them to the extent you describe. In any case, however, I demur to your using on your side arguments which belong to mine.

"The great distance of the scene of action, and the short and broken spell of weather suitable for active operations, are, I contend, reasons for making the force a large one from the first—not for skimping it. The means of transport by sea in China, are, as you say, not abundant—and what is the consequence? Admiral Hope is at this moment reaping the benefit of using for transport to the northward, and of thereby conveying the troops thither almost *en masse*, those vessels which carried out some of the surplus troops (as you consider them), which will be retained at or near to Hong Kong. I do not mean that this particular advantage was before my mind when the force was despatched, but it shows the usefulness of making a force which is to operate at an immense distance from extra resources as large as circumstances will allow, and as self-sufficient as possible.

"You say that you wanted a compact force that should be able to strike its blow and be off again. Are you really going to buccaneer in this fashion? I cannot believe it.

"Again, you say large armies are expected to do large things, and there are no large things to be done—unless great risks are run for objects which are not advantageous, such as the capture of Peking. I trust, with you, that the capture of Peking will not be attempted; but let me add that a large army is likely to prove, even for our small purposes, better and cheaper than one calculated at a minimum. If we hope to succeed by intimidation—and I see you are clinging to this hope at home—the larger the force the better our chance. And if intimidation fails, and we attempt coercion by moderate measures, or, failing those again, are content with small retribution, a large force makes this all the easier. With a large force there may be some hope that even the Chinese will understand forbearance to be mercy; and, at all events, we can forbear with dignity; but if we have barely force enough to do the little at which we wish to stop, forbearance is sure to be attributed, by our enemy at least, to exhaustion and impotency. As to cheapness, it is certain that a force which could make success pretty sure in one campaign would cost less than the very smallest force which, hostilities

lasting, we could prudently maintain there to the close of a second series of operations.

"There are those who, as usual, denounce this China war as wicked. I do not; but I am sure that if anything can make it so, it is to undertake it with a scanty force in a lingering, dallying way. From the beginning I have longed to see it entered into in such a manner as to bring it to the speediest possible close. The bargain with the French interfered with this; but still I think we ought to take all the liberty we can under that bargain, to have on or near to the scene of operations an abundant force—for instance, by making our garrisons at Canton and Hong Kong stronger than strictly necessary. And this is all I have done. At least, the stoppage of one Sikh regiment at Singapore reduced my excesses to this, as the papers sent on April 16th show. I want to see a close of this war for India's sake, as well as for humanity and general policy's sake. The sending away of the regiments is a relief to our finances at the moment; but, if we are to be liable to further calls, reductions must be suspended. Opium may take a bad turn any day, indeed, it is beginning to do so; and the knowledge that our Indian armies are engaged in distant hostilities keeps the native mind, where there is a disposition to settlement, from settling down, and is a constant theme in native newspapers. Rest is what we want in India, and we shall not have it so long as your China war goes simmering on.

"After adding up the force, as you suppose it to stand, you say, 'I say nothing of camp followers, baggage animals, etc.,' and then, that we shall be greatly embarrassed with the immense number of people and animals to transport.

"Pray remember that the camp followers from India have been increased by about one-half at the special demand of your officers in China, and that the strong coolie corps has been entirely created in China. Of baggage animals India has sent less than were called for by General Straubenzee and the Admiral, by some hundreds, and this on account of exorbitant freight.

"Bear in mind, too, when you speak of our operations being confined to the destruction of the Taku

forts, and the seizure of Tientsin, and of there being water communication the whole way, that it is by your own orders that a cavalry force has been sent. I had contemplated no more than, at most, 100 irregulars to act as orderlies in case of need. Now we have a fighting force of cavalry; and, unless they are meant to be horse marines, I suppose they must be prepared to land and to move on shore, and if they move the infantry must move, and neither can move without carriage. I really do not know what you expected.

"Upon the whole, I cannot help thinking, with reverence be it said, that you gentlemen in England have not looked this China affair in the face. More than once your letters and Wood's have spoken of good hopes of avoiding a contest, and of symptoms of a concession to our demands. I don't know how these good signs get to you. They certainly pass India by. I have seen no shadow of them from the beginning, except six weeks ago, when it was said (quite untruly) that the ultimatum was favourably received at Peking. I do not think that Bruce has furnished them to you. And really, except Lord Clyde, I do not know any experienced authority who has given an opinion that the Chinese Government will be easily brought to terms. From your letter, and from Gladstone's modest demand for £800,000! (though he may have reasons for beginning mildly, of which I am not aware), I judge that you expect to get a short, sharp, and decisive campaign done at a low price. It is the old story: Blood, bone, and action, speed, bottom, and fencing, all for fifty pounds; and I only hope we may not get a rattling fall for our money. That, indeed, is not much to be feared. The material of the force is too good, and the commanders are too prudent to make a disaster likely. But I do greatly fear that the end of this season will come and will find us sitting down at Tientsin, perhaps, but not much nearer to gaining our point than when we started. I have no wish to see the troops entangled on land, but I do regret that we have not the means of occupying more points on the coast, and of holding them in strength as long as necessary.

"You will have seen Sir Hope Grant's despatch

of May 12th before this reaches you, but pray read a letter ('private') from him, of the same date, which I enclose. I think it ought to persuade you that his force is not such an overgrown or over-equipped one after all.

"I shall be curious to see what Elgin does with the regiment which I have stopped at Singapore, whether he will wish to be rid of it or to take it on with him. I have a letter from him from Galle of June 4th, just starting for Hong Kong. It is not written in good spirits.

"The sending back to India the Bengal commissariat officers is no doubt right, so far as the working of that department goes, but I am a little anxious as to what may come of it in the management of the native troops. All will go smoothly at headquarters under Hope Grant's eye; but with detachments unaccompanied by any officer of Indian experience, and high in authority, I shall not be surprised if the usages of the men get little attention. Already I have heard of killed meat being given to the Mahomedans, which is an abomination to them. Hope Grant has been cautioned in this.

"Ever yours sincerely,
"CANNING."

Most people, I imagine, will consider Lord Canning to have had the best of this argument. To judge by his rejoinder, Sidney Herbert seems to have been rather of that opinion himself.

MR. HERBERT TO EARL CANNING.

"WAR OFFICE,
"July 21st, 1860.

"MY DEAR CANNING,

"I am afraid you were vexed at my letter as to the amount of China force. I don't at all deny that for the purposes of demonstration you are quite right, and Hope Grant has very wisely, I think, detained the additional force which, as the expense has been incurred, had best be made the greatest use of. You call my notion of a rapid blow and a

withdrawal 'buccaneering'; but I do not see why a short operation is more buccaneering than a long one. If we attempt to winter in the north we shall lose our Army, and, whatever may be done or not done, I hope the allied commanders will not risk a winter in the ice. Grant still writes that he has hopes, not now as at first, of a bloodless termination, but of the Chinese yielding if we take the forts at Taku.

"It is altogether a bad prospect. I confess I do not see the value of a Treaty which is sure to be broken, and every infraction of which will be the source of a new quarrel. We shall spend an enormous sum of money, and get nothing but the seeds of fresh difficulty in return. We began by taking £2,500,000—*i.e.* £850,000 vote of credit immediately, £500,000 to follow, and the rest on the ordinary Estimates. Now, instead of £500,000 we have taken £3,300,000 as an instalment.

"The fact is, that Peking is so placed that no European power can do much against it. We have lost the first half of the practicable season, and the rest is too short to do anything which shall have a very permanent effect. But I do not at all deny that your policy of a large force has its great advantages. The *gros bataillon* is the true thing in war; but I heartily wish we were out of this business. I do not think that after the misadventure in the Peiho we, or any other Government, could have done otherwise than we have done. But, if it lasts, the public here will leave us and our war in the lurch. When we were in the wrong in the lorcha affair, they were all for blood and fury. Now they are weary of the whole thing, and are as tame as sucking doves.

"Lord Clyde is come, and looks younger than when he went. It did one's heart good to hear him talk of you.

"Poor Elphinstone's death is too melancholy. Poor fellow! I did not see him, but heard that he was dreadfully altered.

"I will write about the cavalry separately."

Sir Hope Grant took advantage of the enforced delay caused by the non-arrival of the French troops,

to proceed to Shanghai, and there confer with Mr. Bruce and the French Generals and Admiral who were there assembled. He was there when the reply of the Chinese Government to the ultimatum of the Allies arrived. It contained an absolute refusal of all the demands made, and a Conference was held to decide on the course of action to be pursued. The French General objected to the plans proposed by Sir Hope Grant, and it was finally determined that the two Armies should act separately, though with a common object; the French landing to the south, and the English to the north of the Taku Forts. In all these discussions the tact, temper, and diplomatic ability of the English Commander-in-Chief were conspicuously shown.

MR. HERBERT TO SIR HOPE GRANT.

"LONDON, *June 10th*, 1860.

"DEAR SIR HOPE,

"The Chinese are certainly the strangest people on the face of the earth, and your excellent arrangement with regard to the peninsula of Kewlong certainly would prove it, had we no other evidence on the subject. The commissariat speak of readiness to provide supplies, but I fear, as you get further north, you will meet with a more patriotic but less convenient spirit on the part of the Chinese population.

"I have read with the greatest interest your account of the meeting and discussion with the French officers, and the Government entirely approves of the arrangement you have made. By it you seem to have secured what is best for both; each will act on the plan they themselves advocate. There will be complete co-operation, but each Army will act under the sole direction of its own General in the particular operation. There will be a common object separately attained, and no collision or jealousies on the road to it. Last, but not least, you seem to have the best plans and the least hazard.

"I trust you may prove right in the hopes you

entertain of a bloodless termination to all our preparations, and that the Chinese who have rejected rather contumeliously the ultimatum of a distant enemy, will yield to a visible force appearing off Taku. But I fear that their success last year, and their numbers this year, may encourage them to hold out.

"I should be very glad to have some of your battalions home in the winter, but it is too good to hope for.

"We are building hospital huts here to send out to the Cape; they will leave in August. Their plan is excellent, and you have no healthier place to which you could send your sick for recovery."

MR. HERBERT TO SIR HOPE GRANT.

"WAR OFFICE,

"July 21st, 1860.

"DEAR SIR HOPE,

"I am very glad you have retained the additional force which Lord Canning proposed to stop and send back. Once the expense has been incurred of their transport to your seas, it is well to get all the good out of them which is possible, and you have exercised a sound discretion in keeping them and turning them to the best account. Clearly, by your account of the French, we shall have to do the work, and the more we have to do it with now the better.

"I regret very much the loss of the Indian commissariat. I fear that our people will make blunders as to native caste prejudices and so on, which would be serious. It is another instance of the great inconvenience of having two separate rival and jealous services in lieu of one with a common interest and object.

"We got our China vote, not without the display of a good deal of dissatisfaction from all parties in the House of Commons. We have now taken on the ordinary Estimates about £4,200,000;—by a vote of credit at the commencement £850,000,—and £3,300,000 now. The war was, in my opinion, after the Peiho affair, inevitable, but though the country was keen for war on the miserable Iorcha affair, in which we were in the wrong, it is now weary of the expense and

unsatisfactory results, and ready for any means of escaping from the difficulty. There is no fear, however, but that the good conduct of the forces engaged will meet with all the approbation and reward they deserve."

On the conclusion of the Conferences at Shanghai Sir Hope Grant returned to Hong Kong to expedite the departure of the troops, and await the arrival of Lord Elgin and Baron Gros, who had been shipwrecked on their outward passage. After much vexatious delay he again went north, arriving at Ta-lien-Whan on June 26th, where he found that the whole of the English force, except about 120 of the King's Dragoon Guards, had already arrived. Writing to Mr. Herbert on July 4th, he said:

"We are, however, tied by the leg, and, of course—according to the instructions received from home—cannot proceed to attack the forts till the French are ready. On my way to this place I visited Chefoo, where the French have established themselves and mean to form a *dépôt*. General Jasmin, who was in command, stated that it would be impossible for them to commence active operations even by July 15th. Their infantry had all disembarked, amounting, I understand from him, to about 5,600, but that only 114 ponies had arrived for their artillery; that the artillerymen had not yet come, and that they had not yet commenced to land their guns. General Montauban was not expected to sail from Shanghai until the 2nd or 3rd instant at the soonest. These ponies appeared to me strong and serviceable, but till they have been put into harness and taught to draw they will be of little use, and at least 500 or 600 more will be required before they can horse their batteries. Their infantry is at present in good health, and at Chefoo they appear to get a fair quantity of goats, pigs, and fowls, as well as vegetables, but the supply of water is small. By digging wells they only get sufficient for drinking purposes, and are obliged to wash their clothes in sea water.

"Wei-hi-wei, which I visited on my way to Chefoo,

I found would not do for a dépôt. There was a great scarcity of fresh water, and the harbour was too small and exposed. There is a small town near the beach, containing about 2,000 inhabitants, who appeared very poor. The houses were, however, substantially and well built, and they have apparently a wise mode of keeping themselves warm in winter—viz. by lighting a fire underneath their beds, which are built of clay. In consequence of this delay I have been obliged to land the whole force at Ta-lien-Whan, at three different places in the bay—the cavalry, artillery, and ponies to the east of the entrance, where there are some very small running streams, and the two divisions, one to the north, and the other to the west, where they can get water easily by digging. The population are very civil, and apparently well disposed towards us, but are in great dread of their mandarins, who say they would chop their heads off if they were discovered selling provisions to the Europeans. Goats, pigs, fowls, and vegetables are, however, brought in, and, after confidence is established, the supply will, no doubt, increase.

“I forward you a plan of the bay of Ta-lien-Whan. It ought to feel proud of having 170 vessels in its waters composed of transports and ships belonging to Her Majesty. The bay is about twelve miles long by ten wide, and there is scarcely a rock in any part of it.

“On the 13th instant General Montauban and General Charnier came over to Ta-lien-Whan to pay a visit of ceremony to Lord Elgin, and, after it, I took them over to Adin Bay, to show them our force of cavalry and artillery. We had about 1,000 men on parade, and the turn-out they made was really beautiful. The men, both European and Sikh, were fine, handsome, stalwart fellows, well dressed, very clean, and their horses all in rare condition, and with shining coats. It really was a sight worth seeing, and I felt proud in being the commander of such a force. General Montauban said it was a sight to see in Hyde Park or Paris, but one he never expected to see so far away from home. The infantry force is also very fine, and their behaviour excellent.

"Admiral Hope is the best colleague I could possibly have had. He has a first-rate head, and his zeal and energy are untiring. His arrangements are all first-rate, but he does everything himself, which I think is an error."

SIR HOPE GRANT TO MR. HERBERT.

"PEH-TANG FORTS,

"August 4th, 1860.

"MY DEAR MR. HERBERT,

"We have effected a landing at Peh-tang, which, I am happy to say, was made out without much difficulty and without firing a shot. The fleet arrived at an anchorage about twenty miles from the forts on the 26th and 27th, and within ten miles on the 30th ultimo. The weather proved very rough till the morning of August 1st, on which day we crossed the bar and anchored about 2,000 yards from the forts, which looked sufficiently formidable. The bar had only twelve feet of water over it, and at high tide it appeared on both sides a great sea. We had, however, ascertained that the water was quite shallow, and the ground not very muddy. I landed a brigade on the south side, and the French an equal force, and we proceeded to a raised causeway which leads to the Pei-ho, on which we bivouacked for the night, about two miles from the river, securing a bridge which lay near the town. It was arranged by the two Admirals that they were to proceed up the river at night with their gunboats, and get above the forts, and at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 2nd we were to form a combined attack upon them—the Navy firing into the north and we into the south fort. I, however, ascertained that there would be no resistance, and in the morning of the 2nd we marched into the town. In the fort it was discovered that there were two large mines which were intended to explode on walking across them by means of a trigger and match. Since our occupation of the town we have been landing troops here, and no easy matter it has been; the ships lying out at least 10 miles from the town, and small vessels only being able to cross the bar at full tide.

"I regret much the change the French made in coming to this side. There is barely enough room

in the town for one force, and the robbery and plunder that has been carried on in the part of the town occupied by them is very bad, and a dreadful example to our men. The French troops—here at least—appear to me the worst I have ever seen, and I fear are not much to be depended upon. The country about is very wretched looking, and there is not a spot where you could encamp a force upon. There is not a drop of fresh water to be got in the town, and all there is is brought from a distance of some seven or eight miles, and kept in large earthenware vessels. The only road out of the town is the raised one on which we bivouacked, and two days ago I sent out a party in company with a French force to reconnoitre the road. At five miles' distance they found a strong force of the enemy, principally Tartar cavalry, in an entrenched position. We had three men struck with spent gingal balls. Everything, I expect, will be ready by Wednesday or Thursday, the 8th or 9th, when I trust we shall make a good account of the Tartars; but I must say it is a most difficult country to march a force in, and it must be done with great caution. I fear it will not be in my power to write you an account by this mail of our attack on their entrenched camp, as the mail leaves on the 7th."

MR. HERBERT TO SIR HOPE GRANT.

"WILTON,

"October 24th, 1860.

"DEAR SIR HOPE,

"Your last mail was very tantalising, and we are in a state of anxious suspense, only knowing that your attack on the Taku forts was about to be made. God grant that the next may bring us good news. Your accounts of the loose conduct of our allies is serious, for it may, and indeed must, endanger greatly our relations with the Chinese people.

"One thing has made me rather anxious—namely, the postponement of sending for warm winter clothing, I think for the purpose of ascertaining whether it can be got in China. I trust you may winter south, but if not you will have a fearful climate to contend with. At Bombay a great supply of sheepskin clothing can,

I understand, be obtained. No doubt in China the same skins and furs can be got, but can they be got by an enemy? However, I have no doubt you will have thought of all this.

"I earnestly trust that your operations may have a good and speedy result. Every one speaks in the highest terms of the admirable discipline of your Army, of its perfect efficiency, and admirable arrangement as regards supplies. You deserve success, but your difficulties are great, and will require all your skill and tact to surmount."

SIR HOPE GRANT TO MR. HERBERT.

"SINHO,

"August 18th, 1860.

"MY DEAR MR. HERBERT,

"The last letter I wrote told you of our having secured Peh-tang. I commenced landing everything, and, having divided the town with the French, we were enabled to get our men—though crowded—under cover. The horses were picqueted in the narrow lanes and streets.

"Shortly after our arrival it commenced to rain very heavily, and I don't think it is possible to conceive anything more wretched than the state of the town.¹ The narrow streets became almost impassable from mud, filth, and dead animals, which there was no

¹ Before the rain came there had been great danger from fire, as is shown by the following extract from Sir Hope Grant's private journal :

"The occupation of this town was fraught with the most fearful risks it has ever fallen to my lot to encounter, and had we not been protected by that great Being who rules above, terrible and fearful consequences would have ensued. The town was very small, not much more than 500 yards square, and in it were crowded 11,000 of our men, exclusive of the French force, amounting to above 6,700 more, and about 4,000 of our horses, mules, and ponies, all stowed away in houses and in narrow lanes. The buildings were almost all thatched, fires burning, dinners cooking, men smoking—in fact, all the accessories for the outbreak of a blaze. After the storm the weather became very hot, and the thatched roofs as dry as tinder. Had a spark fallen on one of them it is difficult to say what would have been the result; probably almost all our fine horses and ponies would have been destroyed, and many of the men would have been unable to effect their escape out of the narrow, thickly thronged lanes. At length heavy rain set in, and the danger of fire was much lessened, but the streets became almost impassable from the mud, filth, and dead animals."

place to bury, and when thrown into the river the tide was sure to return them to us and leave them on some muddy bank, where the stink they made was most offensive. The weather cleared up, and, having ascertained that a cart track went up to the right of the causeway about 800 yards from the town, I sent a cavalry reconnoitring party on the morning of the 9th to ascertain the way it took, and if it was practicable for artillery. The officer in command, Colonel Wolseley, D.A.Q.M.-General, made his way along it to the right of the enemy's entrenchments, and reported to me that it was possible to move guns along it, and after the first two miles the ground became more sound. The same afternoon it again commenced to rain very heavily, and the town and country became in a worse state than ever. It appeared to me that remaining in such a position might seriously injure the health of the men, and I accordingly determined, at any risk, as soon as it was possible, to get the troops out and attack the enemy.

"On the 11th I accordingly went to General Montauban and told him my intention of moving out the following morning, but the French General did not seem disposed to think the move wise or necessary, stating an advance to be impracticable on account of the nature of the ground. I was, however, determined to go, and told him that he might come or not, as he pleased. He said if I went he must go, but that he would only take a portion of his force.

"I reconnoitred the two miles reported to be bad myself. I found that, though muddy, guns could be got through with the help of fascines, which I directed to be laid down immediately, and at 4 o'clock on the morning of August 12th (grouse-shooting day) I started off the 2nd Division under Major-General Sir Robert Napier, the cavalry brigade, an Armstrong battery, three 6-lb. guns, and a rocket battery, along the road to the right. The guns were dragged through every difficulty, but the wagons stuck, and it was necessary to take the timber off and leave the remainder under charge of a party behind.

"This force at last got over the difficulties of the two miles of bad ground, and I left it and went with Sir John Michel's Division along the causeway. As soon as I got within about 2,000 yards of the enemy's

position I managed to deploy a regiment to the right across the swampy ground, and the French were enabled to do the same to the left, a battery of Armstrong guns being placed in the centre. We advanced to within 600 yards of the enemy's entrenchments without a shot being fired, when they opened, and which we returned with great effect. I brought up as soon as possible another battery of 9-prs. and a French battery, and we opened a fire from these eighteen guns at such close range upon the crenellated walls of the entrenchment that the enemy could not remain, and after half an hour's firing the place was evacuated. Sir Robert Napier's force on the right was attacked by a large body of Tartar cavalry, some 3,000, who in the most daring way came up close to the guns. Our cavalry were let loose upon the Tartars, and they had a hand-to-hand fight, cutting down about seventy or eighty. The enemy behaved very gallantly, and under better rulers would make excellent troops. They completely surrounded Sir Robert's division in skirmishing order, and remained about it like a flock of hornets. Our whole loss with both divisions was two men killed, three officers and eleven men wounded. It was a beautiful field day, the two divisions coming up at the same time, one on the enemy's left and the other on his front, doubling him up and taking all his camp. Major Probyn and Captain Fane, of the irregular Sikh horse, did their work admirably. General Montauban tried to follow up the enemy after we had driven them through the town (or rather village) of Sinho, but he was obliged to return after having fired some few shots at long ranges at another large entrenched camp which lay on the Peiho some three miles distant. There was only one narrow causeway which led up to this position, and on which the enemy had guns bearing. I deemed it more advisable to reconnoitre the country before attempting to attack the entrenchment. The country to the right of the road appeared in parts marshy, but round the edge of the Peiho the ground was higher and looked much firmer. I had two bridges placed across the canal at the side of the causeway, and found after a reconnaissance that it was perfectly practicable for guns.

"Having arranged with General Montauban, we

attacked the enemy's position on the 14th, and after a heavy fire of six batteries of artillery and three rocket batteries, two of the former French and one of the latter, within 500 yards, we knocked their bastions to pieces and dismounted their guns. We got up so close to them with our artillery that they could not take aim, and I am happy to say in the whole attack we had only three men wounded, and the French one man killed and about twenty-nine wounded. As the fire of the enemy began to slack I passed the 60th Rifles down the side of the river, through the reeds, at a part of the wall and ditch which the enemy had not made so strong, and they were enabled to get into the fort without much difficulty. I then sent to the French and told them what we had done, and they advanced and also got in. Sixteen excellent brass guns were taken in the fort, besides a number of iron ones. But, with exception of one gun, they were of small calibre. We are now in rear of the Peiho forts, on the banks of the river, but the nature of the ground about there is anything but favourable to an advance. They are surrounded by great salt marshes intersected with numerous large canals in every direction. We are now forming a bridge across the Peiho, and trust to find the country there more adapted for the movements of an army. We have succeeded in procuring a sufficient number of junks, but I fear it will be several days before it can be got ready for crossing.

"The Commander-General of Pecheli has sent in several letters praying Lord Elgin to put a stop to the war, and offering to take him up to Peking to settle a treaty. But Lord Elgin, of course, will not listen to this, and in his answer states that in consequence of the unsatisfactory reply to the demands of the British Minister, conveyed in his letter of March last, the Navy and Military are now engaged in taking possession of the Taku forts and opening a passage for him to Tientsin. Lord Elgin's letter has been sent to Peking, and an answer may be down to-morrow. I am most happy to inform you that our whole force is in excellent health, notwithstanding all the difficulties they have had to contend with. There is not above one per cent. sick. The horses are also looking well and in excellent condition. I am happy also to be able to give a good account of the

Armstrong guns. Their precision of fire is admirable, and when the percussion shell explodes, nothing can be more effective; but I am sorry to say the damp seems to have affected them, and many appear useless. The time fuzes have also got injured in the same way, and have not been used.

“TANGKOO,

“*August 23rd.*

“Having reconnoitred the ground very closely, on the left bank up to the northern fort, I found by bridging several canals an approach could be got to it, and as it appeared to me it was the key of the position, I determined to attack it. I accordingly went to General Montauban and stated my proposition. The French General strongly objected, and wrote me the accompanying memo., which I forward to you with my answer. I told him, however, I was perfectly ready to undertake the attacks myself, if he did not wish to come; but he found it necessary to send a force to co-operate with me.

“The night of the 20th, bridges had been made over the canals and batteries formed for heavy guns and mortars.

“I took 1,500 men of the 2nd division under Major-General Sir Robert Napier, two Armstrong batteries, and four 24-lb. howitzers; the French General sent General Collineau with 1,000 men and two batteries, and in the morning of the 21st, the troops and guns being in position, the enemy from the fort and batteries on the other side of the river opened a heavy fire which, however, annoyed us little, and they were soon answered by our guns, which fired with great precision, and mortar shell fell into their magazine and exploded it. The English and French gunboats now commenced a heavy fire upon the lower north fort, and also exploded one of their large magazines. The effect of these two going off was magnificent, and it was supposed the enemy would have evacuated the forts immediately after. I, however, never saw a stouter resistance, and when our troops—English and French—got up to the walls with their scaling ladders, they fought most desperately with pikes and lances, and struck down many a brave fellow.

Our men were, however, not to be kept back, and they got over at two parts of the wall. The poor Chinese had little hope of escape, two deep ditches ran round the walls, and between them an abattis and two broad rows of pointed bamboo stakes, which it was nearly impossible to get over. Two Tartar Generals were killed, and numbers of their men. The fort being in our possession, we had complete command of the highest one on the other side of the river, the fire of which was silenced, and as white flags were immediately hoisted upon all the other forts, we sent a flag of truce to summon them to surrender. The enemy, however, stated that they had no orders on the subject, and we proceeded to attack the lower fort on the north side. Not a shot was fired by the enemy, and we entered without any opposition. Upwards of 2,000 prisoners were taken, and numerous fine large brass guns, also several of the large guns which had been taken out of the gunboats in 1859. The white flags still continued flying on the other forts, and as the garrison were seen marching out of the large southern one, I sent a party in conjunction with the French to occupy it, and our two flags are now flying from the summit of the highest bastion. I immediately sent Mr. Parkes over—who has proved himself a most useful interpreter, and has on all occasions displayed the greatest zeal and ability—to confer with the Governor-General, who agreed to surrender unconditionally the whole of the guns, forts, camps, and munitions of war about the forts, and I trust that war is nearly, if not completely, at an end. I regret to say our loss has been comparatively heavy—17 men killed; 19 officers and about 153 men wounded. The French loss is, I believe, about 100.

“Half an hour after the attack was completed it commenced to rain very heavily, and our heavy guns could not be moved. We have been prospered in the most wonderful manner. If the rain had commenced earlier in the morning we could not have gone on with the attack, nor could we have moved a gun. I do not yet know the number of guns that have fallen to our arms, but it must be great. Admiral Hope and Admiral Charnier have proceeded up the river to-day to reconnoitre, and it is expected they will reach Tientsin.

"August 24th.

"I have heard from Admiral Hope. He had got up within a short distance of Tientsin, and the forts, etc., were all abandoned. A mandarin and deputation came out from the town and tendered their submission. Supplies, I have no doubt, will be got in abundance."

H.R.H. THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO MR. HERBERT.

"HORSE GUARDS,

"November 3rd, 1860.

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"I cannot deprive myself of the pleasure of congratulating you on the glorious news which has reached us from China by to-day's mail. The success of our operations seems to have been complete, and, which is still more valuable, the efficiency of the Armstrong guns is completely established. I do really think this latter success is even more important than the whole expedition to China, for we are no longer working in the dark, and can go on feeling that we are in the right direction in what we are doing. You will observe, however, that complaints are made of the weight of the carriages. I always felt that this would be the case, and I have drawn your attention to it frequently. I hope, therefore, that the lighter gun for horse artillery purposes will be at once sanctioned, and that a method will be adopted for lightening the present gun-carriages and waggons more particularly. Another most satisfactory part of the news is the admirable manner in which Sir Hope Grant has conducted the operation, and his firmness in *council* as regards the French General; for the whole plan was Grant's, and he carried his point in opposition to his French colleagues. This fully justifies the choice we made when we selected him for the command, and stuck by the appointment even after it was questioned by high authorities in India. I think that Sir Hope Grant should at once receive the Grand Cross of the Bath, and I hope you will take steps with Her Majesty to authorise me to make this communication to him by the *next mail*. I shall try at once to promote the Ensign who planted the 67th colour on the fort,

and also the Lieutenants who distinguished themselves specially. There is nothing like promptness in these rewards, they are doubly acceptable. I presume that the Army will move on Pekin, after all, accompanying the Ambassadors, and I hardly think we should be justified in calculating upon any of these troops for New Zealand. I shall repeat to Hope Grant, in my next letter to him, the mode in which we think he had better dispose of the troops after their services are no longer required.

"Yours most sincerely,
"GEORGE."

MR. HERBERT TO SIR HOPE GRANT.

"WAR OFFICE,
"November 10th, 1860.

"MY DEAR SIR HOPE,

"I must add to the public despatches which go out to you by this mail my own congratulations on the brilliant success which you have achieved. There is really not a drawback to it, all the departments seem to have been well up to their work, good commissariat, good medical staff, good health, and good discipline, things not to be attained without vigour and vigilance on the part of the Commander. You have every reason to be proud of the force under you, and never was a Grand Cross better won. The Queen, to whom I sent your correspondence with General de Montauban, spoke most warmly of the admirable manner in which you had behaved under trying circumstances. To your firmness in council, as well as to your just views of what was the course to be taken, must be attributed much of the success achieved. I cannot tell you with how much satisfaction I have seen this, and the Government partake of my feeling on the subject.

"I trust no 'rancour' is left in the minds of your allies; at any rate, the joint success should remove any, if it existed.

"We are looking eagerly for your next despatches, which will give us the complement of your last ones by specifying the names of those who most distinguished themselves, and bringing, I have no doubt,

the account of important events as regards the prospects of peace."

The public despatch referred to ran as follows :

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR TO SIR
HOPE GRANT.

"WAR OFFICE,
"November 10th, 1860.

"I have now received Her Majesty's gracious orders to express to you her sense of the great service you have rendered to the country, and her admiration of the gallantry and discipline which have been generally displayed by the troops under your command. Under your guidance a British force has encountered and overcome all the difficulties interposed by a dangerous climate, and by a country scarcely known, and presenting singular obstacles to the movement of troops.

"At a distance of thousands of miles from home the force under your command has attacked and vanquished enemies fighting in the neighbourhood of their own capital, in the midst of their resources, strong in numbers, entrenched in works, to the construction and strengthening of which all their energy and skill had been for some time directed, and possessed of a numerous and powerful artillery. Flushed with the success of a former attack treacherously made, they have displayed on this occasion, in defence of their forts, a courage and resolution which entitle them to our respect, though it proved unavailing against the superior gallantry and skill of the allied forces. The Queen deeply deplores the inevitable loss incidental to the achievement of this great success.

"To the relatives of those who have fallen Her Majesty offers her heartfelt sympathy, and the expression not only of her own sorrow, but that of her people for their bereavement.

"For the wounded she feels confident that everything will be done which care and skill can effect for the alleviation of their sufferings, for which she feels the deepest concern, and she trusts that they may

soon be restored to the ranks in which they have so nobly fought.

"To yourself as Commander-in-Chief, to the Generals of divisions, to the Brigadiers, and to all the officers and men engaged, Her Majesty tenders her warm and heartfelt thanks."

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SIR HOPE GRANT TO MR. HERBERT.

"TIENTSIN,
"September 8th, 1860.

"MY DEAR MR. HERBERT,

"You will see by the date of this that we are now at Tientsin. After the fall of the Taku forts the Tartar army appeared completely disorganised, and fled in utter confusion.

"The forts on the banks of the river above Taku were all abandoned, the guns dismounted and buried, and a deputation came out from Tientsin stating that they were ready to do everything we required of them. I encamped the British force about two miles outside the town on the right bank of the river, and the French on the left, and everything has gone on most peaceably and quietly. The forces are supplied with any amount of provisions, and the soldier thinks it necessary to have his grog iced every day, abundance of fine block ice being brought round and sold for a very small sum. The Chinese Commissioners have come from Peking, and have agreed to everything demanded by the Ambassadors."

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Unhappily, when peace was on the point of conclusion, an unexpected and apparently unauthorised attack was made on the British force, which led to the resumption of hostilities, and a march on Peking. The advance met with little or no opposition, but was not unattended with its own difficulties.

"The country at this time of the year," wrote Sir H. Grant, "is very bad for moving in both for cavalry and infantry, as the large fields of maize with which it

abounds, and which has just been cut down, form a covering of spikes in the ground which injures the legs of the horses, and makes it very difficult for men to walk through. The Armstrong guns have done their work admirably. I never saw anything more beautiful than the precision of their fire at long ranges, and if the fuzes had only been good, the destruction of the enemy would have been much greater. The Enfield rifles appear, however, to be a mistake. They teach men to fire at long ranges, and at close distances they do not appear so effective as the old Brown Bess. I never saw a more rich country than it is about here. The fields are full of fine crops, and grapes are in abundance."

MR. HERBERT TO SIR HOPE GRANT.

WAR OFFICE,
"November 27th, 1860.

"MY DEAR SIR HOPE,

"I have again to congratulate you on two successful engagements, and which I hope may have the effect of procuring peace. I am glad to see that your Army continues in good health, and you have got so favourable a climate; but you have not much margin in the way of time, and as the Chinese, if they knew how to play their game, could put you in an awkward fix, we here cannot but be anxious as to the future. I am glad to hear that you do not intend wintering in Peking, or near it. So long as you have open and clear communications with the sea you can do well. For the force which may remain in the south I presume you can get ample supplies of warm clothing, such as skins, furs, etc., etc. A country in which people sleep with a stove under their bed must require, and therefore produce, warm clothing.

"I have stopped all reinforcements going out to join their respective battalions, and have sent half supplies of medicines, comforts, etc.; what are not wanted will keep, and can be stored at Hong Kong.

"The red-tapists here were, I find, much shocked at your specially recommending—for the Bath. I did not see who else could if you did not, but they say

that you should have spoken to his merits, but not specified the reward.

"Your accounts of the Armstrong guns are very satisfactory. The defects mentioned in the reports of your officers, had, I think, nearly all been discovered in practice here, and have been more or less remedied. The injury to the fuzes, as you know, was owing to unpardonable neglect in storing on board ship, by which they got damp. The one defect which I think serious is the flying out of the breech-piece, because it can only be prevented by tight screwing up, and you cannot depend on that being done in great hurry and excitement. Those we now are fitting have a better carriage, a simple block trail. I won't take your judgment on the Enfield as final. At Inkermann at close quarters it saved the day, for its penetration was such that it killed not only the front man fired at, but two, three, and once four behind. But if at short distances men fire high, the better the weapon the less harm they will do. The badness of Brown Bess made the ball drop so soon that a bad aim, if too high, was corrected. But it proves, I think, that our men want more training still to make the marksman equal to his weapon."

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A few days later Sir Hope Grant's despatches arrived.

SIR HOPE GRANT TO MR. HERBERT.

"UNDER THE WALLS OF PEKIN,

"November 9th, 1860.

"MY DEAR MR. HERBERT,

"You will perceive we are now at Peking, though we have not yet got into the city. Everything having arrived, the French General and I determined to go at the force under Sang-ko-lin-sin, which had taken up a position on the north side of Peking, and on the 5th we started. I must just tell you that after the two lickings we gave the Chinese army on the 18th and 21st last month, the Prince Kung sent in letters to the two Ambassadors praying for peace, but stating nothing about the prisoners. An answer was sent back to him desiring their

immediate release, that they had gone in under a flag of truce, and that they were unlawfully detained, that no Treaty would be signed till this had taken place. An answer came back stating that the prisoners were in their possession, and would be sent back as soon as the convention was signed. Lord Elgin and Baron Gros wrote again in very severe terms, and told the Prince that they had acted with the greatest perfidy, and that it was now in the hands of the Commanders-in-Chief, who, if the prisoners were not returned, would march on Peking and take it. We accordingly started on the 5th, and, as the way was very difficult from trees and houses, it took us two days to get up to where we understood Sang-ko-lin-sin's camp lay. We arrived at the position he had occupied on the 5th, but found he and all his army had decamped and retired towards a summer palace of the Emperor, which lay some four miles to the north-west. I had made up my mind to attack the place after beating his army away, and had sent the cavalry force with two guns to drive them first, and follow them up as far as possible. The French, who at the time were in my rear, also determined to follow the same course. I, however, came upon a force of Tartar cavalry amounting to some 2,000 men, who retired upon the town, and, as I was determined to drive them away, I followed them up, cleared them out of the bulwarks, and as it was getting late, and the men had had a hard day's work, I halted within a mile of the town, where we remained. The cavalry had met with no opposition, and reached the outside of the palace, having only seen a body of cavalry which retreated at their approach. The French now came up, and took the palace with little or no opposition, and remained therein. The next day letters arrived for Lord Elgin and Baron Gros from the Prince Kung, stating that he hoped a peace would be concluded, and written in a much more subdued tone. General Montauban and I wrote, saying that if all the prisoners in the town were given up and a gate of the city, we should not attack the town. It appeared, however, that Prince Kung had left, and the Emperor and all his council, and no person was there but Hangkee, a sub-commissioner, who at once, or at least the next day, gave up the prisoners, but stated that he had no power to give up the gate, but that he

would write to Kung on the subject. I am delighted to say Mr. Parkes, Mr. Loch, and one sowar came in yesterday, and a French officer and four privates also were given up. The whole of our people on the 28th of last month had started to join our force, and had got within 500 yards of it, when a large force of cavalry and infantry closed round them—the firing began from the enemy's lines, and they were seized. Mr. Parkes accompanied by the two others were allowed to go and remonstrate with Sang-ko-lin-sin, and his party were in consequence separated from the remainder of the party, none of whom they have seen since. They state that upon first being taken they were badly treated, their hands were tied behind their backs, they were put into a cart and taken up to Peking, where they were confined in the common prison and put in irons, but after some days they were taken out and treated with attention. Hangkee states that the other prisoners will be returned to us in four or five days, and General Montauban and I have to-day written a letter to Prince Kung demanding a gate to be given up to us, and that if this is done the city shall be spared, and no troops shall be allowed to enter except the Ambassador's escort.

“A sum of money, amounting to about £20,000, has been taken by the prize agent, at the Imperial Summer Palace, which the French occupied. There were quantities of other valuable articles, which, I regret to say, have been greatly plundered by the French soldiery, and, knowing the demoralising effect this would have upon our men, I strictly forbade any of them going to the palace, and had roll calls every two hours. As, however, the men will feel very much their not being able to secure any of the *loot*, seeing our allies have got so much, I have taken upon myself—and I trust I have not done wrong—to order this money to be given amongst them: two-thirds to the men and one-third to the officers; the two General officers and myself desiring no share in the prize. If the Prince Kung will not give up the gate, we must only go at it and take the town; but I trust he will have more sense. We are well supplied with provisions at present, and here alone we have at least 1,200 sheep, and Mr. Turner, the Commissary-General,

who has arrived to-day, tells me he can keep the Army for any length of time. Admiral Hope is really worth his weight in gold, and keeps us supplied by the Peiho with everything required. The heavy guns have arrived also, and plenty of ammunition, so I trust, if called on, we shall soon make a good breach in the wall."

SIR HOPE GRANT TO MR. HERBERT.

"PEKIN,
" October 13th, 1860.

"MY DEAR MR. HERBERT,

"The Chinese have found it necessary to give us up a gate of the city, which is now occupied by ourselves and the French. The people and rich merchants in the town were praying for peace, and sent up a petition to the Emperor to try and put a stop to the war. Prince Kung was, however, frightened for his head, but said if the wealthy people of Peking would support him he would do so. They at once stated their willingness, and the gate was immediately given up. All our batteries—viz. four 8-inch guns, seven 8-inch mortars, and nine cohorns—are now in position in an excellent place for trenching behind a thick wall of the 'Temple of the Earth,' within about a hundred yards of the city walls, and I have no doubt in four or five hours we should have made a breach. The field pieces were also in position for keeping down the fire from the walls, and I have no doubt the Armstrong guns would have proved most useful. I trust, however, they will not be required.

"The magnificent Summer Palace of His Majesty has been occupied by the French, and completely gutted. Silver and gold was discovered in it, and innumerable beautiful articles of *vertu*, which all soon disappeared. We at last made a division of the spoil left, and one portion alone has been sold by auction for £1,000. I kept my men out of it, I am happy to say, as the demoralising effect on the French was terrible, and I am only too glad we have not been obliged to take Peking, as it would have been impossible, at all events, to have restrained the French, and the

loss of life might have been very severe, as there are 60,000 Tartars—soldiers—in the town, and all their wives and families were not allowed to remove, and every man would have fought for his home, or murdered his wife and family and probably himself too.

"We have also taken 800 guns from them since we first came to the country, and their prestige is quite broken.

"The population of the whole country, nearly, between this and Peh tung, have deserted their homes, and I have been obliged to destroy several villages on the line of road coming up where our Sikh messengers were fired at. Everything is, I am happy to say, going on well at Tientsin, and supplies are abundant both here and there, and the road is open all the way. It has been a most singular campaign.

"I am sorry to find you do not like my sending away the Indian commissariat. But everything has gone on so admirably under Mr. Turner that I have found no reason to regret it."

SIR HOPE GRANT TO MR. HERBERT.

"PEKIN,
"October 17th, 1860.

"MY DEAR MR. HERBERT,

"I regret to say only two of the five prisoners were returned to us alive, and they give a fearful account of the atrocities committed on themselves and the other prisoners with them. Twenty-one bodies in coffins have also been sent in by the Chinese chiefs, presumably to show the prisoners had not been murdered by their own hands, and amongst the number have been recognised the bodies of Lieutenant Anderson, Mr. de Norman, Mr. Boulton, and a man of the King's Dragoon Guards called Phipps, one of the escort. The two men who came in were Sikhs, and their statement is that they were bound hand and foot behind their backs and water poured upon the cords to tighten them. That they were kept in this fashion for three days till worms burst out of their wrists, and all died except their two selves.

"The barbarity and treacherous conduct of these Tartars has determined me, with the full concurrence of Lord Elgin, to destroy and burn—completely—

the splendid Summer Palace of Yuen-ming-Yuen, where these atrocities were first put into execution. I don't know whether I shall be justified at home for committing this, what may be called barbaric act, but in my opinion it is a just retribution.

"The walls of the park contain at least forty different palaces or buildings, and it is the principal residence of the Emperor, who is the cause of these acts of barbarity having been committed. In a proclamation also in the town it appears by his orders prices have been put upon all our heads, at least for any one under the rank of an ambassador or general officer. We were to be kept, I suppose, for some special act of brutality; but they have been prevented from carrying out their vile intention, and Sang-ko-lin-sin's Army is completely broken up. He has neither money to pay them nor commissariat to feed them, and the Mongolians have all bolted to their homes.

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"October 23rd.

"The palace of Yuen-ming-Yuen has been destroyed, and Lord Elgin's letter was sent to the Prince of Kung. On the morning of the 20th an answer came in, and everything was given in. The Prince of Kung agreed at once to pay the compensation money, and to sign the Treaty. One of the stipulations is that Kowlung, opposite Hong Kong, is to be given up, and I trust Her Majesty's Government will allow barracks for the troops to be built on it, as the situation is so much superior to Hong Kong, and I have no doubt will be healthy.

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"25th.

"The 300,000 taels have been paid up, and the Treaty and Convention have been signed. I took the 2nd division and part of the 1st into the town, and lined the streets with the men, and yesterday, in place of the 23rd, as Lord Elgin could not get anything ready by that day, we proceeded to the 'Hall of Ceremonies,' where we were met by the Prince of Kung, and some 400 or 500 other mandarins. The Prince was a young man of about twenty years of age.

He was like a puny schoolboy, brought up to be punished for some offence by his master, and kept turning his eyes about, first at Lord Elgin, and then at me, to see which had the rod. The Convention was handed to him, which he at once signed, and agreed to anything that was required of him. They all seemed excessively glad when we went away, and I have no doubt they will have a regular jollification when we march away from Peking, which I propose to do on November 1st. I forward a return showing the force I propose leaving at Tientsin. But I must reduce it still more. The health of the men has been wonderful in this country, and it is a pity we did not take possession of it when we took India. If it had been well defended, it would have been almost impossible for any foreign nation to have got into it, but the Chinese are no soldiers. The country about here is truly rich and fine. A fine range of hills lies on three sides of the town, and the country round about the city is beautifully wooded.

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"I have been now—counting this war in China—four bad seasons fighting in these warm latitudes, and to be one season under tents in India is a trying time for any man's constitution. I should be very thankful to be allowed to get home to my native land to have a good rest and setting up. I have been certainly greatly blessed with good health the whole time I have been out, but such work must try the constitution. The French sign their convention to-day, and I trust everything will go on well."

It is curious to notice how little comment was made on the destruction of the Summer Palace. Beyond mentioning the fact in the fewest possible words in his letter to Mr. Herbert, and recording in his private journal that the conflagration was "a magnificent sight," Sir Hope Grant says not a word about it. Mr. Herbert's letters are absolutely silent on the subject, and when moving the vote of thanks in Parliament he observed a similar reticence. Lord Palmerston

characteristically not only gave full approval, but expressed regret that the palace in Peking had not shared the same fate.

"I am heartily glad," he wrote to Mr. Herbert (December 20th, 1860), "that Elgin and Grant determined to burn down the Summer Palace, and that 'the blackness of ashes shall mark where it stood,' though the Emperor and his mandarins will no doubt take care that 'the wild mother' shall not 'scream over her famishing brood.' It was absolutely necessary to stamp by some such permanent record our indignation at the treachery and brutality of these Tartars, for Chinese they are not. I should have been equally well pleased if the Peking palace had shared the same fate. It is satisfactory to know that in the conjoint operation our people have throughout had their own way and have led the way. I do not like, however, Shanghai being in the possession of a French garrison stronger than ours. The French are constantly swayed by such unavowed motives, and impelled by interests so different from our own, that it is not pleasant to see the welfare of a large and thriving English community so much depending upon French good behaviour. It seems to me that if the Emperor does not send orders for his troops to come away from Shanghai, we ought, if possible, not only to send at least another battalion thither, but to make our garrison equal to theirs if it can be done."

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But though no doubt Lord Palmerston was right in thinking that as "a record of indignation" the destruction of Yuen-ming-Yuen made a deep impression on the Chinese, it is not clear that this justifies the action taken. The treachery shown at the fall of Rome was felt by Alaric to deserve the infliction of "a permanent record of indignation," but the moral effect of that lesson was soon forgotten, while the sack of Rome is remembered, lamented, and condemned, to this day. At this time, few, I think,

will deem the sack and destruction of the Summer Palace to have been absolutely necessary; and if not absolutely necessary, the destruction in a moment of the accumulated splendour of centuries, and of the finest monuments of an aged civilisation, must be a subject for regret. In all published narratives of the expedition, the subject is judiciously dealt with in the fewest possible words; but those who, like myself, remember the detailed accounts, both of what they found and of what they did, given in conversation by men who took part in the destruction, cannot but feel that while doubts may well exist as to the necessity of the step, none can exist as to its ruthless effacement of a great monument wholly irreplaceable.

LORD HERBERT TO SIR HOPE GRANT.

“WAR OFFICE,
“*January 10th, 1861.*

“The public here are, I think, very much pleased at the way in which everything has been done in China: firmness, temper, skill, and success. But they are puzzled as to the future; they doubt the stability of any treaty, and have a growing objection to wars which succeed in obtaining indemnities, but which cost far more than the indemnities recovered. I trust, however, that the severity of the lesson, the appearance of a hostile force in Peking, and the rapidity and completeness of the campaign, may produce a lasting effect. In the meantime, the whole thing has been so well done, that provided it does not recur, every one seems satisfied. A first-rate General, a capital staff, an excellent commissariat, and a good medical department, are four things which the English public are especially pleased to see, and the more so, when all are got together.

“I hope when you are at Hong Kong you will look carefully over Kowloon. There is a strong feeling

among the Hong Kong civilians that all the advantages of the acquisition must be reserved for them. I have urged on the Colonial Office that merchants go out to Hong Kong or elsewhere at their own risk and for their own good, but that the soldier is sent to protect the merchant, without any option on his part, probably against his will and certainly not for his good, and that the duty of the Government is to give him the best chance of health and comfort.

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"I am about to change my appellation under circumstances which are far from agreeable. I had a very hard session last year, and got through it apparently well enough, but I have suffered from it since so much that I am forbidden to try another in the House of Commons, and I am forced, therefore, to take refuge in the Upper House by the title of 'Lord Herbert.' It has been a great blow to me, for I was fond of the House of Commons, and had many and old friends in it beside whom I have been fighting through various fortunes, for a quarter of a century."

The successful termination of the operations in China was welcomed with a certain degree of satisfaction by the public; but, on the whole, little interest was shown either in the progress or termination of the war. The House of Commons, whilst it voted the sums asked for by the Government, displayed a manifest disinclination to sanction any great or continued expenditure on its prosecution. Though it formed the subject of various interpellations, only one real debate took place on the policy of the war, and that was marked rather by criticism than concurrence. Writing to Lord Elgin in the autumn (October 24th), Mr. Herbert said:

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"The public feeling here is not much excited by the war. The truth is they are rather tired of China wars, and still more tired of paying for them, especially

on the present scale of expenditure. Gladstone has just received from the Indian Government a demand for three millions.

"On the discussion which took place on the loan no one spoke for the war, and Tom Baring's speech against it was very well received from all parts of the House. He argued that we are spending more than the trade is worth. We want not political relations, which can't be got except by force, but tea, which can be got without fighting for it. The Tories and the Peace party think to effect a junction against the Government on this question next session, which I do not think will be successful, though Cobden has rather persuaded the French that it will. I do not, however, think we could get any more money, except to wind up if the war is at an end. All this makes me the more anxious for a speedy conclusion. There is nothing very promising in the proceedings of our allies; we have climate, distance, and an enormous cost to contend with. The public, though this war was, after the Chinese outrages at the Taku forts, both just and inevitable, are too much engrossed by European politics to be eager about China. In short, it seems to me that whatever is to be done should be done now. Nothing must, if possible, be left to next year, and what is attempted, therefore, now would only be what is feasible this year.

"You will, I am confident, be much pleased with Hope Grant. He is a fine fellow, a capital officer, and a thorough gentleman. He (Hope) will do anything that can be done.

"We ended our session with some failure, but some great successes. I am glad to count our Fortification Bill among the latter."

Lord Elgin replied :

"CANTON, *January 13th*, 1861.

"That this war with China is unpopular is not news to me. It is, however, news to me, for I had not read the debate attentively, that Tom Baring should have uttered, and the House of Commons applauded, anything so silly as the sentiment which you ascribe to him—namely, 'that we want not political relations with China, which can't be got except by force, but tea,

which can be got without fighting.' You might, perhaps, have trade with France or with any other state in Christendom without political relations, because there is some analogy between their notions of right and wrong and our own, and some security, therefore, for the treatment to which your traders would be exposed, even in the absence of formal stipulations for their protection. But how can you trade with such a country as China without political relations? The first difficulty—and even Tom Baring must admit that it is a considerable one—is this: that the Chinese Government will not, under these conditions, allow you to trade at all. But if it should so far depart from its system as to allow you to do so, under what restrictions, in the absence of these much-abused political relations, will you exercise this privilege? I do not refer only to restrictions on trade properly so called, arbitrary imposts levied without any regard to fairness, and capricious interferences of all kinds with its course; though, perhaps, even Tom Baring's philosophy might give way if constituents to whom he had made heavy advances proved insolvent in consequence of proceedings of this description on the part of a Government which could not be kept in check because it was not deemed expedient to have political relations with it. But these, depend upon it, are by no means the most awkward dilemmas in which you get involved when you come to apply the doctrine of non-political tea to a country like this. I should like to place Tom Baring between the horns of this, which is not a hypothetical dilemma, but one which has a place in history. Some years ago, when we were dealing in tea non-politically, a woman in a sampan was killed by the wadding of a gun from a merchant ship which was firing a salute somewhere in the Canton River. The mandarins immediately forbade all trading, and declared that they would not remove the prohibition until the sailor who had fired the peccant gun had been delivered to them. The traders of that day, being, I presume, of the Tom Baring school, and having the courage of their convictions, gave up the man at once, who incontinently disappeared from the historical page, and was probably at least beheaded and disembowelled. But this occurred before the modern *civis Romanus* was invented.

Do you think that Tom Baring would have the pluck to go in for that sort of thing now, or would he prefer his Roman citizen to his trade? But then what becomes of his non-political tea?

"I hope that you will come to some understanding with the French Government without delay to give up this place. It is of no use to us whatsoever, and I do not understand why the French wish to retain it, except as a basis for their operations against Cochin China. I cannot say much about its condition, for the weather is so bad that I have not been able to see much. Within a week's time I hope to have left China for good, and to be really on my way to England."

The speech in which Lord Herbert moved the thanks of the House to the Forces engaged in the war with China was the first made by him in the House of Lords.

He declined to enter on the questions raised with regard to the origin of the previous war of 1857, fully recognising that after the disaster on the Peiho it became necessary to take prompt measures, lest the Chinese, intoxicated by their success in repulsing our forces, destroying our ships, and capturing our guns, should rise in other places and endanger our large mercantile population. The campaign itself he described as "short, brilliant, and decisive."

He mentioned as a remarkable feature of the operations the use for the first time in war of the Armstrong gun, and he paid a graceful compliment to his predecessor, General Peel, for having had the courage to introduce it on a large scale into the Army. It had been prophesied that this gun would be found too delicate and complicated for the rough usage of a campaign, but this had not proved to be the case, and he congratulated the country on the possession of "the best gun in the world." At the same time, as before

the beginning of the campaign the Armstrong gun was untried in active service, each piece had been accompanied by one of the old smooth-bore construction to take its place in case of necessity.

He concluded, with some pardonable pride, by calling attention to a feature of the campaign which had distinguished it from all previous ones. There had been no failures in the Civil Department of the Expedition. It had an excellent Commissariat under Mr. Turner ; it had an excellent Medical Staff, and for the first time a medical officer had been appointed for purely preventive and sanitary purposes. The greatest success had attended the operation of this system. Prevention was at all times better than cure. The cost of these precautions had been hardly criticised, and it was said that if the cost of the hospital ships were divided by the number of patients on board of them, it would show that each patient cost an extraordinary amount. That was because the Expedition had been so singularly healthy. If there had been a great amount of sickness, the cost of each patient would, of course, have been much less. The apparent large cost was the result of the success which had attended the sanitary precautions. After all, what expense, he asked, could be too great which ensured the perfect efficiency of an Army ? Including casualties of all kinds, there was a better state of health and a lower rate of mortality among the troops forming the Expedition in China than usually exists among troops in tropical climates in time of peace. Hostile critics had said of English expeditions, that we could always obtain fighting men, but we could not find a General to lead them, nor a Staff to direct them, nor a Commissariat to feed them, nor a Medical Staff to maintain them in health ; but Sir Hope Grant's Army

had given the lie to all those assertions. We had had in this Campaign an admirable force beautifully handled, and universally successful ; there had not been a single reverse or drawback ; and he, therefore, with perfect confidence anticipated unanimous assent to the motion which he proposed.

The Vote of Thanks was adopted without dissent by both Houses of Parliament, though not without some adverse criticism. But it was not easy to find fault with operations so speedily successful and which had been conducted with so little loss or discomfort to the troops engaged in them. Whatever differences there might be as to the policy of the war, there were none as to the excellence of Herbert's arrangements for its conduct. On that point all parties united in a tribute of well-merited praise.

The country was tired of the subject and the campaign was soon forgotten, but it had done its work. The war of 1859 was the third which had been waged against China in a period of twenty years, but more than forty were now to elapse before British soldiers were again seen in hostile array on Chinese soil.

CHAPTER VIII

WORK AS MINISTER

1859-61

THE improvement of the sanitary and social condition of the soldier had engrossed Mr. Herbert's attention for years. It was certain that it would not be neglected by him when in office, and it might be supposed that, power being in his hands, the reforms he had advocated, and others which he had as yet merely contemplated, would now be rapidly and easily adopted. But this was not the case. In one respect, his accession to office may be said to have diminished his power of effecting such changes. Out of office he was able to give full attention to elaborating the details of the schemes he had framed, and to exercise persistent pressure on the Government for their adoption. In office, the improvement of the soldier's condition was but one among many subjects to which the duties of his post compelled him to devote an equal and sometimes a greater amount of thought and time.

Nor was this all. Other circumstances contributed to render Sidney Herbert less able when Secretary of State effectively to attack the insanitary buildings in which the Army was lodged than he had been as Chairman of the Sanitary Commission. General

Peel and the Government of Lord Derby moved slowly, but they had not been disinclined to devote a considerable sum to structural reform, and something had already been done to put in force the recommendations of the Sanitary Commission. Almost immediately after entering office in 1859 Mr. Herbert drafted a Bill to give effect to its suggestions with regard to barrack accommodation for the Army and the devotion to its improvement of any sums which might be acquired by the sale of unhealthy or defective barracks. The Bill recited these recommendations, and proceeded to enact that when such barracks were sold, the net proceeds of the sale should be paid to a separate account, and from time to time applied to the construction of barracks or otherwise for the improvement of the barrack accommodation of the Army (including the purchase of sites), in aid of other moneys provided and appropriated for the same purposes in the usual way.

But against any such enactment Mr. Gladstone steadfastly set his face. A memorandum was sent from the Treasury to Mr. Herbert, setting forth that the proposal was "inconsistent with present practice and all our existing regulations," and it was denounced as "the reintroduction of a vicious and exploded principle." It was imperatively demanded by the Chancellor of the Exchequer that any money obtained by the sale of barracks should at once be paid into the Consolidated Fund, and so placed at the disposal of Parliament as part of the General Revenue for the year.

Mr. Herbert well knew how much the difficulty of accomplishing his contemplated improvements would be increased by his having to ask annually for a grant to continue them, instead of merely having to

ask for the appropriation of a sum from a Fund already existing; but when told by Mr. Gladstone that the scheme was one which could not consistently be defended by the Government, and one which he "not only would not propose, but was determined to oppose," Sidney Herbert could hardly venture to press the adoption of a financial novelty in the teeth of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and reluctantly consented to abstain from the further prosecution of the Bill.

Though this Bill was abandoned, Mr. Herbert proposed to accomplish his object by Votes for the reconstruction of military buildings condemned by the Sanitary Commission. But with Mr. Gladstone Chancellor of the Exchequer, every proposal to rebuild or enlarge a barrack or to construct a hospital involved a battle with the Treasury. Bearing in mind the difficulty he experienced in obtaining funds for the construction of the defensive works which seemed to him indispensable, Mr. Herbert felt compelled to abandon, or at least to postpone, the execution of a large number of the improvements in barracks which in the report of the Sanitary Commission he had shown to be imperatively called for. He did not conceal his reluctance to forgo their prosecution. Had he lived they would no doubt have been gradually executed. As it was, they were, after his death, practically abandoned.

The results of that abandonment were such as might have been anticipated. The retention at Windsor and at Dublin of barracks which on sanitary grounds had been condemned, caused the loss of many young and valuable lives from typhoid. Officers and men both suffered, but years elapsed before efficient measures were taken to correct evils to which Mr. Herbert

would have put a stop some decades earlier. In other places, not attracting so large a share of public attention as Windsor and Dublin, similar results must have followed similar neglect. But, to avoid expense, defective barracks were allowed to remain unrepaired and unaltered, and for the same reason any new barracks were still built on old and insanitary plans, the faults of which were but imperfectly recognised by those in authority. The baths, libraries, and recreation rooms, to which Mr. Herbert attached so much importance, were but sparingly supplied, and ideas that the soldier was being pampered at the expense of the civil population, and that sanitation was a mere passing fad, were not altogether at a discount in some quarters of the War Office itself.

Great changes took place between 1860 and 1890 in the organisation and discipline of the Army; but for many years after his death comparatively little was done to complete or perfect the schemes which Sidney Herbert had formed to protect the soldier's health, and raise him in the social scale by promoting his self-respect, increasing his comfort, and stimulating his intelligence.

Among the privations of a soldier's life few pressed more severely, or contributed in a greater degree to the unpopularity of the service among the more respectable of the lower classes, than the hard lot of the married soldier and his wife, even if "on the strength," and even in time of peace. As we have already seen,¹ they were often lodged in casemates and other unhealthy and unsuitable places, and under the best circumstances were only entitled to a share of an ordinary barrack room. As many as four

¹ Page 163.

families, and sometimes a larger number, were herded together in one room, only separated from each other by extemporised curtains of barrack rugs. Mr. Herbert insisted that every new barrack should contain special quarters for married couples, and that, wherever possible, such quarters should be added to barracks already existing. Till this could be effectively done, lodging allowance was given to married soldiers "on the strength" for whom proper accommodation could not be provided in barracks. Mr. Herbert, with Miss Nightingale's co-operation, also prepared plans for special hospitals for soldiers' wives and children, and the last letter written by him before his death was one to Miss Shaw Stewart, thanking her for accepting the charge of the first established of these institutions.

No one could have been more keenly alive than Mr. Herbert to the truth that the material conditions of a soldier's life necessarily exercise a vast influence on his moral condition, his tastes, habits, and character. He was fond of saying that an unhealthy man would never be either an efficient or contented soldier, and that if his surroundings were comfortless, and his barracks destitute of means of recreation, he would naturally and certainly seek amusement elsewhere, to the but too probable ruin of health and efficiency.

Such means of recreation he sought to supply, and though not able to effect all he desired, he was able, but only at the expense of continued struggles, so far to overcome the persistent resistance of the Treasury as to commence the erection of recreation rooms and reading rooms, and to give renewed life to the garrison and regimental libraries, which had long been in existence, but which had been little used. Cricket grounds were provided at all large garrison

towns, and at the larger barracks; skittle alleys and quoit grounds were even more generally established.

It was in connection with these measures that a regular system of gymnastic instruction was introduced into the Army by Mr. Herbert.

A school of systematic gymnastics had in 1857 been set up at Oxford, where it had attained great popularity. Its founder and director, Mr. Maclaren, was consulted, and with his aid a code of regulations for gymnastic drill was drawn up and enforced in the Army by Mr. Herbert. A model gymnasium was erected at Aldershot from Mr. Maclaren's plans, and gymnastic appliances were furnished even to the smaller stations at which regular gymnasia could not be built. The physique of the average soldier was thus greatly improved, and he was at the same time furnished with a new and engrossing interest and amusement.

The expenditure thus involved, though grudged as for a "fad" of Mr. Herbert's, was indulgently tolerated, but when, going a step further, he proposed to employ soldiers in the construction and repair of military buildings, and to teach them trades, he had to encounter both the passive opposition of the military authorities at the Horse Guards and the more active opposition of the Treasury. The Headquarter Staff feared that such occupations might interfere with the more strictly military training of the troops, while the Chancellor of the Exchequer was shocked at the idea of soldiers being taught at the public expense to compete with the industry of the civil population. Though the attempt to get such a scheme considered was more than once made, it had to be abandoned in face of this double opposition, which formed a combination too strong to be resisted.

The importance of securing a more efficient class of medical officers to attend on the soldier when sick, was, in Herbert's eyes, only second to that of providing him with healthy surroundings when well. His persevering efforts to effect the establishment of the Medical School at Chatham, narrated in an earlier chapter, will not be forgotten.

During the whole of 1858, and the first half of 1859, Sidney Herbert bestowed unceasing, but somewhat Sisyphean, labour on the establishment of this Medical School, through which medical men were to find admission to the Army. But as fast as the War Office did anything Mr. Herbert desired, it practically undid it. It was agreed that there should be five teachers in the school; but it was ruled by the War Office that only two should be "Professors," and the remaining three "Lecturers" at a lower rate of pay. It was pointed out to the Secretary of State that the subjects with which these three latter gentlemen would have to deal were as important as those of military medicine and military surgery, and that if good men were to be secured for these chairs they must not be given inferior rank. When the War Office had reluctantly yielded on this point, a fresh obstacle was started. It had been contemplated as practically necessary that some of the chairs should be filled by civilians; but it was intimated to Mr. Herbert by the Secretary of State that this was inadmissible, and that none but Army medical officers would be eligible for employment. It was in vain urged by Mr. Herbert that however capable Army surgeons might be of filling the professorships of military medicine and surgery, few Army medical men had any knowledge of chemistry or of pathology, and still less of hygiene, "which is a new subject,

hitherto untaught and unknown."¹ General Peel, while not personally denying the force of these considerations, maintained that the opinion of the Army doctors themselves was too strongly opposed to the admission of civilian medical men to permit it to be done, and took refuge in asserting that "there were as good men to be found in the Army for professors as in civil life." He was told that no one denied there being good men in the Army, and that for subjects they understood none could make better professors, but that circumstances made it impossible that they should have such a knowledge of the real state of medical science and of current pathology as would qualify them to teach on that subject, whilst of hygiene and chemistry they were profoundly ignorant. Indeed, the circumstance that all the medical candidates for professorships stated themselves to be ready and qualified to fill every chair, cast some doubt upon their capacity to fill any. As it was not contemplated that the Medical School should be under the control of the Director-General of the Medical Department, but under that of the Secretary of State, General Peel was urged to make the appointments himself, on his own responsibility, and relieve the Director from any odium for having made a suggestion so unpalatable to his subordinates. It was at the same time pointed out that unless he did this boldly, and without delay, there was the greatest risk of the school being a failure. But, like too many other Secretaries of State, General Peel shrunk from placing on his own shoulders responsibilities that could be transferred to those of others, while, of course, the longer the delay, the more the Army

¹ Sir James Clark to Sidney Herbert, December 5th, 1857.

medical men worked against the scheme, and the more puzzled General Peel grew. Sidney Herbert was in despair, Sir James Clark "wiped his hands of it," and Miss Nightingale indulged in much vigorous denunciation. And so matters stood when Sidney Herbert received the seals of the War Department.

On his assuming office, the regulations by which the school was to be governed were speedily drawn up, efficient professors appointed, and the school officially established before the end of 1859. It was not all that Mr. Herbert had wished, for it had been his desire to make it a school not for the medical officers of the Army alone, but for those of the Navy and the East India Company also. This he was unable to accomplish, departmental and professional jealousies being too strong for him. But though his plans were thus partially baffled, a reform of immense importance was effected in securing the proper instruction of Army medical officers, and thus rendering them better qualified for their arduous duties.

With the establishment of the school its affairs passed out of the more immediate view of the Secretary of State, who, considering that work done, turned more of his attention to other matters urgently requiring it. But the moment Mr. Herbert's immediate and direct impulse was withdrawn, a species of paralysis again attacked the subordinate officials of the War Office, and though the school had been established, and its staff appointed in 1859, it was not until the month of September, 1860, that the first ten students arrived at Chatham. When they did so, they stared in astonishment at the bare walls of the building, and, marking the absence of all arrangements for carrying on their work, they, in Miss

Nightingale's incisive words, came to the conclusion "that the school was a hoax."

On inquiry being made as to the cause of the absence of fittings and instruments, it appeared that the estimate for them had been sent in by the professors early in April, but had not received the sanction of the Treasury until late in August. The "authority to expend" was, when at length obtained, sent first to the Tower, whence it was returned with the remark that no surgical instruments were kept there. It was next despatched to the arsenal at Woolwich, which could only supply guns. It then went back to the Director-General, with whom it had already lain so long, and finally, Mr. Dreury, the head clerk in the Financial Department of the War Office, authorised the necessary expenditure from the Sanitary Vote, stipulating, it was said, that the Secretary of State should not be told of the delay. After this a week elapsed, being the time it took for the paper to travel from Mr. Dreury's room to that of the Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Sir E. Lugard, where it again slumbered. What might have been its further adventures remains matter for conjecture, for at this juncture a trenchant letter from Miss Nightingale called back the personal interposition of the Secretary of State, which soon set matters to rights—for a time.

The Medical School has since been removed from Chatham to Netley. The three Professorships to which Herbert attached so much importance, and for which he so earnestly contended, have been again reduced to Lectureships, and all appointments to the school are now filled from the medical staff of the Army—let us hope because it is now so much better educated than formerly as to be perfect in all those branches of

knowledge in which in Herbert's time it was so generally deficient.

But though National Defence and Sanitary Reform were the objects which principally occupied Mr. Herbert's thoughts, there were, of course, many other matters which called for his attention, and absorbed no inconsiderable portion of his time. Many of these were dull and insignificant, others have now lost any interest they may have once possessed, and some, though of temporary importance, had no lasting significance. But there remain others, some account of which is necessary to any correct appreciation of Herbert's work, and which cannot be altogether passed over in any account of his official life.

OFFICE ORGANISATION.

At the time of Mr. Herbert's accession to office the War Office, as a separate department, had existed for only five years, but it already exhibited many of those faults which have since been so conspicuous, which it has been found so hard to eradicate, and which even now, fifty years later, remain to a great degree uncured.

Mr. Herbert's dealings with the War Office in connection with the Sanitary Commission had made him keenly alive to the defective organisation and narrow bureaucratic officialism of the department, and he set to work, at first with a light heart and certainty of success, to reform its modes of doing business. The task was, however, a hopeless one. He could bend aside for a moment the supple boughs which obstructed his path, but when once his hand relaxed its grasp they sprang back to their original position, and before his death he felt that he was baffled,

and that the *vis inertiae* of the office was stronger than he.

Miss Nightingale, in her usual vein of exaggeration, but not wholly without justice, described the War Office as "a very slow office, an enormously expensive office, a not very efficient office, and one in which the minister's intentions can be entirely negated by all his sub-departments and those of each of the sub-departments by every other."¹

The delays, and some of the other defects of the office, were, in Mr. Herbert's opinion, largely due to the amount of minute writing which prevailed.

Under the system in force when Mr. Herbert received the seals, every paper entering the office was minuted upon by a clerk in the department to which its subject related. His minute was again minuted upon, perhaps more than once, by a superior but still subordinate official, before it reached the head of the department. He minuted on it for the Assistant Under-Secretary of State, who again minuted on it for the Permanent Under-Secretary, whose minute was commented on by the Political Under-Secretary, by whom the whole batch of minutes was submitted to the Secretary of State himself.

The author of the original minute probably understood the subject on which he wrote. Of those to whom it was subsequently submitted some as probably did not, but commented adversely on its proposals to show their own acuteness. The original minute writer had no opportunity of answering their objections—objections which naturally influenced the Under-Secretary of State when making his minute for his chief. If in the end the original minute writer stuck to his guns, and protested against the conclusion

¹ Miss Nightingale to Mr. Herbert, November 18th, 1859.

arrived at, the whole wearisome process had to be gone over with a fresh set of arguments and replies.

For this mass of writing Mr. Herbert desired to substitute—and, so far as he could, did substitute—conversations between the parties concerned, in the presence of the Under-Secretary of State, or, on really important occasions, the Secretary of State himself. In nine cases out of ten, personal discussion led to agreement; but where this was not the case, the fact of having heard both sides made the Secretary of State's decision infinitely easier, and removed the feeling of dissatisfaction always created by being overruled without a hearing.

It was objected that conversations left no record of even important suggestions, and were liable to cause misunderstandings which could not arise where every step of every transaction was fully recorded in writing.

To this it was replied that a better understanding was usually effected by a short conversation than by sheets of minutes, in the composition of which much valuable time was lost, and the facts of the case to which they related greatly obscured. The final decision being always in writing it was inaccurate to say that no record was preserved, while, as a matter of fact, in a great majority of cases, when action was once taken, the necessity for record disappeared.

One result of the reluctance of the permanent officials of the War Office to part with any shred of their power over the smallest minutiae of detail, and the consequent reference to headquarters of even the most unimportant decisions, was a profitless waste of the time of the Secretary of State in adjudicating on matters which should have been

promptly dealt with on the spot, and never come under his consideration at all.

Let a single instance suffice in illustration. According to a *précis* paper gravely laid before the Secretary of State for his decision and judgment, the Principal Medical Officer at Yarmouth and the Steward of the General Hospital there quarrelled with regard to some poultry kept by the latter, and to the presence of which in the hospital the former naturally objected. Full of indignation at the Steward's misdeeds, the Principal Medical Officer not only denounced the presence of his fowls, but accused him of employing an orderly to dig his potatoes. The Steward retorted by a charge that the Principal Medical Officer used a hospital rug as a carpet. The Principal Medical Officer rejoined that the Steward issued linen not thoroughly washed. The Steward replied that the Principal Medical Officer used a hospital bath for washing his dog, and dried him with a hospital sheet. The Principal Medical Officer then brought against the Steward a formal charge of "insubordination."

This ridiculous quarrel by no means stands alone, and is but a type of scores of similarly trivial cases solemnly submitted to the Secretary of State for adjudication, instead of being at once disposed of, as they should have been, by the General of the District.

RELATIONS WITH THE CROWN.

The relations between the Secretary of State for War and the Sovereign, always of a somewhat special character, were of course especially delicate during the earlier stages of the process which transferred to the Secretary of State that substantial control of

the Army which had previously been exercised by the Commander-in-Chief and the Crown.

On the efficiency of the Army depends not only our success in foreign wars, but the prompt suppression of disorder at home, and the immediate care and defence of the Sovereign's person.

It was, therefore, not only natural, but a part of her duty, that the Queen should watch with great solicitude and some jealousy any step which might tend to render the Army the instrument not of the nation, but of a party. In this delicate position the Queen and Prince Consort showed the greatest tact, caution, and prudence.

Shortly after taking office Mr. Herbert wrote to Sir James Graham that he "found in those quarters a great thirst for information, but a scrupulous abstinence from interference or dictation." Objections, or apparent objections, to proposals made were frankly pointed out by the Prince Consort. They were argued with persistency, and often with great skill and good sense, though but unfrequently with success. The limit to which resistance could proceed was always instinctively recognised, and though friendly remonstrance and discussion might be strongly pressed, they were never allowed to assume the appearance of a conflict between the will of the Sovereign and the advice of her responsible ministers.

Reading these controversies nearly half a century afterwards, it is impossible not to recognise that in argument Prince Albert frequently had the advantage, and that recommendations made were not always uninfluenced by the pressure of colleagues, the exigencies of Parliamentary support, and other considerations foreign to the question under discussion.

Of these controversies one of the most protracted took place over a scheme for the reorganisation of the Household Cavalry.

Mr. Herbert proposed to reduce the number of officers and non-commissioned officers by reducing the troops of each regiment from eight to six. The officers of the suppressed troops would thus be disposed of, while the men belonging to them would have been distributed among the remaining troops. The net result would have been a slight increase in the numerical strength of the brigade, and at the same time a reduction of expenditure by about £9,000 per annum. He also proposed to equalise the pay of the whole brigade. At that time the Life Guards received 3*d.* a day more than the Blues, for which, as they were raised under the same conditions and performed identically the same duties, no adequate reason could be assigned. Mr. Herbert proposed slightly to lower the pay of two regiments of Life Guards, and slightly to raise that of the third, effecting on the whole operation a saving of £2,000 a year.

These discussions ended, shortly before Lord Herbert's death, in an arrangement to which Mr. Gladstone, who wished for further reductions but desired to avoid controversy with his dying friend, gave, on behalf of the Treasury, what he himself described as a "surly" assent.

PURCHASE SYSTEM.

Among the reforms which Sidney Herbert desired to effect was the abolition of the existing system of purchasing commissions in so far as related to the higher ranks of the Army. The system was itself a strange one, but it no doubt had one useful

effect—that of securing more rapid promotion than would have been the case without it. Mr. Herbert hoped to retain this advantage by continuing to allow purchase in the lower grades while restricting it to authorised prices. These proposals were not in some respects acceptable, either to the Court or to the Commander-in-Chief, and were in those particulars combated by the Prince Consort in very able and very temperate letters.

Mr. Herbert's proposals, of course, did not satisfy those who wished for the total abolition of the purchase system, and were equally unacceptable to those who disapproved of any alteration, even in the case of the command of regiments, of the existing system. These latter were by no means confined to old soldiers and bigoted Tories. Lord Grey and Lord Panmure, though great Army reformers, alike deprecated the abolition of purchase. The proposal was by the Queen's command submitted to the Commander-in-Chief, who in moderate but decided terms expressed his decided disapproval of it.

But the strongest objections to the plan were those of the Prince Consort, who at once perceived that it must transfer the control of promotion and military appointments from the Commander-in-Chief to the Secretary of State—that is to say, to Parliament. Mr. Herbert combated this view, and maintained that no such change would be effected or contemplated, and expressed his opinion that any such transfer was to be deprecated. But in the face of the opposition raised he did not think it then needful, even if possible, to enforce his plan.

The change has since been made, and the transfer of power and responsibility foreseen by the Prince effected, with mixed results doubtless, of the balance

of advantage or disadvantage in which let future generations decide.

MILITARY EDUCATION.

The interest which Sidney Herbert had always taken in the promotion of education in the Army was not likely to fail now that he had reached a station in which he could most powerfully aid it, and this is probably the most fitting place for recounting the work done by him in this connection.

Regimental schools were founded early in the nineteenth century, and garrison and regimental libraries were established by Lord Grey (then Lord Howick) in 1838; but it is not too much to say that all the improvements introduced into the English system of military education between 1845 and 1861 were due to Sidney Herbert's exertions and advocacy.

The first steps towards a real improvement of education in the Army were taken by him when Secretary at War in Sir Robert Peel's Government.

As Secretary to the Admiralty he had already reorganised and revived the Royal Naval School at Greenwich. His educational efforts at the War Office began by a thorough reform of the Duke of York's School for the sons of soldiers, the discipline and teaching of which had been allowed to fall into a wretched condition. The whole course of instruction and system of management were reorganised and adapted to modern requirements. This was in itself a most salutary change, but it was of less importance to the Army generally than another which was its immediate consequence. Schools had been established in every regiment, at the suggestion of the Duke of York, in 1811, but though they had so

long existed, scarcely anything had been done to secure their efficiency. The instruction given varied according to the caprice of the Colonel and the capacity of the schoolmaster. These schoolmasters had no special qualification. They were simply men of the regiment, appointed by the commanding officer, possibly because they possessed a little more education than their fellows, but more frequently in order to provide an old soldier with an easy berth. The first of these defects Herbert sought to remedy by constituting the Duke of York's School a model school, on the pattern of which every regimental school throughout the Army was to be organised and taught. He also sought to secure the efficiency of these schools by securing the efficiency of the teaching staff. A normal school or training institution was grafted on the Duke of York's School, from which Army schoolmasters, properly qualified, were to be sent forth, and to whom for the first time Army rank as "Schoolmaster-Sergeant" was now granted.

To ensure the proper working of the new system, Sidney Herbert created the office of Inspector-General of Military Schools. His duties consisted in the superintendence of primary education in the Army, making periodical inspections of, and reports on, regimental schools, and recommending fresh measures which might occur to him with respect to them. His supervision did not, however, extend to the institutions devoted to the education of officers, such as the College at Sandhurst or the Academy at Woolwich. The Rev. G. Gleig, however, who was appointed to the new post, took the warmest interest in those institutions, and was able to give Mr. Herbert much valuable assistance, both by his counsel and by writing in periodicals. To this assistance Mr.

Herbert cordially acknowledged his obligations in his speech on the education of officers in 1857.

Mr. Herbert's reform of the regimental schools was not wholly completed when he went out of office in 1846, but his measures were so far advanced as to admit of their being easily carried out, without alteration, by his successor, Mr. Fox Maule, whose tribute to the work done by Sidney Herbert has been already mentioned.¹ From that time the Chelsea Asylum has been not only the standard model for regimental schools, but the source whence the agents for spreading education in the ranks of the service have been supplied.

These reforms, important in themselves, inevitably entailed consequences of even yet greater importance. With the supply of increased facilities for the education of the private soldier, a demand arose for the better education of the officer. "We shall soon," it was urged, "require from the private soldier more than subalterns were required to know when the Duke of Wellington began his career. Will it be safe either to leave the officer behind or to trust to his voluntary exertions to save him from being so?"

The subject excited a good deal of popular interest, and articles appeared from time to time in various periodicals advocating different schemes of reform. Among these were several articles in the *Quarterly* and *Edinburgh Reviews* from the pen of Mr. Gleig, the Inspector of Schools, and subsequently Chaplain-General. These articles represented Sidney Herbert's opinions, and were probably to a greater or less extent prompted by him. But although much was written, and a certain languid interest aroused, nothing further of a practical character was done until Mr.

¹ Vol. I., p. 78.

Herbert was again Secretary at War in Lord Aberdeen's Government in 1853.

The only step taken in the interval was the issue by the Duke of Wellington, in 1849, of a General Order requiring officers to submit themselves for examination on promotion to a higher rank. The step was of importance as being the first official recognition of the necessity of educational qualifications of any kind on the part of officers, but the vague character of the proposed examinations, and the faulty machinery contrived for conducting them, would probably have rendered them in any case inefficient. The Duke might, indeed, have insisted on some observance of his own order, but he died not long after its issue, and from that time its provisions became a dead letter, at all events so far as examinations on promotion were concerned. And so the matter slumbered until Mr. Herbert was again at the War Office. He at once turned his attention to the subject, and elaborated a plan, the chief features of which were: (1) The appointment of a Board of Examiners, by whom the examination, both of candidates for commissions and of officers awaiting promotion, should be conducted. (2) The appointment in every military district of a special officer to afford professional instruction to officers after having entered the service. (3) The conversion of the existing "Senior Department" at Sandhurst into a staff school. The scheme was approved by Lord Hardinge, then Commander-in-Chief, and sanctioned by the Cabinet, and a sum of £2,000 was voted on the Estimates for 1854-55 to meet the preliminary expenses of district instruction. The scheme was explained to the House of Commons by Mr. Herbert on February 24th, 1854, and a selection made of two of the officers to be employed as

instructors. But the commencement of the Crimean War caused the suspension of the scheme, and Mr. Herbert's resignation in February, 1855, proved fatal to it; for though the Vote still appeared on the Estimates for 1855-56 (which had been prepared by Mr. Herbert), no part of it was expended, and in the revised Estimates for 1856 the item was altogether omitted. This was naturally regarded as a retrograde step by Mr. Herbert. In April, 1856, he brought the matter before the House of Commons in a remarkable speech, which was listened to with the utmost attention and respect. Surprise was expressed at the abandonment of Mr. Herbert's plans by the Government, and a speech made by him on June 5th, 1856, to which reference has before been made, went far to compel the Government—however reluctantly—to grapple with the subject. He stated at great length, and with greater force, the principles which are laid down in his letter to Lord Hardinge; he exposed unsparingly the rottenness of the existing system, and explained his own proposals for its improvement. It may be said, without going into details, that his first proposal was the conversion of Sandhurst into a general military school, giving only a strictly professional education, to which boys should not be admitted before the age of sixteen. After a course of eighteen months there, those cadets destined for the infantry were to receive their commissions, while candidates for the Engineers, Artillery, or Cavalry were to undergo a further period of training in schools to be established at Chatham, Woolwich, and Maidstone respectively. At the same time he strongly deprecated the idea of making these schools the sole doors of entrance to the Army, while he insisted that all should pass the same examination. His second

proposal was the continued instruction of officers who had obtained commissions by district instructors in the manner recommended in his letter to Lord Hardinge; and the third was the establishment of a Staff College at Farnham, the existing "senior department" at Sandhurst having fallen into a condition of absolute inefficiency.

Lord Palmerston gave the usual official answer, that the subject would be carefully considered, but pleaded for awaiting the Report of a Commission which had been appointed on the training of the Scientific Corps.

As a consequence of this debate, Lord Panmure, then Secretary of State for War, seems to have arrived at the unwelcome conclusion that "something must be done," and after a long period, certainly of inaction, though possibly also one of careful reflection, he, before the close of the year, called on a number of officers, more or less connected with the War Office, individually to submit separate schemes for the education of regimental and staff officers. Lord Hardinge, the Duke of Cambridge, Colonel Lefroy, and Mr. Gleig were among those who complied with the invitation. Almost all the schemes submitted proved to be substantially identical with Mr. Herbert's proposals, the suggested modifications of it concerning for the most part matters of detail only.

Having before him all these materials on which to form an opinion himself, Lord Panmure appeared still desirous to gain further time, and to throw on others the responsibility of any measures taken. He accordingly, in April, 1857, decided to appoint a Council of Military Education, to which should be entrusted the duty of preparing "a comprehensive scheme of military education" for the consideration

of the Government, and which was to include an improvement of the examinations for promotion, the provision of means for the professional instruction of officers, and the conversion into a Staff College of the Sandhurst senior department. These three important reforms might thus be considered as being to a certain extent secured.

Frequent discussions took place in both Houses of Parliament, in 1857, on the subject of military education, and on July 28th Mr. Herbert took a leading part in a debate arising out of Sir De Lacy Evans's motion for the abolition of purchase. He advocated examinations on promotion, and argued that there was nothing in the purchase system incompatible with them. He recommended a staff school, admission to which should be competitive, in preference to a mere qualifying examination for the staff, and maintained that the education of staff officers should extend to the personal staff of commanding officers as well as to the staff generally. He expressed a general approval of the Government scheme, so far as he understood it, but regretted there had been so much delay in introducing a system for the instruction of officers generally. He would still wait in patience, hoping that the Government would provide satisfactorily for it in the Estimates of the following year. He ended by paying a high compliment to Mr. Gleig, the Chaplain-General, from whose advice and assistance he had derived "the greatest possible benefit."

It now appeared as though an educational reform was immediately impending, but the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny afforded a reason or an excuse for another year's delay. So great was the demand for officers that there could be no thought of examining

those who had already obtained commissions. Even the slight entrance examination prescribed by the Duke of Wellington was suspended, and on September 1st, 1857, a circular was issued announcing that commissions would be given without examination to all candidates raising a certain number of recruits.

So far the cause of military education seemed to have retrograded rather than advanced, but its friends were not disheartened, and at the end of the year won their first substantial victory. On the recommendation of the Council appointed by Lord Panmure, the Senior Department of Sandhurst was converted into a Staff College. One of Sidney Herbert's most warmly cherished schemes was thus accomplished, and in February, 1858, the first examination for the admission of students took place. Mr. Herbert could now congratulate himself on the fact that his exertions in the cause of military education were bearing fruit, and from that time onwards it has made steady, if slow, progress. The first stone of the new Staff College was laid by the Duke of Cambridge in December, 1858. The Council also recommended the amalgamation of the Cadet College at Sandhurst with the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich, and this recommendation was adopted by Lord Panmure and the Government, and approved by the Queen, before the fall of Lord Palmerston's Government in March, 1858. General Peel, who succeeded Lord Panmure at the War Office, adopted the scheme already settled by his predecessor, and some progress was made in carrying it out. By this time, however, considerable jealousy as to the proposed changes had been manifested in the House of Commons, mainly based on the fear that they might interfere with the open competition which had already

been established for entrance at Woolwich. Frequent discussions on the subject took place in the early part of the Session, and on April 26th, on the motion of Mr. Monsell, an address to the Queen, hostile to the proposed amalgamation, was carried by a considerable majority.

Mr. Herbert had given but a qualified support to the scheme of amalgamation as presented to the House. In the course of the debate he explained, in an important speech, that it differed materially from his own original plan, and he feared would render admission to Sandhurst the only door to Woolwich, thus preventing the competition of boys from public schools, to which he attached much importance.

In consequence of the vote of the House of Commons, the idea of amalgamating Sandhurst with Woolwich was abandoned, and the attention of the War Office was directed to plans for passing all candidates for the Cavalry and Infantry through a military school before entering the service. This change was not only held to diminish, which it did, the necessity of Mr. Herbert's original proposal for the instruction of officers after receiving their commissions, but was thought to render it wholly unnecessary, which it certainly did not.

Several proposals were submitted to General Peel, during the remainder of 1858 and the early part of 1859, for the reorganisation of Sandhurst on its new basis, but no definite decision had been come to with regard to any of them when General Peel left the War Office on the overthrow of Lord Derby's Government in 1859. The Indian Mutiny, and later on the Dissolution, formed admirable excuses for delay and indecision; but a stronger minister than

General Peel would not have allowed his conclusions on so grave a matter to have been set aside by them. One step, indeed, he took, with a view of giving greater reality to the examination of officers on their first appointment and on promotion. In November, 1858, he issued fresh regulations, restricting the examination to purely professional subjects, and providing that every subaltern should be examined as to his fitness for promotion within eight months of his joining his regiment. It was also directed that these examinations should be conducted, not regimentally, as had till then been the case, but by a Board of Field Officers not belonging to the regiment. But practically these regulations were as completely ignored as those issued fourteen years previously had been.

Matters were still in this state when, on June 19th, 1859, Mr. Herbert received the seals of the War Department. He at once took up the consideration of the various plans proposed, and was not slow in deciding on the general policy to be adopted. But the plan he preferred rendered necessary an enlargement of the Royal Military College sufficient to provide accommodation for 600 cadets—an arrangement involving great expense, amounting even in estimate to not less than £125,000. This expenditure was strongly opposed by the Treasury, and in view of the other and yet more serious controversies pending with that department on the subject of military expenditure, Mr. Herbert did not press, as he would have liked to do, the inclusion of this sum in the Army Estimates for 1860.

Mr. Herbert did not wish to render it compulsory on *all* candidates for commissions to pass through

Sandhurst, and in his speech in June, 1856, had argued against that plan. He then said :

“It has been argued that every man who goes into the Army should pass through Sandhurst ; but I do not think that would do. It would tie up parents too much, and I do not think it would be suitable to our English habits to force all through one particular or exclusive educational establishment. . . . Besides, as a competition between boys keeps boys up to their work, so a competition between schools keeps masters up to their work, which is equally important.”

I do not think that his views on this subject were materially changed at a later period, but the consciousness of failing strength and diminished powers of combat, combined with the desire to secure, before the rapidly approaching end, at least some guarantee for that better education of officers for which he had been so long fighting, induced him to modify his proposals, and to assent, in January, 1861, to the preparation of a scheme which proposed to abolish entirely the grant of direct commissions, and while retaining Woolwich as the door of admission to the Artillery and Engineers, made it compulsory on all candidates for commissions in the Cavalry or Infantry to undergo a preliminary course of military instruction at Sandhurst. It was arranged that the new scheme should come into force on January 1st, 1862.

The plan was again opposed in the House of Commons, and, ostensibly on this ground, again postponed. But Parliamentary opposition might have been faced had it been possible to overcome the reluctance, or rather the peremptory refusal, of Mr. Gladstone to include in the Estimates for 1861 any vote to meet the expenses which the reform of Sandhurst would involve.

In all that concerned the reform of Sandhurst Mr. Herbert had a warm and judicious supporter

in H.R.H. the Prince Consort, thanks mainly to whose untiring exertions the Sandhurst scheme was ultimately adopted; but Mr. Herbert had not the satisfaction of seeing his plans carried into execution, or of knowing that his sacrifice of his own opinion had been useful. Before January 1st, 1862, both the Prince Consort and Mr. Herbert were no more.

Rapid as this sketch has been it is sufficient to show that Lord Herbert, from the date of his first employment at the War Office to the moment of his death, had few things more at heart than the advancement of education in the Army.

THE VOLUNTEERS

It is to the Emperor Louis Napoleon that England in no slight degree owes the creation of the Volunteer Force, which sprang into existence between 1858 and 1860, and which is now a recognised feature of English life. His tacit approval of the insolent language of the French Colonels' Addresses in 1858 had excited violent irritation in England. His ambiguous language and doubtful intentions aroused alarm, which his invasion of Italy and consequently increased military power did not tend to allay. The annexation of Savoy did far more to alienate English feeling than the Commercial Treaty of 1860 did to conciliate it. A burst of national enthusiasm impelled thousands of every rank to volunteer, and the Government of the day, unable to direct or grasp the movement, and equally unable to resist it, dealt with it timidly and tentatively. About a month before the fall of Lord Derby's Cabinet a circular to the Lords Lieutenant of Counties was issued, laying down the conditions on which the offer to form volunteer companies

would be accepted. Such offers at once poured in on every side, and were, in almost all cases, favourably received; but hardly any true effort was made to organise the force on an uniform or definite system.

The Volunteers of 1859-60 were a very different body from the Volunteers of the present day. The Volunteer of the twentieth century is to a great degree armed, clothed, and paid by the State; the Volunteer of 1859 received no pay, and received no advantages from the Government beyond the loan of arms and the allowance of a few rounds of ammunition annually. Nor were these accorded till after Mr. Herbert assumed the seals. They did not form part of the original War Office plan as issued by General Peel. The movement was also very differently looked on by the public. At its outset it was regarded with an enthusiastic admiration on the one hand, or a keen dislike on the other, which have now both given place to a feeling of comparative indifference.

No such indifference existed in 1859. A widespread feeling of popular enthusiasm, now worn off, raised the Volunteer force to a strength of 160,000 within a year from the date on which the formation of companies was first authorised. But, on the other hand, the new movement had to encounter an open hostility or covert dislike now altogether unknown. This hostility came chiefly from two very dissimilar quarters. Military men, with few exceptions, felt and expressed disapproval of citizen soldiers, who clumsily imitated the movements of fully trained men, and who, they predicted, would prove wholly useless in peace, and a constant peril, if not a fruitful cause of disaster, should they be employed in time of war. Men of the Manchester school of politics, not often to be found in agreement

with military men, united with them in disapproval of the new force. Nor was it to the Manchester school alone that the movement was distasteful. A great body of far more moderate men, lovers of peace, deplored the birth of a spirit which they feared would prompt a rash foreign policy abroad, and prove the cause of much loafing, idleness, and misconduct at home. The extent and strength of this sentiment are now hard to be understood. But I have, myself, heard men of sound and sober judgment—cabinet ministers, judges, eminent persons of usually moderate views—loud in their condemnation of the militarism they thought likely to be fostered by what they termed the craze for Volunteering. They denounced the waste of money on uniforms, the waste of time involved in drill instruction, and even went so far as to wax indignant over the music and measured step of a column marching down Portland Place as disturbing the rest of invalids and infants in the houses along their line of march.

Receiving, as they did, little from the Government beyond a bare recognition, the Volunteers necessarily enjoyed a much greater degree of independence than is now the case—an independence, indeed, bordering upon anarchy. Every Volunteer company elected its own officers, and though they had to receive formal commissions from the Lord Lieutenant of the County, these nominations were almost invariably accepted. Paying as they did for their clothing, it was difficult to deny them some voice in its choice. Each company accordingly uniformed itself according to its own fancy, and strange enough some of these fancies were. Every corps, too, whether company or battalion, had its own special "Rules" and an elective "Committee" by which the affairs of the company were discussed

and settled, to the great detriment of discipline. The force practically consisted only of isolated corps, without systematic organisation or adequate supervision.

This was the condition of affairs when Sidney Herbert received the seals of the War Department. He was not himself an enthusiast in the Volunteer cause, which he regarded with a somewhat jealous eye, as likely to interfere with the formation of an efficient Militia force.

"I am perfectly satisfied," he wrote in a letter to Lord Tweeddale, "that the Volunteer system is not adapted to the rural districts. Men who are engaged in business must be close to their store, their practice ground, and one another, to make the short periods they can give to drill available for any effectual purpose.

"I have always discouraged, as much as I can, the formation of corps consisting of members who are unable to provide their own outfit, and also to pay an annual subscription to maintain their drill sergeant, etc. The corps who depend on external subscriptions will clearly melt away. Nor is it wise to enlist in Volunteer Corps men who might, so far as their class is concerned, enter the Militia. I do not mean embodied Militia, but a Militia permanently disembodied except in case of invasion. I am, therefore, opposed to the formation of corps whose existence is a perpetual struggle and difficulty.

"If, as is suggested, the Government were to pay for clothing, accoutrements, and time, they ought to have a better security for their money than a fourteen days' engagement. A local Militia gives this, or, indeed, any Militia, for no Militia can by law be embodied, though we have had an exceptional Act passed to meet an emergency, and which expires in March, 1861, never, I hope, to be re-enacted.

"My view, therefore, is to keep up a fair standing Army, with a disembodied Militia behind it, and an auxiliary force of Volunteers, composed of men who will do the work *for the liking of it, and maintain themselves*. But the two first, one with a ten year and the other with a five-year engagement, are the really dependable force."

But the force, even in the rural districts, had been already raised, and this fact, as well as the strong national feeling which had called it into existence, had to be reckoned with. It was impossible to ignore the movement, and it was therefore imperative to direct and organise it. What were called Administrative Battalions were formed, in which, though usually drilling and acting apart, and possessing separate committees, a number of companies were for administrative purposes treated as a single unit, and, when possible, brought together. Inspecting officers for the different military districts, and adjutants for the Administrative Battalions, were appointed, who laboured, and that not unsuccessfully, to introduce a greater uniformity of system and methods.

The company committees were gradually got rid of, or essentially altered in character, and restricted in their attributes; the manifold costumes which had been adopted were judiciously brought into a general uniformity; a stricter discipline was cautiously introduced; more frequent opportunities were taken for bringing together different corps in battalions and brigades; and before his death Sidney Herbert had the satisfaction of seeing the Volunteer Force assume a more coherent and effective character, without any loss of the spirit which had originally called it into being.

In the spring of 1860, 20,000 of the Volunteers of London and the southern counties were reviewed in Hyde Park by the Queen. No force so numerous had ever before assembled there, and those who remembered the Duke of Wellington's dictum as to the impossibility of getting 10,000 men out of Hyde Park, if they ever got in there, were not without anxiety. A wish was consequently expressed by some members of the Government to restrict the gathering

to the London Volunteers alone. But to this course neither the Prince Consort nor Lord Herbert would consent, and the result fully justified their decision. Not the slightest difficulty arose, either in bringing the battalions into the park or in withdrawing them, an operation which was conducted with astonishing celerity. The march past itself was a magnificent spectacle, gratifying alike to the Sovereign, the people, and the Volunteers themselves.

In the autumn of 1860 another great review of Volunteers, which surpassed that of Hyde Park in the numbers attending it, was held by the Queen at Edinburgh. Sidney Herbert was present at it and thoroughly appreciated its success and the picturesque of its surroundings.

"The review," he wrote,¹ "will be beautiful. Already, two o'clock, the whole face of the mountain opposite my window is crowded, and up paths above, strings of people, like ants, are creeping up for still higher seats. Every crag and ruin is covered with people and tents. It is wonderfully beautiful. The number of Highland Volunteers in kilts adds eminently to the nationality of the whole throng, and the others all have sprigs of heather in their caps. Poor Hyde Park pales wonderfully before it. There are over 20,000 men to be reviewed, so that even in numbers London is beaten. Every five minutes there passes a band or a battalion, and I run to the window to look at them."

And to Mr. Gladstone he wrote :

"I write with a window looking on Arthur's Seat, and the whole face of the mountain and every crag and ruin is covered with heads, like the pit of a theatre. It is a magnificent sight."

Later still in the year there was a great review of the Volunteers of Lancashire and other northern

¹ To Mrs. Herbert.

counties at Knowsley, the residence of Lord Derby, who lent his park for their assembly.

It was not unnatural that the Volunteers should become slightly intoxicated with their own success and popularity, and in the course of the summer a proposal was made that they should pay a visit to Paris and exhibit themselves to the admiring gaze of the French metropolis—a proposition speedily nipped in the bud by Mr. Herbert, who clearly saw the many obvious objections to such a step, and entirely shared the opinions of Lord Palmerston as expressed by that shrewd and clear-sighted man of the world in the following letter :

"November 8th, 1860.

"MY DEAR SIDNEY HERBERT,

"Mr. Jeffs, the bookseller, the bearer of this, came to me to tell me the evil things which he knows of —, the projector of the proposed excursion of London Volunteers to Paris. He says he knows the said — to be a rogue, and believes him to be a spy of the French Government, and that this excursion scheme has been got up to further some French views.

"It seems to me that it would be desirable to stop the scheme, which might be done by communication with the commanding officers of corps. At present the Volunteer movement in this country, seen by foreign nations at a distance, and in the aggregate, as at the reviews in Hyde Park, at Edinburgh, Knowsley, and elsewhere, assumes the shape of a formidable element of national defence; but this impression would be destroyed by the exhibition at Paris of a couple of hundred raw shop boys dressed in the garb of soldiers, but not individually looking like soldiers. They would be paraded before the French troops, treated with outward civility, and laughed at behind their backs, and the French Army would be taught to look with contempt upon a shopkeeper force, which at present they regard as something which might give them much trouble if they were to land here. *Omne ignotum pro magnifico*, and let us for the present at least enjoy the advantage of the indefinite in regard to the individual soldierlike

qualities and appearance, as well as with regard to the possible numbers, of our Rifle Volunteers."

The newly created organisation did not work without friction, and many were the complaints and questions which came to Mr. Herbert for settlement. But in all that concerned the Volunteers he had a most efficient and painstaking assistant in his Under-Secretary, Lord de Grey, now Marquess of Ripon, to whom almost all the details of the administration of the force and the correspondence involved in it were ultimately committed, and who performed the task entrusted to him in a manner which secured the gratitude of his chief, and the respect and approval of all who became acquainted with his work.

THE MILITIA.

Whatever doubts Mr. Herbert may have entertained as to the practical value of the Volunteer Force, he had none with regard to the importance of maintaining the efficiency of the Militia, and as little hesitation in denouncing as radically wrong the system under which it was administered in 1859.

Sidney Herbert's attempt to revive and reorganise the Militia Force, when a member of Sir Robert Peel's Cabinet, has been already mentioned in an earlier chapter.¹ But the Free Trade measures introduced in the spring of 1846 demanded undivided attention, and the Bill which, with the assent of the Cabinet, Mr. Herbert had prepared to give effect to his views, was never introduced. For some years longer the Militia remained practically extinct, but was again called into existence by an Act passed in 1852. When Herbert was once more in office as a member

¹ Vol. I., Chap. III.

of Lord Aberdeen's Government, the Militia was, after the beginning of the Russian War, regarded mainly as a feeder for the Army. As such it proved so useful—over 71,000 men having passed from the Militia into the Regular Forces during the progress of the War—that after the restoration of peace in 1856, the Militia was allowed to remain embodied, and during the Indian Mutiny of 1857-8 was used in much the same manner as it had been a few years before.

Mr. Herbert, on his accession to office in 1859, found the Militia practically a recruiting agency, and an efficient one. But its efficiency in this capacity was equalled by the irrational extravagance of the methods by which that efficiency was secured.

In his Memorandum on National Defence, quoted in an earlier chapter,¹ Mr. Herbert clearly showed the wastefulness and absurdity of an expenditure which, by reason of its success, might be tolerated at a moment of extreme emergency, but which as a permanent system merited nothing but condemnation. In addition to the evils mentioned in the Memorandum referred to, the double bounties given acted as a practical incentive to desertion with a view to re-enlistment under another name and in another locality. The number of deserters in a single year under these conditions exceeded 20,000.

To this system Mr. Herbert announced his intention to "put an end entirely." He proposed that the embodiment of any part of the Militia in time of peace should be discontinued, and a return made to the older system of keeping the force permanently disembodied but annually trained. This force, he held, as he had done in 1845, should be raised by

¹ Vol. II., Chap. VI., p. 218.

ballot. That it should be so raised was, and still is, the existing law, the operation of which is only suspended by an annual enactment.

But a mere abstention from the introduction in any given year of this suspensory enactment would not in itself be sufficient to secure the efficient operation of the ballot. The machinery provided by Acts more than half a century old was complicated and obsolete. The process to be gone through was so slow that it required eleven weeks to raise a single man, and eleven weeks was, in the middle of the nineteenth century, a period within which a campaign might be not only commenced but concluded.

A Bill was therefore drawn, early in 1860, to give effect to Mr. Herbert's views. Though not unobjected to, it obtained the general assent of the Cabinet. But it was never read even a first time in the House of Commons. The Session of 1860 was an unusually busy one. Legislation consequent on the Commercial Treaty with France, a Reform Bill, which though ultimately withdrawn was lengthily discussed, the repeal of the Paper Duties, the Fortification Loan Bill, to say nothing of discussions on Foreign Affairs, a war with China, and a quarrel with the House of Lords, fully occupied the time of the House, and crowded out the consideration of any measure which, though important, was not of immediate urgency. The introduction of the Militia Bill was postponed till the following year. But when the Session of 1861 opened, Sidney Herbert was no longer a member of the House of Commons, nor was his health such as, had he remained there, would have enabled him to grapple with the details of a complicated and highly controversial measure.

But though no legislation with respect to the

Militia was effected, reforms which could be accomplished without resort to Parliament were persistently pressed forward. The embodied force was rapidly reduced, and it was arranged that the disembodied battalions should be called together for their annual drill as nearly as possible on the same day throughout the country; that fourteen days of the twenty-eight for which they were called out should be devoted to rifle practice; and that, in addition to the annual training, every new recruit should, on first joining, be drilled for twenty-five days at the *depôt*. To give greater reality to the local character of the force, it was directed that recruits should be taken only from the county to which the battalion belonged.

Disappointed though he was in his hopes of establishing the Militia Force on what he thought a proper footing, Mr. Herbert never abandoned the intention of ultimately effecting what he desired, and never ceased to insist on the importance of recognising the Militia as the great reserve force of the nation, second only in importance to the Regular Army, though to be used for home service and home service only.

MR. HERBERT AND HIS SUBORDINATES.

Mr. Herbert was a considerate chief. His equanimity was immovable, his patience wellnigh inexhaustible, and honest mistakes or failings were treated by him with much indulgence. But while the discovery of petty schemes for personal advantage seemed to afford him a sort of amusement rather than displeasure, it was far otherwise when he detected any effort to stifle reasonable complaints, or to make him the mouthpiece of an erroneous statement in the House of Commons. It sometimes

happened that he was furnished from the office with memoranda glossing over some departmental mistake or military irregularity, and was thus led to give a misleading answer to questions put to him in the House of Commons. Any attempt at deception of this sort roused in him anger which was all the more formidable from its contrast with his habitual gentleness. Yet so engrained in the office was its desire to "make the best of things" that no severity on his part sufficed to extirpate the abuse.

The suppression of complaints made by officers in the Army against the action of the office itself, especially in financial matters, roused him to almost equal anger. The discovery of any such case—and they were not uncommon—always excited Mr. Herbert's hottest indignation, and he finally established a rule that every such complaint should, if pressed, be brought to himself for settlement.

I have thus indicated some, though by no means all, of the subjects which chiefly engrossed Sidney Herbert's attention during his tenure of the War Office. Of the drudgery and labour involved in dealing with the myriad questions of minor importance which came before him in the routine of daily work, it would be impossible within reasonable limits to give any accurate account.

Nor is it to be forgotten that, as a member of the Cabinet, Mr. Herbert had to take a share, and sometimes an important one, in decisions which had no reference to the business of the War Office. Though differing from Lord Palmerston in regard to his Italian policy, he might be described as generally adhering to the Palmerstonian section of the Cabinet. His instincts were conservative, and he cannot be

supposed to have been greatly concerned at the failure of Lord John Russell's Reform Bill. Friendly in the first instance to the Repeal of the Paper Duties, he would have abandoned the measure, when the commencement of the war with China showed the inexpediency of abandoning an already existing tax. Nor could he heartily associate himself with the financial policy of Mr. Gladstone, who, he thought, looked too much to saving as an object for its own sake, without regard to its effect on the efficiency of the public service.

But the engrossing nature of the business of his own office precluded Mr. Herbert from taking so prominent a part in the considerations of general policy as would otherwise have been the case.

No written account of the work of a minister and of the questions with which he had to deal, however clear and accurate it may be, can present those questions to the mind of a reader in the same manner in which they originally developed themselves in the mind of the minister himself. It would be unreadable if it attempted to do so. Indeed, the clearer and more definite the detailed account, the greater will be the difference between the record of isolated and finished transactions, and the gradual and confused way in which, in varying phases, a question from day to day presented itself among a crowd of others.

In any written memoir the narrative of each transaction must be clearly separated from other topics, must narrate each step in its proper sequence, and as though it alone had occupied at the time the attention of the minister. But it is not in this manner that such questions originally present themselves or are dealt with. Each comes up for notice from time to time, whether day by day, or at more distant

intervals, as one among a crowd of other matters, great and small, all demanding attention and decision, and many of which, though not in themselves specially important, require immediate treatment, and, consequently, take up time which might, as we now believe, have been more usefully employed.

We see things in the light of the past, and with a knowledge of the consequences which have ensued from a minister's action or inaction. But, at the time, the relative importance of the multitude of matters calling for attention is not always apparent, and cannot be so. Many questions, having in them potentialities of much disturbance, never come to a head, being rapidly and firmly disposed of, and are speedily forgotten, though, if neglected, they might have been the cause of much mischief. On the other hand, questions at first seemingly trivial, and but an insignificant item in the mass of matters submitted to a minister, have sometimes a way of assuming enormously greater proportions, and an importance wholly unexpected.

Who, for example, would have supposed that a dispute between the monks of two convents in Syria, about the possession of a door-key, would have been the original cause of a great European war, in which thousands of lives were lost and millions of treasure wasted ?

It is not always possible to say at first sight what is the relative importance of questions demanding consideration at the same time. Some may at once be recognised as manifestly of real consequence, others as clearly as of no importance at all ; but between them are a number of matters as to which no such definite judgment can at once be passed. With regard to them a minister may easily sometimes mistake, and,

among the many subjects clamorously calling for his attention, may give a disproportionate amount of care to some less worthy of it than others at the same moment before him.

In a written narrative composed long afterwards it is essential, for the reader's sake, that every subject should be separately treated, as though it alone had required and received the minister's thought and sanction, and as if each step in each transaction was as plain to him then as it now is to us. But, in fact, this never is so. We, with our after-knowledge and power of isolating the particular topic, can lay our finger on the blot, and wonder why such a contingency was overlooked, or such a step taken or neglected. The explanation is generally to be found in the fact that a hundred other matters distracted the minister's attention. When a man's mind is full of the speech he is about to deliver, and on the success or failure of which may hang the fate of the Government; when a contest in the Cabinet is impending between himself and a powerful colleague, when he is immersed in the elaboration of some great scheme, it is not always easy to give full and patient attention to details of some matter apparently trivial. We can now see that those details, as well as the matter itself, were in fact important, and in a narrative dealing only with the subject to which they relate, they seem to have been strangely and inexcusably neglected. I do not say that the surrounding circumstances afford an excuse, but they certainly afford an explanation. It is worry and not work that renders life so trying to a minister. Work for a single object may weary, but it does not distract or strain mind and body as does the necessity for keeping in view a myriad different subjects, and

the consciousness of inability to attend to any one of them with the fullness and deliberation which their being thoroughly dealt with demands. It has been remarked that not a few of the Roman Emperors went mad under their load of world-wide responsibility. It is, perhaps, rather matter for surprise that they should not all have done so.

CHAPTER IX

CLOSING DAYS

1861

WHEN, after a long and fatiguing session, Parliament was prorogued in the month of August, 1860, no great eagerness was felt by Ministers for an early resumption of Cabinet meetings. Some took a not ill-earned holiday ; some pursued quietly the work of their respective departments, free from the criticism of Parliament and the supervision of their colleagues. With the diminution of personal intercourse there was less insistence on differences of opinion, and the controversies which had agitated the Cabinet during the session of 1860 were for the time allowed to sleep.

Mr. Herbert accompanied the Queen to Scotland, and was a witness of the great Volunteer Review at Edinburgh, a sight which highly pleased him, and of which he wrote with enthusiasm to Mrs. Herbert in a letter which I have already quoted.¹ After leaving the Queen he paid a few visits, including one to Dunrobin and one to Haddo House, where he, for the last time, saw Lord Aberdeen, who died a few weeks later.

In the autumn of 1859, when writing to Sir James Graham, Sidney Herbert had described himself as never having had better health than then, and it is no doubt a fact that he bore the fatigues of office, and of the short session which followed the General

¹ P. 390.

Election of that year, with much less apparent injury than had been apprehended. But the case was materially different twelve months later. The continued labours of the War Office, the stress and fatigue of the session of 1860, during which he was compelled to speak nearly 200 times, and the great personal pain caused by his altered relations with Mr. Gladstone, accelerated the progress of the fatal disease under which he was already suffering.

During Mr. Herbert's stay in the north, it became manifest that he could no longer endure the strain of the double labour imposed on him, and he determined to take—too late—a step which, if taken earlier, might have afforded him sensible relief. On December 9th he wrote to Lord Palmerston, claiming the fulfilment of a promise that he should be removed to the House of Lords, if he found himself unable to endure the fatigue attendant on a seat in the House of Commons. Lord Palmerston replied :

"94, PICCADILLY,
"December 11th, 1860.

"MY DEAR SIDNEY HERBERT,

"I have received your letter of the 9th. . . . I see, on looking to May's book about the usages of Parliament, third edition, in p. 155 that, in the case of elevation to a peerage during a recess, the Speaker is by law empowered to issue a new writ for the place he represents, upon a certificate from two members that a writ of summons for such member to the House of Peers has been issued. In the cases, however, of members of the House of Commons made peers during my time, it has been found convenient, though from May's book it seems not to have been necessary, that instead of waiting for a writ of summons, they should vacate by taking the Chiltern Hundreds. Look, however, at May's book, and settle the question of time according to your own convenience.

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"You say that you have communicated with your chief supporter, and hope to be able to make a safe arrangement for the county, but as yet I have said nothing to the Queen, and it was settled that I should not do so ; but if county arrangements are to be made, some reports may be got out and reach the Queen, and she would not like to hear that steps were taken in anticipation of an exercise of her prerogative upon which her pleasure had not been taken. Would it not be best that I should take her pleasure, enjoining secrecy, which I think she would observe? Answer this question by return of post. I do not go to Broadlands till Thursday afternoon."

MR. HERBERT TO LORD PALMERSTON.

"WILTON, SALISBURY,
"December 23rd, 1860.

"MY DEAR LORD PALMERSTON,

"I think it is important to your Government now to make the arrangements for supplying a representative of the War Office in the House of Commons as soon as possible. The new Under-Secretary will have a difficult task, for he will have very early in the session to open the War Estimates to the House of Commons, and of course it will be an advantage to him to have seen something of their preparation.

"I have to-day told De Grey,¹ who is staying here, in confidence, of my approaching removal to the House of Lords. The manner in which he received the announcement, which necessarily affects him so much, only adds to the high opinion I had formed of his character. He will do anything to facilitate matters for his successor, and will try to finish the details of the re-organisation of the office which we contemplate as coming from the Report of Sir J. Graham's committee.

"I find likewise that it is impossible to delay much longer the announcement to the county. Mr. Grove, who intends to stand, thinks it of importance, as soon as possible, publicly to occupy the ground. I think, therefore, the intention had better be declared soon.

¹ Now Marquess of Ripon, K.G.

Perhaps, therefore, you would kindly ask Her Majesty's leave to declare it.

"Lord de Grey would wish to see you when next you are in town. He is a man who ought, whenever there is an opportunity, to be again employed. He is an excellent man of business, full of tact and good sense, a thorough gentleman, and fond of work, which he executes thoroughly. He managed a great part of the Volunteer business, seeing a good number of people upon it, and did it with the greatest success and credit. He will be a great loss to the office."

LORD PALMERSTON TO MR. HERBERT.

"BROADLANDS,

"*December 24th, 1860.*

"MY DEAR SIDNEY HERBERT,

"I think the reasons you give for making known your intended removal to the Upper House, and for appointing at once a new Under-Secretary for the House of Commons work, are quite sufficient, and I will lose no time in communicating with the Queen. But as she expressed some disinclination to Osborne, although the appointment is in fact not to be made by her but by you, it would smooth matters if you would write me a few lines which I might send to her, stating the reasons for which you think that Osborne would be the best man to do our work in the House of Commons. The Prince made a good observation, which was that Osborne, having himself been in the Army, would bring to the performance of his duties a useful knowledge of, and sympathy with, the feelings of the Service. I pointed out also that his power of speaking would be useful in combating Radical motions for reduction of military establishments.

"What you say of De Grey entirely confirms the opinion which I had formed of him, though from far less means of forming one than you have had.

"With regard to yourself, what would you prefer—that your removal should take place now and during the recess, or that it should be delayed till the meeting of Parliament, when your seat in the House of Commons might be vacated by your taking the Chiltern Hundreds?

"We are still in a difficulty about the Morocco Loan: the Emperor has, as he says, treasure enough to pay off the whole sum due to Spain; but it is in the interior, and he is afraid of popular outbreak if he was [*sic*] to bring it down to the coast to send it to the Spaniards. On the other hand, he is in daily dread of some collision between the Moors in the neighbourhood of Tetuan, and the Spanish garrison; and he asserts that if Tetuan were evacuated, he could establish his authority all over his territory and be able, after a time, to send his money about as he pleased. But the Spaniards will not evacuate Tetuan till another instalment of the indemnity is paid.

"The Spanish Government seems willing to join us in guaranteeing the interest of the loan to be raised by Morocco. They would prefer guaranteeing a loan for the whole amount due to them, so as to make a clean score between Spain and Morocco.

"I do not know how cold it may have been in your valley, but my register thermometer recorded itself to have been down at 15° last night; quite cold enough to satisfy the greatest lovers of seasonable weather."

Lord Herbert's migration to the House of Lords rendered it necessary that the Under-Secretary of State for War, Lord de Grey, should be replaced by a Member of the House of Commons. Though it is not now a matter of any importance by whom this subordinate post was filled in 1861, the correspondence relating to the appointment is of some interest as giving the contemporary opinion of experienced statesmen as to the qualities of men then new to public life, but most of whom have since made their mark and filled high office. Lord Herbert sent to Lord Palmerston a list of possible candidates for the post, and on that list Lord Palmerston commented as follows:

"The list of names you sent me for Under-Secretary to represent the War Department in the House of

Commons are all good. I should say, however, that it would be a pity to take Frederic Peel¹ away from the Treasury, for which he has been working hard to qualify himself; and as to Layard,² though he is a clever man, he is a wild one, and I should doubt his being to be depended on in harness. Osborne³ is a very clever man, and a good and ready speaker; he was idle at the Admiralty because he disliked being nailed to his chair in the Boardroom and having no opportunity of speaking in the House. He is accustomed to business, and, if he took to the collar, would do it well. Of the others, Hartington⁴ in what he has done in the House, has shown much ability and power; whether he would like the confinement, I know not. Enfield⁵ is clever, but wanting in power. Gifford is certainly clever, and has spoken well, but how is his health? not very good, I believe.⁶ Of Austin Bruce⁷ one has heard a good account. It will be well, however, to consult Brand when the proper time comes, and we must find a man who will not only do the business well in the House, but also suit you in the office.

"The Emperor has advised Francis to leave Gaeta. If he had 'ordered' Barbier de Tisant to do so, it would have been more to the purpose. The Empress was better in health and spirits at Stafford House on Sunday than when I saw her at Windsor. It now appears that she travels only for change of air and scene, that she wanted to go to Spain, and the Emperor advised her to come to England. The Duchess of Sutherland had forty workmen for three days taking down brown holland and preparing Stafford House for the luncheon of the Empress."

Mr. Herbert was willing to acquiesce in Lord Palmerston's wish that Mr. Bernal Osborne should become his Under-Secretary; but he doubted the

¹ Sir Robert Peel's second son.

² Sir A. H. Layard, G.C.B.

³ Who had been Secretary to the Admiralty.

⁴ The present Duke of Devonshire, K.G.

⁵ Afterwards Earl of Strafford.

⁶ Lord Gifford died in 1862.

⁷ Afterwards Lord Aberdare.

wisdom of the choice, and was, perhaps, not altogether sorry to find objections made to the expediency of the step.

THE PRINCE CONSORT TO MR. HERBERT.

"WINDSOR CASTLE,

"December 27th, 1860.

"MY DEAR MR. HERBERT,

"I have to acknowledge the receipt of two confidential letters from you. I need hardly say, in reply, *how much distressed* both the Queen and myself are at your having reason to be apprehensive about the state of your health! You are quite right to leave the House of Commons under the circumstances you allude to, and we trust that the lighter work in the House of Lords may permit you to continue long to discharge, with undiminished success, the important but onerous duties of the War Department.

"We shall regret the loss of Lord de Grey very much, who had won golden opinions in the discharge of his duties of Under-Secretary, and will be much regretted by the Army.

"It will be uncommonly difficult to find a good successor for the office in the House of Commons. The list of candidates you send is not a brilliant one! The person at whose name you have arrived at last, by the process of exhaustion, is certainly not free from grave objections. I can say nothing on these to you which will not have occurred to you before, and while Sir James Graham's testimony to Mr. B. Osborne's discretion and willing subordination while at the Admiralty is most valuable in his favour, it must be borne in mind, that whilst Sir James sate in the same House with him and conducted the parliamentary business himself, there was little room left for his secretary to distinguish himself one way or the other. His first speech on leaving office, and last speech (I believe), about the Army was the famous outburst 'that it would require all the waters of the Thames and the Serpentine to be let through the Horse Guards to cleanse them from their filth and corruption.'

"I consider it of the greatest importance for the

well-being of the Army and the conduct of military matters, both with respect to the Army and to the Crown, that there should exist the most perfect harmony and good understanding between the Secretary of State's office and the Commander-in-Chief, perhaps *only* next in *importance* to the person entrusted with the conduct of the Secretary of State's department in the House of Commons possessing the confidence of that House.

"While you are, therefore, going to collect more information from two or three men very familiar with the House of Commons, I would ask you to put yourself in communication with the Duke of Cambridge also. Should he consider that, notwithstanding what has been said by Mr. Osborne, he can work harmoniously and safely with him, and that his talent for debate and ease of temper and conscience should outweigh the effect produced by his former parliamentary bearing, the Queen (I am sure) will not prevent your obtaining that instrument with which you think that you will be best able to carry on the business of your department, even if she should consider it as an experiment.

"Ever yours truly,
"ALBERT."

The Duke of Cambridge was accordingly consulted, with the following result :

H.R.H. THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD HERBERT.

"January 2nd, 1861.

"I will now reply to that portion of your letter in which you so considerably ask my opinion as to the new arrangement that has become necessary by your removal to the House of Lords. The removal of Lord de Grey from the position of Under-Secretary I most sincerely deplore. He has done his work with great tact and great judgment, and his place will not be easily filled up. But, the necessity for the change having arisen, we must endeavour to find the best man to take charge of the difficult office of conducting the affairs of the Army in the House of

Commons. Of the gentlemen you name to me I have no hesitation in preferring Mr. Baring¹ to any of the others named. I do not think that either F. Peel, Sir J. Ramsden, Lord Hartington, or Lord Bury would do. The two former have been tried and were not very successful, the two latter are quite inexperienced. Bernal Osborne is a man I personally like, but his appointment would, I think, be most unpalatable to the Army, who have no sort of confidence in him, and besides his tone has at times been very offensive to the constituted military authorities, however friendly he has always been personally to myself. Mr. Baring has had a good deal of parliamentary experience, he is clever and speaks well, at all events fairly, and I have always understood that he is a good man of business. I, therefore, strongly advocate him as successor to Lord de Grey, the more so as I think he is a very right thinking and safe man. I trust, therefore, that your choice will fall upon him, and that there will be no difficulty on his part to accept of the offer made to him. In conclusion, let me thank you for the frank and unreserved manner in which you have consulted me on this subject, and trusting that the year 1861 may not end without seeing you restored to perfect health."

Mr. Baring accordingly received the appointment.

Mr. Herbert's intention to quit the House of Commons was not immediately made known to the public; but Mrs. Herbert was permitted to communicate it to a few friends, and among them to Sir James Graham, who replied² that he was—

"quite prepared for the information, which you gave me in confidence. I have long urged the necessity of Sidney leaving the House of Commons; and you may remember that, on the formation of the Government, in concert with you, I represented the danger of continuing a heavy office, such as the War Department, with the waste of strength and life which constant attendance in the House of Commons entails.

¹ Afterwards Earl of Northbrook.

² Netherby, December 30th, 1860.

Subsequent observation has confirmed my apprehensions. In the country, with air, exercise, free enjoyment of his happy home and simple occupations, he is a healthy man, and gay as a summer morning on your Wiltshire Downs. In London, during the sitting of Parliament, he is care-worn, drooping, languid, and every exertion leaves a fatal mark behind it. I will hope that the half measure now about to be taken will be equal to the occasion; but anxieties will still be heavy; and inadequate defence of measures in the House of Commons will not be an alleviation of the burden. However, it is right to begin with the step now about to be taken. Your fond, but just, alarms must not be smothered. You must watch; and if you see the necessity for greater privacy and care, you must be prompt and bold in declaring it; and Sidney has no sincere friend who will not back you. His wife and children have the strongest claims; his colleagues and the interests of the Government are quite secondary.

"I suffered very much from my journey to London¹ and from exposure to extreme cold. I kept my bed for a day or two on my return here, but snow and the thermometer often approaching zero are not reviving; and for many sad reasons my heart sinks within me, and I often think that to depart would be far better. While I live, you may rely always on my warmest sympathies and sincere affection, and Sidney has few friends who have loved him longer or better.

"Say what is most kind from me to him on this occasion; and believe me always,

"Yours very affectionately."

Sir Charles Wood had a few days earlier thus expressed his regret at the—

"loss of the best and most agreeable colleague in the House of Commons that ever I knew. There cannot," he went on to say, "be the same constant intimacy between men in the different Houses of Parliament, and though it must have come sooner or later, that does not make the actual separation less painful and disagreeable when it does come.

¹ To attend Lord Aberdeen's funeral.

Therefore, whilst I am glad that he should have the relief, I cannot quite suppress the selfish feeling of regretting his loss."

On January 1st, 1861, Sidney Herbert issued his farewell address to the electors of South Wilts, announcing his resignation of his seat in Parliament. It was simple, dignified, and not without a touch of manly pathos :

*" To the Electors of the Southern Division of the
County of Wilts.*

"WILTON,

" January 1st, 1861.

"GENTLEMEN,

"It is with pain and regret that I find myself compelled to relinquish the seat in the House of Commons which I have so long filled as your representative. The incessant attendance and late hours unavoidable to a Member of Parliament seeking thoroughly to discharge his duty, and aggravated in my case by the labour of representing a heavy department, have proved too much for my strength ; and I have, at last, most reluctantly arrived at the conclusion that I must not risk the result of another year of so much fatigue.

"I entered Parliament a very young man. Through your favour I have represented the division uninterruptedly for twenty-eight years. I have never had to seek for another constituency.

"Neither has this uninterrupted honour been the result of a complete identity of opinion, nor have I purchased it by any dishonest submission of my opinion to yours. Not doubting my earnestness, you have left me a free agent ; and though differences have existed and been unreservedly expressed, you have treated me with a confidence and an indulgence which I can never forget.

"For myself, I can truly say that I have never made a toy or a pastime of the position you have given me, but I have looked upon it as a solemn trust, and have laboured constantly, assiduously, and to the utmost of my ability so to discharge its duties as best to ensure what appeared to me to be the public good.

"Through the favour of the Crown I hope still to be enabled, though at the cost of less physical exertion, to take a part in the Council of the nation; and the interests which you have hitherto committed to my hands will not be less sacred in my eyes when no longer directly confided to me by you.

"In bidding you farewell, I must offer to the many and true friends who have given me so generous and constant a support my most warm and heartfelt thanks. I must thank also those who have been opposed to me for a forbearance and courtesy honourable to them, and now most gratifying to me to remember. To you all I offer my best wishes for the future, and I pray for a continuance to you of every blessing.

"I have the honour to be, Gentlemen,

"Your most grateful and faithful Servant,

"SIDNEY HERBERT."

Unfortunately, partly from his own chivalrous sense of duty, which prompted him to stick to his post so long as he could perform its duties, and partly in deference to the strength of the wish generally expressed that he should retain it, Lord Herbert allowed himself to be persuaded not to retire from office at the same time that he left the House of Commons—the only thing which could then have saved or materially prolonged his life. Had he done so, he might have lived some years more; as it was, he was fated not to see the close of that which had just commenced. One or two friends had the courage to express regret that he should not have given himself a fair chance. Among them was Sidney Godolphin Osborne, who wrote:

"I am truly glad you are going to get some rest, or rather alleviation in the matter of work. I am not patriot enough to wish my friends sacrificed to my country, so I wish you were out of office altogether for a good two years. The brain will kick when hard pressed. Cabinet Ministers have the same organisation as other men; if they will tamper with nature, the liver and heart will complain, then rebel, at last come to open war, and we are beat. Do

think more of yourself and your own folks, etc., than of this country. Were I worldly wise, I should always wish my friends in the Cabinet; but where I really love them, it is the last thing I desire for them. I don't congratulate you on the Peerage, for you do not need the first-class ticket, though I am glad you get into an easier carriage."

But most of the letters which he received expressing regret and sympathy at his leaving the House of Commons contained also expressions of satisfaction at his not leaving his post at the War Office—a post he was to retain for so short a time. These letters came from all quarters, and many of them must have given him sincere pleasure. The Duke of Cambridge, who had not always been at one with him on points of War Office administration, wrote as follows:

"HORSE GUARDS,

"January 2nd, 1861.

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"It was with feelings of real sorrow that I read your letter of yesterday, which reached me this morning. I had heard it reported for some little time that the state of your health would compel you to leave the House of Commons and be removed up to the House of Lords. I hoped it would not be so; I mean that the necessity for such a step had not, and would not, arise. Your letter has, however, confirmed the report I had heard, and from my heart I deplore the cause of it, though I most sincerely hope and trust that by taking these precautions you may see your health completely restored at no very distant period. It is to me at the same time a great relief to find that, in the House of Lords, the Army and country will retain your valuable services as Secretary of State for War. Had it been otherwise, I can conscientiously say that no event could have taken place that would have given me deeper sorrow or regret. I have now some little experience in matters of government, and I do not believe that there is a single statesman or public man who could perform the onerous duties of your office with greater advan-

tage to the Army or to the country than yourself. As for myself, you know, I think, by this time, that I look upon you as a valued friend, and no greater misfortune could happen to me at the present moment, in my public capacity, than to lose you as my valued colleague. However, fortunately, there is no probability of this, and I am so far relieved in the communication you have made to me."

This letter may be relied on as the honest expression of the feelings of a thoroughly straightforward man, and considering the nature of their official relations, it is highly creditable to both.

Lord Granville wrote from Bowood on January 4th :

"You will be an immense addition to us, useful, ornamental, and agreeable—and you will find our parliamentary work perfect child's play after the Commons. You will be an equal loss in the House of Commons. I consider it a blow to the Government there. I trust that it is only a wise precaution on your part; but if you are feeling unwell, you are acting prudently in taking the step, which must be a painful one."

Mr. Gladstone, in reply to Mrs. Herbert's intimation, addressed the following letter to Mr. Herbert himself :

"HAWARDEN, *January 2nd*, 1861.

"MY DEAR HERBERT,

"I had caught some of the rumours, which, notwithstanding all precautions, might well in such a case float about; but it was only this morning and from Mrs. Herbert's kind letter that I learned we are about to lose you from the House of Commons, where you and I have summered and wintered it, and, except for a few months, have rubbed shoulders together for a large piece of our lives. This is a great event and a sad one; but though you will miss us, and we shall more miss you, you are doubtless doing a wise act, and not only could I not wish you to do otherwise, but I feel that the

embarrassments it may occasion for the moment are of very small account compared with the objects you have had in view. I cannot, therefore, thicken my condolences with quite so black an ink as Mrs. Herbert would have me—though a slow observer of faces, I could not but see this recess had failed to do for you what was to be desired, and it is a sincere pleasure to think that you will gain relief without being lost, at any rate, to the Government and to the administrative service of the country.

“I shall be curious and anxious to know what the secondary arrangements are to be. Should they for the moment be hard upon De Grey, they will only quicken his excellent claims for preferment; but I am rather at a loss to know what you will do to procure a fit representative of so vast a department in the House of Commons.

“It is very unfortunate that both the huge spending departments should have their heads in the Lords; but these things cannot always be helped.

“I hope, and suppose, that you will, when you bring forward your Estimates, be able to form some judgment on the cause and limits of the remaining China expenditure. But there will not, I think, be a great pressure in point of time; for though there may be some reasons for finance, there are more against it. The greatest question after all, there and elsewhere, is, Shall we be more discreet in our foreign policy hereafter, not so much as to its principle, but as to its temper and humour?

“I have received, with pleasure, a good account of Graham since Lord Aberdeen's funeral, when he appeared to suffer excessively from the cold.”

Lord John Russell, on first learning Mr. Herbert's intention, wrote to express a hope that “removal to the pure air of the House of Lords may have the invigorating effects which are expected from it.”

A few days after he seems to have thought, or to have been told, that this was hardly an adequate appreciation either of the sacrifice made by Mr. Herbert or the loss sustained by the House of Com-

mons, and added at the commencement of a note on other matters :

"January 9th.

"I fear that, though I felt much grieved at the necessity of your giving up the House of Commons, I wrote rather lightly about it. If so, I am sorry for it."

The Speaker¹ wrote to Mrs. Herbert :

"OSSINGTON,

"January 5th.

"... The loss to the House of Commons will be very great indeed. The work of the War Department in the last session was frightfully laborious and trying to the last degree. It was gone through most ably and most gallantly. To me, much considering these things, it seemed that in S. H. were assembled those rare qualities and powers which mark their possessor as Leader of the House of Commons.

"... I am ready to congratulate you upon it, and to rejoice with you that his services will be preserved to the public (let us hope) without too great a sacrifice of health ; while a little more of the time of the pleasantest gentleman in England will be spared to yourself, to his family, and his friends."

The anticipation as to Leadership here expressed was very widely shared, and would no doubt have been realised had Herbert's life been prolonged. Mr. Cardwell, after lamenting in a letter to Mrs. Herbert the inevitable diminution of intimate intercourse which must result from sitting in different Houses, added : "However, all these considerations are in some degree selfish, for Herbert will not lose the command he has attained, by going now to the House of Lords."

¹ Rt. Hon. J. Evelyn Denison, afterwards Viscount Ossington.

Bishop Wilberforce wrote a day later :

"... Whilst I can fully enter into all your feelings at giving up the county and the House of Commons, so far from your moving into the House of Lords standing in the way of your political course, my own belief is (and I do not believe that I am deceived by my great pleasure in having you there) that it will distinctly tend to help on the end I so fully expect, of seeing you at the Head of the Government of the country."¹

Escape from the House of Commons no doubt lightened Lord Herbert's labours, but there was little really gained by the change, except comparative immunity from late hours and a heated and unwholesome atmosphere. The manifold worries of the War Department, small and great, permitted no diminution of mental anxiety or toil, and the close rooms of the office in which Lord Herbert was daily imprisoned

¹ A delay in the announcement of Lord Herbert's title produced the following elaborate piece of ponderous pleasantry from the Russian Ambassador :

"CHESHAM HOUSE,
"6 *Janvier*, 1861.

"MON CHER VOISIN ET AMI,

"Les journaux me disent que vous êtes un homme charmant. Je le savais, fort longtemps, avant qu'ils m'en eussent fait la découverte. Ils se lamentent de votre retraite de la Chambre des Communes. Je vous en fais mon compliment, car je me réjouis de vous voir dîner à 8 heures et aller ensuite à l'Opéra, surtout si vous voulez bien y venir avec nous. Enfin, ils prétendent que vous êtes d'une santé délicate, affaiblie par le travail. Je n'en crois rien du tout. Vous êtes, Dieu merci, d'une constitution plus forte que celle de la plupart des Etats, vos amis et alliés du Continent, sans en excepter celle de la Sardaigne ! Mais, après tout, une chose essentielle que les journaux ne me disent pas : c'est le nom qu'il faut donner désormais à mon très honorable ami et voisin ! N'allez pas me dire que cela ne me regarde pas du tout. Je vous répondrais : que voilà bien 40 ans que j'ai l'honneur d'être au nombre des amis les plus dévoués de votre famille. Je réclame ainsi mon droit d'ancienneté, en venant à vous, chapeau bas, pour vous demander, mon cher et aimable ami, comment faut-il que je vous adresse les lettres ennuyeuses, dont je vous demande mille pardons chaque fois qu'il m'arrive de vous importuner, je vous l'avoue bien malgré moi ?

"Mille et mille amitiés,
"BRUNNOW."

were wholly wanting in the fresh air he required and longed for.

The recess had passed away quietly, but the differences in the Cabinet were not less existent and not less real because argument with respect to them had for the moment ceased. With the approach of a fresh session they sprang into renewed activity.

During the same month in which he resigned his seat in the House of Commons Lord Herbert was engaged in almost hopeless efforts to reconcile the discordant views of his colleagues as to the nature of the Estimates to be presented to Parliament. He had his own well-considered plans, but was subjected on the one hand to strong pressure from Mr. Gladstone and the economists to reduce the Army Estimates below what he deemed safe, and on the other was urged by Lord Palmerston, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Prince Consort, not to consent even to reductions which Sidney Herbert himself thought justifiable and perhaps desirable. Mr. Gladstone, "after two long days' hard fighting" and threats of resignation, succeeded in getting "the Navy Estimates a little down,"¹ and wrote to Lord Herbert the same day, January 26th :

"Without entering into details, I entreat you to consider how the Government may place its proceedings with regard to the Army in conformity with those respecting the Navy.

"Last year there was a sentiment of danger at times which disposed people to wish for a strong Army as well as a strong Navy. This year the sentiment of danger has materially abated, and a counter-cry for economy has become audible, though I by no means venture to say how far it will prevail. But I wish to take an impartial view of the two cases relatively.

¹ Morley's Life of Gladstone, Vol. II. p. 93.

The sentiment of dignity and the desire to be strong in Europe when Continental convulsion is probably near at hand, certainly will tell much more in favour of keeping up the Navy than the Army. Under these circumstances, and notwithstanding the special urgency of iron shipbuilding, we are going to make a sensible reduction upon the Navy. I will not say how this has been brought about, but it is now a matter of fact. How can we offer this Estimate to Parliament, and at the same time leave the Army Estimates where they were?

"When you told me you had a reduction of 600 men, but would lose the benefit, or nearly the whole, by losing payments from the East Indian Government, I was quite prepared to say we must confront disadvantageous appearances and stand on the substance. But when I find that some two-thirds of that are a nominal reduction, obtained, I must say, in what seems to me an exceptionable manner (never known to me until to-day), I am obliged to confess that what remains is a reduction so trivial that it must be put out of view in dealing with these vast sums.

"If, on the other hand, it is true we are to lose early in the financial year 8,000 men for Indian depôts, is nothing to be allowed for the great addition to reserve force in Militia and the large and increasing number of Volunteers?

"After the war with China has ended, it is true a part of the expeditionary force remains; but how is it possible to justify adding to the effective number of the force at home the 3,000 or 4,000 men who are, as we have every reason to suppose, coming home shortly from Tientsin?

"Waiving details, however, I will now put it to you that your plans for the Army, as they stand, do not agree either in a political or in a popular and parliamentary sense with those for the Navy; and I cannot say how earnestly I trust that you will bring them into a better relation.

"It is, I trust, the last time that you or any one will receive from me an appeal of this nature."

But Lord Palmerston on the same day had written :

"It seems to me that you have proposed quite sufficient reductions, and that we ought not to go

further. We ought not to diminish the force which you propose for the United Kingdom, which is small enough to face any emergency, your colonial garrisons ought not to be reduced, and the force in India is paid for out of Indian revenues. As to stores, we ought to have a good many more muskets, and it is absolutely necessary that our fleet and our land forces should be fully furnished with the best and heaviest guns applicable to the purposes of the sea and land services. Gladstone, Bright, and Cobden, and some forty or fifty of the Liberals may clamour for further reductions; but I am fully convinced that we shall have on our side a large majority in Parliament and in the country."

And the Prince Consort, on a yet earlier day, had thus expressed himself:

"WINDSOR CASTLE,
"January 1st, 1861.

"MY DEAR LORD HERBERT,

"There are rumours afloat in your office of intended reductions in the Army. I sincerely trust they are without foundation, as we were never in a condition to want more our military resources to be developed. I feel certain that the Cobden circular, got up at Paris, has found, and will find, no favour with the British nation. Lord Palmerston and Lord John both declared to us that they would resist the reduction of a single man, and I know that the whole Conservative party is prepared to support the Estimates of the Government.

"Ever yours truly,
"ALBERT."

After hot discussion, a slight reduction was effected on the Military Estimates, which was, however, regarded by Mr. Gladstone as "purely nominal."

Had Military Questions been those on which alone divergent opinions were held, the matter would have been speedily settled by the retirement of those members of the Government who were unable to assent to the Fortification Loan, who objected

to the erection of the works which the Prime Minister and the great majority of the Cabinet were determined to construct, and who desired a reduction in the strength of the Army.

But there were other subjects which caused difference of opinion and dissatisfied feeling in the Cabinet, and yet, curiously enough, tended to prevent secession from its ranks. Both of Lord Palmerston's principal lieutenants thought that they had causes of grievance against him, unconnected with the Fortification Loan. Lord John Russell considered that the Reform Bill which he had been allowed to bring forward had been supported without sincerity, and abandoned without reluctance by the Prime Minister, as was indeed in some degree the case, for there was nothing Lord Palmerston more cordially disliked than any scheme of Parliamentary Reform.

Mr. Gladstone not only loathed with his whole soul the measures of Defence which to Lord Palmerston seemed imperative, but had a more personal and direct cause of offence with his Chief, who had connived, if not more than connived, at the rejection by the House of Lords of Mr. Gladstone's scheme for the removal of what were magniloquently and somewhat inaccurately styled the Taxes on Knowledge—in other words, the Excise and Import Duties upon Paper. Lord Palmerston had not only done this, but had refused to carry reprisals against the House of Lords to the extent desired by Mr. Gladstone.

Moreover, Mr. Gladstone, though in cordial agreement with Lord Palmerston and Lord John as to the propriety of interference to any extent in the domestic affairs of Italy, was, somewhat inconsistently, as much opposed as he had ever been to such meddling in any other quarter, and was never tired of

denouncing what seemed to him the follies and wickednesses of the Foreign Office.

Lord Palmerston on his side had reason to complain that Mr. Gladstone had in an unmistakable manner shown to the world, by his speeches, how strongly he dissented from the policy of the Government of which he was a member, both as regarded the Fortification Vote and the course to be pursued on the rejection of the Paper Duty.

There were, therefore, strong grounds for difference which might, and under other circumstances probably would, have led to a complete rupture between Mr. Gladstone and the Head of the Government, and which were aggravated by the fact that neither Mr. Gladstone nor Lord Palmerston ever understood or appreciated one another at a true value. They were essentially dissimilar. Lord Palmerston's *poco curante* levity in the treatment of affairs, and his not over-rigid morality, were abhorrent to Mr. Gladstone's anxious temperament and grave view of public questions; while Mr. Gladstone's high ideals seemed to Lord Palmerston to be tinged with fanaticism or hypocrisy. The good as well as the bad qualities of Lord Palmerston's character tended to increase his distrust and dislike of his colleague. Remarkable himself for the loyalty with which he adhered to friends and followers, even when little deserving it, he looked on Mr. Gladstone's sudden *volte-face* with distrust, and, though he profited by it, he did not conceal his disapproval of what he regarded as the abandonment by Mr. Gladstone of those with whom, for some years, he had been drawing into closer and closer relations, and had so recently been on the point of joining in Lord Derby's Cabinet. Nor was it possible, unless he had been more than human,

for him wholly to forget that, almost up to the moment of becoming his colleague, Mr. Gladstone had for some years been in the habit of denouncing him as the worst and most profligate minister of the nineteenth century. As the strongest opponent of his cherished Fortification Scheme, Lord Palmerston would have rejoiced to rid himself of Mr. Gladstone, could he have safely done so.

But there were considerations which had a restraining effect on both Mr. Gladstone and Lord Palmerston, and on Lord John Russell also. Mr. Gladstone and Lord John were the only two members of the Cabinet who thoroughly agreed with Lord Palmerston in his Italian policy, which was regarded by most of the Cabinet with half-hearted approval or positive dislike. Lord Palmerston could not afford to lose the most earnest and powerful advocate, both in the Cabinet and in the House of Commons, of the Italian cause. Mr. Gladstone could not afford to risk the weakening of the Government which would result from his secession, and which might involve the downfall of the only Ministry likely to be really zealous in its support of the Italian Revolution, the triumph of which was so near his heart. A rupture was therefore adjourned, and in the end altogether avoided. But the tension was great, and the breaking-point often seemed to have been reached.

In the middle of March, the Militia Estimates raised as great a storm in the Cabinet as the Army Estimates had done two months previously. Mr. Gladstone again threatened resort to what he called the *ultima ratio*, and on March 13th addressed Lord Herbert as follows:

“I think you will agree with me that there was an understanding in the Cabinet, when the Army

Estimates were agreed to, with a slight and scarcely stateable reduction, that the Militia Estimate was not to be materially varied. I remember observing that some sum that was named, and that was much like that you now propose by way of increase (*viz.* £148,000), would absorb practically the whole of that small reduction which we presented.

"I am bound to say that without that reduction—in my opinion, as you know, most insufficient—I for one could not have assented to the Estimates, but should at once have taken, however reluctantly, the only other course open to me.

"I have always felt that in the present inflated state of our establishments it is wholly impossible for me to consider Army and Militia Estimates otherwise than as *one*. With great difficulty I brought myself to acquiesce in proceedings which—after peace with China—simply indicated the turning of the tide. That was a minimum which, in my view, admitted of no further concession; while of course it was, and is, hardly a matter for me to say whether the ground thus taken could be best maintained by withholding augmentations from the Militia or offering diminutions in some part of the Army votes.

"I think the Cabinet, like myself, looked at the two chiefly as a whole."

Mr. Gladstone, a few days after, while paying a visit at Wilton, declared that he would not "yield another inch, or listen to any further proposals." This was not unnaturally understood to mean that he would resign; but on April 3rd he wrote:

"I want to correct a misapprehension which I may have conveyed to your mind on Monday when we were on horseback. After speaking of the manner in which things had been held together up to this point, and expressing my opinion that it must soon end, I said that I had got to the end of my tether, and would not accede to any more proposals. Construed literally, this would mean that I meant to refuse my concurrence during this year to any Act for giving further effect to the Fortifications Act of last year. This is not so: I consider as a part of the

concession then made what may be necessary to execute the works that *then* obtained the sanction of Parliament, whatever my opinion may be of the scheme itself, which, I am sorry to say, grows worse every day. Under all circumstances I hope, and it is no small pleasure and relief to hope so, all debates between you and me on these matters are ended.

"Our visit gave us much delight, but it wanted one thing, and the chief—namely, the knowledge that you were giving yourself fair play."

Mr. Gladstone's decision to remain in office was a cause of surprise to all his colleagues and of disappointment to some. It appeared, however, to be only postponed, for in another week disruption was again threatened, and I find Lord Herbert writing thus to Mr. Gladstone on April 10th :

"I earnestly trust that we may come together again to-day, for all our sakes and for yours likewise. It would never do to break up about the distribution of a surplus, which is a question of convenience, with much to be said as to many courses, so I *hope*.

"I cannot help thinking that Anderson has not given you the amount of the excess on the Army votes for 1859-60. The question of amount depends on what portions can be properly charged to the China vote of credit. The last accounts I had was that it would amount to about £200,000. This, at any rate, ought to be stated, or General Peel will be talking of concealment."

By common though tacit consent, discussion as to the further prosecution of the Fortification Scheme was adjourned to the latest possible moment, and, in point of fact, it did not come before the Cabinet until after Lord Herbert had left England in July. But its shadow was always impending, and Mr. Gladstone's views and intentions were clearly known to his colleagues.

While willing to vote for such additional sums

as might be required to complete the works authorised in the previous year, Mr. Gladstone maintained that he was free to oppose, and would oppose, the commencement of any fresh works, although forming a part of the scheme which had been submitted to Parliament, the whole cost of which had been estimated at £9,000,000.

The general difference in aim and principle between Mr. Gladstone's views on Military Questions and that of his colleagues of course led to a different mode of viewing all questions, even though minor and subsidiary ones, which affected the reduction, maintenance, or increase of military expenditure. Lord John Russell wrote to Lord Herbert on January 4th :

"We are in trouble with Mexico. The Government there have stolen £130,000 from the bondholders, secured under the padlock and seal of the Legation. The merchants want us to occupy Vera Cruz, and march to Mexico. But there are strong objections to both operations. Could we, however, furnish an auxiliary force to help the other and rival Government to get into the city of Mexico? They are already very near it. I should think 2,000 men might suffice. Could they be sent from the West Indies? I would not propose to send them, except in the healthy season. What would you say to this? I wish to know before I write to Palmerston. Some persons suggest that part of the force from China might march through Mexico. But this would be costly and very uncertain, and would require a large force."

To this suggestion Lord Herbert objected, and Lord John gave way :

"January 8th.

"I do not wonder," he wrote, "at your demurring to an expedition to Mexico, and it is just what I expected. On the other hand, you must not expect me to get the robbers to disgorge £130,000 by merely asking them to do so in a despatch. I therefore propose

to recognise Juarez, as Buchanan has already done, and to give him our *moral* support, provided he aids us in getting back the bondholders' money."

Discussions with the United States respecting conflicting claims to the islands in Vancouver Sound induced Lord Russell to write Lord Herbert two or three days later, January 8th :

"I hope you will find no difficulty in sending a regiment to Vancouver."

Mr. Gladstone opposed this measure, as also the intention to retain troops in China till the War indemnity was paid, and wrote to Lord Herbert on January 10th :

"It surely cannot be that we are going to levy instalments of 'indemnity' in China at a cost of occupation heavier than said instalments. Such a question seems insulting ; but in these times everything is credible.

"The F[oreign] O[ffice] is a furnace which must be fed with a certain quantity of fuel ; and if the wickedness of men, original and actual, will not furnish the requisite supplies, we must make more. This seems to be the 'principle' of our policy. . . .

"It seems to me a point of duty and principle to decline putting force into the hands of our diplomatist in Mexico (I know not who) until reparation has been refused. Perhaps that may have happened. If not, the error will be that which has been at the root of all our misfortunes in China. I might say of our *sins* there too."

In another letter written on the same date he said :

"To increase force in Vancouver's Island at this moment of distraction for the United States would surely be something like carrying bullying to the point of shabbiness. It seems equally unsuited to the juncture when we have just proposed arbitration. I, on the contrary, should look for a decrease of force in that quarter for the next financial year."

Lord Palmerston, with perhaps larger foresight, took a different view, and asked Lord Herbert to concert with the Duke of Cambridge and the Duke of Newcastle the best means of strengthening our force in Canada.

"The account we got from Lyons of the temper and behaviour of Seward, amply corroborated by what we saw of that worthy when he was here, lead to the conclusion, which Lyons very urgently impresses on us, that there is great danger that at any time, and soon as likely as late, Seward may create some serious differences between the two Governments.

"It is obvious that he would be encouraged so to do just in proportion as he might think us weak in any point which he could reach, and of course our North American provinces are that point. We have proposed, and we all agreed, that one additional regiment should be sent to Canada ; but I would strongly urge that we should send at least three. They might go successively if that was thought best, or at once and together if it was thought that their so going might be a useful hint to Seward and Lincoln and their associates. It is quite true that four or five regiments of the line would not of themselves constitute a force sufficient to make head against a large United States force ; but they would be a most important foundation upon which a Militia and Volunteer force might be formed into an army. Their presence would impose confidence, and stimulate and organise local exertion. The summer is the only time at which troops can be sent, and they ought to arrive soon in order to prevent things which it might require more active efforts to correct after they had happened. The accounts we shall from time to time receive will show whether it will or will not be advisable still further to strengthen our North American garrison before the navigation is closed by frost.

"The Federal Government have been rousing the military spirit of the people, and have been telling them that their national dignity and power and position among the nations of the earth will be greatly damaged by the separation of the Southern States.

"The military ardour may soon be satiated by an

encounter with the Southern States, and it may seek a vent against what they may think a weaker antagonist in our provinces. The Northern States may find that it is beyond their power to reunite the broken Federal lock, and they may then think of indemnifying themselves in the North for what they have irrecoverably lost in the South. For these reasons common prudence seems to require that we should be seen and known to be strong enough for defensive purposes in our provinces.

"I apprehend that we could without inconvenience or risk at home send a respectable force to Canada, if required. It would be well also to consider how we are off in those provinces for artillery and good Enfields.

"The Americans will be well armed, and our Militia and Volunteers in North America ought to be furnished with arms as good as those of the people whom they may have to meet.

"It was not a bad dodge of Seward and Lincoln to try to get away all our spare muskets from Canada, with the intention of being more easily able afterwards to threaten us with a quarrel without danger to themselves.

"I have just got your Iceland information, which I have sent on to John Russell. It confirms with more detail what we knew generally before as to French proceedings in Iceland, and it corroborates the conviction which every reasoning man ought to entertain, that our friend, the Emperor, is only waiting till he has succeeded in being strongest at sea (which it is our business to prevent) to launch his thunders and his long-pent-up and craftily concealed enmity against England."

Lord Herbert was willing to yield a good deal to Mr. Gladstone by withdrawing a part of the force in China, but Lord John Russell was not. On receiving Lord Herbert's announcement that he proposed to direct the evacuation of the Taku forts and Canton, coupled with a request that Mr. Bruce might be instructed accordingly, Lord John formally and officially replied :

"FOREIGN OFFICE,
"April 2nd.

"MY LORD,

"I have had the honour to receive your lordship's letter of yesterday's date. It appears to me that the grave questions of Imperial policy carried in it cannot be decided except by the Cabinet, with the approbation of Her Majesty. If the force at Tientsin were brought away prematurely, I should be apprehensive that Mr. Bruce and the members of his Legation might suffer the fate of Major Anderson and Captain Brabazon, who were captured during a flag of truce and inhumanly murdered.

"But this is a question not merely affecting Mr. Bruce and his Legation; it is a question affecting peace and war with China. Nor is it simply a question of economy. We have not asked an indemnity from China as a matter of financial gain or financial saving: we have asked and obtained it to show to the Chinese the consequences of a breach of faith. I will not enter into the diplomatic relations now subsisting with China. They are uncertain and unsettled. I will content myself with saying that until Mr. Bruce shall have written from Peking, and the Cabinet shall have decided on the contents of his despatches, I must decline to accede to your lordship's request to send instructions to Mr. Bruce in conformity with your lordship's views.

"I have, etc.,
"J. RUSSELL."

And on the 5th he wrote privately from Pembroke Lodge :

"My recollection of what passed is this. I proposed that the Cabinet should keep in its own hands the power of recalling the troops from China, on reports of our agents there. Gladstone wished that, in order to expedite the evacuation, Bruce should be authorised to order the evacuation, and with this wish I complied.

"It is now proposed that this discretion should be taken away from Bruce, and that he should be exposed to the murderous attacks of the Chinese, if they are so minded. Would England leave his

death unavenged? And if not, where would be the economy?

"I cannot take upon myself to send peremptory orders to Bruce to evacuate Tientsin till I get his reports from Peking.

"I should have thought that the furnishing of transports to bring away 10,000 men would be a very costly operation. But I suppose the Naval Estimates would have to provide the money. Still, the cost to the country will be the same.

"In framing the Estimates you had the treaty before your eyes, and that treaty provides for the occupation of Tientsin and the Taku forts till the indemnity is paid. The Indian troops may be removed when you like, provided the British troops remain."

Mr. Gladstone's comment was that—

"It appears quite clear that the Chinese occupation, prolonged in order to get the indemnity, is costing us much more than the indemnity itself! But these are not days in which notes of exclamation ought to be used on these subjects."

The matter was, as usual, compromised. On April 28th Lord John writes of a draft prepared by Lord Herbert:

"This letter will do very well, and I will frame my despatch upon it. . . . The force at Canton may be entirely taken away, if, as I understand from Thouvenel, the whole French force is to be withdrawn from China in order to make the conquest of Cochin China."

All through the spring Lord Herbert's illness was increasing, nor had his transfer to the House of Lords afforded him any real relief. As early as February the Prince Consort had written of him that "death had him in his grasp."¹ To avoid sleeping in town he lived almost entirely at a villa at Highgate, lent to him by Lady Dufferin. He was now unable to walk

¹ Martin's *Life of the Prince Consort*, Vol. V. p. 272.

upstairs without distress, and, when in London, only used the ground floor of his house in Belgrave Square. He spent Whitsuntide at Wilton, but returned to Highgate on May 27th.

But, ill though he was, he still paid unremitting attention to details of service. In the last few days of June he received and wrote many letters. There was correspondence with the Prince Consort as to the gift and exchange of decorations ; with the Duke of Cambridge on the same subject ; with the Duke of Newcastle and the Duke of Cambridge as to the suppression and amalgamation of colonial regiments, about leave to the Governor of Gibraltar, about the system of education, marks, and discipline at Sandhurst, about staff appointments in Ireland, the military and civil government of the Ionian Islands, and other subjects, among them the reluctance of Generals to accept West Indian commands—a matter which occupied more time and gave more trouble than was at all deserved by its intrinsic importance. On June 21st he spoke at some length—and for the last time—in the House of Lords on a motion for the admission of natives of India to the examination for entrance into the Army Medical Service. He contended that it was only in India that natives were entitled, as of right, to compete with other British subjects, so that the question was one not of principle, but of expediency. He fully recognised the skill and care shown by the Indian doctors ; but the fact remained that the British soldier had a prejudice against them, and did not trust them. However unreasonable that prejudice might be, its existence must be taken into account, and he considered that as soldiers had no choice in the selection of their doctor, and could not go where they would for medical

advice, it was only reasonable that their wishes should receive attention.

Nor was it to official work only that his attention was directed. On June 11th he wrote to the Bishop of Salisbury, earnestly dissuading him from the contemplated prosecution of the Rev. R. Williams for his article in "Essays and Reviews," urging that :

"Public opinion is the true corrective of these errors. At present the whole feeling of the community is against a man who eats the bread of the Church and undermines her doctrines. He is looked upon as a faithless servant, and a traitor to his vows, and his doctrines are discredited with him. If, however, he is ejected from his benefice he stands in a different light. He is quits with the Church, for he has paid the penalty of his offence. He is a self-denying martyr who has sacrificed all to what he considers truth. It is assumed that that for which he has made the sacrifice may be truth, or have some truth in it. A large amount of public sympathy always rallies round a man in this position. He becomes the weaker party, and a certain indiscriminating generosity of feeling sides with him and supports him. His name becomes a rallying point, a standard is raised, and the doctrines receive a certain imprimatur."

More complete rest was urgently enjoined on him, and on June 29th he went down to Wilton much exhausted. The same night he was taken ill with an attack of a character which he had not before experienced—a species of pleurisy. After much suffering, he partially recovered, and his cheerfulness and determination to hide, as far as possible, his sufferings from others are shown in a letter written to Mr. Gladstone from Wilton on July 5th, in which he says :

"Thanks for a most kind and affectionate letter from you about my wretched self. I am very much

better ; but I am doing now what I ought to have done months ago. I was very unwell on Friday and Saturday, and came down here skipping the Cabinet, and going to bed when I arrived. Here I have had perfect quiet, rest, a cool temperature, and every comfort, to say nothing of a doctor who always sets me up, and almost always by the simple process of stopping all drugs and leaving me alone. He has put all the London doctor's drugs behind the fire ; and I have had three nights' sleep and three days' comfort, such as I have not had for these six months. Goodbye."

It was on the following day that Dr. Bence Jones told Lord Malmesbury that the case was hopeless.¹ There was no diminution in the more serious symptoms of Lord Herbert's illness, and it was determined, at his own wish, and with the rather reluctant acquiescence of his medical advisers, that he should go at once to Spa. He was himself aware of the incurable nature of his disease, but had determined to fight against it so long as there was any scope for his being of use to others. He now, however, felt that the battle was over, and placed his resignation in Lord Palmerston's hands, leaving him free to use it when convenient. Lord Palmerston acquiesced, as indeed he could not but do, in his retirement from the War Office, but begged him to remain in the Cabinet, a delicate attention to the dying Minister, with whom Lord Palmerston but too well knew he would never again sit in Council.

Even yet he was pestered by official business--at all events up to July 6th, on which day, among many other letters, he received one from Lord Palmerston of considerable importance as showing that the Fortification Question with all its troubles was immediately about to come before the Cabinet.

¹ "Diary of an Ex-Minister," Vol. II. p. 256.

"I shall have very soon to propose to the House of Commons a Bill authorising a further issue of terminable annuities on account of our fortifications, and I should wish to add to the sum required for them a further sum to enable Somerset to make progress with the additional iron-plated ships, which it will be necessary for us to build in order to keep pace with the French; but Somerset is not at present ready with his estimates for that purpose.

"With regard to the fortifications I can, without troubling you, get from Jervois and Burgoyne and others a statement of what may be required this year for the works already authorised and begun.

"I should, however, much like to get from the House of Commons authority for the additional fort which was intended to be placed nearly opposite the entrance of Portsmouth Harbour, and for the completion of the chain of forts round Chatham—the western portion of which we last year postponed. If Chatham Dockyard is enlarged, the line of defence to the east, south, and west ought to be made complete. But these two matters may be considered by-and-by.

"The Sultan seems destined to resuscitate the Turkish Empire. He has put on half pay, and otherwise disposed of, the 2,000 female inhabitants of his brother's establishment. He has dismissed 500 unworthy servants, and the still more unworthy Minister of War, Riza Pasha."

In the face of subsequent events this last paragraph reads like satire!

I do not think this letter was answered. At all events, Herbert's last word on the subject of Fortification had been spoken, nor was he to take part again in the discussions which had so deeply interested him.

On July 9th Sidney Herbert left Wilton, and on that evening saw and took leave of his more intimate personal and political friends. Among them was Sir James Graham, who was greatly overcome. He tried to attribute his emotion to other causes, but he and all others admitted and recognised that, though their

farewells were avowedly only those given to a friend contemplating a short absence at a foreign watering-place, they were, in fact, final. It was the day on which the Queen's birthday was that year kept, and, before leaving Belgrave Square, Lord Herbert wandered through the reception-rooms, looking at the preparations for the Birthday dinner, which was to be given in his name that evening, and at which in his absence the Duke of Cambridge had consented to preside. About four o'clock he quitted the house, and on his way to the station stopped to order a wedding present for a niece who was just about to be married, and to take leave of Miss Nightingale. He spoke cheerfully and even hopefully about himself, but was under no illusion as to the inevitable result. Count Strelecki, who accompanied Lord and Lady Herbert to Spa, talked to him, while waiting at the station, about the purchase of some ponies, and a light open carriage for drives at Wilton after his return. It so happened that on a truck of the train in which they were about to travel a hearse was being conveyed to some point on the line. To this Lord Herbert pointed, and said, "That's the only carriage I shall ever want," and then earnestly added, after a short pause, "Don't tell Liz!"

The party reached Spa on the 13th, and at first the change seemed to amuse Lord Herbert and do him good. On the 16th he sent to Lord Palmerston his formal resignation of the War Department. It concluded with the words, "I hope Her Majesty will believe that, while my strength enabled me, I laboured to the best of my ability in her service."

In a private letter which accompanied the more formal one, he wrote, "I think I may say without vanity that I leave England in a much more advanced

state of defence than I found it in, and my two years, therefore, have not been wasted." On the same day he wrote to Miss Shaw Stewart, thanking her for withdrawing her previous refusal to take charge of the first military female hospital. He had appealed to her to overcome the reluctance she felt to assume the post, assuring her that "if this system is not introduced by me, I fear it will never be introduced at all, and if it is not done *now*, it will not be done by me." This wish of his was gratified, and this anxiety relieved.

"I accept," he wrote, "your offer of undertaking the little hospital at Woolwich as Superintendent—the four nurses under you to be chosen by yourself, and on your own conditions. Colonel Wilbraham has been appointed Governor. You will find him a gentleman in every sense of the word, and one with whom I feel sure you will have no difficulty in acting. All questions of salary, etc., you will find specified in the Regulations. On one point only you are in error. Ever since the Crimean War I have inquired and searched after a lady of the class you describe. I have tried several in various ways and places, but they have been invariably found wanting in the most essential qualities. You yourself, who have had as great opportunity as any one, bear the same testimony. You have no one to propose to me, nor has Miss Nightingale; therefore you cannot wonder at my selecting one who, like yourself, combines the experience of both civil and military hospitals, and who is actuated by the purest and best motives in undertaking the charge."

These three letters were the last ever written by Sidney Herbert. On the following day he was decidedly less well, and the local physicians strongly urged his immediate return to England if it were desired that he should die in peace at home, and not in a Belgian hotel. Accordingly, on July 25th, a

little more than ten days after reaching it, Lord and Lady Herbert left Spa in the railway saloon of the King of the Belgians, which His Majesty had kindly placed at their disposal. Lord Herbert's favourite saddle-horse "Andover" had been brought over to Spa for his use, and up to the day before that on which he set out on his return he rode every morning. On dismounting for the last time he kissed the horse's neck and fed him with sugar, saying, as he did so, "I shall never ride again." Lord Herbert's last act at Spa was one of kind thoughtfulness. On one of the little expeditions he had taken during the first few days of his stay he had found a poor young priest very ill, and suffering from the want of stimulants, which he was unable to purchase. These were provided by Lord Herbert's care.

Lord and Lady Herbert arrived at Brussels early in the afternoon, and remained there that evening and the next day. The first night was a very bad and breathless one, and the application of blisters and other remedies gave him no relief. The next day he was better, and in the evening discussed military hygiene eagerly, and at great length, with Baron Sentin (King Leopold's physician), and dwelt at length on the probable effect of new medical and surgical discoveries, especially those of Baron Sentin himself, with which he showed himself well acquainted. The Baron left the house exclaiming, "*Impossible de croire qu'il soit si gravement malade!*"

On the 27th the journey was resumed. Notwithstanding every precaution, it produced extreme exhaustion, and on the 29th he was carried into his house in Belgrave Square, manifestly very much nearer his end than when he had left it less than three weeks previously. His one great desire was

to see Wilton once again, and, after a day in London, the journey there was performed with less fatigue than might have been anticipated. Mr. Gladstone watched him from an adjoining house as he got into the carriage, and followed him in a cab to the station, to catch one more glimpse of his friend's face on the platform. He had intimated his intention to Lady Herbert in the following note :

" 11, CARLTON HOUSE TERRACE,

"July 31st, 1861.

" MY DEAR LADY HERBERT,

" I sent a letter to your husband at Brussels, with one from America that I then thought might interest him. Perhaps it did not reach you, and in any case I fear he is suffering too much discomfort to have anything read to him.

" I have designedly kept away from his house, and should have done so even had I not gathered it to be your very reasonable wish that all should be still there at this solemn time. But my thoughts are ever with you, and you and he must know that if not mine alone, but universal grief and love could avail, you would have no cause to be anxious about him. But we must leave him in the hands of his Father, Who counts and treasures all, and will take counsel for him better than we, or even than you can. May His help be wanting to neither of you !

" I shall go and see him from a distance as he quits his threshold. Give him my most earnest love—if there be a moment when it can be done without disturbance, but not otherwise—and ask him, what I know is needless, to forgive me if I have ever torn his tender spirit.

" Ever affectionately yours,

" W. E. GLADSTONE."

It was a great joy to the dying man to be permitted once more to see the home he loved so dearly, and to look again upon the faces of his children. On the day after his arrival, August 1st, he was well enough to go out in a bath chair, and gaze for the



Monument in the Church at Wilton

last time on the green lawns, the stately cedars, and the Palladian bridge, reposing in all the glory of an English summer afternoon. After coming in again he lay for some time on a sofa by the window enjoying the calm beauty of the evening and its sunset lights. Somewhat later he took leave of his children and sisters, and received the Holy Communion. Then, with perfect calm and resignation he waited for the end. No expression of impatience escaped him throughout his illness, nor to the very end did he lose his cheery playfulness of manner, or his thoughtfulness for others. Throughout the night, alone with the devoted wife who had watched and tended him with unremitting solicitude, he repeatedly expressed his thankfulness to God for many mercies, and his trust in the promises of the Saviour. At half-past eleven on the following morning he expired, surrounded by his family and near relations. Almost his last words were, "Well, this is the end. I have had a life of great happiness : a short one, perhaps ; but an active one. I have not done all I wished ; but I have tried to do my best."



A GREAT writer and thinker of our own days¹ has told us that one of the chief uses of an aristocracy is its early introduction into Parliamentary and official life of young men between twenty and thirty years of age. They are, he observes, free, as a rule, from selfish objects, and, even if possessing abilities but slightly above the average, acquire a skill in the conduct of public affairs rarely attained by men of greater capacity whose intelligence and

¹ W. E. H. Lecky, "History of England in the Eighteenth Century," Vol. I. chap. ii.

character have been moulded in other spheres of thought and action.

Of this type of statesmen Sidney Herbert was a striking example. When he entered Parliament he was but a boy. All the temptations which attend the possession of rank, wealth, and social popularity were spread before him in unwonted measure. He had no strong ambition for personal distinction. He was inclined to shrink from the fatigues and disappointments of political strife, and he heartily despised the petty meannesses of party interests. But a grave sense that from those who have received much, much may rightly be required, led him to devote his whole life from boyhood to the grave to the service of the State.

By the present generation he is wellnigh forgotten. Of the thousands who daily pass his statue in Pall Mall¹ few know or ask whom it represents. Fewer still have any idea that his life was spent and indeed sacrificed in labours to promote the welfare of the rank and file of the British Army, and to render that Army a more efficient force.

The effects of Herbert's death soon showed themselves. Six months later we find Mr. Gladstone exulting in the "heavy blow" given to the scheme for fortifying the dockyards² by the omission of the annual Vote for the continuance of the works,—a blow which was indeed fatal to the scheme, for though the Vote was stated to be only temporarily suspended on account of pressing financial emergencies of the moment, it never again appeared upon the Estimates. Lord Palmerston's wishes and convictions remained unchanged, but age had enfeebled his control over

¹ Now about to be removed to the New War Office.

² Morley's *Life of Gladstone*, Vol. II. p. 50.

the Cabinet, and after the death of Sir George Lewis in 1863 he practically abandoned all contest with his masterful Lieutenant on any question involving considerations of finance.

It would have been well if the arrest of Herbert's policy had been confined to a matter so fairly open to difference of opinion as the Fortification Scheme. But this was not the case. Mr. Gladstone's eagerness to reduce expenditure led him to set aside, almost roughly, other considerations. Any proposal involving outlay—more especially if for Military or Naval purposes—was coldly received, discouraged, and probably dismissed. The amount asked for was more regarded than the merits of the proposal itself. While this was the attitude of the Treasury, the usual bureaucratic aversion to reform regained strength in the War Office itself. Few of the schemes which Herbert had already initiated for the social and moral elevation of the soldier were allowed their proper development, and much of his policy was, through misapprehension of its value, actually reversed.

The bad consequences of the abandonment of Herbert's plans for the improvement of barracks and military hospitals have been pointed out in an earlier chapter.¹ The results of a reversal of his policy in other directions were hardly less unfortunate. The constitution of the Army Medical Board was modified in the sense against which Herbert had so vigorously and successfully protested. Its Sanitary and Statistical Members were placed in the inferior position to their colleagues which the War Office clerks had originally wished them to occupy. The Professorships of Hygiene and Sanitation at the Army Medical School, the importance of the equality of

¹ Vol. II. p. 360.

which with the other Professorships Herbert had so strongly urged, were reduced to lectureships at a lower salary. The school itself was removed from Chatham to Netley. In that unsuitable locality it still remains. On nothing had Herbert more strongly insisted than on the necessity of providing every Army Corps with a Sanitary Officer whose attention should be devoted to the prevention of epidemics rather than their cure, and whose business it should be to warn commanding officers of the dangers arising from injudicious selection of a camping ground, from the supply of improper food, or from a neglect of precautions against the effects of climate. After Herbert's death this wise safeguard was discontinued, and has only very lately been revived. A few pounds were saved and the prejudices of the War Office gratified, but at the cost of much loss of life, and to the serious detriment of the health and efficiency of the Army.

During the last few years much has been done to correct mistakes and introduce improvements. In great part this has consisted, in all probability unconsciously, in the revival of what Herbert did or in carrying out what he designed to do.

But though much which he desired has since been done, it was not the less a grave misfortune for the Army and for the nation that his career at the War Office was so soon closed. Had his life been spared a little longer, reforms lately made would have been effected forty years ago, and others accomplished which as yet have no existence.

As it was, his life was incomplete, and afforded but an earnest of what it might have been. Its chief characteristics were his personal charm, the beneficence of his private life, and the thoroughness and disinterestedness of the work done by him.

The charm he possessed cannot be recalled, or its magic described, in writing. It can only remain as a fragrant memory with the few survivors of those who, like myself, have known its influence. His ever-active benevolence (of which it might be said, as it has been finely said of his ancestor Sir Philip Sidney, whom in other ways he so strikingly resembled,¹ that "with him not to give was not to enjoy what he had") was to a great extent hidden from the view of even those nearest to him. Nor can his private life and personal qualities be more than dimly outlined. His public career can be more distinctly traced, and even the feeblest account of it must ensure agreement with Mr. Gladstone, who, a few days after Lord Herbert's funeral, wrote of his dead friend: "Rare indeed—God only knows how rare—are men with his qualities; but even a man with his qualities might not have been so happy as to possess his opportunities. He had them, and he used them."

¹ How close the similarity will be seen from the following extract from Stigant's Essay on Sir Philip Sidney: "He was gentle, loving, compassionate, forgiving as a woman, and yet had the dignity and valour of a man. His liberality was so great that with him not to give was not to enjoy what he had. In his familiarity with men he never descended, but raised everybody to his own level. So modest, so humble was he, and so inaccessible to flattery, that he esteemed not praise except as an encouragement to further exertion in well-doing. His tongue knew no deceit, and his mind no policy but frankness, courage, and sincerity. . . . England has had greater statesmen, but never so choice a union of the qualities which make a Sidney. His fame is founded on those personal qualities of which his contemporaries were the best judges, although they may not leave a trace in books or in history" (Stigant's Essay on Sir Philip Sidney, 1858). Every word in this quotation might have been written with direct reference to Sidney Herbert.

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